DÆDALUS

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Black Africa: A Generation After Independence

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Black Africa: A Generation After Independence

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

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Preface to the Issue, "Black Africa: A Generation After Independence"

Two decades ago, when the greatest part of sub-Saharan Africa was securing independence from its European colonizers, a major French publisher, Éditions du Seuil, known to be sympathetic to the liberation process, published a book with the provocative title *L'Afrique Noir est mal partie*. The book's author, René Dumont, aware of the incendiary implications of his work, even more of its title, ruminated in his introduction on what he had done, on how others might view his contribution. Speaking to himself, he wrote "Black Africa has started badly, your title is too brutal, you will offend our African friends, whom you know to be sensitive." Worse, "in criticizing the young states and their administrations, you will appear to be justifying all the classical colonialists, who always said that they were not ready." The author, perhaps a trifle histrionically, spoke of his pen trembling as he settled down to begin his work.

Today, a generation later, we know a great deal more about how these (and other) new African states have fared. Yet there is a continuing uncertainty about how one ought to write about Africa. Does it makes sense to dwell on the collapse of infrastructures, the decay of communications systems, and the like? Or would it perhaps be more reasonable to point to concrete African achievements, and to emphasize the failures of outsiders—the former colonial powers, the United States, the international economic order, capitalism, multinational corporations—all insensitive to Africa's needs and only intermittently, if at all, concerned with either its poverty or its suffering.

Africa, for reasons that need to be explored, invites certain reticences today, not least among those who view the continent from a distance, who may feel some disappointment with what has been accomplished, but who see no great advantage in voicing that disappointment. Those who adopt such an attitude do more than tremble as they pen their criticisms; they often suppress them, sometimes going so far as to abandon Africa as their chosen area of study. For these individuals, silence is thought to be an acceptable strategy.

This issue of *Daedalus* disdains such unnecessary reserve. Without seeking to be incendiary, it is intentionally provocative, both in what it says and in the manner of its presentation. While there has been no deliberate effort to achieve "representativeness," both Africans and non-Africans, blacks and whites, have chosen to write. Among the African authors, a number have written about their societies with a freedom that is not altogether common among recently "liberated" peoples. A study of early "postcolonial" literatures in other times does not always provide a record of incisive self-analysis. Tocqueville, for example, as late as the 1830s, expressed the opinion that Americans would only learn certain things about themselves by hearing it from others. Africans today

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do not appear to suffer under the same handicap. They are developing a tradition of self-criticism even as they encounter a certain measure of candor in others. One ought not to exaggerate this, but a good number of the essays in this volume suggest that some "outsiders" feel neither defensive nor unfaithful when they dwell on African insufficiencies. They do not appear to fret overly much about how others will respond to their criticisms. Indeed, several of the authors seem to know intuitively that the purpose of scholarship can never be the awarding of merit badges, or their denial, and that contemporary Africa is as deserving of serious and objective inquiry as any other region in the world. The only truly patronizing act is neglect, exceeded perhaps only by condescension.

J. F. Ade Ajayi introduces the volume with a candid explanation of why the African intellectuals' expectations of what would follow independence were never realized, why, indeed, they never could be. While many African intellectuals imagined that their superior education would "entitle" them to leadership roles, few achieved such positions after independence. Another kind of leader was called for—one who would know how "to monitor and manipulate government patronage and the historic rivalries of different ethnic and communal groups." A group of leaders "more rooted in the local culture" came to the fore. Interested in fame and adventure, money and power, they never deluded themselves into believing that they had embarked on an idealistic venture. Politics, for them, was an "exciting and lucrative profession," and they knew they would win power and hold it not by preaching "abstract concepts of freedom, human rights, and the dignity of the black man," but by "fashioning a network of patronage and brokerage." Given such ends, it was not long before many of these leaders began to see the army as the institution best suited to maintaining such control. Yet, even when the military took over, as they frequently did, the obsession with politics remained. The obsession, Ajayi argues, left little time for any major continuing concern with economic development, and it is not entirely surprising that this good has proved to be so elusive. If Africans have been too much obsessed with politics, and if African politicians have been conspicuously inept in dealing with the economic and social needs of the people, this is no criticism of the original drive toward independence. Africa has gained immeasurably from its new freedom. What is needed today, Ajayi writes, is a new vision, and this can only come from within Africa, reflecting Africa's unique historical experiences.

Lanciné Sylla, looking at African politics from another perspective, sees that the problem of succession, particularly the succession of the charismatic leader, is one that all African states are required to confront. If principles of political legitimacy are not developed, stability cannot be realized in the African world. Employing the methodology of Max Weber, Sylla demonstrates why all charismatic authority is fundamentally revolutionary, and why it must be ephemeral and transitory. In time, charismatic authority must give way to some other more permanent, secure form. Charismatic rule was natural in the early days after independence, when the masses were literally "starved for charisma," and when those who had led in the fight against colonialism could almost without pause assume leadership roles; such rule, however, cannot now be perpetuated. Sylla writes: "As long as African societies fail to agree on a principle for the legitimation of power, they will continue to be subject . . . to

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permanent political instability in the form of civil war, subversion, conspiracy, governmental crisis, or coups d'état." Because "charisma cannot be taught or improvised," it cannot be passed on. The potentiality for violence is increased immensely whenever a successor to a charismatic leader must be chosen. In Africa, the now-traditional method is to invest the military leader who has successfully seized power with "charismatic attributes." Certain military regimes, however, have favored other strategies, including, occasionally, the institution of democracy and the total withdrawal of the army from politics. Sylla provides examples of the kinds of succession that have occurred in recent years, suggesting why continuing difficulties with this problem have had such adverse effects on African economic development. Only the institution of legal-rational authority, in Weber's sense, carries the promise of economic, technological, and cultural development. All, in his view, are intertwined. There will be no stability in Africa so long as there is no rationalization of authority. This does not imply that all such rationalizations must assume identical forms. The possibilities for African political development are numerous. The forms that developed in the first decades after independence, however, are not the ones likely to survive.

Es'kia Mphahlele, concerned with a different, though not unrelated, problem, sets out to explain another characteristic modern African phenomenon, exile. The exile is a "representative" contemporary African personality, recognizable not only within Africa, but conspicuous also in several of the former imperial capitals, including London and Paris, and often found in the United States and elsewhere. Mphahlele writes of the "tragic unfolding of the imperial theme": office achieved one day; exile, a distinct possibility the next. Recognizing that "savagely repressive regimes stay in power relatively long in Africa," and that finding a refuge from such repression has become a problem for many Africans, he tries to understand what such people have experienced and what they are today experiencing. Whether it be an acute sense of alienation, a powerful desire to belong, an acquiescence in accepting the white man's values in the hope perhaps of sharing in his power, exile has served to underscore the relentless search for home, for rootedness. When independence has "miscarried" for African intellectuals, driving them into exile, it has often led them to experience the kinds of spiritual loss that earlier African writers felt when they sought to draw distinctions between the colonizing, aggressive civilization of the West and the humanism of Africa. In dealing with such matters, Mphahlele speaks of himself, of his own exile, of his family, of the vulnerabilities and fears he came to experience. Writing of his nine years in the United States, he says:

> I could only identify intellectually and emotionally with the black American's condition, but could not in any tangible, particular way feel his history. To be actively and meaningfully involved in a people's concerns and political struggle as a genuine participant, you should feel its history. On the contrary, I kept feeling that that river was passing me by. Its complexity defies the oversimplification contained in the assertion, "I am black." And one thing I dislike is intellectual dishonesty, faked involvement that has only repeated slogans to subsist on.

In the end, he felt that he had to return to South Africa, to know again what it was "to have community." Again in South Africa, a black man among blacks, oppressed, his was still a homecoming.

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If African literature and African autobiography can serve to provide additional dimensions to a story all too frequently represented wholly in statistical terms, with "economic development" crowding out every other kind of reality, Jan Vansina employs "thick description" of an anthropological and sociological kind to render another sort of modern African reality. Vansina tells about what happened in Zaïre in June 1971 to the wife of a student who, with all of his comrades, was drafted into the army when the military occupied the Lovanium University campus and closed the university. It is a tale rich in details about Zaïrian political and social institutions. Even more, perhaps, Vansina illuminates the personal relations that subsist in such a society, one no longer held together by traditional loyalties, but capable of throwing up new defenses. The story clearly has significance for more than just Zaïre. While it does not pretend to describe all of Africa in the first decade following independence, the details about African bureaucracy, both civil and military, and the efficiencies and inefficiencies of each, suggest how men and women adjusted to these new powers, how they came to cope with them and with their idiosyncracies, so that in the end they were not simply crushed by them. While certain of the traditional social networks remain effective, not wholly succumbing to adversity, others have clearly lost their authority. "Mwasi's Trials" tells about expectations deceived and promises unheeded, but it tells also of specific new social entities—the students, for example—as important as any that once enjoyed influence. While social class, in the modern sense, is only incipient in Zaïre, Vansina suggests that it has become a more powerful force in the years since. Those who deny this, choosing to believe only in the continued vitality of kinship solidarity, deceive themselves. In the new class structures, corruption and patronage are prominent; they reflect many conditions, the precariousness of life, the uncertainty generally felt about the future. Vansina's tale tells much of the gulf that separates city from village, urban life from rural existence. It also tells about the modern African Leviathan, the state always prepared to use coercion to guarantee its legitimacy. The difficulties caused by the constant fall in the standard of living, exacerbated by a political corruption whose dimensions can never be known too precisely, but which seems to exceed anything common in the colonial era, creates a sense of deterioration. Vansina never suggests that Zaïre is a characteristic African state, that all Africa can be judged by its performance or behavior. In its loss of personal freedoms, however, in its problems with achieving political legitimacy, and, in the economic sphere—its continuing agricultural crisis, not to speak of its population explosion—Zaïre's experience is not wholly unlike that of other African states in the decades since independence.

Crawford Young, believing that the African state was significantly shaped by its experience in the colonial era, argues that today's patterns of class and ethnic relationships owe a great deal to these earlier developments. Colonialism, for example, created the modern preoccupation with state boundaries, making such boundaries seem economically and socially significant. Colonial states, overwhelmingly preoccupied with domination, treated whole populations as subject peoples. Ethnicity was thus the inevitable casualty of empire. State and ethnic boundaries rarely coincided. The colonial state achieved its legitimacy in Africa largely through insisting on such concepts as "trusteeship" and the

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"civilizing mission" of Europeans. Later, when the argument began to be heard that colonial states needed to concern themselves with "development" and "welfare," this was quite new to Africa. So, also, were the forms of stratification created by European colonialism. At the top, obviously, were the colonizers, the foreign elites who enjoyed the greatest power, status, and relative wealth. Next came Africans with some literacy in a European language, who qualified for white-collar employ, and who could be thought of as "advanced." Although they enjoyed status during the colonial era, they rarely commanded great wealth or power. Africans with traditional rights to exercise authority—when these rights were respected—enjoyed some status, but such chiefs were of no great consequence when contrasted with Europeans. And it was during the colonial era that capitalists, both urban and rural, and predominantly European, emerged as a distinctive class. But such stratification, as inimical as it was to native interests, was considerably less harmful than the sweeping generalizations made by the colonizers about specific ethnic groups, awarding them particular attributes and devising policies based on such collective images. A "martial race," for example, would be recruited for military service. Again, groups that were thought by the colonial state to be "backward" were treated as such, thereby reinforcing other disadvantages they might be experiencing.

With independence, the new states, notwithstanding their artificial boundaries, became intensely nationalistic. Existing state boundaries were made to appear sacred. The new governments greatly expanded their authority, created wholly new services to satisfy their citizens, and increased their bureaucracies substantially. Politics provided both new positions and new places for Africans, and these often carried the possibility of profitable mercantile activity. A new class—an African state bourgeoisie, with its own distinctive power bases—appeared as the dominant class. While foreigners did not disappear entirely, they were no longer politically significant. In some places, they continued to serve as functionaries; more often they appeared as representatives of multinational corporations, or as experts sent to Africa by international bodies. Thus insulated from politics, they became autonomous in a way that the indigenous state bourgeoisie could never be. Because nation-building was high on the agenda of all African states, the absorption of ethnic groups became a matter of some urgency. Ethnicity had its place, but enthusiasm for it could never be permitted to challenge the larger goal of making citizens both conscious and proud of their national identity.

As for other classes, Young reminds us that "relatively few African states have a really substantial stratum of wage laborers." The peasantry generally remains large, despite the substantial movements to the city after independence. Heavily taxed, often restive, there is surprisingly little to suggest the development of a collective consciousness. Immediately after World War II, the opportunities for social mobility seemed considerable; they are much less obvious today. Where social closure was once imposed by the fact of race, it is now created largely by the "class-based transmission of privilege across generations." Modernization, while continuing, has not led to the decline of either ethnicity or religion; indeed, both appear strengthened. Competition, particularly for political power, is rife, and the evidences of anxiety and insecurity are numerous. Most Africans appear to have more than a single

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cultural identity; the one that will have "relevance" will generally depend on the situational context. Regional lingua francas are increasingly common. While most Africans subscribe to the ideal of legal equality and would hope such equality to have social and economic dimensions as well, conflict in Africa is generally more often related to issues of ethnicity than to issues of class. The formation of patron-client ties, based on ethnicity, we are told, is an unending process in Africa today.

Colin Leys, reflecting on the exaggerated expectations for African economic development in the 1960s, asks why these were never realized. Considering *how* early "modernization" theories proved to be wrong, he asks also *why* they were mistaken. To argue that they were too "Eurocentric," too accepting of the proposition that Europe's industrializing experience might be replicated in Africa, tells only part of the tale. The idea that the theories were too "economistic," overly concerned with capital-output ratios, and insufficiently interested in education, administrative competence, ethnic rigidity, and the like, adds only a little. The fundamental mistake, Leys says, derived from the belief that African "backwardness" was original, almost primeval, when the truth was that it emanated principally from colonialism. Modernization theory simply "reinforced the backward, inegalitarian structures of the ex-colonial African economies." When, later, "dependency" theory became fashionable, and Africans used explanations largely fashioned in Latin America, the "external orientation" of the African economies—their dependence on foreign capital and foreign trade—was made to explain continued economic backwardness. Dependency theory, Leys says, was no more reliable than modernization theory; it was too ahistorical, too much the intellectual creation of the boom years 1958-65, too little aware of the geopolitical forces operating in Africa.

If the late Bill Warren was correct in believing that the Third World development of the immediate postwar years was an instance of "successful capitalist development," and that its costliness in human terms does not in any significant way invalidate that success, then the consequences for all conventional evaluations of African economic performance since independence are altered. The question for Leys is whether such growth is today coming to an end, and whether this is inevitable. In the Ivory Coast and Kenya, for example, it is by no means obvious that it is. This does not imply that capitalism is capable of developing all of Africa. This would be as untrue as the contrary proposition, that it is capable of developing no part of that vast continent.

While certain African states have very deliberately chosen the socialist path of development, and while the opponents of such programs have done much to hamper or defeat them, it is also true that even sympathetic observers have been disappointed by their record to date. As Leys says: "If the avatar of African capitalism is a corrupt, arbitrary, and despotic regime presiding over economic regression, the avatar of African socialism is an increasingly hollow and parasitic form of domination by the state *apparat*, again leading to economic regression." African socialism, like African capitalism, must be seen in a context that is long-term, continental in scope. Believing that social classes are today forming in Africa, and that their struggles must shape the continent's future, Leys argues that the underclass will in the end choose socialism, and urges support for their struggles. Those who imagine a long-term future of stagnation

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and decline for Africa are mistaken, Leys writes; they do not see that the crises now so apparent must lead to the emergence of new social forces that will opt for wholly new solutions.

Michael Roemer, in writing about African economic conditions, does not distance himself from Leys in reflecting on the intellectual mood of an earlier period, the record of success and failure of individual African states, and the need to measure this success in other than purely economic growth terms. Where he does separate himself, however, is in his prescription for how Africa can be helped to escape from its present economic predicament. There is no suggestion that socialism can provide the way out; Roemer's remedies are specific and pragmatic. Africa must stop pursuing industrialization through import substitution. High tariff barriers and import quotas, we are told, neither protect nor foster efficient, profitable, competitive concerns. High wage rates, low interest, and overvalued exchange rates—generally enforced by African governments—tend to provide benefits to very limited numbers in the population. The control of food prices, set at artificially low levels, serves to discourage farm production and to lower farm incomes. In the absence of adequate managerial, administrative, and technical skills, the limits on development are necessarily low. All these, however, Roemer writes, are remediable conditions. More difficult, in his view, is the creation of the kind of political stability that will create a climate conducive to economic growth. While acknowledging that the market is not a panacea, we are told that it is "alive and well" in Africa, producing entrepreneurially gifted people who can be depended on to make the system work. Because labor-intensive, smallholder agriculture gives the promise of high levels of output, useful for both internal and external markets, Roemer sees this as an essential part of his reform proposals. Thus he argues also for the manufacture of products that will effectively capitalize on Africa's comparative advantage, not least on its large labor force. The continent's interest must always be to find world markets, to go beyond those available internally. Policies of this kind, Roemer writes, would help Africans precisely in those sectors of the economy where they now find themselves, on the land. The growth of small-scale urban enterprises must also improve employment prospects. That such a strategy will never appeal to dependency theorists, and that they will resist it, Roemer accepts as inevitable. This does not dissuade him from believing that the strategy is suited to Africa, that it can be adapted even to the needs of the socialist countries of the continent.

Andrew Kamarck's strategy for African economic development is of yet another kind. Believing that far too little is known about Africa's mineral resources, and that the world's understanding of tropical agriculture is generally deficient, he argues for policies that will increase knowledge, making possible economic developments that will take account of Africa's tropical conditions. The technologies for mineral discovery and extraction, largely developed for temperate zones, are not necessarily suited to Africa. Kamarck, like other of his fellow authors, dwells substantially on the problems of economic development created by unstable political-bureaucratic structures. Insecurity, endemic in most parts of Africa, exacts a serious economic toll. Because the lead time for the successful development of mineral finds must be counted in decades, Kamarck expects no striking developments for the rest of the century. There are

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possibilities, however, for additional oil exploration and development; also, hydropower is an important potential African asset. All such development, however, presumes the existence of sufficient investment capital, a commodity in perpetual short supply. Agriculture, which still provides a livelihood for the vast majority of Africans, can become a source of significantly larger income for many millions. Such agrarian development, however, presumes a knowledge of tropical conditions that does not now exist. Only extensive research, we are told, can create the knowledge that will make such greater productivity possible. While some have chosen to exaggerate Africa's mineral wealth—as they have exaggerated other of Africa's putative riches—there are economic potentials in these commodities that have not been realized. Kamarck, while insisting that greater exploitation of the land and of other African resources is possible, sees no advantage in making light of the difficulties that must attend all such major ventures.

E. A. Ayandele, writing about African education, recounts a tale of an insatiable African appetite for learning and an almost total collapse of educational standards and institutions. Although figures for school attendance continue to soar, particularly at the primary school level, quality has not generally been preserved. The situation is particularly acute in the universities. While there has been an impressive expansion of higher education facilities, provincial and national pride have often served to create installations in the wrong places, with educational goals being set that are wholly unrealizable, given the quality of teaching and research staff. To make matters worse, despite all the growth, many Africans are unable to secure admission, and are compelled to seek places abroad, mostly in Europe and in North America. The African universities, overwhelmingly modeled on European patterns, have aimed at an international orientation in their curricula, and many have succeeded in this. Their most significant contribution, however, has been to train men and women for administrative public service functions in the newly created African states. This achievement is not matched by an equal facility in training students for careers in science and technology. In neither of those areas have the African accomplishments been at all impressive. Middle-level manpower needs are scarcely provided for. As for helping to define, develop, or protect African culture, the university record is equally unimpressive. The major African universities "remain essentially centers for the diffusion of Western culture," graduating individuals who will constitute a "new class," resembling neither their white contemporaries nor the indigenous world they have left behind. Quoting Senghor, Ayandele writes that too many of them are "photographic negatives of the [former] colonizers." African research, we are told, is largely unimpressive; there is very little that is genuinely original, or that makes very much of an impression on the larger society. Only substantial cooperation on a regional and continental basis can alleviate the unsatisfactory conditions that now exist. While pleas for assistance continue to go out to the "developed" countries, Ayandele is not at all sanguine that they will be either heard or heeded.

Joel Gregory and Victor Piché view Africa's problems from a quite different perspective. They believe emphatically that Africa's exploding population problem and the move from rural areas to the cities are not fundamental causes of African poverty, but rather that demographic change and poverty are "parts

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of a larger process of peripheral capitalist development." Although Africa's population statistics are poor, it is safe to assume that African population has tripled over the last fifty years. Most African states, however, are small; only thirteen have populations of more than 10 million; only six more than 20 million. Nigeria, with 75 million, is the continent's largest country. High fertility means that most of the population is young; between 40 and 46 percent are under the age of fifteen, a large proportion of that number being economically inactive. There are high overall levels of mortality, with high infant mortality rates. The differences between the various African states in these matters are not insignificant. Migration remains important in many parts of the continent, in certain instances perpetuating older migration patterns. In addition, however, there has been a substantial urban influx, with important consequences for both the cities and the countryside. Refugees are conspicuous in many parts of Africa; the estimate that there may have been 4 million refugees in 1979 is thought to be accurate. The neo-Malthusians, Gregory and Piché assert, have long considered population growth to be an obstacle to economic development, and have spent their time devising strategies to keep population growth down. Their view is wholly different from that of the materialists, who insist that the expansion of production is independent of population, and that population changes are primarily responses to material conditions. The neo-Malthusian paradigm, we are told, has long been the favored one; the authors' preference is clearly for a materialist paradigm. They reject the neo-Malthusian hypothesis, with its emphasis on fertility and its preferred strategy of family planning, dismissing such thinking as flawed because of its "Western, elitist, urban emphasis." Gregory and Piché say that capitalism was superimposed on a domestic mode of production in Africa. This was never the capitalism of Europe, however, but capitalism of a quite different kind. Noncapitalist domestic production was never wholly eliminated in Africa, but simply dominated. In this "peripheral capitalism," where labor exploitation was particularly favorable to capital, individuals moved back and forth between the capitalist and the noncapitalist sectors. This system was never embraced by Africans; European colonial administrations simply imposed it. So long as it continued, Africa's domestic economy eroded. The older economy lost its autonomy; the new capitalist economy gained from having cheap labor available. The household survived, but its survival depended on hands being available. Yet with many obliged to migrate seasonally or for longer periods, high fertility became essential. There was no other way to guarantee survival. Only by studying the household, the strategies that the family was required to embrace if it was to exist, can Africa's population growth be explained. Such growth, the authors argue, is a "survival strategy." The neo-Malthusian explanations they dismiss as cynical, a form of "science fiction."

Willard Johnson and Ernest Wilson, seeking to explain how the oil crises of the 1970s affected the individual African economies, and whether these crises merit a primary place in any explanation of the stunted economic growth of the period, suggest that this was not true for the greatest number of African states. It was not so much the need to import oil at very high prices that adversely affected individual African economies as the greatly inflated prices of many other commodities, which originated in the industrialized countries of the world

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and on which Africa was completely dependent. The authors suggest that those who have ascribed recent economic difficulties in the less-developed countries to OPEC have exaggerated the influence of the cartel. How individual African states fared, and how they adjusted their economies to cope with higher energy prices, is a complex tale. Many of the short-term strategies, introduced piecemeal, need now to be supplemented by much more fundamental reforms. The authors speak of the need for "new energy institutions, a new self-consciousness about energy policy, and a clearer view of the links between energy and economy." Although no one policy will work for all African states, the authors point out that the more economically developed countries were able to absorb the shocks of the 1970s more easily than the less developed. None, however, made a major political commitment to fundamental institutional reforms. These can no longer be delayed; both capital and manpower needs are apparent and glaring. The difficulties of obtaining economic assistance are increasingly evident. The authors suggest that substantial help must come from the outside, and that it needs to be looked for in both the OPEC and the OECD communities. The African states have no alternative but to turn in these directions.

Bolaji Akinyemi, looking at Africa as a continent of fifty-four states, with quite different levels of political maturity, and very different kinds of economies and cultures, asks whether it makes any sense to represent Africa as a single entity. Can a continent characterized by such diverse ideologies, so divided by linguistic and ethnic differences, be said to hold any single doctrine? Many outside Africa doubt that any fundamental unity exists. Akinyemi believes they are wrong. He speaks of the intellectual colonialism that has survived the end of Europe's political colonialism, that tends to disparage Africa, dwelling too much on Africa as a complex of states with "artificial" boundaries. All such argument ignores the fact that most boundaries in the world *are* artificial, that they are the result of war, conquest, treaties, and the like. Africa is not best understood as a random collection of sovereign states. It is a continent held together by a common experience; memories of slavery and colonialism are shared by all Africans. Pan-Africanism is a reality; supranational feeling is a fact of African life. There are identical interests that cut across all ethnic and state lines, and the Organization of African Unity testifies to this reality. While African states may at times differ on individual issues, an "African position" exists at all times; it is known and can be defined. In dealing with three recent crises—the civil war in Nigeria, the opening of an African dialogue with South Africa, and the Angolan civil war—Akinyemi shows the reality of this unity, and even more, its capacity to withstand and defeat outside pressures. The OAU has not always been able to resolve all differences within Africa, but its record, when compared with that of other international organizations—the UN, NATO, EEC, or the OAS, for example—is impressive. In the United Nations, Africa has made the world increasingly sensitive to two issues—racism and colonialism. This has been Africa's principal contribution to international dialogue; it is the basis of Africa's ability to win friends and support outside Africa for its specific policies. All this does not imply that Africa has achieved all its principal objectives; only that it has articulated its principal goals and gone on to win significant support for them.

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Hedley Bull, writing about the most sensitive international issue affecting Africa, inquires into the meaning of what appears to be the Reagan Administration's concern to have closer relations with the Republic of South Africa. Probing the arguments that the United States today increasingly uses in emphasizing the Soviet threat in Southern Africa, the West's stakes in South Africa's economy, and the interests shared with South Africa both in maintaining free enterprise and in resisting international terrorism, Bull accepts the idea that some shift in policy has undoubtedly taken place, though he is wary about defining too precisely the extent of the change. The Administration, limited in what it can do by opinion in Black Africa, but also by black American public opinion, knows that Congress is little inclined to accept any presidential initiative in this area, and that America's allies are similarly reluctant. Public support for a dramatic shift in U.S.-South African relations does not seem to exist. Still, there has been a change both in official rhetoric and in style. What, then, does this change signify? Since there is little evidence to suggest that Pretoria is planning to make major internal reforms very soon—dismantling the apartheid system or otherwise loosening controls—and since there is no evidence of an interest in withdrawing from Namibia, what justification can there be for close collaboration with South Africa? Bull recites the arguments most frequently heard: we have strategic interests there; the Soviet threat can best be met by an anticommunist South Africa; the West's economic stakes in the region must be protected; a gradual evolution in South Africa provides the best guarantee of such protection; we judge the South Africans too harshly, since others, including ourselves, are often no less culpable; we do not acknowledge that the present regime, in the event of dramatic change, would not be followed by a liberal multiracial government, but almost certainly by some sort of authoritarian rule, possibly Marxist; there is, in any case, no way to appease the Third World. Why try? Bull finds none of these arguments convincing, but he knows that all need to be taken seriously. If the Soviets enjoy considerable prestige in Africa, it is precisely because they are not seen as a former colonial power; they have adopted Africa's official antiracist slogans, and this helps them enormously. They will not be made less attractive by the West embracing South Africa. Nor, for that matter, can the West hope to prolong the life of the regime of South Africa by saying that the alternative to it is chaos, disorder, possibly socialism of a Marxist kind. The world does not view that prospect with the same horror as do certain individuals in Washington; indeed, few of America's allies are led by men who share what Bull refers to as "the Reagan Administration's born-again ideology of capitalist enterprise." Nor can the West ignore the fact that South Africa is not simply its white minority, one sixth of the country's population. While the future cannot be predicted, and the most exaggerated fears may indeed be realized, it is one thing to deal with a black authoritarian regime, recognized by the OAU and the UN, and quite another to deal with a regime that bears the stigma of white racism and that enjoys no wide international support. Finally, where the Third World is expressing support for Western values, it is a mistake for the West to deny those values. America's allies in Europe, Bull writes, do not believe that the Reagan Administration is likely to prevail if it chooses to "tilt" in the direction of Pretoria.

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To read this issue of *Daedalus* is to be instructed not only in the complexities of a continent still insufficiently known, but to understand the depth of the ideological passions of many who seek to interpret this tumultuous world. Africa deserves to be better known; even more, it deserves the candor and regard that only serious scholarship can provide. The alternative is silence—respectful and well-intentioned—but ultimately, demeaning and barren.

This issue was made possible through a generous grant from the Ford Foundation. Our indebtedness to the Foundation extends beyond this support, however, to include a substantial debt for the invaluable advice rendered by many Foundation officers who made the Editor's task easier. The planning for the issue took a long time; we are particularly grateful to the Rockefeller Foundation for making its facilities at the Villa Serbelloni in Bellagio, Italy, available for a crucial planning meeting. The enterprise, from the beginning, was unique in the way that it called on the active participation of Africans, Europeans, and North Americans. A quite different study would have emerged had any one of those "universes" not been present. African studies, in the foreseeable future, will have substantially greater intellectual resonance to the extent that they can enlist international involvement, affording the opportunity for the kinds of dialogue that are still too uncommon.

S.R.G.

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J. F. ADE AJAYI

Expectations of Independence

> What is our objective? An end to the exploitation of man by man, more freedom, more well-being. In short, we want to shake off the imperialist yoke. . . . It is hard to express the anguished hope with which the suffering masses look forward to this.
>
> —Dr. Alexandre Adande, 1959.[1]

> How have we come to this sorry state of affairs in the post-independence years which seemed at the beginning to have held so much promise?
>
> —Dr. Adebayo Adedeji, 1979.[2]

How do we sum up the expectations that the peoples of Africa had on the eve of independence, or evaluate what has happened to those hopes and aspirations since the coming of political independence? If Alexandre Adande was right in his summation of the yearnings of intellectuals, did he speak for the traditional elite, and was he right about the "anguished hope" of the masses?

Adande was speaking at Ibadan in March 1959, at the conference "Representative Government and National Progress," organized by the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Extra-Mural Department of what was then University College, Ibadan. The intention of the conference was to bring together, in their personal capacities, "leaders of thought" in the newly independent and soon to be independent countries of Black Africa, to discuss the prospects of representative government, given the commitment of the emergent regimes to promoting "national progress." It was a unique meeting, providing one of the earliest interfaces between Francophone and Anglophone intellectuals in Africa, and the participants were most appreciative of the international exposure given leaders like Patrice Lumumba and Cyril Adoula of the Congo. The proceedings of the conference, entitled *Africa: The Dynamics of Change*, provide a useful record of the intellectuals' aspirations and their perception of the expectations of the masses on the eve of independence.[3]

Intellectual Aspirations

The priority of the intellectuals was clearly to assume the reigns of government of the new states: other objectives were to flow from this. The intellectuals were leading the struggle for independence, and in varying

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degrees, they secured the support or connivance of the traditional elite and the masses—farmers, urban workers, and petty traders. They believed that they, not the masses nor the traditional elite, had the knowledge and skills to create the political and socioeconomic structures necessary to promote national progress and to lead the emergent states to their rightful places in the modern world.

Influenced, no doubt, by the theme of the conference, the participants expressed their expectations of independence in very abstract terms, and were much clearer about what they wanted to end than about what they wanted to put in its place. They wanted to throw off the imperialist yoke, and end discrimination and the exploitation of man by man; they wanted freedom, and respect for the dignity of the black man. Beyond that, however, they had little conception of the kind of society they were striving to build outside of vague concepts of Europeanization or modernization. They had no clear-cut goals, and nothing like a blueprint for development. They mentioned economic development, but it was low on their list of priorities, subsumed under the concept of well-being and national progress. Implicit in this abstract expression of the ends of government was the assumption that the leaders in the new states would be those who most thoroughly understood the Western cultural models that were to remain the prototypes of the new structures and institutions to be established. The conferees assumed that higher studies in Western education and advanced skills in Western science and technology, such as these probable leaders possessed, would be the most important attributes one could have in gaining positions of power and influence in the new states.

Here was the dilemma of the intellectuals: despite their occasional references to African institutions and ideas, their vision of freedom, equality, representative government, and democracy derived essentially from Western liberal models, and they staked their claims to leadership on their superior knowledge of these Western ideals and models. Yet they were not unaware of the fragility of the newly won or still to be won independence, or that the greatest threats to it could be expected from Western powers, especially former colonial powers. Their priority was commitment to that independence, and they wished to assert that independence from former colonial powers, and to stress the need for national cohesion and Pan-African unity as a basis for that assertion. They took for granted the masses' and the traditional elite's willingness to accept their leadership, and underestimated the problems of achieving national cohesion, dismissing the ethnicity that surfaced during the independence movements as ignorant or unpatriotic "tribalism." A radical group at the first All African Peoples Congress at Accra in December 1958 even pushed through a resolution to abolish those traditional African institutions, such as chieftaincy, that might prove to be incompatible with democracy and modernity. But the intellectuals realized that the support or the connivance of the masses was conditional upon meeting their aspirations for a better life in the immediate future. Meeting such aspirations, at least in the short run, seemed to depend on continued cooperation with—and aid from—the former colonial powers and their allies, from whom the intellectuals wished to be independent. Even those who talked about an African Revolution realized that it would depend on mass support, which could not be guaranteed in the short term without external support.

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It was the imperative of achieving national cohesion and stability that the intellectuals saw as the main danger to democracy and representative government, the fear that future governments might fail the masses and be tempted to create dictatorships in the name of protecting national unity.[4] Already the proponents of Western models of multiparty democracies had to contend with minority arguments for "one-party democracy,"[5] based, it was said, on neo-traditional models of debate, followed by consensus and withdrawal of dissent. There was no spectre of imminent class conflict, the intellectuals being more conscious of hierarchy based on education than on economic power. Nor was the spectre of the military, which loomed so large ahead, noticed. The only reference to the army at the Ibadan conference was not that it constituted a threat to representative government, but that the emergent leaders might not need armies to protect themselves if they pursued socialist policies and promoted social justice.[6]

The Traditional Elite

To sum up or to document the views of the traditional elite on the eve of independence is more difficult. To a greater or lesser extent, they owed their titles and access to power more to the colonial rulers than to traditional rights, but generally they operated within the traditional milieu. This meant that whether they were regarded as guardians of traditional culture or not, their activities as rulers remained within the confines of traditional groups and divisions of local government. A few, by virtue of previous educational, administrative, or other experience, achieved some national significance in their personal capacities. Since every country, however, consisted of more than one traditional state, kingdom, or ethnic group, the traditional elite were handicapped in competing with politicians for power at the national level.

Most of the traditional elite had been used as the channel, if not the vehicle, of colonial administration at the local level. Apart from a few educated court and local government officials, the traditional elite as a group constituted the most important African agents and direct beneficiaries of colonial administration. Few of them would have expected colonial rule to come to an end so soon and so abruptly, and they could not have been unmindful of their possible claims to the succession. As colonial power began to be challenged by the intellectuals and the political leaders in the independence movements, only a few of the chiefs identified themselves with the nationalists. The majority rallied to the defense of colonial power, and it was often with great dismay that they watched what seemed to them the abdication of power by the colonial rulers to the nationalist leaders.[7]

In circumstances amounting almost to betrayal, and confined as they were within the traditional mold, they discovered, as they became fully aware of what was happening, that they had to accept the leadership of a new political elite who were inheriting the powers of the colonial rulers. They did this, for the most part, with little enthusiasm, for they had come to accept the colonial ruler at his own evaluation—just, wise, incorruptible—while they did not trust the new politicians. Some chiefs, especially in former French colonies, were aware of the hostility of the masses, who had come to identify them with the

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most hated aspects of colonial rule, and they feared that this might encourage politicians to seek abolition of the chieftaincy institution as outmoded and obstructive. The struggle for their own existence left them little room to develop concepts of the goals of society as a whole or of what the masses might expect from independence.[8]

The basic expectation of the traditional elite, then, was to preserve as much as possible the power, influence, and privileges they had acquired during colonial days. They sought Western education for their children, invested in business, and speculated on land, forest, and other resources available to them. Their basic weapon, however, was to place themselves, wherever feasible, at the head of their ethnic groups to compete with politicians as brokers of political power within the group. Where they were successful, this ensured that politicians seeking electoral votes within the group had to negotiate with them, consult them, and induce their support and compensate them for it, or risk alienating the whole ethnic group. Where hostile politicians had a greater hold on the people's electoral votes, traditional rulers had more to lose than their influence. Sometimes they were removed from power, and in a few cases, as in Guinea and Uganda, the politicians tried to abolish the institution altogether.

The Masses' Anguished Hope

Victims alike of the colonial powers, the traditional elite, and of each succeeding regime, the "people" remained largely mute, for it was difficult to decide which self-appointed spokesman could be relied upon. The mass of the people paid the colonial taxes, supplied the forced labor to build the roads and work the mines, and sold at uneconomic prices the crops they were ordered to grow. They went as soldiers to die far from home, and above all, it was *their* land that was expropriated to make way for new towns and mines, and for the insatiable appetites of white settler farmers. Yet despite this, in most parts of Africa, it would appear that on the eve of independence, the level of mobilization and political education of the masses was so low, that they had formed no clear expectations of what society in the new states ought to be. They had only vague notions of the promises the politicians were making to secure their support for the independence movements. In areas of white settlement, such as Central Kenya or Portuguese Africa, however, where widespread expropriation of land and prolonged armed struggle occurred, the leaders had to achieve a higher degree of mobilization and set clearer goals before the masses.[9]

Suspicion of government seems to have been the most characteristic attitude of the people. They were impressed by the technology of the white man and regarded him with awe. They viewed him from a safe distance as an incomprehensible, irrational, and uncontrollable force. They blamed their misfortunes on the traditional elite, who acted as agents of this irrational force. But the traditional elite were the only leaders they knew, understood, and in the ultimate analysis, could deal with. They barely knew the politicians or trusted them, and at times, merely to communicate with some of the political leaders, required the services of interpreters.

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Insofar as they fully appreciated what was involved in the independence movements, their basic expectation was to see an end to the unpredictability and irrationality of the white man's world. Without the dubious advantage of Western education, they rejected the white man's culture, and for as long and as much as possible, stuck to what they knew. This did not mean that they wanted to re-create the past in its entirety. Their notion of freedom was not an abstract ideal, but a catalogue of specific wants: freedom from unjust and incomprehensible laws and directives; return of their land; and freedom to be left alone to live their lives and seek their own goals, especially in regard to land tenure and local government groupings that affected historical relationships. These wants developed and became more specific with each new hope and each disastrous frustration. Soon, expectations came to include improved standards of living in housing and clothing, greater returns for their labor, better transportation for exporting and marketing their surpluses, education as a means to the social mobility that would ensure a better life for their children, and an adequate water supply, electricity, health-care facilities, and other such amenities of life.

The Political Elite

The task of securing these and other expectations of independence fell not so much on the intellectuals as such as on a new political elite. Some of the political elite, including a few outstanding leaders, came, of course, from the ranks of the intellectuals and nationalists who had led the independence movements. The continuing problem of rival nationalities and ethnicity in the emergent states, however, complicated any efforts toward the horizontal restructuring of society, based on knowledge and education or even largely economic factors. Although education remained of some importance, it soon ceased to be the dominant factor in the access to power that the intellectuals had imagined. More important were the ability to monitor and manipulate governmental patronage and the historic rivalries of different ethnic and communal groups. A new political elite, usually less well educated, more rooted in the local culture, and less idealistic than the intellectuals, emerged. They saw politics not only as an exciting and lucrative profession, but also one that guaranteed fame and adventure. In the political process that emerged, emphasis was placed not on the abstract concepts of freedom, human rights, and the dignity of the black man, but on fashioning a network of patronage and brokerage necessary for accession to office, and for its retention.[10]

Without the same degree of involvement in European cultures that the intellectuals had, the new political elite were nevertheless constrained to operate within the framework of models of development inherited from the final years of the colonial period—increased linkage with the Western world, investment of Western capital, attempted transfer of technology, building of an infrastructure, and others. Even in areas of white settlement like Kenya, where the masses had been directly involved in the independence struggle, and where some expected an attempt at land reform and a rapid restructuring of society, the political elite chose to maintain their own control over the political system inherited from colonial days, and to pursue economic development through

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attracting foreign investment on terms favorable to maintaining such control. Even where leaders favored a socialist approach, it stopped short of immediate attempts at social transformation, relying instead on a long-term policy of villagization and rural transformation. Only in countries where prolonged struggles were necessary to achieve independence, such as in the Portuguese territories, was more commitment shown for the abolition of the private sector and a socialist restructuring of society. Yet even then, they found it difficult to reject the economic involvement of the Western powers.

With the new political elite placing such unambiguous emphasis on the acquisition and retention of power, without similarly clarifying the ideology or the goals of government, it is not surprising that many interest groups soon began to see in the army a more logical and efficient alternative to the political elite. The widespread emergence of military regimes, however, did not alter the framework within which the political elite operated. The gun was often used to suspend constitutions, but it could hardly suspend the political process necessary to secure the support or connivance of the masses, the traditional elite, and ethnic and communal groups. The result has been that even under military regimes, the obsession with politics has continued. A significant portion of the energies of the state, government functionaries, and all public institutions has been expended in the struggle for power and for keeping particular regimes in power, with little left, or allowed to be left, for the tasks necessary for development.

The Elusiveness of Development

The most fundamental aspect of postindependence Africa has been the elusiveness of development, however characterized—Europeanization, Westernization, modernization, progress, or simply development. That is to say, in many ways the quality of life of the average farmer and his family in the village, or worker in the urban areas, has not improved significantly; in some respects, and in some areas, it is even worse than on the eve of independence. In particular, many African countries now find it difficult to provide for their populations sufficient food and energy resources for the basic necessities of life.

Most of the new states have yet to evolve stable political structures that are imbued with a sense of national commitment and notions of social justice, around which the loyalties of the masses could be mobilized. Rather, the uneven development between different regions of the same country and between cities and rural areas of the same region persists. In addition, the inequalities of income distribution that characterized colonial rule have tended to widen considerably since independence. As a result, there have been civil unrest and civil war, and there is generally less security for life and property. In a few cases, grotesque and abnormal regimes have emerged that prey on their own populations rather than protect them or promote their welfare. The optimism of development plans of the 1960s has given way to increasing frustration in the 1970s and disillusionment in the 1980s. The general lament is that this is not what was expected from independence.

The intellectuals—who had the sharpest notions and clearest expectations of independence—have been the most frustrated, and their lamentations, especially when expressed in poetry, tend to be hyperbolic. Their sense of frustration

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has been heightened by the now current theory of dependency, which sees the new states as having been sucked through colonialism into an inescapable state of underdevelopment and a permanent state of dependency on the industrialized nations. African rulers, therefore, appear virtually helpless before the international network of neo-colonial forces. In the dependency theory, a capitalist mode of development in the periphery is, by definition, doomed. Yet a socialist mode appears no less doomed, for the new states have already been locked, through colonialism, into a system where they have become satellites of the Western world, and the socialist or communist countries do not appear to be providing the kind of assistance necessary to break that bond.

Serious, but Not Hopeless

Despite the foregoing, we can hardly deny that political independence has been a positive good. That is the only explanation of the exhilaration at the liberation of Portuguese Africa and the independence of Zimbabwe, as well as the struggle to extend this liberation to Namibia and even the Union of South Africa. Very few, even of the traditional elite, except perhaps in places like Uganda, would like to see a return to colonial rule. The assumption of sovereign power by the new political elite has transferred to Africa at least some power of self-government and self-regulation, which is often misused and sometimes abused, but is yet available. The responsibility for utilizing this more effectively, given African aspirations and the state of world economic relationships, lies to a considerable extent within Africa. Some of the regimes have at times made an effort to meet some of the expectations of the people. The pipe-borne water, electricity, and improved health facilities have already cut down the rate of infant mortality and raised life expectancy. The expansion of Western-type systems of education has facilitated social mobility, and for all the increasing inequalities in income distribution, no rigid class structure has yet solidified; the network of family relationships often cuts across income groups and links urban and rural populations inextricably.

In anticipation of independence, no provisions seem to have been made for an effective transitional period, and thus this period merely drags along. The greatest cause of the frustration of the mass of the people comes from the uncertainties of this period. After the initial uncertainties of colonial rule, people came to know what to expect. They approached independence with hesitation, for they had no idea what to expect from it. Since independence, the feeling of uncertainty has increased. The political process has obeyed few rules consistently, whether constitutional or legal. World inflation and shifting economic policies have made prices unstable and the value of incomes most unreliable. New facilities such as electricity and pipe-borne water are expanded, but their performance is most unpredictable. Infant mortality is curbed, but highway fatalities are growing alarmingly. Life has become more uncertain. With the spread of Western education, and science and technology, the insecurity of life has bred superstition, and the search for faith healers and prophets has crept into every facet of society.

The healthiest aspect of the current reappraisals in Africa is the growing realism. With increasing cynicism about the possibilities of a new International Economic Order, or North-South dialogue, there is a new emphasis on self-

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reliance, self-fulfillment, and the more rational use of resources within Africa. The contrast with 1959 may be judged from the Report of the Monrovia Symposium, "What Kind of Africa by the Year 2000?" As at the Ibadan Conference, some forty participants were invited in their individual capacities. Although their frames of reference regarding the theme of the symposium differed, the greater realism of the Monrovia Symposium was unmistakable. Its Final Report set out four objectives of development in Africa, in this order:

1. The creation of a material and cultural environment that is conducive to self-fulfillment and creative participation
2. [The formation of] policies for the rational use and exploitation of natural resources, entailing above all self-sufficiency in food and local processing of raw materials
3. [A fresh look at] the whole educational and training set-up . . . and [the removal] of barriers . . . between education and employment, education and society, education and culture—in other words, between education and life
4. [Understanding fully] that the issues of freedom and justice can no longer be left in abeyance

On this last point, the report goes on to say: "Only yesterday the birth of a State that respected basic freedoms was one of the most important demands in the struggle for independence. Has this erstwhile dream now turned into a nightmare?"

How widespread the new sense of realism and what the chances are of implementing this program are not certain. But the very frustrations of the past point to the need for fresh approaches, and such indications are being noticed. The vision of a new society in Africa will need to be developed *in* Africa, born out of the African historical experience and the sense of continuity of African history. The African is not yet master of his own fate, but neither is he completely at the mercy of fate.

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[1]*Africa: The Dynamics of Change*, edited by H. Passin and J. A. B. Jones-Quartey (Ibadan: I.U.P., 1963), pp. 73-74. Dr. Adande is an anthropologist from Benin.

[2]*What Kind of Africa by the Year 2000? Final Report of the Monrovia Symposium on the Future Development Prospects of Africa towards the Year 2000*, OAU/International Institute of Labour Studies, Geneva, 1979, p. 62. Dr. Adedeji is a Nigerian economist and executive secretary for the United Nations' Economic Commission for Africa.

[3]Contrast the more official Conference of Independent African States, Accra, April 1958, or even the first All African Peoples Congress, Accra, December 1958, where participants were in a representative capacity. Compare also *Pan-Africanism Reconsidered*, Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of the American Society of African Culture, Philadelphia, June 1960 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

[4]For example, L. N. Namme, a Cameroonian living in Nigeria, said: "Would it not be essential that the government in power be strong enough to establish cohesion and stability?" *Africa: The Dynamics of Change*, p. 47. Also, the words of F. Amorin of Togo: "Too much freedom kills freedom, too much democracy kills democracy," Ibid., p. 82.

[5]Ibid., especially Abdoulaye Diallo of Guinea, on p. 50. See also the reply of David Soumah, a Guinean exile living in Dakar.

[6]Ibid., F. Amorin, p. 253. Contrast with the more politically oriented All African Peoples Congress in Accra, where there was a resolution in favor of establishing armies to protect the newly

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won independence. A few newly independent countries even signed military pacts with their former rulers.

[7]See M. Crowder and O. Ikime, *West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status under Colonial Rule and Independence* (APC and University of Ife Press, 1970).

[8]See, for example, J. J. Okunu, "Odinga and the Purpose of Independence: A Note on *Not Yet Uhuru*," in *East Africa Journal*, Nairobi, 4 (6): 13-15.

[9]Colin Leys: *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), and O. L. E. Mbatia's review in *Journal of African Studies* 4 (1) (1977): 107-12.

[10]For a recent and perceptive analysis of the political process in a middle-size town in Western Nigeria, see J. D. Y. Peel, "Inequality and Action: The Forms of Ijesha Social Conflict," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 14 (3) (1980): 473-502.

[11] Compare S. J. Kobrin, "Multi-national Corporations, Sociocultural Dependence and Industrialization: Need Satisfaction or Want Creation?" *Journal of Developing Areas* 13 (2) (January 1979): 109-26; and T. M. Shaw and M. J. Grieve, "Dependence as an Approach to Understanding Continuing Inequalities in Africa," Ibid., 13 (3) (April 1979): 229-46. Kobrin concedes, "Contrary to the assertions of earlier *dependentistas*, political independence has and does make a difference" (p. 124).

[12]*What Kind of Africa by the Year 2000:?* especially pp. 14-16.

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LANCINÉ SYLLA

Succession of the Charismatic Leader: The Gordian Knot of African Politics

THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT in Africa is one that has been familiar to sociologists since Max Weber: the succession of the charismatic leader. Change, whether violent (assassination, coup d'état, or civil war) or peaceful (the orderly transition of power, liberalization, democratization), has been guided by underlying forces whose concrete, often dramatic manifestations conceal their essential nature and real significance. How is power transferred in a given society? How is the succession to leadership determined (in practice as well as theory)? In the new African nations, which have experienced many political crises in the course of their development, there seems to be no generally accepted answer to these questions. Or at any rate, there seems to be no understanding of the fact that agreement as to how power should be transferred is the *sine qua non* of political stability and of society's peaceful development. Change, therefore, has often been chaotic and haphazard, and attempts at rational organization of the state have been erratic at best, usually coming in the wake of military coups or other crises of the sort that are all too familiar in most African countries. Indeed, it is because difficulties have been encountered in trying to organize the state rationally, and to establish a consensus concerning the transfer of power, that coups have become endemic, and that experiments with democracy and civilian rule have so often proved disappointing. If the winds of democracy are blowing over Africa today, one reason may be that democracy provides a rational solution to the problem of succession. Liberalization of the regime in a sense forces a country to establish a rational system for transferring power. Thus, by beginning the liberalization process, the aging charismatic leader sets the stage for his own succession. From Bourguiba in Tunisia to Senghor in Senegal and Houphouet-Boigny in the Ivory Coast, democratization in one form or another has lately been laying the groundwork for new leadership by changing the balance of power among the various opposing political forces, forces that can no longer be controlled by what Weber calls the "routinization of charisma." Thus it is no exaggeration to say that the problem of succession is one that all African states must confront.

What solutions to this problem have been proposed? This is the question that I shall try to answer in this essay. I also want to look at the nature of power itself. Indeed, to speak of a "mode of succession" is really to speak of a "mode of legitimation of power," for any mode of succession necessarily corresponds to some mode of legitimation. In other words, no transfer of power is likely to

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succeed unless it is sanctioned by the prevailing form of authority. Thus the kinds of political crisis and conflict that we have been talking about until now may be described as "crises of legitimacy," to borrow Habermas's phrase. In short, the problem of finding successors for charismatic leaders in Africa is one aspect of a general crisis of political legitimacy that different countries have tried to resolve in different ways.

The point of the present essay, then, is to examine the foundations of political authority in Africa in the light of Max Weber's analysis of charismatic leadership. We shall be looking at the forms that charismatic power has taken in Africa, how they came into being, and how they operate. In short, we shall be studying the history of charismatic power in Africa and its influence on African political development in general. We shall also be looking at the problems that charismatic leadership poses for political development in Africa, and in particular, at the one central problem that overshadows all the rest, namely, the problem of continuity, or how to find a successor for a charismatic leader. Concrete examples will be given to illustrate the points being made, examples drawn from the experience of various African nations. Since an exhaustive analysis is impossible within the confines of an essay, I shall focus on typical cases that exemplify my general points.

Beyond irrational political behavior and other perverse consequences of charismatic authority, African societies must confront a more general problem: namely, how to organize their governments. In my view, without a rational organization of the state, no political development is possible. Here we touch not only on questions of sociological method and scientific outlook, but also, if I may say so, on matters of political faith. Let me make my own position clear: for better or for worse, every society must agree on a principle of political legitimacy. The rationalization of the state is a crucial prerequisite of all social development. It is in this connection that Weber's ideas about charisma and the rationalization of power turn out to be most relevant to the analysis of political systems in the developing countries. Because of the profound cultural changes that these countries are being forced to undergo in the course of development, it is more likely than not that they will give rise to charismatic leadership of one sort or another. Before turning to a detailed examination of the situation in Africa, therefore, I should like first to relate the topic of the present essay to Weber's general theory of charismatic authority.[1]

The Nature of Power in Africa and Weber's Theory of Charisma

For methodological reasons, it is convenient to digress a moment to explain the concepts we will be using and a little about the general theory they are part of. I start from Weber's analysis of "types of legitimacy," because the notion of charisma can really be understood only in relation to the two other types of authority that Weber defines. It will soon become apparent that all the African regimes that have come into being since 1960 have been based on authority of the charismatic type.

According to Weber, all power is based on legitimate authority. By "legitimate authority," he means an authority that invokes generally recognized principles to justify its exercise of power. There are three ways in which an

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authority may obtain legitimacy, or recognition of its right to govern. More precisely, Weber defines three pure forms of legitimate authority, three "ideal types" that exist nowhere in their pure state. By combining these three ideal types in various proportions, however, we can gain a clearer understanding of actual political regimes. The three ideal types defined by Weber are traditional authority, legal-rational authority, and charismatic authority.

Traditional authority is recognized as legitimate by virtue of tradition, custom, and veneration of previous generations. Typically, it is found in monarchical societies, ancient kingdoms, and traditional African tribes. Traditional authority depends in one sense on the force of habit. It is rooted in an ancestral past. The current leaders thus become the supreme guardians of tradition, the defenders of the age-old institutions that they control. Under this type of authority, laws and customs handed down from earlier generations are used to justify the current political structure. Thus the transmission of authority is characteristically hereditary in this type of regime. Status is normally inherited and is not due solely to an individual's personal merit.

Legal-rational authority derives from a coherent system of rules that are commonly submitted to the entire population for acceptance or rejection. Typical examples of such rules are the constitutions and legal systems of modern states. Modern administrative and bureaucratic structures are also typical of this form of authority. Institutions, laws, and constitutional order are the only source of legitimacy in a legal-rational system. The law is sovereign, not individuals or particular groups of individuals. The institutions created by constitutional laws take precedence over the individuals and groups who happen to hold power at any given moment. Those in authority derive their right to govern from the provisions of the constitution and laws currently in effect. The rules governing succession or alternation of power are also defined by the constitution. Modern democratic states are the most striking example of this kind of authority: in democratic systems, universal suffrage settles the question of how power is to be transferred.

Finally, charismatic authority, the focus of this essay, is based on an almost religious respect for, or faith in, a leader to whom exceptional qualities are attributed. These qualities may be thought to be of divine origin, as in the case of a religious prophet, or they may simply manifest extraordinary personal talents. According to Weber, this type of authority is characterized by "absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership. This is 'charismatic' domination, as exercised by the prophet or—in the field of politics—by the elected war lord, the plebiscitarian ruler, the great demagogue, or the political party leader."[2] It is the "personal grace"—the charisma—of the leader that is the prime mover of the political system. The charismatic leader is obeyed because of his charm, his prestige, his influence, his personal magnetism and power to sway crowds. Pomp and ceremony, mob passion, ritual, the cult of personality, deification and personalization of power—in short, all the symbolic and emotional components of politics—assume greater importance in this kind of regime than rational decision-making. As Weber says, "Men do not obey [the charismatic leader] by virtue of tradition or statute but because they believe in him."[3] This explains why all charismatic power is in essence revolutionary: breaking with

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custom, respecting no law, it rises against the established order and stands as the creator of a new order. Accordingly, charismatic rule is generally linked to a social movement that establishes a new order. A revolution led by a charismatic figure is one of the most effective ways of overthrowing regimes based on traditional or legal authority. But since charismatic power depends on the exceptional qualities of an individual, sooner or later its legitimacy will be called into question, most notably when it comes time to find a successor for the charismatic figure. Thus the great question of charismatic authority is succession. In effect, when the authority of a leader extends beyond the limits laid down by custom and law, the crucial question is how to make sure that authority will endure when the individual in whom extraordinary powers are vested is no longer on the scene.

In Weber's view, charismatic power is in essence ephemeral and transitory. It sets the stage either for a traditional form of authority, by establishing a new tradition, or for a legal-rational form of authority, by institutionalizing procedures for the transfer of power. Before either of these possibilities is realized, however, the charismatic leader or his successors may try to capitalize on the leader's legendary prestige in order to "routinize" his charisma, to use Weber's now celebrated term. Weber goes into considerable detail about the ways in which charisma may be routinized. Space does not allow us to recapitulate his account here in full detail. Let me say simply that the end result of routinization is the glorification of the period during which the new regime was founded. Either the aging charismatic leader himself or his successor (who benefits from the prestige accruing to his illustrious predecessor) attempts to prolong the period of charismatic rule by staging festivals, establishing public holidays, and creating new political rituals (involving outdoor speeches, meetings, ceremonial state visits, international conferences, and so forth, with a judicious admixture of ethnic color, stirring ideology, and appeals to ancestral roots). In Africa it is common for the leader to emphasize the symbolic, emotional, and utopian, rather than the rational, institutional, and practical, aspects of politics. Thus the consequences of the routinization of charisma, in the forms it has generally taken in Africa, have been unfortunate: these include economic and political inefficiency, the development of one-party rule, excessive personalization of power, authoritarianism, slowing of political development, coups d'état, and military dictatorships. In African politics, the coup d'état has come to be seen as an almost normal way of transferring power from a charismatic leader to others.

Weber's account of the development and routinization of charisma seems to fit African political realities fairly well. Before turning to the main topic of this essay, the succession of the charismatic leader, it will therefore be useful to take a brief look at what Weber has to say on these topics.[4]

All of the recently decolonized African nations have had to deal with problems created by charismatic power. Conditions favorable to the development of charismatic leadership were created in Africa first by colonization itself and later by the problems that developed not only after independence, but even more during the period of struggles that led to decolonization. The hope of a savior or a hero capable of putting an end to colonial domination, and the need for a great teacher to restore a shattered cultural identity and establish a new

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political order, created a situation that fairly demanded the emergence of a charismatic leader. Pushing the point somewhat, we might even say that the very anticipation of a savior, the expectation of a new political order, made the society itself charismatic, even before the advent of the charismatic personality. The masses were "starved for charisma," to use Erik Erikson's expression.[5] Thus the historic figure who leads the anticolonial forces and succeeds in winning his country's independence becomes the leader of a triumphant party and a national hero, the father of his country. He becomes the symbol of the long-awaited new order, and whether he likes it or not, the adulation of the masses makes the providential hero into a charismatic leader.

To recapitulate, then, the emergence of historic leaders in the fight for independence, the problems of modernization and economic development that all new nations must face, and the general mobilization of the populace in the face of these problems all contribute to the development of charismatic forms of power. Charismatic governments are, as we mentioned earlier, typically associated with social movements that create a new social order. Weber in fact emphasizes the connection between the emergence of charismatic leadership and situations involving a transition from a traditional to a modern type of society, situations in which the foundations of the traditional order are for one reason or another shaken. In short, charismatic governments are quite likely to emerge in societies that, like those of Africa, are undergoing profound cultural transformation.

Once a charismatic government is established, however, there are urgent tasks to be accomplished: power must be consolidated, political control established, governmental institutions created, and an administrative network extended to cover the full extent of the national territory. In trying to carry out these tasks, the new government immediately comes up against all of the problems associated with charismatic regimes, problems that in Africa are all the more acute owing to the lack of a legal tradition and to the reemergence of older forms of authority in the wake of decolonization. There is no doubt that in the postindependence period, political development throughout Africa has been hampered by problems inherent in charismatic forms of government. Indeed, the reemergence of older forms of legitimacy, coinciding with the period of consolidation of the newly established regimes, has created a general crisis of legitimacy on the continent.

This crisis of legitimacy sets the stage for a kind of political drama that is quite familiar in Africa. What we commonly see in this phase of legitimation and consolidation of new regimes is conflict between the different principles of legitimacy. In African nations today we find all three principles at work, and none outweighs the others sufficiently to insure the permanence of the system. The sources of instability inherent in each type of legitimacy reinforce one another, with the result that the political system is always potentially in crisis. The way in which power is transferred is of course a crucial feature of the general crisis situation. Political conflict in general revolves around the crisis of legitimacy, and the new nations must therefore find ways to resolve this crisis. The situation in Africa is one in which traditional authority has crumbled and yet no new authority (whether institutional or charismatic) is sufficiently

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established to take its place. This leads to social disintegration and to a breakdown of the political order, both old and new, with the result that the developing countries are beset with constant political conflict.

Indeed, I want to argue that, whenever a society experiences a conflict between different principles of legitimacy, it enters upon a long period of crisis marked by incessant struggle over the fundamental nature of the political system, struggle that brings social unrest in its wake. Society itself becomes "sick," or as Emile Durkheim would say, "anomic." As long as African societies fail to agree on a principle for the legitimation of power, they will continue to be subject to this kind of conflict and to permanent political instability in the form of civil war, subversion, conspiracy, governmental crisis, or coups d'état. Indeed, as was mentioned earlier, in the absence of any rules governing the transfer of power from a charismatic leader to his successors, the coup d'état has become almost an accepted way of making the transition. Before turning to a discussion of the specific ways in which this transition has been accomplished in Africa, it is worth pausing a moment to consider the theoretical connection between the crisis of legitimacy and the problem of succession in a charismatic regime.

When a political system must confront a crisis of succession, the entire population becomes subject to a sort of mass hysteria, particularly in charismatic regimes, where the people's only sense of political security and stability comes from their enthusiastic support for the charismatic leader. This hysteria, which grips masses and political leaders alike, is but the outward expression of the crisis of political legitimacy that is the inevitable consequence of the departure of a charismatic leader. All thought turns to the question of how best to assure the continuation of power once the leader is gone. Even though laws may exist that in theory spell out the way in which power is to be transferred, the mere existence of an appropriate body of law is not enough to ensure that its provisions will be accepted by the leader's "followers," whose relationship to him is more emotional than rational or legalistic. Where a long-standing legal-rational tradition exists, as in Western Europe, for example, the emergence of a charismatic leader seems purely circumstantial. There, charismatic authority will sooner or later give way to a traditional or institutional regime based on the existing legal tradition. But in newly established countries, like those of Africa, that lack any legal tradition of their own, the problem of succession is the Gordian knot of politics.

With the leader gone and everyone in the grip of political hysteria, the leader's aides and other political figures then try to discover or, by manipulating the masses, to fabricate a replacement, a new bearer of charisma, someone with characteristics similar to those of the departed leader. Sometimes the charismatic leader himself, while he is still in power, designates his own successor. The nomination of a prime minister or vice-president may alleviate the hysteria, but the central problem remains, for charisma cannot be taught or improvised. Alternatively, the leader may appoint himself president for life or crown himself emperor in an effort to establish a tradition in terms of which the hereditary transmission of his charisma can be justified. Or the masses may try to predict who the eventual successor will be by interpreting the ruler's statements, predilections, and desires, or by taking the temperature, so to

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speak, of the ruling class, whose members often compete for the succession in an atmosphere of general discord, not to say animosity and fierce rivalry. At the grassroots, these conflicts within the ruling class may translate into nothing more complicated than traditional tribal rivalries: since the ruler is a member of tribe A, someone is bound to argue that his successor must come from tribe B, C, or D. This kind of rotating leadership is familiar to ethnologists who have studied societies divided along generational lines. Dahomey (present-day Benin) experimented with a system in which co-presidents drawn from each of the country's three major ethnic groups were supposed to govern in turn, but the experiment proved unsuccessful.

Because of the difficulty of transferring power peacefully in charismatic regimes, recent years have seen a growing number of military coups in African states ruled by charismatic figures. Consequently, I should like to turn now to a discussion of present-day conditions in Africa, applying Weber's theoretical ideas to actual situations.

The Succession of Charismatic Leaders in Africa: A Historical Overview

We now shift the ground of our discussion, moving from general sociological theory to empirical political science. It is therefore important to bear in mind that Weber's ideal types of authority are never found in the pure state. In most political systems we find all three types, mixed in varying proportions. In discussing any real polity, we must take account of both what kind of political system the founders intended to create and what form of authority actually predominates. In particular, the routinization of charisma does not always go according to the charismatic leader's plan. What actually takes place is a contest involving charismatic, institutional, and traditional forces, each seeking supremacy over the others. If the political system is to achieve stability, the contest must sooner or later result in the victory of either a traditional or a legal-rational structure. The charismatic element will not totally disappear, however, at least not in the current state of African politics. Rather, it will be absorbed into the other elements and thus outlive the original authority figure. In this power struggle, the political actors will try various strategies to achieve one of two possible goals: either they will seek to establish the charismatic system on a permanent footing, or they will try to change it to establish either a traditional system or a more legal-rational form of government. No matter what mode of succession is chosen, the aim is always to resolve what we have been calling the crisis of legitimacy.

We are now ready to begin discussing concrete cases. But since there have been so many different kinds of attempts to resolve the problem of succession in Africa, for ease of understanding I will group the cases into three broad categories.

First of all, there have been efforts to perpetuate charismatic rule, with or without the historical leader's participation. These may be subsumed under the head of routinization of charisma. Second, there have been attempts to use violence to put an end to charismatic rule, usually in order to establish a legal-rational system. Here I am thinking of the efforts that have been made in some African states to normalize or democratize military dictatorships established

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subsequent to a coup d'état. Finally, in certain other states, the leader himself has initiated democratization by decreeing systematic rules for the transfer of power, thus paving the way for his own succession. Summarizing, then, we have the following three categories:

1. Routinization of charisma
2. Violent seizure of power, followed by transformation of political system
3. Democratization initiated by the charismatic leader himself

Of course this typology, though useful for analytical purposes, does not do justice to the complexity of real political situations. There is in fact some overlap: a coup d'état may lead not only to democratization, but also to routinization of charisma; a charismatic leader may justify his power in traditional ways instead of moving toward more rational institutions and greater democracy; and finally, a crisis in an institutionalized form of government may be resolved by turning to a charismatic leader. Since an exhaustive treatment is beyond the scope of this essay, I repeat that only a few more or less typical cases will be considered here.

ROUTINIZATION OF CHARISMA

Quite dissimilar situations are grouped together under this head. To begin with, the charismatic leader himself may seek to perpetuate his reign. Or he and his aides, or both, may look for another charismatic personality. Or again, a general may be thrust into power in the wake of a coup d'état and be transformed by a society starved for charisma into a new charismatic head of state. The modality of change is immaterial; the important point is that in each case the result is routinization of charisma.

To look first at some extreme examples: a charismatic leader may appoint himself "president for life" or crown himself "emperor." This may be done in stages. For example, Macias Nguema, the former president of Equatorial Guinea, who wielded a personalized and deified form of power that can only be regarded as charismatic, appointed himself "president for life, major general of the army, chief educator of the nation, supreme scientist, master of traditional culture, and chairman of the *Parti Unique National des Travailleurs* [the One National Workers' Party], as well as the only miracle that Equatorial Guinea ever produced." Outlawing the Christian religion, he replaced it with his own personality cult: all prayers were required to begin with the words, "In the name of Father Macias, our savior and redeemer." Doubtless, this is an extreme example, and the dictatorship and tyranny that almost inevitably result from such excesses ultimately set the stage for a coup d'état, such as the one that toppled Macias and so many others like him. Still, the important point to be made here is that the institution of a life presidency has frequently been used in Africa as a way of routinizing charisma. And if Macias Nguema declared himself president for life in violation of the Guinean constitution, another dictator, General Bokassa, had the support of his party when he did the same thing in 1972. After winning power in the Central African Republic in 1965, Bokassa, then a colonel, proclaimed himself first general and then field marshal

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of his army. He then had his appointment as president for life approved by the members of the only party in the country, the MESSAN, in 1972. Finally, in December 1977 a special party congress declared him emperor of the Central African Republic. A new constitution inaugurated a constitutional monarchy, with the intention of making the succession hereditary. Of course, as everyone knows, this attempt to turn the Central African Republic into a traditional empire proved unsuccessful. Like Macias Nguema and Idi Amin Dada, who were also preparing to elevate themselves to the status of emperor, Bokassa was turned out by a military coup.[6]

If the routinization of charisma led to a return to a traditional type of regime in Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, and Uganda, events took a different turn in Tunisia. There, Habib Bourguiba became president for life and succeeded in institutionalizing his charismatic authority. The "commander in chief and father of the Tunisian nation," Bourguiba gained independence for his country in 1956. Article 40 of the Tunisian constitution states clearly that "no person shall be elected President of the Republic for more than three consecutive terms." But Bourguiba, after having been elected three times, in 1959, 1964, and 1969, ran for office a fourth time and was once again elected. He resorted to the simple expedient of having the constitution amended by referendum to provide for his own election as president for life.

The case of Tunisia invites reflection, not so much on questions of power politics or legal niceties, but rather on the crucial role of elections in the routinization of charisma in Africa. Given the political realities prevailing in Africa today, a head of state need not declare himself president for life or stage an election to sanction his life tenure. It is common for the incumbent to garner 99.99 percent of the votes cast in many elections, so that a sitting president becomes in effect president for life, whether or not he officially assumes the title. Barring resignation or a military takeover, he is assured of a life term in office. Yet elections also have a cathartic function. They enable the head of state to mobilize his people and to reestablish contact with the masses. And they renew and reaffirm the legitimacy of the historic leader of the nation. Furthermore, since African states are generally ruled by one-party regimes, it is hardly to be expected that elections will sweep a rival party into power as in a pluralist democracy. Rather, they serve a ritual function, reinforcing the power of the charismatic leader. Pluralism is out of the question in any truly charismatic society, for the opposition would be doomed in advance to lose every election. Each electoral contest provides the leader's party with an opportunity to strengthen its hand. Since all good fortune is thought to flow from the divine grace (charisma) of the true historic leader, members of the opposition are likely to be viewed as traitors and enemies of the state.

Another strategy for perpetuating and reinforcing charismatic power is the threat of resignation, real or feigned. For instance, rumors of the leader's possible retirement may be circulated at the party convention in order to whip up political hysteria, with the result that the president is soon besieged with requests that he remain in power lest the nation fall into chaos. President Eyadema of Togo was three times persuaded to remain in office by his people and his party, despite his stated intention to resign. A similar scenario has been played out at party conventions in other countries, such as Cameroon and the

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Ivory Coast, where Ahidjo and Houphouet-Boigny were persuaded by their parties to remain in office rather than retire. In these one-party states, the role of the party congress is to strengthen the leader's position. Like elections, the resignation strategy enables the chief of state to test his popularity, bolster his legitimacy, and assure the continuity of his regime.

The death of the leader can also play a part in the routinization of charisma. Generally, either the leader handpicks his own successor before he dies or his staff makes the decision after his death. The man chosen will usually be another charismatic figure with qualities similar to those of his predecessor. If the staff makes the decision after the leader's death, there may be a power struggle over the leadership.

A case in point occurred with the sudden death of Angola's historic leader, Agostinho Neto, in September 1979. Neto had never considered designating a successor, but he did leave behind a well-oiled and highly disciplined political machine, the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), put together during the war for independence. To succeed him, the party chose the current president, Dos Santos, one of Neto's earliest supporters and the man to whom he ordinarily entrusted the reins of government when he was out of the country. He was confirmed as president by a special party congress.

In the Congo, a similar course was followed after the assassination of President Marien Ngouabi, but splits within the ruling party ultimately proved fatal to the man designated to serve as acting president, Yhombi Opango, the most senior and highest ranking officer in the country's army. Because of opposition to Opango within the Congolese Workers Party (PCT), the central committee was forced to consider three candidates: Opango, another officer, Colonel Sassou Nguesso, and a civilian member of the party central committee, Mr. Tchicaya. Opango received fifteen votes, Tchicaya fourteen, and Nguesso seven in the first round of balloting, but on the second round, contrary to all expectation, Nguesso was elected when Tchicaya withdrew in his favor.

The death of Kenyan president Jomo Kenyatta provoked a crisis that was resolved by a combination of political dealing in the party central committee and recourse to constitutional procedures. Eighty-five when he died, Kenyatta had had ample opportunity to prepare for his succession, but avoided doing so for fear of sowing bitter dissension in the ranks of his ruling party, the KANU (Kenya African National Union). As political leaders became increasingly impatient for a solution to the problem of succession, certain changes were made in the country's constitution. These proved insufficient, however, to quell the conflict that ensued upon Kenyatta's death. The constitution provided that a vice-president, appointed by the president, would become acting president for a period of ninety days, during which presidential elections were to be held. The candidates in this election were to be designated by the duly authorized political parties—in reality, therefore, by KANU, the only legal party in Kenya. The constitution further stipulated that if there was only one candidate, no election need be held; hence, if KANU chose to designate a single candidate, he automatically became president of Kenya. In the event, the party split into two factions. One favored the incumbent vice-president, Arap Moi. The other, which opposed him, organized an assassination plot that was to be put into effect on the day following Kenyatta's death. The plan was to murder Arap Moi

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in Nakuru, the residence of President Kenyatta. But when Kenyatta died in Mombassa rather than Nakuru, the plan was aborted. Events then followed one another in quick succession. The plot was dismantled, and Arap Moi was sworn in as acting president under the provisions of the constitution. He was then elected chairman of KANU and named as the only candidate for the presidency, making him automatically the head of state. The decision of the party was then bolstered by the usual charisma-enhancing ritual: rallies were held in support of the new president, resolutions of support were drafted, and elections by acclamation were held in various places around the country.

As these examples show, there is a potential for violence whenever a successor has to be chosen for a charismatic leader. It is to the examination of cases of violent change that we shall turn next.

CHANGE BY FORCE: FROM CHARISMA TO INSTITUTIONAL ORDER

A coup d'état may do either of two things: help to routinize charisma or transform a charismatic regime into a legal-rational one. It is common in Africa for masses starved for charisma to invest with charismatic attributes a military leader who has successfully seized power. Typically, the officer is lifted out of obscurity and raised above the general run of mankind on a wave of popular frenzy stirred up by ritual, magic, music, dance, folklore, festivals, and mass demonstrations. Given that the conditions prevailing in some African countries today are not compatible with institutionalized politics, a temporary solution to the problem of transferring power has been found in the coup d'état. As Carl Schmitt has said, "He is sovereign who takes charge in extraordinary circumstances."[7] Now, a crisis of succession creates extraordinary circumstances on which the leader of a coup may capitalize. The cycle is endless: a charismatic regime enters upon a crisis, the crisis is resolved by a coup, the leader of the coup is invested with charisma, and the whole sequence begins all over again.

Striking instances of the transformation of a victorious general into a charismatic figure may be found in Togo, Zaïre, and Benin. In Togo, for example, a referendum held in November 1971 put the following question to a vote: "Do you want General Eyadema to become president of the republic and carry on with the mission entrusted to him by the People's Army?" The overwhelming answer was Yes. Since his 1967 coup, Eyadema has made repeated use of charisma-enhancing techniques of the sort discussed above. In particular, since the 1971 referendum he has often expressed his desire to withdraw from politics and return to the barracks. Now that the army's mission of preserving the unity of the nation is accomplished, presumably it is safe to turn power back over to a civilian government. But the Togolese, fearing a return to anarchy without Eyadema, have always prevailed upon him to remain in power.[8]

If some military dictatorships have served to perpetuate charismatic rule, others have moved deliberately toward the institution of democracy and a return to civilian government based on legal-rational authority. The military itself takes the initiative in drawing up a new constitution, authorizing political parties to resume their normal activities. The liberalization process begins with legislative and presidential elections, followed by a withdrawal of the army

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from politics. To be sure, not all such attempts have met with success. But Nigeria and Ghana, after several earlier failures, have recently established multiparty parliamentary regimes.[9]

The normalization process accentuates the legal and rational, rather than the traditional and charismatic, aspects of power. Charisma and tradition may still be influential, however, at lower levels of the political structure. Political parties may, for example, try to organize ethnic, linguistic, regional, or religious groups, or may try to capitalize on the charisma of a former national leader by borrowing his slogans, ideology, or program, while the national authorities may attempt to hinder the activity of parties organized along such lines in order to favor a more legal-rational mode of legitimation. The result is a contest between different kinds of legitimacy, in which the law can be used to set the rules. In such cases, the aim of reinstating normal forms of political activity is ultimately to achieve a political system based on legal-rational forms of authority.

In Nigeria, for example, the military government began liberalizing political life in September 1978 by lifting the ban on political parties that had been imposed by past military regimes over the previous twelve years. Political parties were required to register with a federal electoral commission prior to December 18, 1978. Parties quickly proliferated, and by the deadline, more than forty had registered. But the military authorities, determined to avoid past errors and to prevent a return to regional and tribal politics (which had taken such a toll on national unity), laid down strict rules to ensure that only truly national parties would survive and be able to participate in national elections. To be eligible to participate in the national campaign, a party had to prove to the electoral commission that it was represented in two thirds of Nigeria's nineteen states. Only five of the more than forty parties in the country were able to do so. In this way, Nigeria has been able to establish a form of liberal democracy that closely resembles the American system. Elections are held regularly, and the country's institutions are functioning normally. Pluralist democracy seems to have made an orderly transfer of power possible.

Ghana too has established a pluralist democracy under quite similar conditions. However, the winning party there has borrowed its slogans, program, and ideology from Ghana's former charismatic leader, Kwame Nkrumah, so that elements of charisma linger on. It is nevertheless correct to say that Ghana is firmly on the road to institutionalizing a democratic form of government. Ghanaians now turn to their constitution to resolve the problem of succession.

We have seen, then, that some military dictators have been able to democratize their regimes and thus lay the groundwork for institutionalized politics. The same thing has also been attempted—and achieved—by certain charismatic leaders. Charismatic authority has been successfully transformed into legal-rational authority. It is to the discussion of this kind of change that we turn next, in the third and final section of this essay.

DEMOCRATIZATION OF CHARISMATIC REGIMES

Presidents Senghor of Senegal, Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, and Ahidjo of Cameroon are all charismatic leaders who have successfully trans-

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formed their regimes into democratic political systems. But before considering these examples, I shall first examine the case of Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, a case that falls midway between that of the military dictatorship that turns toward democracy, discussed in the previous section, and that of charismatic democratization, to be considered below.

After Algeria's historic national leader Mohammed Ben Bella unexpectedly suspended the constitution and assumed plenary powers, he was overthrown in a June 1965 coup led by General Houari Boumedienne, one of his earliest supporters. Boumedienne became president of both the Revolutionary Council and the state of Algeria, remaining in office until his death in December 1978. He had concentrated so much power in his own hands that, when he became incapacitated for a lengthy period prior to his death, the country was faced with almost insurmountable problems. Although the constitution he had given Algeria did provide for succession to the presidency in case of death or resignation, it did not cover the case of illness or incapacitation. Nor had Boumedienne appointed a vice-president or prime minister, even though the constitution provided for such appointments. The country's other political leaders were thus plunged into a state of deep anxiety when Boumedienne became ill. The Revolutionary Council, which had supplanted the political wing of the National Liberation Front (FLN), temporarily took power. But the president's illness precipitated a power struggle within the council. Hence it was impossible for Algeria to follow the route taken in Angola, the Congo, or Kenya, by having the council appoint one of its members to head the country and then convoke a congress of the ruling party to confirm him in office. When Boumedienne finally died, the situation was somewhat altered. The constitution provided that the president of the National Assembly should become acting president for a period of forty-five days, long enough to allow the ruling party to meet in special congress to designate a candidate for the presidency. But the acting president was prohibited from becoming a candidate himself. It was therefore necessary to look to the Revolutionary Council, of which all of Boumedienne's earliest supporters were members, to find a potential candidate. Boumedienne's opponents now ended their silence and began calling for the inauguration of total democracy, liberation of political prisoners, and immediate elections open to all comers. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Council split into three factions. The main bone of contention was of course the procedure for designating candidates: Which official body was to be empowered to select the candidate or candidates for the presidency? The opposition parties were officially illegal. But the ruling party, the FLN, had been reduced to a caretaker role since Boumedienne's takeover in 1965. The Revolutionary Council had relieved the party's political wing of its functions pending the party's reorganization, scheduled for 1979. Finally, within the council, none of the three factions was strong enough to dominate. Two were almost equal in size, while the third, much smaller, favored following the constitution and calling a special party congress, even though the party had for many years played only a minimal role in government. In the words of this faction's leader, "A party congress is the only politically feasible and constitutionally lawful way of resolving the crisis of the moment." Meanwhile, the opposition wanted full democratization of the regime, and the army favored strict enforcement of the

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constitution: "The officers of the People's National Army declare their unshakable devotion to the Constitution, which they wish to see strictly enforced, in order to carry the Revolution forward and preserve what it has already achieved."[10] In the end, a party congress was convoked to choose Boumedienne's successor.

In the forty-five days following Boumedienne's death, the constitution was strictly adhered to. The president of the National Assembly became acting president, and ordered that a special party congress be held. At the congress, the same factions that existed within the Revolutionary Council made their presence felt. To avoid a deadlock, it was suggested that a candidate be chosen who was not associated with any of the factions. Only one man was acceptable to all the interested groups: Chadly Bendjeddid, an uncommitted Boumedienne supporter. He was chosen to be the party's candidate, elected president on February 7, and sworn in on February 9. Thus, although Boumedienne did not handpick his own successor, he did establish the constitutional procedures that made the transfer of power possible.

Other African leaders have also tried to set procedures for the transfer of power while still in office. Some of these experiments were even more far-reaching than Boumedienne's constitution. In Senegal, for instance, President Senghor personally initiated a process of democratization that culminated in an orderly transfer of power that was without precedent on the African continent. Senghor had of course succeeded in building a one-party state around his own party, the UPS (Senegalese Progressive Union), even though Senegal was a country with long-standing democratic and pluralist traditions. A 1971 constitutional amendment provided for the appointment of a prime minister, and Senghor named a young technocrat, Abdou Diouf, to the post. Further amendments in 1976 did away with the one-party system and reinstated a multiparty regime with at first three and later four legal parties. Even more important, the 1976 revision of the constitution stipulated that the prime minister automatically became president for the remainder of the current term if the president should die or resign.

The UPS, renamed the PS (Socialist Party), ran candidates in the February 1978 elections against the candidates of two other parties, the PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party) and the PAI (African Independence Party). Senghor's ruling party emerged from this election even stronger than it had been, since in this kind of situation, elections serve more as a ritual to enforce charisma than as a way of choosing leaders. The PS took eighty-three of the one hundred seats in parliament, the remainder going to the PDS. Later on, a fourth party was also legalized, but even this did not put an end to the clamor of "illegal" parties for a full multiparty regime. In the midst of this controversy, Senghor announced his retirement. Prime Minister Diouf was sworn in as president on January 1, 1981, before the Supreme Court. He immediately announced his intention to proceed toward a totally democratic regime and a full multiparty system. His term of office runs until 1983, at which time all parties will be free to compete for the presidency.

President Ahidjo of Cameroon is following a similar course. As his plan was originally conceived, succession was not as automatic as in Senegal. The president of the National Assembly was to become acting president for a period

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of fifty days if the presidency became vacant. This arrangement did not eliminate the danger of power struggles of the sort we have seen occurring elsewhere. Ahidjo's threats to retire revealed the seriousness of the problem of succession, and each party congress provided renewed evidence of the threat of a power struggle in case the president should die. As a result, Ahidjo took the second step of appointing a prime minister who would become acting president in case of the death, resignation, or incapacitation of the president. The choice of a permanent successor, however, was to be left up to the ruling party. At the 1975 congress of the party, held in Douala, Ahidjo stated that "the selection of a prime minister should not be thought of as the appointment of an heir apparent. God willing, I shall make that choice in conjunction with the party's central committee. It is up to the party to choose my successor and thus to allow our joint efforts to continue."[11] But even this measure could not allay the fears of Cameroon's political leaders or alleviate the ongoing power struggle. Ahidjo therefore took a third and final step: in June 1979 the constitution was amended once again, this time putting the prime minister first in line to succeed the president. Just as in Senegal, if the president is incapacitated, resigns, or dies, the prime minister finishes out his term.

In all three cases we have looked at thus far—Algeria, Senegal, and Cameroon—the emphasis has been more on institutional arrangements and legal technicalities than on politics per se. Now, in a charismatic regime, politics is of course the heart of the matter, and as long as the political problems are not resolved, political leaders will continue to worry about the fate of the regime. This anxiety leads to constant tinkering with the provisions of the constitution in search of a viable political solution. This is what happened in the Ivory Coast, for example, where all of the various constitutional arrangements discussed above were tried out at one time or another, only to be rejected in the end as unworkable. Finally, at the September 1980 congress of the ruling party, the PDCI (Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast), President Houphouet-Boigny opted in favor of a "definitive" political solution. An earlier amendment to the constitution, adopted in 1975, had provided for the president of the National Assembly to complete the unfinished term of the chief of state, at which time national elections would be held. Speculation had been that, instead of this arrangement, a new amendment would provide for the appointment of a prime minister, who would then become the constitutionally designated successor to the president, but this rumor proved false. In Houphouet-Boigny's view, the only answer to the problem of succession was to democratize the regime. But by this he did not mean establishing a multiparty state, as in Senegal. Rather, he favored democratization of the PDCI, through reorganization of its internal structures and an injection of new blood. If the party hoped to survive, the president said, it would have to "abide by the fundamental rules of all true democracies. . . . Our people have come of age. We must decentralize political responsibilities in an orderly way and trust the people to choose their own representatives at every level of government." Thus the definitive solution of the problem of succession, according to the Ivory Coast's president, must rely on universal suffrage and not on mere institutional adjustments. When one reporter asked the president what he had done to prepare the way for his own succession, Houphouet-Boigny first compared himself to George Washington,

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who left office voluntarily, and then put the following question to his interlocutor: "Do you think Lenin realized that Stalin would succeed him? Or Stalin that his successor would be Khrushchev? For my own part, I place my trust in people. I am trying to put together a new government. The man who follows me will probably come out of this new cabinet."[12]

After his reelection as president, Houphouet-Boigny put these ideas into practice. He regained control of the ruling party from the political bosses who had allowed it to become rigid and unresponsive. The party was reorganized to allow for greater democracy and to inject fresh blood. Party secretaries were now popularly elected, and young technocrats worked shoulder to shoulder with old political infighters. Where once the party bosses had drawn up the only list of candidates in this one-party state, now elections were free and open. Anyone who wished to run might do so. Neither the party nor its leader, Houphouet-Boigny, would intervene on behalf of any candidate.

But this was not all. Not only would the revitalized party bring forth a new leader, but the people themselves would participate in naming him when the office of president became vacant. Now that the political solution to the problem of succession was in hand, the constitution had to be amended to facilitate its application. Accordingly, the following amendment was adopted: "The president of the republic shall choose a vice-president to be elected along with him. . . . If the office of president becomes vacant as a result of death, resignation, or total incapacitation duly determined by the Supreme Court upon petition of the government, the vice-president shall become, ipso jure, president of the republic for a period not to exceed the unexpired term of office of the previous president."

Thus the system adopted in the Ivory Coast is modeled on the American idea of a "ticket," pairing the president and the vice-president. As a political solution to the problem of succession, this bestows a twofold legitimacy on the man who succeeds to the presidency: first, he benefits from the charismatic authority of his predecessor, who chose him for the job, and second, he obtains the legal-rational (institutional) sanction offered by popular election, coupled with constitutional due process. In this one-party state, these arrangements would appear to offer ample guarantees of continuity.

Since, however, no vice-president has yet been designated, is there not reason to fear a situation such as that which developed in Algeria after the death of Boumedienne? And how can a vice-president be elected now, when the president himself has just been elected for a five-year term that does not expire until 1985? A look at what happened when the National Assembly debated the proposed constitutional reforms will help to shed further light on the changes. When one deputy asked what would happen if the head of state were elected without a vice-president, and the need for a successor arose, the president of the National Assembly answered that "cases make law and not the other way around." He then evoked the case of President Nixon: when Nixon resigned, Vice-President Ford automatically became president, and he in turn named a vice-president who had not been elected. In other words, the president of the Ivory Coast is free to choose his own vice-president until the next presidential elections in 1985, at which time the president and vice-president must run together on a single ticket. Still, since no vice-president has yet been named, the fear remains that a situation may come to pass such as that which occurred in

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Algeria upon the death of President Boumedienne.[13] Is Houphouet-Boigny afraid that nominating a vice-president will precipitate a power struggle? Or is he simply waiting for a viable candidate to emerge from within his new government?

* * *

The problem of succession is not unique to African regimes. Any political system must constantly cope with problems arising from the fact that more than one kind of authority is found in any real polity. Different forms of authority are always found in unstable amalgams, and there is always conflict over which principle of legitimacy should dominate. The ultimate goal of any political system is to establish rules governing the transfer and use of power, no matter what form that power may take. The way power is transferred—the mode of succession—is thus an important attribute of any political system.

In today's world, where all national problems become international ones, a government whose mode of succession is securely established inspires confidence not only domestically, but also abroad. This is of great concern to African nations, whose developmental problems involve international as well as internal considerations. In the current geopolitical climate, it is more than ever imperative that states succeed in rationalizing their political behavior. I therefore believe that a rationally organized state is a prerequisite for all national development.

Development, though, involves rationalization not only of political behavior but also of the economic, technological, and cultural aspects of a social system, since each is intimately associated with all the others. Indeed, the types of authority that we have examined in this essay can never really be isolated from other aspects of social reality. Hence the economic, technological, and cultural environment should always be kept in mind when discussing political questions. In the developed countries, such political structures as the nation-state and multiparty parliamentary democracy became stable only after the development of specific forms of social stratification and economic and cultural change. It was only after the global social context had been modified that it became impossible for older charismatic and traditional forms of authority to survive (or at any rate to flourish as they once did).

What emerges, then, from the foregoing analysis is that the rationalization of power may take different forms in different societies. Rationalization cannot run its course, however, until the importance of charismatic and traditional forms of power has waned. In particular, democracy—that is, the broadening of popular participation in political institutions regardless of their type—also appears to contribute to political rationalization.

The approach I have taken in this essay derives from Max Weber. It is of course only one of many possible approaches to the study of political science. Still, I think it has been shown to be useful for understanding the problems of succession, democratization, and political rationalization in African societies, which in turn can help political scientists to gain a deeper understanding of political development generally.

Translated by Arthur Goldhammer

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[1]Weber's theory of charisma is used here only as a convenient instrument for the study of power in Africa. Since the theory has already proved abundantly fruitful in sociology and political science, it seems reasonable to employ it in the study of African societies. Still, it is essential to guard against confusing the nature of the European societies studied by Weber with the quite specific nature of African societies. Charisma, however, is a general concept, useful for the study of any society; Weber studied specifically European variants of charismatic authority, whereas we will be examining African instances of the same kind of power.

[2]Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber*, edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 79.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Generally speaking, African heads of state acquire charismatic attributes through myth and symbol. One might go so far as to say that charisma is commonly attached to the office itself, and that any head of state automatically becomes a charismatic figure (whether the role suits his character or not). Dictators and tyrants are thus able to make use of their ex officio charisma, as it were, to establish their hold over the people bit by bit. Such leaders as Bokassa, Nguema, and Idi Amin fit this description. On this subject, see especially Jean Girard, *Genèse du pouvoir charismatique en basse Casamance (Sénégal)* (IFAN-DAKAR, 1969).

[5]Erik Erikson, "The Leader as a Child," cited by Jean Lacouture, *Quatre hommes et leurs peuples, sur-pouvoir et sous-développement* (Paris: Seuil, 1969), p. 25.

[6]Lanciné Sylla, "*Dictatures aux abois*," afterword to *Flux et reflux des dictatures civiles et militaires en Afrique* (Paris: *Association Française de Science Politique*, 1981), colloquium on the end of dictatorships.

[7]Carl Schmitt, *Politische Theologie—Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von Souveranität* (Munich-Leipzig: 1934), p. 11.

[8]Lanciné Sylla, *Flux et reflux*.

[9]Ibid.

[10]*Demain l'Afrique* 18 (January 15, 1979).

[11]Ibid., 30 (July 2, 1979): 23.

[12]*Jeune Afrique* 148 (February 4, 1981): 30.

[13]See the report on the National Assembly debate on constitutional reform in *Fraternité matin*, the Ivory Coast's major newspaper, for Thursday, November 27, 1980.

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ES'KIA MPHAHLELE

Africa in Exile

EXILES. The numbers keep growing. Every political upheaval in Africa yields yet another crop of exiles. I saw it happen in the twenty years I myself was an exile. I met them in Africa, in Europe, in North America.

In 1958, when I had just left South Africa and was teaching in Nigeria, it was generally believed that white-ruled Southern Africa was the only part of the continent that could qualify for the kind of violence that throws people out into exile. Those were the high political times immediately after Ghana's independence, and during which the French colonies were, except for Guinea, negotiating de Gaulle's offer of independence two years later. Kenyatta's impending release from prison was being hotly debated.

Those were the days when Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd of South Africa and Sir Roy Wellensky of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were issuing threats all around against their dissident African subjects. Wellensky was proclaiming African nationalism as just so much poppycock. Verwoerd had a treason trial on, in which 156 members of the interracial Congress Alliance and affiliated trade unionists were on the dock for allegedly attempting to overthrow the government by violence.

In December 1958, Kwame Nkrumah, head of newly independent Ghana, called the All African Peoples Conference, which was mostly attended by representatives of resistance movements still operating in colonial countries. Ethiopia was conspicuously absent. I made my first acquaintance with Kenneth Kaunda, at Accra then, still a political initiate, and vying with Harry Nkumbula for leadership of Northern Rhodesian opposition groups.

When I was visiting England in the middle of 1959, Joshua Nkomo had already attracted a strong British lobby to support his cause in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, especially from among the Labor party ranks. I met him and activists from Malawi and East African countries. In Paris were Malagasy and West Africans, some still undecided about returning to an independent homeland, others still studying, others again quite sure that there was not much to return to.

In 1962, as director of African Programs, in the employ of the Paris-based International Congress for Cultural Freedom, I made a tour of African states to survey their cultural institutions. By then, countries like Malawi, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania were a year or two away from independence. President Banda and some of his party associates were rebuking South African refugees

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for not returning home "to fight the whites." His Congress newspaper was attacking the refugees for being cowards.

I remember vividly how high my spirits were, vicariously filled with pride at viewing especially the whole theatrical setting and regalia of proud, strong, self-confident Nigerians, Ghanaians, Senegalese, Malians, and so on, in their newly won independence.

The first South African black to flee the country came from the Treason Trial group in 1957—the writer Alfred Hutchinson. He subsequently died in exile in Nigeria, where he was teaching.

Sharpeville broke upon us on March 20, 1960. With the subsequent banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), more South Africans fled, taking the tortuous route that cut through Botswana, the Rhodesias, East Africa, and thence either to Ethiopia or Zaïre. Some of them, assisted with scholarships from international organizations like the African-American Institute, proceeded to the United States for further studies. Others went to England, West and East Germany, and Russia to take up studies.

Then followed the Rivonia Trial in the wake of the Treason Trial, and that of Robert Sobukwe, leader of the Pan-Africanist Congress, and colleagues who had organized the anti-pass conference at Sharpeville. Nelson Mandela and Sobukwe, among several others, were sent to Robben Island to serve sentences ranging from five years to life.

Kwame Nkrumah needed only to visit Peking, in an attempt to mediate in the Indochinese upheavals, for a military coup to be staged in Ghana. He died a few years later, an exile in Sekou Touré's Guinea. Then the Nigerian deluge broke out in 1966, followed by the Biafran war of secession. Milton Obote of Uganda had to flee the wrath of a military junta, to become an exile in Tanzania.

Already a few intellectuals had fled Obote's wrath when he ruled Uganda. Exiles, and still more exiles, were to be found in African states. Nyerere's Tanzania, Nkrumah's Uganda, Banda's Malawi, Kenyatta's Kenya, Touré's Guinea, North Africa, Ethiopia, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Zaïre—all these were to see their sons and daughters join the Southern Africans, the Angolans, the Mozambiquans, in African capitals and those of the Western world.

Almost overnight after independence, I witnessed the tragic unfolding of the imperial theme, as Shakespeare would have dramatized it. News filled the air of treachery, assassination, palace rebellions, preventive detention, corrupt government, neo-colonial plots to subvert independence, public executions involving rebels, of persons being liquidated by murder as members of the parliamentary opposition, and so on. Such news still hangs over the whole African landscape. Each time the bell tolls the death of one person, several refugees spill across borders. Intellectuals who are frustrated because the existing neo-colonial structures of education resist new ideas are leaving to try their luck in other institutions of higher learning outside the continent.

Men I found cabinet ministers in newly independent states were exiles three years later. I met the same Malawians who had reviled Southern Africans in

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Tanzania. Several of these and others have no hope of returning home in the near future.

Savagely repressive regimes stay in power relatively long in Africa. The lack of political sophistication and strong ethnic loyalties are among the factors responsible for this. Such regimes stay long, especially if they sustain their level of repression somewhere between a state of utter chaos, a lack of will to rule, and Amin-type monstrosities. And so exiles from countries where there is even a semblance of "benevolent dictatorship" remain outside longest.

At this point, one is compelled to ask if South Africa, in its own grotesquely ironic fashion, might not be classed among the states that operate a regime of "benevolent repression" at varying degrees of brutality. Pressure from black political groups counts for very little in the minor concessions the government makes to ease the brunt here and there. The government is all-powerful, bans existing organizations, and scorns those they allow to function, because these organizations have not yet developed anything like the national dimensions and relevance of the ANC or PAC. Like all benevolent dictatorships, the government hands down a few concessions, like desegregating some parks, some post offices, some theatres, and so on. In themselves insignificant, these concessions come from an authority that has the unassailable power to dispense them. It does not matter that it is economics that often determines the pace; the final decision rests with the conqueror to relieve tension here and keep on the heat there, to operate the profit-and-loss mechanics of power in relation to its white constituency, to manipulate its expectations.

It did not take a constituted political movement, such as the banned organizations, to touch off the savage anger of the government in 1976. Schoolchildren did it. It took more subsequent boycotts to shake the rulers, this time involving also "coloreds" and Indians, who would normally have been thought to be comfortable in the preferential treatment that successive white regimes have used to buy them over. But it also took many children's lives before the regime decided to appoint a commission to inquire into South African education for both black and white, with the express aim of seeking ways to attain equality of education "for all inhabitants of South Africa." A state-funded organization, rather than an independent judicial commission, has been assigned the job. The aftermath of 1976-77 was the flight of scores of children ranging in age from ten years and up. Their parents continue to be harassed by the police, who are trying to keep track of the whereabouts of the children.

Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, and more recently Lesotho—all these have, like southern Sudan and Amin's Uganda, experienced political upheavals in the last decade, the excruciating aftermath of which has been the exile of whole families and several children with no parental companionship, who people a landscape stretching from the Orange River to the Niger.

Civil strife has had its own toll. Several intellectuals from eastern Nigeria, mostly Iboland, could be found in African and American universities well into the 1970s. Sporadic attacks on Chief Leabua's government in Lesotho by his exiled opponent, Ntsu Mokhehle, have resulted in suspect families being hounded across Lesotho's border with South Africa. The most recent distress

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signals come from the considerably enlarged refugee population in southern Sudan, whence only a few years ago the Sudanese of Negro stock fled into Uganda in droves from the Arab-dominated rule in their country. The current flood of refugees has emerged from the civil war in Chad, from the secessionist war in the Eritrea portion of Ethiopia, from Amin's reign of terror in Uganda.

II

The UN Commission for Refugees hopes to resettle these new refugees on Sudan's virgin land. This will only benefit those who have fled war or political unrest. It will exclude those refugees who came across in whole families from Ethiopia and were grounded by drought and famine. Among these are several individuals, as distinct from groups of refugees, who believed their lives were in danger in Ethiopia, Chad, and Uganda, and those who had personal quarrels with one official or another in charge of a deadly political machine in these three turbulent situations.

You are a refugee today. As soon as you find asylum in a country disposed to grant it, you are an exile. Indeed, mentally you already consider yourself an exile as soon as you cross the border of your country in flight. To the extent that you are conscious of what you are fleeing from and of where you are heading to seek a place of refuge, you are an exile.

The Statute of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees defines refugee in an international context. The Statute goes back to 1950, but it has been ratified by only some states. On September 4, 1967, a Protocol took effect that was added to the Convention to cover the status of refugees. So more countries became signatories to the Protocol, in addition to those who ratified the 1950 Convention Agreement.

In his book *The Anatomy of Exile*,[1] Paul Tabori asks us to consider the following points of definition, arrived at after testing an initially tentative definition against the sentiments of several exiles:

1. An exile is a person who is compelled to leave his homeland—though the forces that send him on his way may be political, economic, or purely psychological. It does not make an essential difference whether he is expelled by physical force or whether he makes the decision to leave without such immediate pressure.

2. The status of the exile, both material and psychological, is a dynamic one—it changes from exile to emigrant or emigrant to exile. These changes can be the result both of circumstances altering his homeland and of the assimilation process in his new country. An essential element in this process is the attitude of the exile to the circumstances prevailing in his homeland that are bound to influence him psychologically.

3. The contribution of the exile can be determined by his efforts at assimilation, his desire to become accepted, and by the assets (spiritual and intellectual) he brings with him. That is, he might acquire skills and knowledge in the country of reception that enable him to make such a

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contribution—or he might cling to his original national and spiritual identity, which makes such a contribution more valuable and more acceptable.

4. While the exile may leave with the full determination to return, this resolve is likely to weaken and fade in direct proportion to the length of absence. It is only exceptional that it survives more than one generation.

5. However eager for assimilation, the exile will always retain an often subconscious interest and affection for his homeland. (He may be watching the Olympic Games and cheer with equal enthusiasm the representatives of his native country and those of his adopted country.)

6. The contribution of the exile to his new country is always likely to be greater than his influence still felt in the land of his birth. His successes abroad are likely to be envied and derided.

There are some variants of his categories, as Paul Tabori readily admits. One can readily think of the following:

1. Essentially, African exiles have left owing to immediate pressure, or out of frustration in the practice of a profession. The frustration may be rooted in considerations of material welfare or spiritual self-fulfillment, or both.

2. The attitude of the exile to the "circumstances prevailing in his homeland" that influence him psychologically varies from person to person, with the possible exception of exiles who leave as a group, bound together by an ideology. Even then, the longer the group stays outside, the greater the likelihood of separation, as the members find avenues for their professional fulfillment separate from one another.

3. Where exiles come as refugees and are accommodated in camps according to their affiliation with exiled political parties, the longer they have been away, the greater the likelihood of internal fighting, splinter factions, even, in extreme cases, killings. This happened to Angola's MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), Mozambique's FRELIMO (Liberation Front of Mozambique), Zimbabwe's African Peoples Union and African National Union, and South Africa's Pan-Africanist Congress and African National Congress.

4. In countries that provide camps, there may be professionals—teachers, lawyers, doctors, writers—who share a common nationality with the freedom fighters. These professionals are employed by the country of reception under conditions that make assimilation and an immigrant status impossible. Relations between the two groups of exiles are commonly uneasy, and the freedom fighter silently resents his professional countryman. The intellectual most often resigns himself to his personal academic pursuits. Even in relation to the political leadership from his own country, he is gradually made to feel irrelevant, because he is no longer (if he ever was) regarded as a freedom fighter.

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5. By and large, because of the shortage of jobs in African countries, and the propensity of these countries to take care of their own first, Europe, including Britain, and North America have become the main areas of political asylum.

6. There are exiles who return home even if the political situation they left behind may not have changed for the better. The reasons for this are mainly psychological.

7. I would venture to say that there are only a negligible number of African intellectuals who would assert, as so many European exiles do, that they left because of their countries' backwardness and philistinism, the latter being a concern of artists.

8. Of a singular kind, one imagines, is the loneliness of the ruler, or members of the ruling class, who had to flee the retribution that awaits them after a "people's revolution," and for whose blood the masses cry out. They have to go into hiding wherever they can find asylum. They are kept on sufferance, euphemistically called "humanitarian grounds," by the host government. This view, of course, assumes that such people have a high degree of sensitivity and intellect. Even when the host government sympathizes with their cause, owing to its own homegrown tyranny toward the masses, "it can never be like home." And power is sweet: to lose it is to forfeit your whole purpose for living. Amin and Bokassa are among this last category.

The mechanics of living may very well be taken care of for the exile who contributes his skills to his host country. The exiles who live in camps, too, may want for little in material welfare. They may all be provided for by the UN Commission for Refugees, and travel freely on UN documents. But ultimately, it is the individual who is left with the burden of exile as a condition of the mind. He has to face himself and try to resolve this condition. This is especially so among intellectuals. There is a point beyond which the camp leader, the leader of an organization, or the commander in the barracks, where military training is conducted for refugees or freedom fighters, can never reach the individual in his charge.

Beyond this is the exile's private world, a personality loaded with contradictions, riddled with guilt feelings concerning the people who need his services back home. You may perhaps be one in a cluster of exiles in the same city or district thrown together by a common fear. Two insecure persons cannot room together with ease. So you feed on one another's miseries and insecurity. You attend the same parties. Several of these parties are embassy or consulate functions. You move in with a sense of belonging, you have an international status. You are being noticed by the international community. Being there makes you a "legitimate" exile, and exile justifies your being there. Who of your political enemies back home would dare cross that threshold to be graciously received by the ambassador and his wife, and still maintain a normal flow of adrenaline, sail in, and assert a cosmopolitan presence—*who?*

You are thrown together in a house, and Memory Lane takes you all back to your home country. Anecdotes are reeled off. You watch the daily newspapers

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and look for news about home. You analyze it to death. When, when, *when* will that glorious day come—the return?

"The government's running scared—there's a split in the ruling party. Hear me tell you, boys, it's not long before we march back in."

"Strong people scared—they become brutal, sadistic."

"They say my Ma's very ill."

"Hey, my sister just got married—I should've been there. Me and my sister were close."

"The ancestors will be with you, you've been in touch with your Ma all these years. Think of Kotsi—you know—remember he didn't know his Ma was dead till six years after her burial?"

"Guess who's in the city, fellows?"

"Who?"

"The Chief."

"What's so new about that? He's often here."

"Don't be dumb—the rebels, of course! The gang of eight, man."

"Discipline. Some people don't know we've got to stick together in exile. Either you're nationalist or not—no revisionism in that department. They've got to be disciplined."

"Yes, but what if there's dictatorship in the movement—why should we take the kind of manure from one another we don't want the whites raining on us?"

"You want to join the gang?"

"No, but I just can't stand this any longer!"

"Where would the movement be if we allowed every loudmouth rank-and-file to tell the leaders how to run it? Democracy's a luxury in a freedom movement in exile."

"And don't you be talking subversion, my friend. You forget you're still under a cloud until you're cleared."

"You think I care about being called an informer?"

"You damn well should *care—*I *would."*

"Try me—hey, the world's big, man, call me an informer, persecute me for it. I'll move elsewhere. It'd still be better than moulding and collecting cobwebs in our brains like we're doing here in a walkie-talkie organization."

"You've no right to speak like that about the Congress."

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"What'll you do—assassinate me? Go ahead—what a laugh! The organization's bored because it hasn't got a strategy for the return like FRELIMO and MPLA—so we chew each other's asses off, gun each other down."

"Shut up!"

The words keep coming: sad words, barbed words, venomous words. And the lonely ones keep coming back for more hurt. Suspicions, the guilt, borrowed bravery and stamina, the impotent anger, the vicarious exasperation touched off by events back home, theories insinuated into a home situation and proved later to be quite irrelevant—a home situation that is progressively receding into the hazier areas of memory; the haunting sense of loss and lack of a cultural context that can be intimately felt—all these rush into the vortex of one's person, expand and bubble into a poisonous yeast that can be soul-mutilating.

And when MPLA and FRELIMO and the Zimbabweans shoot their way back home, when Obote returns to Kampala, for better or for worse, those left in exile look on with a mixture of pride, hope, envy, and immobilizing exasperation. And again, some decide to abdicate, stand away for a while, try to better their own educational standing. Several can be found teaching in schools and universities in various parts of the world. For besides teaching, what other escape route or refuge is there for an exile?

As most African exiles are male, the need for female companionship becomes an added problem that extends beyond the basic burden of exile and its political dimensions. Reaching out to the surrounding milieu to find or create female friendships implies the acceptance, conscious or otherwise, of an extragroup commitment. The exile is stepping out of his cultural identity, a process he must contemplate in relation to his future, his plans to return home one day. Numerous things are possible as a result, whether the companion is black or white. On the one hand, she is being asked either to share a life of exile or to ensure the man's negation of it. On the other, this liaison compels him to reckon with his own future as a man and as a political exile.

On what terms will he be assimilated if he wants to raise a family and stay? How will the family adjust if or when that uncertain day comes for the return? Only in very rare cases has a whole African family returned home from exile, because man and wife have considered it unfair to ask that their children exchange a metropolitan life for an underprivileged one, even if this may be under black rule. They have roots in their ancestral soil their children will not necessarily have, hopes for spiritual solace their children cannot share. For them, return will mean the resolution of a condition the children do not psychologically share—exile. And the political imponderables back there are just too many. These are considerations and decisions that lie outside the sanctions of the ideological group, such as one's fellow-exiles may be tempted to project into the situation.

III

Prodigals, exiles, homecomings. First it was the exiled personality, the disinherited mind, uprooted from its indigenous African beliefs and ancestral

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shrines. That was when Africa entered the history of the West during the latter part of the fifteenth century, with the Portuguese plying their trade and setting up Christian mission stations along the coast from Senegal to Mozambique. It has become evident during all these centuries of African-European relationship that African humanism was just not morally equipped to deal with European humanism—the former rooted in the essence of being and social relationships, the other rooted in the aggressive, intrinsically colonizing and conquering push and thrust and drive peculiar to Renaissance intelligence. And so Africa was just ready for carving up at the Berlin Convention of 1885 and being served to the European guests.

Whether through Anglo-Saxon indirect rule and its laissez-faire policies, or through French and Portuguese assimilation, Africa was intellectually considered to be a province of the West, sharing and often even appropriating its language, its history of ideas, its commerce, its religion, its political styles.

From the 1950s onward, Edward Blyden, a Jamaican-born scholar who went to work in Liberia, and other polemicists of West Africa became the first to point up sharply the way in which Christian missionaries had sought to suck in all of the African's soul and personality. In the process, the African was stripped of the dignity of his traditional wisdom. Indeed, it was with Blyden that the concept of the "African personality" began, as an assertion of something distinctive that was being alienated.

A later development of the African personality can be seen in the use of the phrase by Kwame Nkrumah in 1958. For him, the African personality referred to the African's political presence in world affairs, Ghana's independence being an ostensible realization of this.

The spiritual expression of Blyden's concept found fertile ground in Haiti. After the War of Haitian Independence, which freed the island from French rule, literature became an effective vehicle for ideas that were meant to decolonize the Haitian mind and reestablish the people's cultural heritage rooted in their past.

Exiled first from the African soil as slaves and then again from their heritage as a French-colonized people, subsequently aggravated by the American occupation, the Haitians set out in quest of their folklore. Writers and scholars formed themselves into groups, and expressed their will to be free from the occupation and to restore their indigenous culture.

Dr. Jean Price-Mars, leader of the Indigenist Movement, as it came to be called, struck out in this spiritual odyssey and published in 1928 *Ainsi parla l'oncle*. The book revealed Haitian cultural values, linking them with African agrarian and pastoral cultures. The dignity in which he clothed his ideas cushioned the Haitians against the pain of exile.

His reading of Price-Mars confirmed in Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal the need for an ideology such as *négritude*. He saw the Haitian as the father of *négritude*, a term that came to mean for Senghor, and for other Africans and West Indians who were studying in Paris in the 1930s, the amalgam of African traditional values. Among these were Aimé Césaire of Martinique, the late Léon Damas of Guyana, and Birago Diop of Senegal.

As writers, they had become acutely conscious of the same alienation from their origins as Price-Mars had felt. In their compositions, they began to

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substitute African imagery for the derivative imagery of French romanticism—for example, ancestral shrines, savannah and jungle, tom-toms, the rituals that revealed a zest for life, a sense of theatre, and the emotional-spiritual levels of the African's way of perceiving and of expressing himself. Senghor created the metaphors of the *prodigal* and *exile* in his intellectual trip back to African sources. Not because we had squandered our heritage, he would say, but because we had sought to bury it. "Listen to the voice of the ancestors," because, although they were exiled like us, when the white man arrived, the ancestors "never wanted to die, to let the torrent of their seed be lost in the sands."[2]

After sixteen years in France, Senghor returned home for a visit. Among other places, he visited his father's grave. In the poem "The Return of the Prodigal Son," he prostrates himself at the feet of the Ancestor, "faithful servant" of his childhood. His own feet are covered with the "mud of Civilization." He prays for "Peace, peace and peace . . . upon the brow of the Prodigal Son."[3]

If one had to write the refrain to this odyssey of the African intellectual, summed up in the allegory of Orpheus in the underworld, it would have to express the counterpoint act the African is caught up in, by virtue of the equilibrium he must find between the demands of modern life and those determined by traditional values:

> And, once out of the searing darkness of the Middle Passage,
> we were to follow the neon lights that would never let us be.

Not long afterward, Kofir Awoonor of Ghana and the late Christopher Okigbo of Nigeria took up the theme of spiritual exile, of the Prodigal. We are, according to Awoonor, exiles who abandoned our traditional shrines, leaving our fences to the termites, and dunghills to heap up on our birthplace. His supplication is for the moon to shine and our way to light up the return.[4] Our music, he says, is "the hallelujahs of our second selves," the indigenous consciousness and the superimposed styles of Western culture. Here the exiles

> . . . shuffle their feet in agonies of birth
> Lost souls, lost souls that are still at the gate

Having entered the white man's history, we need to locate a point of equilibrium. Awoonor is always urging us to return for purification. "Sew the old days for me," he asks the ancestors. And yet, he does not try to make the return appear easy. It can only be a qualified return, because of the equipment we bring with us, because of the new socioeconomic demands we have to meet. He knows very well that culture is not static, that it is the death of a people from the day they decide that their culture is adequately defined and neatly packaged for all time, available any time at the supermarket.

What equipment we bring to this process of rediscovery of the indigenous African self is symbolized in a poem by Gambia's Lenrie Peters, "Parachute Men." He sees his own return to his country, after years of study and work in England, as a descent by parachute. You reach earth with a jolt after coming through condensed time, and then lug your gear across the field. You have

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absorbed the ideas and life-style of the country that gave shelter and room to develop. This cultural equipment is bound to qualify your return. So you are again at the starting point:

> The violent arrival
> Puts out the joint
> Earth has nowhere to go
> You are at the starting point.
> Jumping across worlds
> In condensed time
> After the awkward fall
> We are always at the starting point.[5]

In yet another poem, "We have come home," Peters tells how we have come home "from the bloodless wars / with sunken hearts." Bloodless wars, because out there, in the world of strangers, there is a constant tug and shove in your involvement with the environment. We have to survive and so must adapt:

> We have come home
> Bringing the pledge
> Which is written in rainbow colors
> Across the sky—for burial
> But it is not the time
> To lay wreaths
> For yesterday's crimes.[6]

Inasmuch as he was always monitoring his spiritual growth so closely, always measuring the distances and limits of his being, Christopher Okigbo was being rather too harsh on himself in his use of prodigal. In his poetry, he continually revisits his shrines and the spirits of his universe:

> Thundering drums and cannons
> in palm grove:
> the spirit is in ascent . . .
> I have visited the prodigal.
>
> In palm grove,
> long-drums and cannons
> the spirit in the ascent.[7]

And when the time comes for worship, he pleads:

> softly sing the bells of exile,
> the angelus,
> softly sing my guardian angels.[8]

He is peeved at the thought that he does not wear the ancestral mask, but that of a Christian. So he invokes the help of his mother Anna:

> protect me
> from them fucking angels
> protect me
> my sandhouse and bones.

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On the other hand, he may very well have been prodigal with the time and energy expended in pursuit of a metaphor from the traditions of Western classical literatures; prodigal in the excessive facility and glee with which he moved in and out of classical allusions.

African poets, novelists, and dramatists have for some time been making this point: that for the intellectual—for it is not the masses they are addressing, who do not share their education and language—to redeem himself and snap out of his kind of exile, he should, like Awoonor and Okigbo, go back and listen to the rhetoric and concerns of his people, to the music and drama of his native landscape. He should not expect the "fatted calf" to be slaughtered to celebrate his return either. The return per se is sufficient and self-justifying.

> And, once out of the searing darkness of the Middle Passage
> we were to follow the neon lights that would never let us be.

In the subcontinent of Southern Africa, the most white-settled part of this land mass, the indigenous people began to express themselves on their condition—landlessness and the total absence of political rights. They saw their condition essentially as a frontier one, as a physical encounter with white military strength. In the oldest newspapers to publish African writing, *Isigidimi* (The Messenger, 1871) and *Imvo* (The Voice, 1884), writers satirized Christianity. But they generally would not conceive the idea of alienation. Rather, the elite, brought up in mission stations, like Lovedale in the Eastern Cape, and others where mission presses existed, were in fact telling the whites that they (the Africans) made worthier Christians.

In the Basutoland of the nineteenth century, the French mission press was used by writers to urge their people not to forget their traditional lore. But it was always within the Christian fold. The missionaries themselves rigorously vetoed any expression of alienation that could imply a yearning to return to "heathen" ways.

Even when Ethiopianism—the movement for religious independence—began in South Africa in the 1890s, and the African Methodist Episcopal Church of America (AME) later planted its denomination in the country, the idea of exile was wrapped up in Christian symbolism. The sense of urgency generated by a brutal present-white rule preempted any sense of exile. To wrest power from whites, one needed formal education, political experience, and wisdom, and a relatively secure economic base—all of which are Western tools. In time, the underdog would feel compelled to assimilate the white man's values, because they seemed inseparable from power, perhaps even sustained power.

It was, however, a sense of alienation, of Africa desecrated, that drove Dr. Pixley kaIzaka Seme, later to be one of the founders of the African National Congress (1912), to write in 1906:

> Oh Africa!
> Like some great century plant that shall bloom
> In ages hence, we watch thee; in our dream
> See in thy swamps the Prospero of our stream;

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> Thy doors unlocked, where knowledge in her tomb
> Hath lain innumerable years in gloom.
> Then shalt thou, walking with that morning gleam,
> Shine as thy sister lands with equal beam.[9]

John Dube and Sol Plaatje, the first president and secretary-general of the African National Congress, together with Seme, considered the need to establish a newspaper that could be a mouthpiece of the ANC and an instrument for "the regeneration of Africa." It is significant that the educated elite who led the political struggle those days defined nationalist aspirations *in relation to Africa as a whole*, because they felt strongly that the indigenous people of South Africa were marooned, cut off from Africa's umbilical cord. The ANC's national anthem talks about Africa, not South Africa.

At the same time that Senghor and others were hammering out *négritude* verse, Herbert Dhlomo was contemplating in a long poem, "The Valley of a Thousand Hills" (1941), a lost garden of beauty, the valley of a thousand hills in his home province, Natal. He saw it trampled underfoot by the white man's land greed, reduced to only a shadow of the home where there had been peace and serenity, where Africans had had full control over their lives. The migrant labor system that became a legalized institution drove able-bodied men into exile, where they became wanderers forever, having little or nothing to go back to after the valley had been raped.

Urban ghettos swelled with workers, who were building the white man's cities and manning his industries, and became festering slums. To escape the agony of exile, these urban dwellers dug in to establish a kind of permanence in areas where they were denied a sense of place. Over the generations, the sheer struggle for survival blurred the sense of exile, the sense of being emigrants. Senghor's image of the prodigal was unheard of in South Africa. The literature here reflected a pastoral sense of dispossession on the one hand, and on the other, a proletarian sense of urgency and restlessness that had everything to do with subjugation sustained by the white man's political machine. Africans were preoccupied with the "survival motion" that required one to balance the huge loss of land with the tiny profit accruing from cash wages in the cities. Survival of the ghetto siege, which generated its own poisonous juices within itself, became itself a heroic act. Do white folks' laundry . . . clean them and their houses . . . cook for them . . . stay on the factory job . . . save up so that you can make slight improvements on your municipal hovel, so that you can send your children to school. . . . Go to school, my son, and learn something useful that will earn you a job in the white man's city. These became acts of heroism that continued to exorcise any sense of exile the earlier migrants had felt. In any case, there was not much to return to in the rural areas.

But the white man was never going to let his subjects forget that they were black. The natural result of this was what we see today—the upsurge of a black consciousness: the full realization that the black man's assimilation of an urban sensibility operates not on his own terms, but on the white man's. There is a resurgence of that old feeling of being marooned, of having heard somewhere, at some time, that Africa will come back and drag you out of the deep mire and reclaim you.

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There is a poignant poem by Antonio Jacinto of Angola, who was imprisoned in Lisbon for fourteen years—"Letter from a Contract Worker." The sense of exile is there, although not stated in Senghorian terms:

I wanted to write you a letter
my love
a letter to tell
of this longing
to see you
and this fear
of losing you
of this thing which deeper than I want, I feel
a nameless pain which pursues me
a sorrow wrapped about my life. . . .
I wanted to write you a letter
my love
to bring back our days together in our secret haunts
nights lost in the shadow of your legs
and the moonlight filtering through the endless
palms
to bring back the madness of our passion
and the bitterness of separation. . . .
I wanted to write you a letter
but my love, I don't know why it is,
why, why, why it is, my love,
but you can't read
and I—oh the hopelessness—I can't write[10]

The early fiction from the pen of African writers speaks of childhood and youthful experiences in idyllic, though colonial, settings. It is a story of lost innocence, of maturing youth—for example, Camara Laye's *African Child* (Guinea), Ngugi wa Thiongo's *Weep Not Child* and *The River Between* (Kenya), Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* (Nigeria), and Cheik Hamidou Kane's *Ambiguous Adventure* (Senegal).

The long journey into European enlightenment turns out to be an adventure into night, as Kane sees it in his novel. Diallo, the young man in *Ambiguous Adventure*, is advised to go to the white man's school, to learn "the art of conquering without being right." The school bewitches the soul, makes conquest permanent. But you must take your chances. Diallo is in France, moving in the European corridors of learning, and observing the life of the European. His Islamic sensibilities are outraged. When he is back home, still shaken by his experience abroad, he is killed by the village fool, who thinks Diallo has abandoned the ways of Islam. It has been a long journey into night, into exile.

The loss of innocence and parental protection, initiation into the rigors of Jim Crow life, are depicted in my book *Down Second Avenue*, in *Tell Freedom*, by Peter Abraham, and in the short fiction of Alex la Guma, Richard Rive, and James Matthews, all South African writers. My novel *The Wanderers*, as the title suggests, is the odyssey of a South African exile who seeks a home. His son grows away from him, recedes into his own world that he himself doesn't comprehend, out of reach.

More recently, fiction and drama in independent Black Africa have set the stage for all that has become, for the intellectual, the catastrophic collapse of a

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social order, driving him bodily into exile. It is a story of how independence miscarried. And the point I want to make is that African exile, in the literal sense, has its roots in the spiritual exile earlier writers felt and expressed. That exile arose from a fundamental clash between the colonizing and aggressive civilization of the West and the humanism of Africa, which takes an organic view of the universe and which in turn rotates on the axis of social relationships. Colonial exploitation, the racism of Europe, the money economy that runs full tilt against indigenous social values, the ascendency-submission relations between colonizer and subject, nation-building that of necessity undermines ethnic boundaries and the self-contained political organizations they define, the conflict between national ideologies and ethnic loyalties, the continued dependence of Africans on their former colonizers and the rest of the white world, world powers that can impose their own terms for economic and technical aid on a governing elite in charge of a nation's treasury, large-scale illiteracy—all these and other factors point to a malady that says much about the alienation of the intellect, the disinherited mind, the dislocation of an indigenous world view, and the failure of both Africa and the West to arrive at a synthesis. And the story began with spiritual exile. It won't matter for now that Africa has several well-trained and efficient politicians and economists who in normal circumstances could run a state efficiently.

The story of how independence miscarried, Ayi Kwei Armah's *The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born* (Ghana), suggests in its very title that independence has not yet been won. The political or military coup and civil war are now prevalent themes. Chinua Achebe's *A Man of the People* is prophetic, when we consider the bloodbath into which Nigeria was subsequently to be plunged. Wole Soyinka's play *Kongi's Harvest* satirizes the tyrant, who is driven into exile in the end. Ngugi wa Thiongo's *Petals of Blood* deals with the complexities of life in a corrupt, independent country.

Soyinka has continued in his plays to probe mythology, but his poetry has become mostly ideological in the context of today's political experiences. Gone are the idyllic dreams of childhood. Gone are the beautiful lyrics that probed the inner mysteries of Africa, in which the writer was, with a newfound voice, exploring his location in relation to his myths, the traditional thought and belief of his people, and new cultural demands. In one decade the poetry has shifted away from the lyricism that celebrated the ways of birth and dying, the way of and to the gods, and sang the triumph of independence. Now the lyrics are being muffled by the clamor of the times. Now we hear in the poetry a hard narrative tone that alternates with agonized incantation. The elegy still expresses a sense of loss, but of another order.

The stage for subsequent upheavals is movingly described for us by Bernard Dadie's "*Homme de tous les continents*" (Ivory Coast). The poem's protagonist announces that he has emerged from "blood-bespattered nights." He was there, he says, when "the angel drove out the ancestor," when Jesus "reconciled heaven and earth." We now look for ourselves "in the false dawn of the streetlamps." The hours are "drunk with gunpowder." There is a refrain, repeated only twice, that establishes the mood of a future time not far off:

> bullets still behead the roses
> in the mornings of dreams.[11]

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Casualties, a volume of poetry by J. P. Clark of Nigeria, expresses in a hard, dramatic diction the bewilderment and acrimony generated by the civil war of 1967–70 in his country:

> Caucuses at night, caucuses by day,
> With envoys, alien and local,
> Coming and going, in and out
> of the strongroom. What brief
> In their cases? The state,
> Like a snake severed of its head,
> Lies thrashing in blood, and
> Unless a graft at once is found,
> the bird will flee the tree.[12]

Clark tells us also that the casualties are not only the dead, the wounded, the dispossessed, those in prison. There are others who are "outside the scenes of ravage and wreck"—there are the "emissaries of rift" who are "snug" in the foreign countries where they are exiles, raising partisan money and other support for a "dance with rites it does not know."

Clark is intensely partisan on the side of the federal government. Other writers, like Chinua Achebe, and Christopher Okigbo, were naturally on Biafra's side. Wole Soyinka tried to mediate between the two sides before the war broke out, and was arrested and detained by the federal government on suspicion that he was backing Biafra. It is in a special sense that Soyinka bewails the failure of governments to learn from history: the ghosts of war "evade guardianship of predecessors," and bring with them to the earth old hints and old truths. The present rulers ignore these hints, this wisdom, trusting in the bankruptcy of instant wisdom.

Soyinka finds the motivations behind the war absurd: "old pretensions," "throbs of dead passion," the "heat of comradeship," "cold betrayal," the fact that "little victories" will result in "greater losses." The best that Soyinka can hope for in this time of civil strife is that some great truths shall be learned in spite of "stammering planes," great buildings shall emerge despite "crooked sights," something strong shall grow in spite of the dwarfs who deliver war.

Intellectual freedom suffered during the war: some writers acquiesced, others not. Soyinka wrote a volume of poetry, *A Shuttle in the Crypt*, in prison. Of Okigbo, who died in battle during the war, Soyinka contemplates a soul in peace in contrast to his own imprisonment:

> Perhaps 'tis kinder that vultures toil
> To cleanse torch-bearers for the soil
>
> Than eagles bare their living bone
> Chained to an eternity of stone.

Okigbo is cleansed by the death unleashed upon him by political vultures; Soyinka's flesh is being picked by eagles until he is a skeleton.

In 1965 Okigbo was already invoking the talking drums to "hide us; deliver us from our nakedness."

> Come; limber our raw hides of antelopes. . . .
> Thunder of tanks of giant iron steps of detonators.
> Fail safe from the clearing, we implore you:
> We are tuned for a feast-of-seven souls.[13]

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The drums should now sound a message of warning, of collective effort against political power gone insane.

Okigbo saw the disorder in Nigeria as the return of the forces of colonialism, symbolized in "eagles" with bayonets and cannons. The eagles are also robbers, descending on us "to strip us of our laughter, of our thunder"; they are back "in black hidden steps of detonators." The poet feared that these eagles and robbers would lead the revolution astray; for to him, the military coup (i.e., preceding the war) was a welcome new order that would supplant the old corrupt order.

IV

Of the eight major black writers living in exile and writing about their home country—South Africa—four are poets of considerable importance who are still active: Dennis Brutus and Mazisi Kunene in the United States, Keorapetse Kgositsile (Tanzania), and Mongane Serote (Botswana). Four black writers from South Africa died in exile. I knew each of them intimately, and do not hesitate to say that the circumstances of their deaths had much to do with the frustrations of art that tries desperately to be heard from the wilderness of exile, unsupported by the cultural milieu it is addressing.

South Africa issued a blanket ban in 1966 on all its black writers living abroad. This means that their writings are forbidden circulation in South Africa, a measure entrenched in the Internal Security Act.

Kgositsile contemplates the purpose of exile:

> My days have fallen
> into nightmarish despair. I know
> no days that move on toward laughter,
> except in memory stale as our glory.
> I see no touch of determined desire,
> past the impotence of militant rhetoric.

He refers here to the impotence of exile politics: "I know no dance but the slow death of a dazed continent."

Mazisi Kunene dreams of waking up and calling, "We have come home." But what is it *like* at home?

> There were those shadows that were human
> Others followed the long outline of knives
> And uniforms of iron and buttons of steel
> And faces filed against a prison wall.

A man in exile will continually be haunted by "nightmares of sealed walls," silences, although he can still speculate on "rich tomorrows."

Dennis Brutus's poetry still echoes the sirens, knuckles, boots of police power back home:

> gentle I am, and calm
> and with abstracted pace
> absorbed in planning
> courteous to servility
>
> but wailings fill the chambers of my heart
> and in my head behind my quiet eyes
> I hear the cries and sirens.

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He sees himself as driftwood on an Algerian beach, amid the din and bustle of happy bathers, seabirds, sea rollers. Always he is driftwood.

Another poet, Arthur Nortje, who took his own life at Oxford with an overdose of drugs, refers to "the isolation of exile" as "a gutted warehouse at the back of pleasure streets." And,

> Origins trouble the voyager much, those roots
> that have sipped the waters of another continent.
> Africa is gigantic, one cannot begin
> to know even the strange behavior furthest
> south in my xenophobic department.

My own case history as an exile goes back to September 6, 1957. I have come to know that exile for the writer, or the artist in general, has psychological complexities that only the individual can try to delineate for himself and for others who may care to listen to him. I returned to South Africa in August 1977.

During a social upheaval, a writer is often called upon to give a share of his time to a cause as a social animal rather than as an artist. It seems perfectly natural to make such a distinction when you are on your own homeground. But in exile, you seem to have been thrown into your ego center, as it were, so that to hurt the writer is to hurt the whole man. To use another metaphor, you seem to be living in a rented glasshouse. Vulnerable. You can see clearly only when the rain is gone or when there is no mist. You pray that the lease holds until—who knows?

You and your family press upon one another. There is an extraordinary degree of interdependency among you all, until the children begin to socialize, move in and out of the family circle. For a while you let go, and even if you don't like their peer group, who are acting out another culture or subculture, you feel the relief is worth it. You hope you can manage the peer group influence. In reality, you never fully grasp its influence sufficiently to control it.

As a writer, you seem more than ever before to be monitoring every response you make to what happens to you. You seem to be watching closely the rise and fall of the dial—whatever it is—that you use to measure the intensity and pressure of experience. You are hyperconscious. You are too aware of your mental growth, as if you were contemplating a personality moving in front of your eyes. As if it wouldn't surprise you to have to monitor your own funeral. You seem to be curled up and listening to the juices flow inside you, to every beat of the heart, every pulse in the veins. You think you can even detect the malfunctioning of some part of you that is going to burst into pain. You seem incapable of responding to real-life experience with the ordinary instruments endowed every man, because something compels you to teach as if the experience demanded a literary interpretation, one that has to be sifted through your artistic sensibility and replayed in a verbal medium.

While I absorbed the African environment outside South Africa and felt at home in cultures that were so similar to my own, by turns I consciously and unconsciously resisted assimilation into the local setting during all my nine years in the United States. I was scared of the commitment that would hold me in fee and make return to South Africa more and more difficult. I had no such fear in Africa. I was again thinking of the implications such commitment would

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have for my writing. One step further into the American setting, I feared, would throw me out of the definition of exile. Unless I sustained an arbitrary definition to assert a nonemigré status, I would be living at least half a lie.

Much has also to do with the circumstances of one's leaving a home country. I did so because I was banned from teaching, having campaigned against the inferior education the authorities were imposing on Africans. I would have continued to teach even in a system I loathed, because I was sure that that very act would give me a purpose—that thing for which one lives when one wants to create beauty out of chaos and make sense out of it. Let the imponderables fall where they might—like the events in 1976 in which schoolchildren revolted against the same inferior system of education—I would be guided by my instinct as a teacher in what to do.

I left on a South African passport, which I abandoned two years after my exit, because it was endorsed only for my initial destination—Nigeria. I registered as a subject of the United Kingdom and Colonies (Nigeria then still being a colony), whose passport facilitated travel for me and my family to any place in the world if its immigration rules allowed. But one day, my wife and I knew, we would want to return. We would cross that bridge when the time came. For the time being, we gloried in the release from the nightmare that those first thirty-seven years of our lives had been in South Africa.

We lived nine years in West, East, and Central Africa, two years in France, and nine years in the United States. For five out of the nine that we lived in the United States, my wife and I kept feeling that we were irrelevant outside Africa. To whom was I teaching black literatures in the United States—people genuinely interested in Africa, or merely students wanting to pick up an exotic grade? Should I not be where black literatures are organized and taught as a functional and organic part of African development, and located, therefore, where there is a living cultural forum for them—on their own native soil? Shouldn't I be spending the rest of my life contributing to this development of the African consciousness?

I had come into a line of tradition in America that had started long ago, and could not grasp the American's cultural goals. I saw them as too fragmented for me to feel part of a unified purpose. I want to teach a community whose cultural goals and aspirations I can comprehend, because education is for me an *agent* of culture at the same time it is culture itself.

I could only identify intellectually and emotionally with the black American's condition, but could not in any tangible, particular way feel his history. To be actively and meaningfully involved in a people's concerns and political struggle as a genuine participant, you *should* feel its history. On the contrary, I kept feeling that *that* river was passing me by. Its complexity defies the oversimplification contained in the assertion, "I am black." And one thing I dislike is intellectual dishonesty, faked involvement that has only repeated slogans to subsist on.

We returned to find most things had not changed, except for the worse. But my wife and I find that we can achieve a number of things in our professions that as long as we were outsiders, we could not. Now we have community. You take your place among the millions of oppressed blacks, you are subjected to the same procedures as they are for restricting movement, choice of jobs, entrances and exits in public places, and so on. You are voteless, regardless of your

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academic standing. In brief, YOU ARE NOT WHITE. But among the community, YOU ARE POSITIVELY BLACK. There is also the faith that no matter what white people do to us, our ultimate goal is bigger than they are, than even *we* are, and therein lies the moral of a homecoming.

I got to learn, when I was in the United States, that an academic can, if he likes, lose himself in intellectual pursuits, move only in the university community, and be insulated from the rest of the larger community out there, safe, cozy, contented. I didn't want that to happen to me, so that my self-respect hung on the thin thread of long-distance commitment.

I also realized that the longer I was away from South Africa, the angrier, the more outraged, I felt against the sufferings of people here. Out of sheer impotence. In a sense, my homecoming was another way of dealing with impotent anger. It was also a way of extricating myself from twenty years of the compromise that exile itself is. Indeed, exile had become for me a ghetto of the mind.

We left our children in the United States. They will, in their own good time, decide what to do as they grow up. We reckoned that it would be unfair to ask them to accompany or follow us, after having grown up in an atmosphere of relative freedom—relative, but substantial; an atmosphere in which one has a fighting chance to fulfill or equip oneself as a young exile. There is this about exile: there is an age below which it yields tremendous benefits to the individual ego, and there is an age beyond which the local setting can make impossible demands on one's commitment.

Another aspect of my homecoming is that it concludes a cycle in the life of a writer. Like all the other writers in South Africa, I feel the pressure of censorship acutely. But I feel I can deal with this in a way I could not when I was writing outside the context that breeds these tensions. The real sense of community that I feel now helps me understand the nature of my audience better, which must help define the functions of literature at the grassroots level. In more ways than one, I can deal with something tangible, something real, rather than the shadows and echoes that haunted me in exile, the recurrent dream about people coming after me because they believed I had something of value, which I wasn't sure I possessed. Again, my writing can now be the educational tool I want it to be, according to the needs of the audience.

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JAN VANSINA

Mwasi's Trials

On the evening of June 3, 1971, Mwasi was at home with her husband and her infant son. Home was a room in a modest boarding house in Livulu, in the lee of the high hill where Lovanium University's buildings rise against the skyline. Life had been happy up to that week, even if it had not always been easy. Mwasi had been in Livulu since the fall, having joined her husband from the nook in the country where their families lived, weeks of travel away. Her husband, Mobali, had already acquired a diploma, before she could go with him to Livulu. This was his first university degree, the *candidature*, which made it likely that he would be able to finish his studies. For during their first years at the university, most students failed, and it was only after the *candidature* that the survivors could reasonably expect to win the *licence*, the degree that mattered. So Mobali was well on his way, and Mwasi came with her infant son, and found a place they could afford on a student stipend that had not quite kept up with inflation. Their landlord, Nkolo, worked as a servant for a family of academics up there on the Lovanium plateau, and also ran a little shop from a room in his compound. All his renters were married students. All paid half of their monthly stipend of eight Zaïres for rent (about twelve dollars). In Mwasi's case, she earned three Zaïres more as a family allowance, and she was pregnant again, which would raise the allowance. Up to that week all had gone well.

But now, old tensions on campus had flared up again. The students were commemorating the riots of June 4, 1969, that had caused some deaths among the students and a shakeup in the government. Minor damage had already been caused, but the ugly mood was still building up, fanned by rumors about heroic deeds to be done on the anniversary of 1969. Frigid wisps of fear eddied around as speculation mounted: What would the government do? That evening they knew. The radio announced that all students were to be inducted into the army. What could that mean?

Mobali left early next morning for the hill to see what it all meant. He found the military on the campus, and was drafted right away. There was no time to send any word to his wife. All day long the military occupied the campus and arrested all students, sometimes beating them when they ran for cover. They gathered them in big shoals, kept them covered with rusty Bren machine guns, and carted them away to unknown military camps, while Mwasi waited in Livulu. Mobali did not return. From the hill came only rumors, passing army lorries, and a helicopter shuttling back and forth between the city of Kinshasa

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and the hill. The radio was yapping on and on about subversive students, stern army controls, and wise leaders. Mwasi felt lost. She began to weep, and huddled together with several other wives of students to share their common misery. Finally they decided to hire a zone cab *(fulafula)* early the next morning and to go all together in search of their husbands. Rumor had it that they were at a camp in the vicinity of the airport, many miles away. So before 5 A.M. the next morning they went there. Only at the gate did they realize that they could not see the students—if indeed they were there—because the gate was too far away from the buildings. So they squatted beside the gate and waited, having given the names of their husbands to the sentries. It was almost noon before a list of students held in that camp was read out, and Mobali's name was not on it. Nor were several others. They had already been transferred to another camp. But where? No one would tell their wives. So they took the taxi again and roamed all over the huge city of Kinshasa, even then larger in area than any city in the United States. Night fell, and the fruitless search had to be called off. By dawn the other wives went out again. But not Mwasi. She was pregnant, worn out, and could do no more. It was just as well that she stayed home. The city was in an uproar. The night before, soldiers swaggering through the townships had been ill-treated by irate civilians. It was rumored that some had been killed. The rumor brought the military out of their camps like a swarm of wasps buzzing around. There was a rampage. Much of the city's population sided with the students, despite the best efforts of the radio to paint the students as ungrateful enemies of the regime, and the atmosphere was explosive.

Mwasi stayed home and worried about money. Her landlord generously decided that no rent was to be paid until everything was settled and the stipend resumed. For the time being, then, she would not lose her room.

The third day other wives cruised the city again, but without any luck. But that evening after dark Mwasi received a visit. It was Bonduki, a man who had been a schoolmate of Mobali back in primary school. Now he was a professional soldier and the chauffeur of a general. He had seen Mobali. Mobali had been quartered in his camp at Binza. He realized the situation, and came to tell Mwasi. She begged him to arrange for her to see her husband, although that was strictly forbidden. So they concocted a scheme. And the next day she went to camp, pretending to be Bonduki's sister, coming for a visit. Luckily for her, she was fluent in Lingala, the language of the army. As the soldiers in Zaïre all lived with their families in their camps, the sentry called for Bonduki, who vouched for her and took her to his house. That day she finally saw Mobali. At first she could not even recognize him. He was covered with a thick layer of dust, his hair had been completely shaved off, and he waddled around in an outsized uniform. But at least she had found him, and she stayed a few days in Bonduki's house to meet Mobali whenever an opportunity presented itself.

Meanwhile, the army had finally settled the status of its new recruits. The students were to be sergeants, and as sergeants, their pay would be five Zaïres a month, and no family allowances. Thus Mwasi's income fell from eleven to five Zaïres, but she did not have to pay rent for the time being. So she had two Zaïres less per month than she used to have. Her savings were gone. Taxis and restaurants—for during their frantic search, the wives had not cooked any food—had swallowed all her money. On returning to Livulu, Nkolo helped her

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out again. He told her to buy rice at the main market on Kasavubu Boulevard, and to sell it retail in his shop. She found money enough for a bag of one Zaïre twenty-five, and managed to get it shipped to the shop. The retail sale made enough of a profit to live from hand to mouth, rather less than two Zaïres a month.

Kinshasa was not quiet during this time. Rumors that students had been ill-treated abounded (they were true), while more ugly rumors that they had been killed or had "disappeared" surfaced periodically, despite any number of official denials. By the second week of the crisis, the president was forced to invite all the people of the whole city to come to Binza camp and see for themselves that all was well. On the appointed Sunday of the rendezvous, the gates were thrown wide open, a mass was celebrated on the parade ground, a parade followed, and then the students and their families finally were reunited for a few hours. Only a few of the students were not found. For Mwasi, the day was not as memorable as it was for others, as she had seen Mobali before. Nevertheless, the day was a climax. From then on, a routine took hold. Weekly visits were allowed, students were less roughly treated, and alarmist rumors died out. This routine was to continue well into the late fall. On August 6, the government abolished all the universities of the country and fused them into a single entity: the National University. Then came the business of reorganizing the whole into something new.

Meanwhile, very far in the countryside, Mwasi's and Mobali's parents did not know what exactly was happening. When the radio announced the induction, Mobali's kin went into mourning for the customary four days. Then Mobali's mother continued to mourn all by herself. Soon, travelers from Kinshasa brought the news that every student had been killed, and no one believed the denials on the radio. Indeed, denials convinced the family even more that their son had died. It was then that Mwasi's father came over to demand his daughter from Mobali's father. Everyday, at daybreak, he hurried from his compound to the Mobali's, to accuse that family, but the parents of Mobali would not give him any answer. They could only remain shamefully quiet.

Mwasi and Mobali had written to their parents as soon as they could do so, some two weeks after the event. But the letters took another four weeks to reach the families. When they arrived, mourning ceased, and Mobali's younger brother undertook to send Mwasi some money. Not much, because he was poor himself, and the money arrived late because of the mails. Meanwhile, Mwasi had had her baby.

She had been so penniless, that Nkolo had to pay the cab to bring her to the university hospital, where the delivery took place. The staff there were humane enough to waive the bill, considering Mwasi to be still a student's wife, even when there were no more students. Later in the summer, this was to change. In the fall, the new baby girl caught some serious respiratory ailment. Mwasi could no longer go to the university hospital gratis, she had no money for consultation fees, and the baby went untreated.

By then it was November. The National University began to operate, and the sergeant-students were now assigned to campuses. Mobali was transferred to Lubumbashi in the south, the air force to carry the recruits and their families

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there. Mwasi was notified to be at the airport with her children and luggage by 2 A.M. on a given day. She did so, and waited. No plane came, no recruits came, and the baby girl became worse. This repeated itself every day for almost a week. One night the plane was there, the recruits were there, and they all flew to the unknown city, a thousand miles away. On arrival, Mobali was met by a friend, whose first words were, "Why did you bring your wife here? No one can afford to live here with their wives." Mwasi heard it, and broke down.

But the worst was over. The baby was brought to a doctor and lived, housing was found, and once again Mwasi and Mobali became a student family.

* * *

Why this tale? It contains no single dramatic highlight, and although it is true, it is not unique, since hundreds of wives struggled through what was a minor crisis in the history of Zaïre. It is not even sensational. And yet, to those who know the area and the times, it is a poignant testimony to Zaïrian society in 1971.[1] Others compare it with their experiences in different societies and read these into it, rather in the manner of the art lover who reads meaning into an African piece of sculpture that to him is an *objet trouvé*. The tale is for such readers a bit of exotica. Yet such slices of real life are priceless, because they show people in concrete situations coping with a society. Such tales cut across the strands of analysis that have been labeled "economics," "sociology," "cultural anthropology," "political science," "history," and so on. A story from real life is opaque. To analyze a world of opaque events we must dissect. But in dissecting, we often forget the artificial character of our boundaries. Living people must play on all registers at once. Precisely, then, because our tale is neither a single event, nor a sensational drama, nor unique, it is all the better suited as a touchstone about Zaïre and Africa in the last generation.

Interstices and Failures

Actors such as Mwasi perceived the large-scale institutions operating in Zaïrian society as a set of huge machineries run by capricious bureaucracies, in often unexpected ways. Sometimes they acted for a person's good, equally often, for the bad. They were as unpredictable as some of the spirits in which Mwasi's elders had believed or still believed. At home in her rural area she belonged also to smaller-scale institutions such as kinship groups, residential groups of neighbors, local political groups run by people who were not just "officials," but people she knew as persons with likes, dislikes, quirks, career ambitions, and private lives. Sometimes a person set a bureaucracy in motion of her own accord, as when Mwasi went to the hospital, or before the crisis, when the university system sheltered Mobali and her. But the terrifying unpredictability of the huge bureaucracies was apparent in the crisis. Mwasi was swept up in turmoil caused by a major shift at the national level: the actions of the president in order that he might take control of the intelligentsia that had remained outside of direct state control. He nationalized the universities as he had nationalized big business before, and would nationalize other sectors later on. To Mwasi, the crisis was an unexpected disaster, even though Mobali and

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she feared that something would happen. In earlier years, student dissatisfaction had led to confrontations with the military, and in 1969—Mobali was then a first-year student—such a clash had left more than a score of students dead.[2] Still, neither Mobali nor Mwasi reckoned with a crisis in the time of a few hours, a day, a displaced person without being displaced. No more husband, no more income, no more status protection by the nearby huge university that had been overcome by an even bigger institution.

In this clash of major institutions, no one had even thought about students' wives. Their husbands were drafted, but unlike other soldiers, they could not house their families there. No longer were they students, so the university no longer had any responsibility toward their wives. Indeed, the university could no longer pay them family allowances. The army could not pay these either, because that procedure was alien to it: it housed families, it fed them, it had provisions for the schooling of army children. But it did not pay allowances. Thus Mwasi's economic predicament stemmed from this discrepancy between the university and the army systems. Her plight stemmed from a lack of uniformity between major blocs of the institutional framework in Zaïrian society. There was a fissure here.

Such fissures were not at all unusual to her. Gaps and cracks in the operation of these huge institutional complexes were common enough. Some were expected. Thus information would reach her parents first by radio, then by rumors bred in Kinshasa and carried by travelers. Letters would be the slowest means of communication, if indeed they arrived. Hence the confusion and stress at home. No one informed parents by telegraph, because neither the university nor the army was "responsible." But Mwasi did not expect the telegraph to be used at all. That kind of flaw was foreseen, even if it was distressing. Similarly, the students' wives foresaw that the city buses would be running erratically and be overcrowded, so they hired a zone cab. That situation was so common in Kinshasa, that a special class of taxi, the *fulafula*, answered the resulting need by offering common transportation at a low fare. Thus the women of Livulu could fill up a *fulafula* and afford to retain it for a day. Another flaw in the operation of the big systems actually helped Mwasi. The flourishing retail trade at Livulu was partly a consequence of the poor quality of transportation, so that most residents of Livulu preferred to buy what they needed in small quantities at local part-time shops rather than go to markets or shopping centers farther away. Moreover, these customers had very low incomes, so they preferred to buy in the minute quantities offered by this type of shop. In this case, Mwasi "beat the system" by being able to find transportation for her bag of rice and by actually having a little over a Zaïre of savings, then officially two dollars worth.

Some fissures, however, were quite unexpected. The tally of names at the first army camp and the failure of the personnel on duty there to report which students had been transferred where led to two more days of anxious search. This was probably not sadism on the part of the military, but simply inefficiency: Recruits were moving faster than tallies could follow. The call to board the plane to Lubumbashi illustrates another similar failure of information as well as a common failure in logistics, and shows the kinds of letdowns and stresses that resulted.

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But precisely because Mwasi and others expected the system to work imperfectly, she was more prepared to cope with the failures. Mwasi used all the solidarity of the networks to which she belonged. First came the group of her peers, other students' wives at Livulu, through which she had probably found her lodgings in the first place. As the crisis was leveled at the university, this loose group solidified in defense. The attitude of Nkolo seems in part due to his position in this milieu: working for a member of the university staff, renting rooms to students and living in Livulu, a hamlet connected 90 percent or more with the university. The solidarity of peers working for a single employer was not new. It is already documented for the 1950s and earlier in Lubumbashi's mining compounds.

Mwasi benefited unwittingly from a second network, the solidarity existing between classmates. Bonduki went to her, on the instigation of Mobali, as a classmate and an ethnic brother to Mobali. He did not belong to Mwasi's ethnic group. No one of her own ethnic group was either called upon to help or turned up to help. Her marriage was an interethnic one, and that may have had something to do with the matter. More important is the fact that Mobali and Mwasi came from so far away, that their ethnic references made no sense in Kinshasa. Even in their home area, there were so many ethnic groups in such a small area, and the towns there were so mixed for so long, that in fact the grade school connection acted as the equivalent of an ethnic tie. Even so, it represented regional (and class?) solidarity, not ethnic cohesion. Ten years later Mobali and Mwasi were to rely on the services of another classmate, who dumped his "responsibility" as fast as he could and left them both stranded.

Solidarity stemming from Mwasi's and Mobali's kin-groups was ineffective. They lived too far away. The only expression of support her father could give was the traditional and totally inadequate one of requiring accounts of the father of Mobali. Kinship in this situation, as in the later life of Mwasi, was to remain highly ineffective, because she lived so far away.

The whole incident points to the importance of residential groups, rather than kinship by itself, in the creation of effective solidarity. It has been the mistake of many anthropologists, especially most British social anthropologists, to privilege kinship over residence, to make models that are a mystique of kinship. In technical terms, Mobali's household was patrifilial (the son belonging to his father's group by virtue of being his son) with regard to Mobali's father, and it did not belong to a true corporate lineage. When aid came, it came from the father through the full younger brother of Mobali. Mwasi, in fact, was helped most, and at the crucial time, by the solidarity emanating from her milieu: the university wives at Livulu.

Indirectly, wider solidarities also played a very significant role. The anger of the millions in Kinshasa at the presidential measure was an expression of solidarity. Many of the parents of students involved lived there. Many others hoped to send children to study there and thereby better their own lot. Moreover, since 1958-59 the people of Kinshasa had had much to suffer from various army personnel. It was their reaction, their rumors, that obliged the president to put the student recruits on show and to allow family reunions. Further, the social set in which the president moved, the national bourgeoisie, was perhaps most immediately affected. They put pressure on him and his wife

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to relax his stance. Another subgroup in the city was also unusually active. These were the people from the townships that consisted mostly of inhabitants of Lower Zaïre—Nkolo was one of these—who saw the regime as hostile to them. It was in such townships that soldiers had been molested during the second night of the crisis.

Some failures and interstices are caused by paradoxes. Thus the ruling class was split over access to education and the desire to control this major means of access to future membership in the class. There was the situation of various ethnic solidarities with differential access to education and to the ruling class. In this paradox, the most successful groups, on top during the first Republic (1960-65), feared most to be denied access in the future. Some paradoxes actually helped. Thus Mwasi was a woman who was destined to be well up the social scale one day, yet trained to be a farmer's or a worker's wife; her husband never was, and hence was more vulnerable in this crisis perhaps than she.

Mwasi, like others, was prepared to cope with fissures and breakdowns by personal adaptation as well. Because of such fissures and failures generally, men and women in Zaïre learned to cope by acquiring all sorts of skills that would have been wasted in better regulated environments. Mwasi could both farm and be a trader. As a student wife, she had no access to farming, and she was not expected to be a retail trader, because that would clash too much with her status as a refined student wife, one who would soon belong to the elite. Nevertheless, back at home her mother had trained her in all the skills a wife there needed. There a woman should farm, market, trade, walk tens of miles with loads on her head or her back, and be able to lead a harsh life. She had acquired resiliency there. Once offered a chance to act as a poorer woman of Kinshasa would, she did not hesitate, and knew how to set up her retail business right away, even though she had an infant son and was pregnant again.

Most important, she had already learned to cope with impersonal bureaucracies. When Bonduki told her to come to the camp as his sister, she knew how to play the role, how to be a rustic arriving in town, how to use feminine indignation so as not to be stopped by a mere sentry at the camp. All Zaïrois and all those who live there have to develop such skills, as countless anecdotes can testify. It is the same resilience that allows the successful to be diplomats in the United Nations, political leaders at home, patrons to their urban clients, juniors to their rural chiefs, comrades to their age-mates in the villages. The adaptation to each of these roles seems so total, that the outsider often wonders which is the real role of such people. But as we saw, this virtuosity in manipulating her behavior was efficient only in a few situations. It could not help Mwasi out of her predicament.

Disillusion

Mwasi had come to Kinshasa with clear expectations. Her husband could confidently expect to have his degree two years hence. He would then belong to the bourgeoisie. He would be posted to a relatively high position in the administration of the country, perhaps at the level of district commissioner, a high level indeed both in their eyes and in the eyes of their parents. They would have several children (they now have four). Perhaps better things would

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happen. After all, the first students with such degrees had become ministers, and had formed the government on September 14, 1960, by the grace of Mobutu, who was now president. Later, such spectacular fortune had not repeated itself, but nevertheless, students with degrees did become ministers, high officials in ministries, or influential heads of other services. By 1971 those who began to appear in the civil service at the district commissioner rank or below, because the upper levels were filled, still were few in number. Thus it was a reasonable expectation of Mwasi to count on a career for Mobali at that level.

The career chosen was precisely one in the most complex of modern institutions, the ones that were precipitating Mwasi into this crisis. And Mobali had been an idealist. He hoped that a career in these milieus, with the proper university training, would allow him scope to improve the performance of these institutions and to press for reform of the country as a whole. It was an idealism then shared by most other students, a sentiment that had already moved them to confront and to protest.

All these expectations crashed with the induction of the students. Small consolation that they were to be sergeants. Even that, it was rumored, was only to keep them from the regular soldiers, for fear the students would infect the army with subversive ideas. Indeed, the regime even feared for the subversion of its younger, better-trained officers. What people saw was that the privileged status of "student" had been broken. Perhaps the likes of Mobali would never finish their studies, never achieve the careers they had expected. Who knew? Mwasi's plans for a safe future all were shattered.

So were General Mobutu's hopes. In 1960 he had believed that education was the passport to certain success. His College of Commissioners (all the recent graduates from Lovanium!) had not helped the country on its feet. Still, they had been useful. After he took power again in 1965, the students were for a while supportive, and the president gave the highest priority but one (the army!) to higher education. He doted on Lovanium, was often seen there, used the university church for the baptism of some of his children, and conducted his negotiations with the powerful Catholic Church at this Catholic university. But the students had grown increasingly critical, subversive even. Slogans did not take them in for long, and as soon as the major internal threats, such as the mercenary revolts were quelled, opposition became vocal at Lovanium. The 1969 confrontation had hurt the regime, and by 1971 the president was in a quandary. He needed to produce an intelligentsia, but not the intelligentsia of the opposition! He needed technicians, not social scientists. And yet the universities produced few technicians and vast numbers of students in the social sciences, precisely the kind that were most critical of his efforts. The university was beyond his direct command, the only major institution in the country to remain so, after the humbling of the mining companies. Thus student agitation this time led him to bring Lovanium, the university he had so admired, to heel. His action was born out of disillusion. In doing so, he knew that he would have to enter a longer fight with the Catholic Church, and that student resentment would never fully abate. And yet he could not abolish universities altogether! He was probably confident about the future of state-church relations, and

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hoped that students could be rallied in the future, even if only after their studies had been completed and they needed positions in government service. On the whole, in fact, the situation later developed in that direction.

The university authorities and academic staff were obviously disillusioned. The crisis showed that the academics counted for naught, and that academic autonomy was gone. It showed that the administrators could no longer succeed as brokers between the government and academia. The population at large was disillusioned. The creed had been that a university degree was the main and safest avenue to social promotion. Now people feared that their sons and a few of their daughters would not reach the coveted elite status. For them too, a great dream had crashed.

Expectations had played a great role in Zaïre's affairs before then. The expectations unleashed by independence in 1960 led to civil war, a popular revolution in 1963-64 that fell just short of success, and Mobutu's own political platform. His putsch succeeded in 1965-66, by carrying out the promises made by his opponents, the revolutionaries. The dangers bred by disillusion were real, as the president knew. And by 1971 he had just succeeded in raising the morale of the army—the backbone of both the regime and the state—by inducements that gave professional soldiers better career expectations. Ever since its rebellion at independence in 1960, the army had shown a profound envy toward the civilian "politicians," who soared to the glittering heights of influence and wealth without, so it seemed to the military, any competence or merit. By 1971 the students had become part of the group envied by the military. They were pampered troublemakers, who unlike army officers, would quickly rise to lucrative posts, once their antics ended with graduation. Inducting the students was a means of appeasing the army. It told the generals and the officers that the president prized them more than he did the ineffectual intellectuals. The brutality shown by soldiers and noncommissioned officers during the induction reflected their feelings of victimization. The president's decisions were a boost to their morale to the same degree that these decisions terrified both the students and the bourgeoisie.

Mobutu's problem was not unique or novel. Some years before, President Nyerere of Tanzania had coped with it by instituting a paramilitary work-program for students to quell their unceasing criticism, as well as head off their emergence as a separate, privileged group in society. It had, on the whole, worked rather well. Mobutu went one step further, a step that would be imitated later by others and by himself. In the spring of 1980, the campus of Lovanium was closed once again, but this time the students were not inducted but merely sent home.

Actors

The main actors in the crisis were the military, the new politicians—many of whom had been students—and the students. Church officials, including a cardinal, and university officials had been almost powerless in restraining either the government or the students. The body of old politicians, those who had dominated the scene before 1965, were powerless and played no role at all. Nor

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did the bureaucracy, which was not involved, nor the Party, which was also not involved. Its input probably was felt through the new politicians. From this point of view, the military, especially the generals, first obtained satisfaction; the new politicians, backed by unrest in Kinshasa, forced the president to backtrack somewhat; and the solution finally adopted was the result of a compromise between the leaders of the army and those of the new bourgeoisie.

In the longer run, the military and students remain the opponents. The military run the country; students challenge their rule. This is why in 1980 Amnesty International's report about Zaïre found that a majority of political prisoners were either dissident officers or students.[3] By now, most of the bourgeoisie were co-opted, as were many former students, who had become technocrats. When a member of these groups realizes that he has fallen out of favor, he flees the country with the financial gains he has made. In most cases, the establishment allows the flight. As to the fate of the old politicians, they were either dead by 1980 or had lost their credibility. They had been in exile too long. It is thus quite likely that in the future, student groups and military coteries will remain the enemy of the regime, especially because after the mid-1970s, the students could no longer all be absorbed into the higher ranks of the hierarchy, and thus be co-opted. As student unrest spread in the spring of 1980 in Kinshasa, the students on the campus were joined by the high-school teachers, former students themselves, often working without even a minimum guaranteed salary, and fighting, as were the students, for bare subsistence. In the late 1970s, the main fear of the regime began to be the coalescing of these opposition groups. Frequent purges in the Officer Corps as well as humiliation in war have left so many officers insecure, that they too have become susceptible to subversion, along with discontented intelligentsia and the students still at what is now National University.

The minimal role played by ethnicity in this emergency of 1971 is remarkable. Actors were more defined by their professions than by their ethnic affiliation, and the situation has since perdured. This is surprising, in that only six years before the Lovanium events, ethnic conflicts had raged throughout the country, and "tribalism" was, and still is, denounced as the most dangerous enemy of the state. In accordance with this, but in a twisted way, was the president's use of a popular ethnography of the Congo to calculate ethnic dosages in the different state organs. By 1971 superethnic groups began to appear, opposing the whole north and east of the country to the south, while there still remained foci of ethnic feelings, especially in lower Zaïre and Central Kasai, but also in other areas.

The Lovanium crisis, however, involved "students," and not any ethnic category. Hence ethnicity played a minor role in the response as well, if indeed it played any role at all. The incidents between soldiers and the residents of some of the townships had had an ethnic undertone, but this was not played up by any of the participant groups. Ethnicity remained quiescent. It was not a category in this crisis; it has not been in most crises since. Perhaps ethnicity has become less important as a social reference point than other classifications, such as occupation and rank. Nonetheless, today ethnic clubs, similar to those that flourished in the late 1950s, have surfaced again, especially in Kinshasa and among the weaker ethnic groups there.

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Class and Corruption

In the end, the contrast that stood out was one of incipient class. Student unrest manifested itself immediately in a protest against the repression of free speech and other political freedoms. Beyond that, they protested against sheer inequity and especially against corruption, which by 1971 was becoming rampant. Corruption was the means by which a national bourgeoisie was emerging, enriching itself and impoverishing others. But the issue was not put in these terms, as the nature of the process had not yet sunk into the general consciousness of the population and the students. Class had surfaced before briefly, during the 1963-64 revolution, when the *penepene* ("almost-almost"-white!) label had become popular to stigmatize the Westernized elite. In 1971 neither the unemployed, the workers, nor any other class of Kinshasa came to the rescue of the students, most of whom, in fact, stemmed from the bourgeoisie, although Mwasi did not. Certainly, the long-suffering privates in the army did not see allies among the students. Yet Kinshasa stirred. Not just the upper crust, but the masses. They felt that with state control over higher education, an avenue of promotion was to be cut off. The masses believed strongly in the equality of opportunity within the educational structure. They believed in the power of the diploma as an avenue to the good life. No one then claimed, however, that state control would in the end choke off equal opportunity.

Yet social classes obviously existed. They have become even more pronounced since 1971.[4] Mwasi's family did not lead the life of a poor farmer nor that of an urban proletariat, even if they were not wealthy. Differences in education, life-style (housing, food, etiquette, religion, leisure activities), and wealth show us that by 1980 objective classes existed, and they were developing in 1971. One can quarrel about their number, about the position of individuals with regard to class, about the position of professional categories or of rural/urban strata with regard to class. But class differences on the whole are clear. And class struggle existed by 1980.

Corruption is the prime mover in shaping both differences of wealth and class attitudes. It has become so universal, so blatant, so coercive, that it eclipses every other form of consciousness. Monsignor Kabango blasted corruption in 1976 in a moving homily, "Je suis un homme" ("I am a man [too]"),[5] which details how corruption had undermined the value systems and set man against man. Today, most of the country's foreign earnings go to a tiny group of people. The president is one of the wealthiest persons in Africa. Corruption made the country extremely vulnerable to foreign aggression, as the invasions in Shaba in 1977 and 1978 showed. The army then practically dissolved, and civilians everywhere in the country expected to be "liberated." A confused sense existed then, as it had in 1959-60 and again in 1963-64, that the millennium was at hand. In the end, foreign military assistance kept the regime alive, but the hopes for a millennium remain. At the same time, the closure of classes is becoming accentuated. Entry into the Party is denied the nonaffluent, and their children are practically and gradually barred from schools—by corruption. The wealthy find room for their children at a price. The poor find the classes full, and are rejected. In rural areas, schools are neglected and take

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fewer and fewer pupils in every new year. Yet school and Party are the only avenues for upward social mobility.[6]

It is often said that classes do not exist in tropical Africa because kinship solidarity effectively counteracts their formation. The wealthy hand out their riches to many poorer relatives, and income is thus equalized. This is rubbish. The wealthy no longer can be compelled by social pressure or internalized beliefs and values to do so.[7] In Zaïre, especially in Kinshasa, every wealthy person becomes the patron of a number of hangers-on, who live from his handouts or from positions they owe to his patronage. Corruption certainly is not justified by the needs of hordes of poor relatives, as is sometimes claimed. It is kept in motion by the need to keep, or to increase, the number of followers, since patrons are ranked politically by this criterion. Already in 1971, during the crisis, I could perceive the role of patronage in politics. A man rumored to be powerful was to be greeted in Kinshasa by all on the premises when he entered a public building, while some of his creatures scurried forth to enquire of his desires. If fewer people wished to press his hand, his fortunes were rumored to be in decline. The amount of commotion caused by such visitors showed their relative standing. Wealth without patronage was devoid of status. And patronage consisted essentially in the ability to manipulate the resources of large-scale institutions so as to place one's followers, as well as to reward them from time to time by gifts of cash.

Recently a political scientist commented to me that corruption in Zaïre was indeed outstanding, when compared to other African countries, but that it was essential. It kept the country together, because it was for him the only efficient centralized and streamlined mechanism that linked all the major institutions into a single web. To him, it had become a form of government, and hence was no longer simply to be condemned, for fear that the country would collapse if corruption was stamped out. Needless to say, this is not the view of most of the Zaïrois, although it may be the defense invoked by some members of its ruling class.

But corruption and patronage do account for the unusual aspects of class formation in Zaïre, especially for the fact that everyone feels exploited, even though most people exploit those weaker than themselves. The callous attitudes toward one's fellow man described by Monsignor Kabango have not yet taken over the whole of society. Such attitudes of exploitation derive not only from the pressures of class formation, but even more, perhaps, from the uncertainties of the future. People have lived from crisis to crisis for so long now, especially in the towns, that the exceptional behavior followed in a time of crisis is becoming the norm.

The class situation in Zaïre has not led to a general outburst, but the signs of disaffection are clear. In some rural areas, villagers flee the exactions of the military by moving to inaccessible bush, while others flee to the cities, which are less directly ransomed by the military. Others flee the city where they are starving to try and join their village of origin. But without gifts they are no longer welcome there. Every year since the mid-seventies, rural revolts have erupted. Every year they are put down with greater ease, as new weapons such as helicopter transportation increase the advantage of the military. This was only beginning in 1971, just as banditry in the cities was only developing on a

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fairly large scale then. Now even whole foreign army units (Belgian) are assigned to Kinshasa to control banditry.

By 1971 most of these aspects of the class situation were barely incipient. What struck observers then was the opposition between the city and the countryside, even between Kinshasa, the capital, and the "provinces." Dissatisfaction in the capital is the main danger signal for the regime. Therefore, several military camps existed in and around the city. Four main camps controlled not only the entrances to the city, the heart of the city, and the airport, but one also guarded the president himself. That camp, the camp of Binza, was garrisoned by the elite troops of the regime, and it was there that most of the students were finally transferred. So sensitive was the regime to reaction in Kinshasa, that even during the invasions of Shaba in 1977 and 1978, the elite troops were not committed at all, or only at the last moment, after foreign military contingents had been flown into the country.

The student crisis might never have erupted if the campus had not been located on what were then the outskirts of the capital. Student protests in other cities had occurred before, and occurred again later, without triggering such violent reactions. Here, however, confrontation was likely, and the government attempted to forestall it.

In Mwasi's story, the countryside seems another world. The way of life there contrasts strongly with the customs of Kinshasa or any city. Differences in power, life-style, and wealth were then evident to everyone, and rivalry between rural and urban populations was recognized to flow from such differences. The distinction in life-style, education, values, and wealth certainly paralleled that found between classes, and in 1971 one could argue that these were class differences, too. They were differences that harked back to the late 1940s, when they became conscious in the public mind. Ever since, the countryside paid more taxes, but had less income, and received less money than the cities. The situation only worsened after independence. The situation was so acute by 1963-64, that a major goal of one of the revolutionary groups was to destroy the cities and to reduce Kinshasa to "a collection of villages." Since then, the countryside had avoided clashes on a large scale, but small uprisings continued and have intensified since 1971. This urban-rural background too is highly significant in the story of Mwasi.

Legitimacy

The state in Zaïre was everywhere by 1971. Mobutu had recentralized the country after 1965 and rebuilt the Leviathan that had been the colonial state.[7] He was still extending the state's power into more and more areas of social life. The nationalization of the universities was but one step in this sequence. It had been preceded by the nationalization of the giant mining companies, and was followed in 1973 by the "Zaïrization" of all foreign businesses, an attempt to control all the churches, especially the well-structured Catholic Church, and the extension of greater state control over all schools. The later attempts all ended in uneasy stalemates. Zaïrization was such a failure, that by 1975 foreigners were invited once again to start businesses. The Catholic Church continued to provide the regime with public ritual, as it did during the crisis

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with the mass at Binza. But it resisted complete control by the state of its seminaries, and some of its prelates continued to criticize the regime. The high-school system became so riddled with corruption and mismanagement of funds, that by 1980 even the teachers in the capital were not paid for most of the year. Attempts were then made to restore this section again to the different missionary groups that had operated them before. And in 1981 the government decentralized the university system. It failed to restore the situation as it was before June 1971, but it did restore three full-fledged universities rather than the single one created in June 1971.

All states need legitimacy, and centralized states need it even more. On taking power in 1965, Mobutu created a "popular" party to provide him with the trappings of democratic legitimacy. His main argument for legitimacy, however, came from his claim to have ended civil war and restored peace and order. During his first years, there was much public support for this claim, and many, especially in the towns, believed in the populist "newspeak" of the regime. By 1967 the president began to capitalize on feelings of cultural independence, which he labeled "authenticity." These were stronger in Zaïre than in other colonies, and always had been of more concern to nationalists there than elsewhere. The country changed its name from Congo to Zaïre. The currency took the same name (hiding a devaluation at the same time). Western clothing was abolished, and the populist trends were satisfied by substituting "Citizen" for "Mister." Over the years, measures of this sort continued to be taken, and by 1971 even the state's symbols had been adapted to this trend. The president walked with the cane of the elder and the leopard-skin of the chief. He was to be considered as a cultural messiah, and he justified his autocratic ways by his "traditional leadership." The one-party system was "the traditional consensus in council." After 1971 he was to abolish Christian given names, and even the pope concurred in the end. More and more newfangled ceremonies with dancers *(animateurs)* and praise-singers were introduced at state occasions, all supposedly revivals of the authentic ways, all intending to bolster the regime, to distract the public from falling living standards and to hide a succession of crises that continued to plague the state. Even the 1980 proclamation of Mobutu as Sun-King at Lisala did not create any stir.

Although his "authenticity" tack to acquire legitimacy found some favor, for the most part it failed, especially with the intellectuals. By 1971 no one took seriously the claim that the government represented the people through the Party. Rather, the state was seen as a new variant of the colonial state, especially by those in the rural areas and in smaller towns. The Party was widely seen as a structure of patronage and a channel for corruption. The population expressed its skepticism, not in tracts or treatises, but in its handling of news. All the media were controlled by the government, and all were disbelieved, when it came to denials of rumors or statements of intentions. Nevertheless, radio had become very popular. They were a must even in remote villages. The villagers liked the music from Kinshasa. They also had to know what the state was up to next. In the Lovanium crisis, the radio bombarded the population with information about the students' subversion and the need to end their pampered existence, the paternalism of the "Guide of the Nation." Nowhere did anyone believe it. All the people knew was that the students had been carried off to the

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dreaded military camps. They had been drafted, and being forcefully drafted was everywhere perhaps the most hated memory of colonial times. Such was the image of the regime that, when rumor claimed that students had been killed, it was believed. This belief led to the attacks in Kinshasa on swaggering soldiers, which then spread over the whole country, as far away as Mobali's home area. The rumor was believed so completely there, that Mobali was formally mourned. And it could only be quelled when the government put the students on show.

The Lovanium crisis harmed the legitimacy of the state seriously. The state had to rely on naked force, and thereby admitted the failure of its ideological claims to legitimacy. Coercion, in fact, *was* its legitimacy. By 1980 such a remark seemed trivial. Force has now for so long been the mainstay of the state's ability to rule, and so many repressions have occurred, that the matter is obvious.

Another source of legitimacy was spiritual. By 1971 rumor had it that the regime derived its strength from its command over charms and sorcery,[8] and since then that feeling has grown. It harks back to the legitimacy of traditional leaders in precolonial days. In the eyes of many, mystical coercion explained the success of physical coercion—and no one doubted of that success. The power of the state was, even in 1971, pervading all facets of living, and in this sense the state was totalitarian. Expectations for change and "liberation" often took the shape of hoping for a millennium, where spiritual forces would sweep the mist of mystical coercion away. In 1971 this had not yet been developed. But from the mid-seventies, the government became more and more anxious to control "sects," as it also became more fearful both of conspiracy and foreign invasion, although evidence of these expressions of opposition had already occurred before 1971 as well.

Foreigners

Mwasi saw the helicopter shuttle between town and campus. It had, she knew, a foreign pilot, but she never saw him. The unseen foreigner was one element in the situation. Another was the visible foreigner, the pathetic cluster of foreign faculty kept apart from the students by a platoon. Most of those were paid by Belgian foreign aid.

Mwasi's predicament was not started by foreigners, nor were foreigners involved in the execution of the plan. There were none in this crisis. Yet there were, as the pilot, the faculty, the helicopter, and the Bren guns show.

Independence opened the gates of Zaïre to the world. The Belgian preserve was now accessible. Belgium had tried to guide Zaïre's evolution discreetly from afar, but two weeks after independence, that had failed. Independence derailed, and in the general chaos, the United Nations had to send an administration and armed forces. Businessmen from various Western countries other than Belgium were at hand even before derailment. When the United Nations withdrew, the Western powers and the businessmen stayed. Mobutu's coup in 1965 was not organized from abroad, but it was not opposed. It was approved, even though he ousted a president better known for his close ties to business and to Western countries. But business is not government, and one

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Western power is not another one. Mobutu then looked like a man able to achieve the stability that had for so long been elusive. It worked. He succeeded—with help from Belgium, in setting up his administration again; with help from France and the United States, for the creation of an efficient information and intelligence network; and with help from all the Western powers and Israel, in rebuilding his army. All the while he was eliminating European mercenaries and nationalizing huge Belgian mining trusts. By 1970 all this was over. The stranglehold the Belgians held over the copper mining areas was loosened, and other investors could be attracted from Japan as well as from the United States. Expectations about investments in Zaïre began to rise in foreign circles, and 1971 was the year when the investment boom began. The fatal link between investment and the later need to protect investment by protecting the stable government that had allowed it was cast. In the end, the governments of Belgium, France, and the United States even intervened directly, or by proxy, when the regime was threatened by invasion.

But the arrival of businessmen had another more direct effect on the situation, and that since 1960. To obtain concessions, they had offered incentives. They greased palms, and in the early 1960s, taught the Zaïrois leadership how to organize graft. When Mobutu came to power, the game had already been learned, and very soon afterward, it began to be played as it still is. The president and his close collaborators excluded all others, and in a few years established a monopoly over that source of income. In the university crisis, however, graft played only a shadowy role in the general situation against which the students were protesting, much less visible than the foreign academics who were tools of cultural policies. Some of the students were idealists working for a better order. They were powerless now, for there were no foreign interests at stake in this crisis.

The Standard of Living

Student unrest, even in 1971, was in part motivated by their declining standard of living. The stipends were becoming inadequate. But compared to 1980, Mwasi's stipend in 1971 was generous. Student protests by 1980 centered on economic issues first. By then they lacked food, the stipend was left unpaid for long periods, and its buying power was ridiculously low. By then even university professors earned just enough to buy one bag of cassava a month, while the head of a fish cost one Zaïre. The teachers in secondary school, who joined the 1980 protest, had remained unpaid, because their salaries were siphoned off by officials in the ministries. And in any case, all of these incomes had become grossly inadequate simply to survive in Kinshasa at a reasonable level of nutrition.[9]

In 1971 Mwasi pulled through, thanks to her entry into the retail trade and the social security still provided by the university hospital. But she did not have the money to have the illness of her daughter attended to. And yet, seen from 1980, 1971 was "the good old times." By 1980 most city-dwellers were bereft of all medication. From about 1977, even in Kinshasa, only the black market had drugs, a situation that was found in 1971 only in smaller centers of the countryside. By 1971 the first cases of severe malnutrition in children began to

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appear in the hospital at Lubumbashi, the country's second city, Kinshasa following a few years later. In 1971 Mwasi could at least drive around to look for her husband. For a while in 1978 there was no gasoline at all in Kinshasa.

The Zaïrois have steadily been impoverished, probably since 1960. The situation has been blamed on deteriorating terms of trade, especially with regard to copper. The government also blamed the years of civil war until 1965 for the disappearance of agricultural products for export and the mounting problems in the domestic market for food. By 1966 already this reconstruction of the country's agricultural base was the "first priority." Nothing happened. The infrastructure of transportation deteriorated year after year. Necessary rail links were to be built. The money earmarked for them was used to build showplaces in the capital. An uneconomic steel complex was built near the capital, while only a single stretch of road was completed near Kinshasa to allow for a better flow of foodstuffs into the capital. All physical plants everywhere were run down. Only in the mining areas of Shaba province were plants kept up and minerals continued to be exported.

Agriculture was hobbled by a number of factors. The first was a lack of outlets, owing to the absence of roads. Second, after 1966 state agencies or local monopolists bought crops at nominal prices, thus robbing the farmer of any economic incentive to produce. Third, police and soldiers in ever-growing numbers lived off the land. The police were notoriously underpaid, and by 1975 had to live with less than two Zaïres a month. Although available funding levels declined from year to year, more and more police were hired each year, while they were paid less and less. Hence they had to rely increasingly on extortion to make a living. Farmers found it more and more dangerous to own anything that would attract the attention of armed men. For this reason, they grew fewer crops, emigrated to the cities, or fled to the inaccessible fastnesses where they attempted to become autarchic. Those who lived near the borders began to subsist by smuggling. All of these trends had begun by 1971, but the effects are now writ large. Already by 1966 Kinshasa was dependent on the arrival, once every three weeks, of ships with flour from abroad. If a ship was even a few days late, queues formed, and eddies of unrest spread in the city, the very hub of the state.

The terms of trade deteriorated further as corruption siphoned off more funds to Switzerland and elsewhere. The influx of foreign capital dried up when state debts remained unpaid in 1977. By 1978 Zaïre was practically bankrupt. Meanwhile, fortunes were made on the black market, in the various nationalization schemes, by the diversion of vital supplies to private warehouses, and by fraudulent accounting—in short, by all available means. And corruption became more centralized, benefiting fewer and fewer people. Meanwhile also, the population grew inexorably at close to 4 percent a year, while food became scarcer, and infrastructures deteriorated.[10] From 1970 onward, malnutrition and unemployment became the norm in the cities. In the countryside, pauperization also increased. Yet at the same time, most Zaïrois in town continued to believe that the country really held boundless resources. If only corruption could be stamped out, a better life was around the corner. The regime has held a steady series of trials involving corruption to placate the population, especially at Kinshasa. Such trials were also used to get rid of those

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politicians who began to be perceived as potential opponents, or even simply unwelcome competitors for the now dwindling sources of spoils. Meanwhile, the standard of living has fallen so far, that the very subsistence of many is in question.

Historical Perspectives

The immediate cause for Mwasi's predicament was the student decision to commemorate the events of 1969 by emulating their elders, who were themselves the culmination of student unrest over many years. Lovanium was the oldest and most prestigious university in the country. Its alumni occupied most top-level positions in the administration, and were beginning to hold a few major political appointments as well. But the role of student implied the expression of some grievances, because ever since colonial days, students had expressed national aspirations and dissatisfaction, as well as grievances linked more closely to their own situation. In 1965 they had hailed Mobutu's rise to power, but two years later they were already critical, as they saw both personality cult and the formation of wealth around politicians take more definite shape. Every year from then on to 1969 saw an escalation of protests. Whether or not student unrest around the world in 1968 had any major role in this development is still unclear.

The other immediate cause for Mwasi's predicament was her marriage. That had been interethnic, and was possible mainly because the social climate in her area had changed radically from 1919-20 onward, as both the colonial economy and the colonial administration had reorganized social space. In their area, her husband was one of the very first high-school students to cross beyond secondary education into the university, and a great career, by local standards, could be expected of him.

Once we widen the circle of causes, we come to the colonial situation as a whole. The university was the creation of the Roman Catholic Church, the capstone of a policy on education developed since the beginning of the colony, and regulated by the 1906 Concordate between state and church. It had grown directly out of the vocationally oriented earlier institute for higher education at Kisantu, not far away. The Church was part of what has been dubbed the colonial trinity: administration, big business, Roman Catholic Church. The unity of that coalition has often been overly stressed, but on the whole, the coalition did exist, especially from 1920 to the early 1950s. Lovanium, including its relative degree of autonomy, had been a direct outgrowth of the colonial situation. In another sense, this was even more true. The university had been a major window open to the world, a transmission belt of essentially European values, expectations, technicity, legitimation. The paradox of protesting students becoming the main recipients of the benefits in Mobutu's state is but one facet of the larger paradox that independence meant, both in the final insertion of Zaïre in a world order dominated by Europe and the United States, and in Zaïre's liberation from a single metropolis. Zaïre by 1960 was Europeanized all the way to the top. Any serious deviation from the Western plan for the just democratic state was denounced by students, because they cherished the

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personal freedoms as much as national freedom. And the university as a whole had been ambiguous from the start: it trained an intelligentsia for independence, yet all its ideas came from Europe.

One can widen the circle of causality even further and raise the question of colonial and later responsibilities for Mwasi's trials. In the colonial state, the machinery of the state had worked much more smoothly from 1920 on, with the larger input of European personnel and strict controls over their activities. The colonial state had been totalitarian in that it controlled every aspect of African life. It had been a police state in that no popular representation existed at all, and legitimacy was based on coercion and on the notion among the rulers that "civilization was good for the people." In 1960 the instrument of coercion, the army, rebelled. A period of monumental chaos followed, until Mobutu's coup in 1965. At first he was hailed for his desire to restore law and order. But his model, inevitably, was the colonial one, at least for the technical operation of the machinery of state. His political model definitely was not.

Politics in colonial times had been largely played out at a very high level in the metropolis and at very low levels in the smallest territorial units: chiefdoms and *secteurs*. After independence, the hastily acquired model of parties and elections led to the buildup of local networks of allies gravitating around a figurehead, a baron, but even these had very little access to wealth. Wealth accrued to political leaders after 1960 rather slowly at first. Mobutu's political model came, I believe, from the "big man," who tied clients to himself by favors and expectations of favors, and dropped them whenever their stature or their power base acquired features that seemed to give them some independence of maneuver. Ultimately, I believe, Mobutu's political model harks back to the precolonial politics of big men. But now the scale was not a handful of villages but one of Africa's largest countries. That model required that the big man control wealth and that clients derive their wealth from him. Corruption was an essential part of it.

We know little about the politics of the small rural communities in colonial time, for they have not been studied. We also know little about corruption then. Strict controls over the doings of European agents and a long metropolitan tradition had ensured that there was very little direct prevarication or graft among the agents. True, they had invented technical means to siphon off state income by tricks in accounting that set up hidden funds. But these were used to cover shortfalls in receipts elsewhere, not pocketed. It also is true that former higher officials regularly took up careers in the businesses they had regulated. But clearly, this was not the fount of the corruption after 1960. There are indications that African clerks and Africans heading local rural communities were bribed by the public and derived income from their charges. As ordinary folk were often denied access to higher echelons of the colonial administration, or did not know about it, they were at least partly at the mercy of helpful African agents. This may well be an aspect of all authoritarian regimes. But local leaders needed at least enough income to maintain themselves as big men in their communities. Otherwise they would lose support to some rival, who usually succeeded in having the European administration recognize him as the "rightful heir" or the "competent chief." Small-scale rural corruption, like

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small-scale rural politics, was, I believe, the root from which the later evils sprang. We cannot be quite certain yet. The subject has not been systematically studied.

Classes were inchoate in colonial days. Whether corruption was already then acting as an engine for class formation is doubtful: the amounts were too small, and impunity was far from assured. The first visible opposition between Africans concerned mixed ethnic and income groups. After 1945, when the cities began their spectacular growth, the basic social cleavage came to be that of city-dwellers and of country folk. Elites had come into full view from the later 1930s onward, and since then were conscious of belonging to a privileged stratum of society. But labor, farmers, and the unemployed (a category rising only after 1957) had not developed much consciousness yet, and it was possible even in the 1960s to maintain that a class society was not emerging. In the days of Mwasi's trials, upward social mobility was only beginning to be slowed, and closure of social classes, by denying access to education, among other things, was not yet truly visible.

The colonial legacy is not responsible for the whole situation in which Mwasi found herself. Causality, we saw, widens in circles, and dilutes as the circle widens. I have already enumerated significant links with the colonial legacy. But this was a postcolonial situation. It was not as inevitable as the conclusion to a Greek tragedy, that only this outcome could follow from colonial rule. That may seem so in hindsight, but hindsight is blind to what did not happen. It does not see alternatives. Hence immediate causes must be given full weight. Mobutu's Zaïre was responsible for Mwasi's trials.

Mwasi as a Case

Mwasi's trials reflected many features of life in Zaïre in 1971. But is Zaïre typical of Africa? It is one of the largest countries of the continent. It underwent the most chaotic process of decolonization in 1959-60. Since then it has remained one of the less stable countries. Pauperization may have increased here more than anywhere else, because corruption became more centralized, more efficient, and one may think, more of the substance of government than elsewhere. But there are many military regimes in Africa, even more single-party states, and corruption thrives in many countries. Worse excesses have been reported from Uganda under Amin, Equatorial Guinea under Macias Nguema, and the Central African Republic under Bokassa. War has unsettled Chad more than Zaïre. Famine has ravaged more areas in the Sahel, the Horn, and northern Uganda.

Zaïre shares a great many of its circumstances with other states. It shares, for instance, its dependence on the world terms of trade for copper with Zambia, its experience of civil war with Nigeria or Sudan, its loss of personal freedoms or its problems of legitimacy with other countries. Its agricultural problems are far from unique, and its population increases match those of most of its neighbors.

And yet Zaïrois see that in many countries, daily life is different. Transportation infrastructure slowly improves, amenities increase in the cities, schooling facilities expand and are more open to all. Zaïre belongs to a tiny minority of

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African states where such developments do not occur. Its uniqueness today may well lie in the scale and ruthlessness of pauperization. Despite substantial resources, a high rate of literacy, and technical know-how, there is a declining willingness to work the country. International terms of trade are not the main reason. Foreign backing for Mobutu's regime is more important. Public wealth has either been squandered on a grand scale or stolen. Unproductive investments, especially excessive military expenditures, and until recently, a certain military adventurism exceed the norm in Africa. Losses through internal corruption seem to me to exceed those of any other country. Although external dependency is as real elsewhere as here, only Mobutu would lease almost a whole province so that a private firm could test missiles there. Only Zaïre went technically bankrupt in 1978. Only there has the standard of living been falling for so long a time, and more drastically than even in Ghana or Liberia. Only the president of Zaïre is Africa's wealthiest person. Only here, in short, do we find the raw extremes of class formation associated with an exploitation as crass as existed in King Leopold's Congo. But there is no Congo Reform Movement now.

* * *

The story of Mwasi's trials is only a *fait divers*. As such, there is no conclusion to it. But in its opaqueness it involved all of the major trends of her day. The most significant has been the loss of rule by law. Legitimacy is gone, citizens are alienated, the intelligentsia dream of reform or revolution, some others expect liberation or a millennium, most have sunk into a gloomy resignation. Naked power and bribes erode the law. In turn, the strongly centralized state has lost most of its effective grip, because its legal directives are ignored, except under duress or when they seem to be opportune. Lack of security does not allow anyone to plan for the long term. If democratic rights had been upheld, the country's leaders would have been repudiated long ago. Without foreign intervention, the regime would have been overthrown, and profound changes would, perhaps, have occurred. But perhaps not.

The future literally is uncertain, and uncertainty paralyzes. Crisis behavior, with its extravagances of heroism and villainy, becomes routine. The value systems are changing in the direction deplored by Monsignor Kabango. Seemingly, Zaïre has undergone total and irreversible change. Class formation is the unbridled dynamic at work, punctuated by sporadic outbursts of the poor as they become still poorer. And everyone seems struck by powerlessness. Such a feeling of bewilderment, of inexorable forces at work, is a sign that gigantic transformations of the whole fabric of society are confusedly perceived. In 1971 the trends were but incipient. Now it has become clearer that, for better or for worse, a wholly new Zaïre is in the making.

My colleagues chide me for painting such a bleak picture. There must be a silver lining—there could be an upbeat ending to Mwasi's story. Despite all sorts of setbacks later on, Mwasi's first goal has been achieved. Mobali no longer is a student but a scholar. Yet the struggles are becoming even more complex. How to educate one's children when schools are venal? How to exist when food is in short supply, medication cannot be found, and income is eroded by

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inflation to a degree unimaginable in the United States? How to maintain one's moral integrity and sense of purpose in Zaïre's society today? Mwasi and Mobali have shown almost incredible resiliency, gentleness of manner, generosity, a sense of commitment, and a humor that overcomes all. Mwasi does show the silver lining in Zaïre's situation: its people. There is among some in Zaïre a great willingness to sacrifice for the common good, a tenacity to endure for moral causes, a deep commitment to ideals that heroically defies the risks involved. This is an age of great women and great men in Zaïre. But their greatness is to hold on, not to shake and move destiny. Historians know that heroes do not shape history, but are shaped by it. Sociologists know that value systems will change over time, once a majority adopts them. In the end, Zaïre could squander its human potential for renovation as well.

We have traveled very far beyond the trials of Mwasi. But we must remember them. We must remember, beyond analyses derived from different disciplines, life as it occurs. By 1971 separate analyses by economists, political scientists, sociologists, demographers (Mwasi now has four children), and social and cultural anthropologists were not leading their readers to the unpalatable conclusions that hardships were real and that pauperization was becoming a way of life. Had Mwasi's story then been analyzed, future trends, by now evident, would also have been evident then. Even more important, foreigners would then have better grasped how the life of a woman belonging to a middle stratum of urban society in Zaïre differed in practice from those who apparently live similar lives elsewhere. Readers would have sensed that something was terribly wrong, in a more immediate way than any table of comparative costs of living and income could tell them.

References

[1]The story of Mwasi is real, the names are assumed. For background about Zaïre during the period from 1960 to 1980, see *Du Congo au Zaïre (1960-1980)*, edited by J. Vanderlinden. (Brussels: CEDAF 1980); and C. Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton: 1965), to be superceded by his new book on Mobutu's Zaïre, co-authored with T. Turner, to be published this year.

[2]On June 4, 1969. See B. Lacroix, "*Pouvoirs et structures de l'université Lovanium*," *Les cahiers du CEDAF* 2/3 (1972), for a detailed history of Lovanium.

[3]Amnesty International, *Human Rights Violations in Zaïre* (London: 1980), pp. 12-14; and its report Afr. 65/25/80 Distr. NS/CO, 1980, p. 6.

[4]M. Schatzberg, *Politics and Class in Zaïre* (New York: Africana Publications, 1980).

[5]Kabango, *Je suis un homme. Lettre pastorale de carême* (Lubumbashi: Archbishopric, 1976).

[6]Schatzberg, *Politics and Class in Zaïre*, pp. 175-86.

[7]The argument of classlessness is still used, as in *Scientific American*, September 1980, pp. 60-61 (Tanzania).

[8]Young, *Politics in the Congo*.

[9]Student riots in 1980 are mentioned in R. Beeckmans, "*Afrique actualités*," *Zaïre-Afrique*, June-August 1980 and March-May 1980, pp. 317-18. The minister responsible at that time circulated a pamphlet when he went into exile. Cf. Mungul Diaka, *Note sur l'université nationale du Zaïre*, (Brussels: May 7, 1980), pp. 1-5.

[10]Demographic data by L. De Saint Moulin, *Atlas des collectivités du Zaïre* (Kinshasa: Presidency of the Republic, 1976). In 1978 the same author gave a figure of 8.5 percent growth per annum for Kinshasa.

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CRAWFORD YOUNG

Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class, and Ethnicity

IN THE SOMBER MOOD evoked by reflections on the prospects for mankind worldwide in this decade, it is difficult to recapture the sense of exhilaration that attended African liberation at its high-water mark in 1960, when no fewer than sixteen states achieved independence. The crumbling of colonialism seemed but prologue to other triumphs. A young and vigorous leadership would capture the resources once diverted by the colonizers, and direct them into the swift construction of prosperous national economies. The sense of common purpose that nationalism had frequently crystallized would be translatable into the sphere of economic development. In this springtime of hope, the harvest of plenty was within reach.

Probably no other geographic region experienced such a conjuncture of optimism and newly won sovereignty. Confusion and disorder had attended the birth of new states in Latin America. Independence in Asia was punctuated with such upheavals as the partition of India and the bitter colonial wars in Indonesia and Indochina. Progress appeared at the time a veritable birthright of humanity, as a prolonged era of economic expansion in most parts of the world fostered the conviction among many that the policy instruments and political wisdom for its indefinite continuation were at hand.[1]

In the two decades that followed, the sanguine expectations of 1960 were shattered by a number of savage blows. In Africa, it became clear that, for many states, the blessings of abundance were remote. In many countries, the rural economy stagnated, which in turn accelerated the flight of the young from the countryside. Growing numbers of formerly self-sufficient countries required increasing quantities of food imports to feed burgeoning urban populations. Non-oil-producing states faced a devastating rise in energy costs, payable in scarce hard currency. Returns from the classical export commodities—cotton, coffee, cocoa, vegetable oils—could not keep pace, leading to a rising external indebtedness. Inter-African armed conflicts were on the increase—the Horn, the Uganda invasion, Chad, the Western Sahara—and carried with them the risk of higher degrees of external involvement. The extraordinary and lasting damage that could be inflicted upon a society by destructive and predatory regimes became clear, as in Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, and Ghana. The continuing liberation struggle in Southern Africa imposed heavy sacrifices on neighboring states. All of these trends portend higher orders of potential social conflict in the years ahead.

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Recent history suggests that the major patterns of social conflict cohere around two organizing principles: class and ethnicity. Both are shaped and defined in important ways by the state, which serves as the primary arena for social encounter and collective conflict. Thus an inquest into contemporary and prospective social conflict requires an examination of the spheres of state, class, and ethnicity. All three are in flux, all three are changing, and the task before us is to seek out the elements of transformation within each. Most critical of all is the nexus that joins them. Although each has a certain autonomy, at least analytically, the essence of political and social dynamics can be found in the interaction between them.

The contemporary state was shaped in profound ways by its colonial past, as were its current patterns of class and ethnic relationships. In contrast, the continuities in the character of state, class, or ethnicity with the precolonial world are far more tenuous, for during the colonial era, older forms of stratification and cultural identity were eroded and new state structures superposed on previous political forms. An analysis of the contemporary African state thus needs to begin with a consideration of the colonial state and the class and ethnic realms shaped by it. Political independence brought important changes in the character of the state, as well as major transformations in the nature of class and cultural pluralism; this is most conveniently examined as a separate historical moment. I will begin with a discussion of the colonial period, and then proceed to an analysis of the contemporary epoch. First, however, it is important to define the concepts of state, class, and ethnicity as used herein.

State, Class, and Ethnicity

One of the most curious paradoxes in recent intellectual history was the simultaneous vast increase in the scope and impact of the state and its virtual eclipse as an issue in all major theoretical paradigms in the postwar era. Only in the last few years has a revived consciousness of the state's centrality as an autonomous component of society become apparent. This renewed concern with the state as a conceptual problematic can be seen in the Fall 1979 issue of *Daedalus* that was devoted to this topic, and in the designation of "state" as the theme for the 1981 annual meetings of the American Political Science Association.[2]

It is useful to understand the state as existing on two levels: concrete and theoretical. The first, the matrix of institutions through which rule is exercised, poses no great difficulties. For most readers, the term "state" will initially evoke the classical three branches of governance: executive, legislative, and judicial. When to these are added such other familiar instrumentalities as political parties, regulatory bodies, parastatal corporations (public enterprises), social agencies (schools, medical facilities), regional administration, and local governmental bodies, the state as the organized public sector of society begins to take shape.

Less immediately apparent, but even more crucial to my discussion, is the state as a theoretical abstraction, that is, the state as expressed in the realm of ideology. Every living state reflects a public doctrine of rule and authority. In

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one sense, the state ideology finds formal expression in constitutions and jurisprudence, through which its structures are specified and its commands congealed into a code of prescriptions. Underlying these manifestations of public doctrine are the philosophical assumptions upon which the supremacy of the state rests and according to which its legitimacy is asserted. The normative doctrine of the modern state includes such postulates as sovereignty (supremacy with respect to society, autonomy in relation to other states), territoriality, and nationality. This well-nigh universal public doctrine of the nation-state is distinctively modern; although state forms of political organization can be traced back several millennia, such critical notions as sovereignty, territoriality, and nation received conscious elaboration only in comparatively recent times.[3]

Although the state in important respects is autonomous from society, and exercises rule over it, the state also reflects and embodies class structure and ethnic (or religious) configurations. Its public doctrine tends to incorporate the values that prevail among dominant social strata, and its agents are likely to be disproportionately recruited from these groups.[4] In its self-definition as nation, the state projects an identity that often incorporates the cultural symbols of its most numerous or dominant ethnolinguistic or religious communities: contemporary Iran, for example, is self-consciously a Persian and Islamic state.

Class, even more than the state, is the subject of a vast and rich literature; I cannot begin to cover all aspects of the stratification and class question in this essay, but only to make clear its usage therein.[5] Much of the theoretical debate concerning class in Africa arises from the lack of congruence between the social formations observable in African states and the categories that have gained currency in class analysis.[6] A definitive resolution is not yet in sight.

For purposes of this discussion, then, class is viewed as a social aggregate within the polity, defined by its common role, function, and status within the socioeconomic setting—that is, a societal unit primarily bounded by the nation-state, though influenced by the external arena. Unlike ethnicity, class categories are analytical constructs in the first instance, though they may acquire social meaning and become powerful foci of solidarity. Like ethnicity, class is, both objectively and subjectively, a relational concept.

Precisely because class categories are analytical formulations, they tend to reflect in part terminology that is already widely current: worker and bourgeoisie, peasant and middle class. Yet, specific features in the development of systematic patterns of inequality in Africa work against the replication of these class forms. Further, folk perceptions of inequality yield categories of understanding of social hierarchies that offers important insights into the way stratification penetrates the social consciousness.[7] Thus social class in Africa can be most usefully delineated by examining the impact of classical lexicon, emerging patterns of vertical differentiation, and popular conceptualizations.[8]

Class as a basis for ordering the social universe is intersected by cultural pluralism, understood as multiple units of social affinity within a territorial society, based upon commonalities of language, ethnicity, religion, or region. To grasp this phenomenon, it is necessary to set aside the lapidary simplicity of the ethnic map, with its connotations of stability and discrete, bounded entities. Cultural pluralism in Africa is an exceedingly complex amalgam of multilayered and interpenetrating identities, themselves in the process of evolution. In

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essence, it is a self-versus-other relationship, where particular categories are defined according to characteristics that differentiate them from relevant others. For any individual, the "other" is a set of collective representations that are perceived as having some objective existence. The "we," however, is an intensely subjective category, and is likely to be accompanied by powerful affective attachments. The groups are not defined by innate, permanent cultural characteristics; the set of customs associated with a particular group may change appreciably over time, while the identity of the group persists.[9]

Ethnicity is not simply a mirror image of class, a horizontal set of cleavages that symmetrically contrast with the vertical hierarchies of class. Class divisions can be important to society without the crystallization of pronounced solidarities within the strata. Consciousness, however, is what at bottom defines ethnos. Common cultural traits and linguistic similarity provide the potential for subjective affinity, but the ethnic group only becomes an actuality when its members grasp the meaning of "we-ness." Further, ethnic consciousness has emotional dimensions not usually found in class solidarities, even where these are well rooted. The very vocabulary in which ethnicity is articulated is suffused with the intimacy of kinship referents. "We" are fictive brothers and sisters, while ethnic myths frequently postulate an eponymous common ancestor, thereby creating an ideology of genealogical commonality. Religious affinity frequently travels a similar course.

These, then, are the understandings of state, class, and ethnicity employed herein. They will be examined first in the colonial, and then in the postcolonial setting.

The Colonial State

The state as a form of human organization is of course very old in Africa, going back at least five thousand years. Indeed, like the human species itself, states may well have originated in Africa. The system of states that concerns us, however, the fifty-four contemporary sovereign units, originates in the imperial partition of Africa in the late nineteenth century. The amalgam of factors that propelled the partition—simple imperial aggrandizement, European rivalries, aggressive imperial agents, the expansion of religious missions, the scent of precious minerals, the quest for markets—led within a short time to the imposition of a largely novel pattern of territorial demarcations. Some precolonial states, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Rwanda, Burundi, Swaziland, and Lesotho, preserved their identity in partition. But the network of colonial territories was fundamentally new, both in the units created and in the international state system into which Africa now became incorporated.[10]

The colonial state system carried a concept of territoriality with important implications. In striking contrast to the precolonial African state system, boundaries acquired great significance; as the colonial states became organized, all persons were compelled to acquire a territorial classification. Further, the Berlin Conference of 1884-85—a pivotal diplomatic event in the partition process—introduced the new principle of "effective occupation" as indispensable to legitimation of imperial territorial claims. The colonial state thus had to establish a military presence quickly, particularly on its frontiers, if it were not

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to risk seizure by a European rival. Over time, the boundaries that demarcated the colonial domains of different European powers acquired considerable social and economic significance. Movement of peoples across these boundaries—while it continued—was now an international affair. Different monetary systems were established, and trade across borders was subject to regulation and taxation. The communication systems created by the colonial powers were oriented toward the new territorial concepts, and externally directed toward the metropolis. In myriad symbolic ways, the distinctiveness of colonial territorial zones was embodied in the rituals and artifacts of everyday life: flags, coins, uniforms, postage stamps, administrative languages. In the baggage trains of imperialism traveled quite novel concepts of the state, derived from the public ideologies of nineteenth century Europe. The precolonial state, the stateless zones of jural community, rested on shared customary values and often elaborate traditional constitutionalism. The new state was an abstraction, equipped with comprehensive innate rights attached to the new impersonal doctrine of sovereignty. Its existence and legitimacy were validated by its recognition within the European system of international jurisprudence. In this perspective, Africa, with a few exceptions such as Morocco, Egypt, or Ethiopia, was a sovereign void, permitting the new states to claim plenary powers of occupation and exploitation of the continent's land, minerals, and human labor.

Certain crucial aspects of European state theory, however, were not transferred. State-limiting doctrines that had grown in tandem with the jural philosophy of the state—constitutionalism, civil liberties, liberalism—were carefully left behind. So also was the idea of the nation as sacred corollary of the state, a notion that had acquired explosive force in Europe.

Colonial states, in truth, were the antithesis of national states; they were alien entities, instrumentalities whose raison d'être was domination. Their institutional forms were marked by the imperative of hegemony over subject populations: the essentially military character of the early colonial state, the network of district strongholds through which overrule was extended through the territorial domain, the uniforms that state agents frequently wore. The colonial state sought to equip itself with a mythology of irresistible power and force—in the Belgian case, the state was colloquially known as *Bula Matari* (crusher of rocks)[11]—in order to impose its hegemony and simultaneously find means to extract from peasant economies the fiscal resources to pay for conquest and for its own institutionalization.[12]

The newly imposed boundaries created by the grid of colonial states for the most part ignored cultural patterns in the subjugated societies, to which, with a few exceptions, little importance was attached. The vagaries of European diplomacy and military campaigns, possibly influenced by alliances with local African political forces, determined the boundary outcomes. A particular precolonial African state might, by treaty or alliance, or by calculation (or miscalculation) of advantage, assign itself to a given colonial domain. However, almost no one on the European side cared whether a particular language group was united or divided by colonial partition. Indeed, only with the rise of the concept of the national state in Europe had such issues acquired political significance anywhere; language and culture were not weighty concerns in boundary maneuvering for the premodern dynastic states of Europe. In Africa

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as well, state and ethnicity were usually quite separate principles of affiliation. As Elizabeth Colson has pointed out, "Political and ethnic boundaries rarely coincided in pre-colonial Africa."[13]

Over time, the colonial state required an additional gloss for its public ideology to consolidate its claims of internal and external legitimacy. This was found in such concepts as "trusteeship," "*mise en valeur*," and the "civilizing mission." Hegemony was a paternal obligation of the administering power, to bring the blessings of "good government," as understood by the colonizer, to subjugated populations. With political and legal protection for metropolitan capital, in the form of property rights and contract enforcement, and with the frequently coercive mobilization of indigenous labor, natural resources could be developed for what was asserted to be the common benefit of mankind. Spiritual uplift would be made available through Christian evangelization, and Western culture would be dispensed through a colonial education system.

For a long time, the colonial state was not nearly as able to impose its will fully and to implement its designs as it claimed. Until the 1920s, a number of areas were not really under administrative control. A basic framework of state organization was in place, however, and this carried the potential for considerable expansion. Transformations in the international arena—particularly the changes wrought by World War II—and the emergent challenge of nationalism imposed the formulation of additional ideological defenses for the colonial state, which in turn impelled its remarkably swift expansion in the postwar era. The notions of "development" and "welfare" were added to the public doctrine of the state, and given concrete embodiment in a ramifying state infrastructure to provide these services. In the Belgian Congo, state expenditures multiplied fifteenfold between 1939 and 1950, then tripled again in the 1950s.[14] In Ghana, public expenditures in 1946-47 were a mere £6,630,000, having only doubled over the preceding thirty-five years; in the following decade, they multiplied tenfold.[15]

The Colonial State, Class, and Ethnicity

The colonial state radically altered existing patterns of social stratification and ethnicity. In only a few places in precolonial Africa was socioeconomic differentiation rooted in large differences of wealth and command of resources (Egypt, Maghreb, Ethiopia), though there were often important status differentials between noble, commoner, and client or slave.[16] Wholly new principles and determinants of stratification were injected by the colonial state.

At the top of the social hierarchy stood the European category. This foreign estate included colonial officialdom, those associated with colonial mercantile capitalism, missionaries, and—in North, East, and especially Southern Africa—a permanent, settled white populace that seized much of the best land and dominated the economy. In the extreme case of South Africa, the colonial state quickly gave way to a racial hegemony state,[17] whose constitutive ideology was the preservation of white supremacy. At the other end of the spectrum, in West Africa, white populations were generally small and dominated by officialdom. Everywhere, the foreign estate that grew up around the colonial state held a commanding position in power, status, and relative wealth (partially excepting, on the latter score, the missionaries).

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In its quest for hegemony and revenue, the colonial state in its early stages usually took steps that precluded African access to new means of wealth accumulation: European trading houses were accorded various mercantile monopolies; lucrative export crops were reserved to European planters; and restrictions of legal status and property rights truncated indigenous capitalism. The severity of the blockages ran on a gradient dependent upon the size of the European populace, with Nigeria—where significant room for indigenous enterprise existed—and South Africa—with comprehensive exclusion—constituting the poles.[18]

Yet a new class was beginning to take form in the shadow of the colonial state, Africans who through some degree of Western education had acquired literacy in the European language and thus qualified for white-collar employment in one of the new hierarchies of the colonial era: clerks in public or private bureaucracies; teachers; auxiliary medical personnel; priests, preachers, and catechists for the religious institutions brought by the missionaries. At the height of the colonial epoch, they were usually labeled by some status term that connoted their relative proximity to the European world and their distance from the mere "native" subject: *assimilado* for the Portuguese, *évolué* for the Belgians, perhaps "citizen" for the French. In the 1950s, terminology shifted, and they became known as "elites," a descriptor alluding to their presumptive leading position within African society.[19] Subsequently, they have become retrospectively categorized as a "petty bourgeoisie,"[20] to incorporate them within more conventional social class terminology. Within the system of social values introduced by the colonial state, they had considerable status, yet rarely did they enjoy either wealth or power.

Also of significance during the colonial period, especially in areas under British rule, were the chiefs, administrative intermediaries who, like capillaries, linked the European-staffed colonial state with the rural subject populace. Particularly under the administrative ideology of "indirect rule," these were usually persons with some customary claim to authority. Only in a relatively few cases did they have much real autonomy (for example, in northern Nigeria and Buganda). Relative to the average villager, they had some power and wealth, certainly enough to ensure a supply of candidates. In comparison to the foreign estate or their counterparts in, say, India, the chiefs cut a sorry figure. As agents of execution of the colonial order and its frequently distasteful commands (taxation, labor recruitment, military conscription, repression of dissidence), their situation was often uncomfortable. They were above all dependent clients of the colonial state. As the latter responded to its own inner imperative of increasing bureaucratic rationality, "competency" by European criteria took its place alongside prescriptive attributes of descent and customary legitimacy in determining appointment.[21]

The new political order created by the colonial state opened the door for the emergence of a capitalist sector, launched by the foreign estate. Initially, this took the form of mines and plantations (apart from the trading companies, which needed only a small labor force). These were highly labor-intensive operations; the gold mines in northwest Zaïre, for example, employed 50,000 workers in their heyday. The state generally believed these developments to be indispensable for its own fiscal viability, and through various devices—taxation and enforced recruitment—took steps to guarantee a labor supply. Also, the

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crucial infrastructure that the state was obliged to provide, above all in transportation (railways, roads, harbors), was itself a substantial employer. From the 1920s on, light consumer industries producing such goods as textiles and beverages also developed. The workers gradually became a significant social category, though—except in South Africa—not a very numerous one overall. Its collective consciousness during the colonial era remained weaker than its numbers, because in many areas, migrant laborers, who planned only a limited sojourn in the workforce, predominated, retaining their rural affiliations and rights.[22]

In the rural sector, the colonial state quickly became committed to the promotion of cash export agriculture, usually grafted onto peasant household economies. The most crucial impetus again came from the revenue requirements of the state. The imposition of commercial agriculture created small monetary incomes for peasants, which could then be recaptured in part through the head tax. Also, the bulked and processed commodity could be inexpensively taxed at the point of export—often as much as a third of its value. Finally, these impositions provided metropolitan manufacturers with a source for raw materials, especially cotton and vegetable oils. A significant portion of the peasant household labor resources were thus diverted to producing peanuts, cotton, palm oil, cocoa, or coffee. In the process, the villager became part of a larger economic and social system,[23] and "peasant" as a social category took on new meanings.[24]

In a few areas, the value of the export crop (in relation to its labor requirements) was sufficiently high to permit a modest number of farmers to become predominantly commercial in their outlook; this was possible especially in cocoa and coffee areas. A significant class of petty rural capitalists took form here, often combining trade and transport with farming as a means of accumulation (Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Uganda, and Tanzania).[25] In many areas, a small number of cultivators, through farming skill and effective exploitation of government services, became somewhat more prosperous than the average villager, and were seen as "big men" in the local community.

The territorial colonial state also indelibly marked the cultural definitions of the subjugated societies. Ethnic and religious self-consciousness certainly existed in precolonial Africa. The lack of coincidence, however, between these principles of affiliation and political construction, the small scale of most rural societies, and (save within the Islamic sphere) the absence of crystallized ideologies of identity meant that earlier patterns of cultural geography were qualitatively different from contemporary modes of ethnic identities. In this respect, Africa followed a pathway quite similar to that taken elsewhere in the development of what in European studies has usually been termed "nationalism."[26]

Two phenomena had a profound and crucial impact on the development of ethnic categories. These were, first, the classification and creation of territorial subdivisions by the colonial state, which were indispensable to the institutionalization of its dominance, and second, the unequal opportunities for social mobility among the different cultural groups, which over time created widespread perceptions of ethnic stratification.

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Regarding classification, we should first note the comprehensive social, legal, and economic significance created for racial categories. While phenotypical difference was always obvious, "races" as self-conscious collective categories were new. Colonial legal systems invariably accorded a privileged status to Europeans, and possibly to a small number of mulattoes or Africans assimilated to European status; "natives," or subjects, were relegated to a secondary juridical zone. With varying degrees of intensity, the white-black hierarchy became embedded in social practices wherever Africans and Europeans interacted. From this eventually arose the racial consciousness that was an important motif in the African nationalist response to colonialism and subjugation (Pan-Africanism, the *négritude* doctrines of Senghor and others, and the Black Consciousness movement in South Africa).[27]

For a number of colonial purposes, it sufficed to apply the broad and ultimately racial label of "native." There were, however, a number of circumstances for which a more discriminating typology was important. The institutionalization of a system of rural administration required the drawing of discrete local boundaries. The designation of local intermediaries presumed knowledge of who held authority over whom, with a frequent presumption that political affiliation and ethnic affinity were identical. Christian missions, with vast evangelical ambitions and limited means, had crucial decisions to make regarding linguistic vehicles for catechism and how best to use their resources. Labor recruiters swiftly acquired mental maps for applying labels and accompanying stereotypes to various workforce reservoirs.

An important part of the energies of the early generation of field administrators was devoted to this type of identification and sorting process. Although a number of these exhibited great analytical subtlety in the execution of their tasks, they inevitably applied an alien logic to the infinite complexities of the social milieu. The ethnic reality so well captured by Aidan Southall in his epigrammatic observation that cultural affinities were in their essence "interlocking, overlapping, multiple"[28] was anathema to administrative rationality, which demanded a physical map with discrete, bounded units.

The impulse for classification went furthest in the British case, no doubt informed by the imperial experience in India, where differences of community, religion, or language were discovered to have so many implications for an economical system of alien governance. In the extreme case, primarily encountered in the British realm, the colonial state visibly created new categories of identity.[29] Ethnonyms in East Africa such as Teso, Gisu, Toro, Acholi, Kiga, Sukuma, or Luhya would hardly have been encountered at all a century ago. Even where the identity units were not themselves novel, major alterations in the scope of ethnonyms were very frequent.

A corollary to this process of classification was the crystallization of stereotypical attributes concerning the various groups. Industrious or lazy; valorous or timorous; receptive or antipathetic to the imported culture of the colonizer; faithful allies or rebellious adversaries to colonial authority. Over time, these imputed properties could acquire a life of their own, and become assimilated into group self-images; certainly, this has occurred for ethnic groups such as the Chagga, Kasai Luba, Ibo, or Bamileke, who enjoyed relatively

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positive stereotypes as aggressive, competitive, and keen for "modernization." Important policy choices were made based on such collective images. Military recruitment, for example, especially for the British and the Belgians, was concentrated upon groups perceived as "martial races," a doctrine that emerged in early nineteenth century India and became firmly rooted dogma after the Sepoy Rebellion in 1857.[30]

The uneven distribution of opportunities for social mobility arose from the new avenues for upward movement that became available during the colonial period. Over time, the location of a town, the route followed by road or railway, the siting of a school, the proximity of a major employer—all had an important cumulative impact in endowing some groups with much more numerous and visible elites than others. A growing recognition of this pattern, generally unperceived before World War II, was central to the rise of ethnic self-consciousness in the postwar years. Aggressive groups, who savored the esteem accorded to the successful, redoubled their efforts to move upward. Those groups that suddenly discovered themselves scorned as "backwards," and threatened with subordination, mobilized themselves socially and politically to claim their share of the "national cake."

Thus during the three quarters of a century of colonialism in Africa, quite novel patterns of social stratification were taking form, shaped by the colonial state itself, the status values it introduced, and the peripheral capitalism it sponsored. Simultaneously, sea changes were occurring in the cultural configurations in the social consciousness; here again, the colonial state itself played a central role. The end of colonialism brought important changes in the nature and doctrine of the state, which in turn had repercussions for the dynamics of class and cultural pluralism.

Class, Ethnicity, and the Independent State

Outside the colonized lands, the identification of the nation with the juridical state had become widely accepted by the twentieth century. The nation, a warm, vibrant, anthropomorphic being, was a higher form than the cold, inanimate, legal state; a state that deemed itself modern had within it the seeds of nationhood, however multicultural its society might be. With independence, the idea of the "state" in Africa became fused for the first time with the concept of "nation." The prestige of the nation-state was perhaps never higher than at the moment of African independence, for the cultural autonomy and solidarity movements worldwide that punctuated the 1960s and 1970s were not yet perceptible. "National integration" was no mere neologism of the political scientist, but a powerful imperative to the intelligentsia and leadership of the newly independent states. Few voices at the time would have challenged the conclusion of Carl Friedrich: "Such is the dialectic of the political that the state seeks and must seek to foster the growth of a nation, indeed must posit its potential coming into being."[31]

The idea of the nation became attached of necessity to the territorial entities of the colonial partition. This process began as the nationalist challenge to imperial rule gathered force. Although at the earliest stages pan-territorial movements were common (*Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*, *Etoile Nord-*

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Africain, West African Student Union, among others), as the struggle was joined with colonial power, the practical logic of combat dictated organization within the existing territorial frame. The very process of building a solidarity capable of challenging the colonizer required endowing the territorial unit with a new legitimacy. After independence, an intense awareness of the fragility of power engendered unitary state formulas for its exercise and political slogans of the "one leader, one party, one nation" variety. At the international level, the nascent African concert of nations made into a fundamental postulate of inter-African public law the sanctity of existing colonial boundaries. Over time, this creed has hardened into immutable dogma.

The second fundamental development in the nature of the state is its rapid and multifaceted expansion, which began in the postwar years of defensive colonialism, reflecting in part a political response to the immense clamor for amenities—schools, clinics, roads, a safe water supply. The expanded provision of such services requires large numbers of additional state employees—above all, in the education system; the number of teachers in Zaïre, for example, expanded from approximately 37,000 in 1960 to over 200,000 in 1979.[32] Public expenditures totaled 59 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1974 in Zaïre;[33] in Tanzania, the fraction of GDP collected by the state increased from 15 percent in 1961 to nearly 35 percent in 1974.[34] This remarkable growth in the scope of the state necessarily raises the stakes for all self-conscious social groupings, whether based on strata or ethnicity.

Another important consequence of full political independence has been enhanced significance for boundaries and citizenship. This is particularly marked within contiguous zones previously under a single colonial sovereignty. Voltaics in the Ivory Coast are no longer conceived of only as migrant workers, but also as foreign nationals, as are the numerous Kenyan workers in Kampala (Uganda), or the Benin and Senegalese civil servants who once served the French administration throughout former French West Africa. When to this is added the occasional political circumstance that can place whole cultural groups into the status of hostile or suspect communities, it becomes clear why Africa, by the end of the 1970s, had come to harbor the largest number of refugees of any major region, with about half the world total.[35]

The altered nature of the postcolonial state had an important impact on social class definitions. The most visible and significant was the rapid crystallization of a state bourgeoisie, which took form around the political and bureaucratic apparatus of the public sector. As Richard Sklar has cogently argued, in independent Africa, the dynamics of class are shaped by power relations, rather than relations of production.[36] Independence opened positions in the upper reaches of the state hierarchy previously closed to Africans; politics created whole new superstructures (legislatures, parties, ministries). For a significant fraction, especially among the political cohort, the exercise of power has opened up opportunities for parallel mercantile activities that bring significant wealth within reach.

When contrasted with dominant strata in other regions, there are some particular characteristics of this class that deserve note. Its dependence on the state and proximity to political power are quite exceptional. Put conversely, the state bourgeoisie has little autonomy relative to the state; its standing in society

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is not rooted in control of property, wealth, or productive facilities. An individual's class membership is contingent upon remaining within the orbit of established political authority; a fall from political grace can be exceedingly costly. Likewise, loss of post can threaten an individual's ability to transmit his high status to the next generation, ordinarily facilitated by enrolling one's children in the superior schools, or possibly abroad. There can be considerable turnover in the specific membership in this dominant class, though as a social category, the state bourgeoisie has congealed into what appears to be a stable feature of the evolving society.

There is, of course, considerable variation across the continent. In countries such as Nigeria and Kenya, an African entrepreneurial or capitalist class that does have some autonomy from the state seems to be taking form. Over time, this may occur elsewhere as well, though such processes are inhibited by the very large public sectors created in a number of countries, and not only those inspired by some form of socialist perspective. In South Africa, where power was transferred in 1910 to the white community, the issue is posed in totally different terms; corporate mining empires, industry, large-scale farming, and the professions provide autonomous niches for segments of the white community. They are, however, dependent on the racially defined state to preserve their privileged status.[37] There is a distant echo of the state bourgeoisie in the importance of the public sector, which has become unusually large (for a market-economy capitalist state) as the Afrikaner has moved upward since 1948.

At the other extreme, for which Zaïre may serve as example, the state bourgeoisie is a veritable service class.[38] The dependency of the state bourgeoisie has been systematically used as scaffolding for the current regime, this by way of patrimonial allocation of a substantial fraction of the public resources that pass through state channels.[39] By fully exploiting the potential of the state, the regime maintains decisive leverage over the state bourgeoisie, which helps explain the regime's persistence, despite the debilitating crisis and massive disaffection that have engulfed the country.

Because the state bourgeoisie is the internally dominant class, and because powerful social formations autonomous from the state are relatively lacking, the link between state and class in Africa is quite different from that which has evolved in the Western state. There, the state always encountered potent forces that were outside its grasp and partly hostile to its growth—the feudal nobility and mercantile capital, and later, industrial and financial capital. The colonial state, on the other hand, acquired full hegemony over all. The mutual impact of the state and the foreign estate changed after independence. The latter was long accustomed to regarding the state as its particular domain. Political independence forced the foreign estate to retreat into the economic realm. Indeed, over time, most of its members whose livelihood depended directly on the state (the colonial servants) departed, to be replaced by a new technocracy of international experts, foreign assistance functionaries, and multinational representatives. Although they initially had significant political influence, in most countries this influence has shriveled; to a degree, the price paid for economic latitude is insulation from internal political conflict. They are, however, important intermediaries in the asymmetrical linkages between the postcolonial state and the industrial world. As a racial category, they continue to enjoy high status,

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and their very high consumption standards serve as a reference point for the state bourgeoisie. Here, perhaps, the Ivory Coast is the limiting case, for the foreign estate there has multiplied fivefold since independence, earning about twice what they could expect to make at home, accounting for about a third of the total wage bill in the early 1970s, and remitting $100 million in 1975.[40] The dependence of the state upon external transactions (taxation of foreign trade, flows of loans, capital of loans, capital, and aid) to meet its own resource needs guaranteed the role of this category and provided it with leverage. Although the foreign estate could of course only subsist with the cooperation of the state, it was autonomous in a way that the state bourgeoisie was not.

More generally, the location of African states in the international system of states plays an important part with respect to the state bourgeoisie as well as the foreign estate. The economic weakness of all but a few renders them highly vulnerable to market fluctuations, the high cost of energy and food imports, and the great difficulty in meeting foreign exchange and state revenue needs. The tributary linkages of debt and aid that arise out of these needs create interdependencies between the state, the state bourgeoisie, and the international system. The physical apparatus of the state requires the skill and services of the state bourgeoisie. The latter depends for its prosperity upon the fiscal and mercantile viability of the state. External creditors, political sponsors, and trading partners acquire an increasing, almost proprietary concern with the stability and survivability of the state (though not necessarily a given regime). Anarchy is as terrifying a concept to the international system as it is to the state bourgeoisie and foreign estate; only the state can assure the repayment of debts and guarantee the continuing flow of vital mineral resources—not to mention the destabilizing risks for the international arena of conflicts growing out of the breakdown of a state.

The nature and role of the state were also linked to the rapid expansion of the urban sector. This occurred through the critical part played by the state in employment creation. In a number of countries, private sector employment has stagnated since 1960. For example, public sector employees in Congo increased from 4,000 in 1960 to over 36,000 in 1972, at which time they accounted for 53 percent of all wage employment.[41] The very effectiveness of the state in expanding education systems and, negatively, the disappointments of its rural development efforts accelerated flight to the cities by the young, for whom life in the village offered only assured poverty. The sheer scale of state consumption tended to direct resources to cities and towns associated with the governmental apparatus, particularly the capital. Many of the new urban immigrants who were unable to find regular jobs sought subsistence in the burgeoning informal sector as petty traders, artisans, purveyors of personal services, and messengers. Some turned to pilferage and prostitution.[42]

The postcolonial state has also had a noteworthy impact on ethnicity. In its fundamental approach to the issue of cultural pluralism, it has differed sharply from its colonial predecessor. The latter was an alien, racial entity, apart from the dominated society. The postcolonial state, on the other hand, embraced the doctrine of state as nation-in-becoming, thereby projecting its own image as a higher synthesis of society. "Nation-building" was everywhere placed at the top of the agenda.

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Few imagined that the national identity to be created was to supercede ethnic affiliation. Rather, it was to transcend ethnicity, by superposing a historically higher and ethically superior form of human solidarity. A folkloric attachment to the ethnic community was harmless and acceptable, but its elevation as the basis for collective claims upon the state was wrong. Only the nation has full status as a recognized and totally legitimate conception of solidarity.

For the most part, the concept of nation to be developed was a culturally neutral one, distinct from any of the particular cultural entities within the territorial boundaries. From the inanimate material of the state, a living sense of community was to be created. There were exceptions to this, in the Arab tier of states in North Africa and those states that were lineal descendants of a precolonial state or community (Swaziland, Lesotho, and Somalia, for example). The two states that were for the most part outside the colonial universe, Liberia and Ethiopia, were also somewhat different; in each, there was a founding community that took in its charge the destinies and expansion of the state during the nineteenth century (Americo-Liberians, Amhara). The inability to project a national image of the state distinct from these groups played no small part in the Sergeant Doe 1980 coup in Liberia and the rebellions around the periphery of Ethiopia beginning in the 1960s. South Africa was also a special case; in particular, from the official adoption of apartheid as state ideology in 1948, the concept of "nation" was restricted to the white community. Africans were defined as outside the national community, through legal assignment to ten "homelands," to which the state assigned a set of cultural classifications. The Asian and colored communities were conceived as subordinate racial categories, not entitled to the normal prerogatives of full citizenship that membership in the "nation" would provide.[43]

A number of strategies were pursued in executing the nation-building design. The colonial pattern of avid classification largely ceased; indeed, the state frequently sought to replace ethnic categories by those based on territory. Many ceased employing ethnicity or maternal languages as a census category. Even states such as Zaïre, while adopting policies of "affirmative action" on behalf of disadvantaged groups, applied the protective quotas to administrative subdivisions, not to ethnic groups.

Thus the overly exuberant celebration of ethnicity is viewed with suspicion by the state. A number have forbidden the formation of ethnic associations, which were generally tolerated by the colonial state. Cultural entrepreneurs who use such structures as a base for the elaboration of ethnic ideologies are thereby denied a crucial organizational resource.[44] Demonstrations for protest action to support ethnic claims are a dangerous threat; one recent illustration was the sharp reaction of the Algerian regime to student action in Tizi-Ouzou in April 1980 calling for recognition of the Berber cultural heritage.

That politicized ethnicity is a potential—and potent—threat to the nation-building mission has been a prime factor in the widespread adoption of single-party or military formulas of governance, where open political competition is averted. In most instances, some effort is made to project an image of the state as a faithful representation of the nation by ensuring that major regions and groups are included in the ruling group. The considerable symbol-wielding machinery

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of the state as well as the socializing agencies—schools and the media—all play their part in spreading the idea of nationality.

This effort seems to have had real impact: passive submission to the colonial state has been widely replaced by an active consciousness of national identification.[45] At the same time, the aim of communicating a culturally neutral image of nation is not always achieved. Rwanda is unambiguously associated with Hutu domination, as is Burundi with Tutsi. The perception is widespread in Zaïre that the state is identified with an Equateur and Lingalaphone inner core; conversely, certain regions believe themselves to be outcast, for example, by a 1978 ordinance forbidding military recruitment in Bandundu and the two Kasais. As for Ethiopia, in recent years, regions of the cultural periphery—Somali, Eritrea, and Oromo—have succeeded in creating a counterimage of the state as colonial occupant, rather than nation.[46]

At the very least, the territorial personality of the state has been strongly affirmed. In colonial times, when most of Africa fell under the sway of four colonial powers, the discontinuities between territories dependent upon a common external sovereign were not sharply drawn. Since independence, the fifty-four sovereign polities have constituted distinctive, bounded arenas within which class formation and ethnic definitions occur. Two decades ago, there was little to distinguish, say, Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) from Malawi (Nyasaland), Rwanda from Burundi, the Ivory Coast from Benin. Today, the texture of the state and the configurations of class and ethnicity within it are of growing specificity.

Class in Contemporary Africa

Thus far, we have considered class and ethnicity in conjunction with the state. Let us set aside the latter, and direct our attention explicitly to these two patterns of societal cleavage—affiliation and differentiation—whose particular dynamics require closer scrutiny. Earlier we considered three key categories in the African context: the foreign estate, the state bourgeoisie, and the informal sector. With respect to the first two categories, which are the dominant social classes, we need not retrace our steps. Yet a few words more need to be said about the informal sector.

In many cities, informal sector activity accounts for a large fraction of the urban populace. One extreme case is Kananga, the second largest city in Zaïre; in 1973 there were only 10,000 recorded jobs for a population of over 400,000.[47] The myriad activities, almost all small-scale, that comprise this sector, as well as the importance of kinship and clientage as instrumentalities of survival, serve to inhibit the social mobilization of this group. Although the mainly impoverished participants in the informal sector economy are well aware of the two dominant classes, their shared poverty alone does not seem to foster a collective consciousness.

The "informal sector" thus conceived includes those persons who might otherwise be classified as an unemployment lumpenproletariat. Indeed, many consider themselves to be "unemployed," in that they do not hold regular wage employment, and continue to seek a steady job actively. Although unskilled workers often earn very low wages indeed, their regularity provides a degree of

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predictability and a small measure of security, compared to the high uncertainty and irregularity surrounding much informal sector activity. While waiting for a steady job, however, most cannot rely on handouts from kin; the survival pursuits of the informal sector are therefore a practical necessity. For this reason, this large category of the urban poor seems to be best described through their informal sector membership rather than as "unemployed" or some derivative term.

Four other social categories deserve mention. One newly emerging at the upper end of the economic scale in some countries—in some respects, a mirror image of the informal sector at the lower end—is what might be termed the *magendo* class. The lexical referent itself is new; the term, of Swahili origin, has gained currency as a general descriptor of the black market, or underground, economy in East Africa, which is particularly widespread in Uganda. *Magendo* thrives on the decay of the state; it flourishes where the probity, competence, and effectiveness of the state are corroded. In countries such as Uganda, Ghana, or Zaïre, *magendo* becomes a very large part of the economy—estimated by one economist as 50 percent of Uganda's total economy in 1979.[48]

If such figures are conceivable, those who occupy this niche of the market may deserve recognition as a distinct and potentially powerful social category.[49] Beyond *magendo*, there is probably a growing group of purveyors of services to the state (the ubiquitous "contractor" in Nigeria, building roads and schools) and merchant communities (the Bamileke in Cameroon) who are distinct from the state bourgeoisie and partly autonomous from the state.

A significant group in the towns is what might be termed a petty bourgeoisie, or lower middle class of white-collar employees—clerks, secretaries, nurses, and the like. A short three decades ago, this category ranked relatively high in the African community in status terms, and was poised for the spectacular social leap upward that Africanization of various bureaucracies would bring. Today the petty bourgeoisie is *déclassé;* it no longer has high prestige, its mobility prospects are blocked by the availability of more highly educated persons for top echelon posts, and its relative income has often declined.

Although the working class is no longer primarily migratory, relatively few African states have a really substantial stratum of wage laborers; South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Egypt are among the few exceptions.[50] Those employed by large foreign corporations were frequently somewhat better remunerated than other workers, and those with jobs were certainly more fortunate than their fellows in the informal sector, or most in the countryside. In a context where all were poor, this slight edge in well-being gave rise to the controversial "labor aristocracy" thesis, which many of these workers now feel placed too much stress on their marginal advantage over the peasantry, rather than their absolute poverty.[51] In recent years, private sector employment opportunities in many countries have not expanded, while a very large reserve army of job applicants is penned into the informal sector. Many of the major development projects employ relatively few workers; oil in Nigeria, the backbone of the economy, provides fewer than 20,000 jobs. Gabon, which has a remarkably (and deceptively) high per capita national income of $3,750, derives nearly all of its wealth from oil wells and uranium and manganese mines, and these employ under 1,000, just over 1,000, and 3,500. GECAMINES, the major copper

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producer in Zaïre, in 1980-81 exported several times the volume of copper exported in the 1920s, with fewer workers. Working-class organizations—trade unions—are generally kept under firm tutelage by incumbent regimes (though this is not always effective: for example, Upper Volta in 1980 and Tanzania in 1971-72). Thus, although symptoms of labor unrest are quite frequent, they are usually confined to particular enterprises. In only a few countries (such as Congo and South Africa) can one speak of a proletarian consciousness that weighs heavily in the social equation.[52]

We come, finally, to the peasantry. Only a handful of countries can point to improving conditions in the countryside (the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, possibly Kenya and Tunisia). In most, smallholders continue to carry the heavy fiscal burden that characterized the colonial era, especially through export taxation. African states have widely recognized in the last few years that their pricing policies on both export crops and staple foods (a form of indirect taxation) have discouraged production. What is only now being appreciated is that peasants have the option of "exit"[53]—the shift into growing crops that can be sold outside the official marketing channels, or the diversion of export produce into *magendo* circuits.[54] The one major benefit delivered to the countryside has been the dramatic expansion of the primary school system. Yet even this, although sustaining the hope of upward social movement for the next generation, has the effect of withdrawing labor from the rural economy, and thus increasing the burden on the women and the elderly who remain behind.

There can be no doubt that a widespread perception of relative deprivation exists among the peasantry. There is also a shrewd awareness that the interests of the state and the small farmer are partly in conflict; the state wants export production that can be taxed, and cheap, abundant food supplies to curb urban unrest, while the peasant seeks higher returns per unit of agricultural labor. However widely shared this perception, it must be clearly distinguished from a collective consciousness.

Outside of a few exceptions, the modest class of petty capitalist farmers that emerged in the latter years of colonial rule has neither expanded rapidly nor consolidated. States have generally imposed high rates of taxation on the export crops on which their relative prosperity was based, and pricing policies have generally worked to their disadvantage. Also, except for the latter half of the 1970s, world market prices for their main crops have not matched the high levels of the early postwar years. Although a few countries have actively pursued policies beneficial to the interests of this class—for example, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, or Malawi—the majority have not, and in some cases, the state has been downright hostile (Nkrumah's Ghana and Tanzania). Only in the Ivory Coast did large numbers of the political class originate in the petty capitalist planter group. Despite the fears sometimes expressed of the social danger constituted by "kulaks," commercial farmers are not usually a part of the politically dominant social categories. These farmers, of course, are to be sharply distinguished from some members of the state bourgeoisie who have acquired, primarily through political access, former European farms or plantations.[55]

Central to the problematic of class in Africa is the pace of change and the indeterminacy of categories. Three decades ago, such classifications as state bourgeoisie, *magendo*, or informal sector were unknown, the foreign estate

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occupied a very different role, and the working class was still in large part migratory. Class must thus be viewed as a dynamic concept; to achieve this, Michael Schatzberg proposes that strata categories be conceived of as processual. His approach may be summarized in three propositions:

- Social classes are constantly changing in response to differing sociopolitical contexts
- The individual actor can, and does, belong to different class alliances at the same time
- The degree of class identity will vary, depending on the geographic, social, political, and economic junctures of the moment in question[56]

I have already shown how the pervasiveness of the state plays a part in shaping this process. So also does the changing character of the political economy: the structure of production; patterns of wealth generation and distribution; options available to the young at the point where they become assigned to adult socioeconomic roles; status ranking of various likelihoods. The international system influences the outcome as well, through its impact on production patterns, the external models of consumption and hierarchy that it supplies, and the linkages it sustains through the foreign estate.

Finally, the degree of social mobility, on the one hand, and mechanisms of social closure, on the other, are key determinants of stratification over time. The first quarter century after World War II was an era of exceptional opportunities for social mobility. Educational systems were swiftly expanded almost everywhere, and Africans gained access for the first time to the upper ranks of political, administrative, and economic hierarchies. This process has slowed perceptibly in the last decade, as the one-time opportunities offered by Africanization of the state apparatus in particular have been utilized. Yet the Africans' belief in the possibility of upward mobility appears to remain strong, nourished by the now general availability of primary schools, and the knowledge in most villages that some of their sons and daughters have broken through to the upper echelons.[57]

Social closure may become an increasingly widespread phenomenon, however, especially in states where little economic expansion has occurred in recent years. In the colonial era, closure was maintained by racial barriers, the method of exclusion still in use today in South Africa. Possibly these are being replaced by the class-based transmission of privilege across generations. Members of the state bourgeoisie perhaps do not consciously intend to erect such barriers, but they will naturally make every effort to guarantee the life-chances of their own children, especially through investment in their education. If the size of the top strata cannot be expanded, almost inevitably a disproportionate fraction will over time be recruited from within its own ranks.[58]

Cultural Pluralism

Contemporary cultural pluralism, or ethnicity, has been strongly affected by the various processes termed "modernization." Far from eroding attach-

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ments of ethnicity and religion, modernization is quite likely to strengthen them. The spread of education brings higher levels of social consciousness, which may include a more highly articulated cultural identity. The extension and intensification of communication networks brings individuals within reach of broader collectivities; thus an ethnic affiliation that may have been highly localized becomes extended over a broader zone of cultural affinity. The rapid growth of cities creates social arenas where competition for survival is intense, and where the consciousness of other groups locked in combat for the same resources deepens.

The importance of scarcity of resources and competition for status in the crystallization of contemporary identities can hardly be overstated. In the localized, subsistence-oriented rural world of yore, there was little resource competition to sharpen the "we-they" sense across broad groups. The incorporation of populations within the frame of a national political economy, and the multiple arenas for encounter and conflict that this creates (schools, jobs, housing, political power, to mention but a few), have fostered novel patterns of cultural self-consciousness.

Of these competitive arenas, political power has particular importance. Few observers or African political leaders in the 1950s foresaw the force of ethnic and religious factors in politics, because within the colonial framework of white racial hegemony, political competition among Africans was unlikely to occur. When the surge to independence occurred, colonizers generally transferred to the newly created states the constitutional machinery and procedures of Western states; legitimacy was to be determined by competitive elections. Inevitably, in a number of countries, the surest way for aspiring political leaders to build constituencies was to mobilize their own ethnic clientele.

The citizenry became aware that not only were they being pressed to rally behind their own ethnic leadership, but also that other groups were being similarly courted. Thus crept in the fear of possible domination through electoral numbers, and a crescendo of mutually reinforcing suspicions. Ethnic solidarity in the political realm, if perhaps viewed with intellectual misgivings, became a defensive necessity. The process is well conveyed by the autobiographical reflections of a leading Zaïrian scholar, recollecting the mood on the eve of independence.

> Especially for the young Luba of my generation in Katanga, the agony of this situation stemmed not only from our sense of internal conflict as we struggled to find a personal and collective identity; it arose as well from the sense of frustration which we experienced in interaction with others. The people of the other ethnic groups, indeed, would not accept us as individuals, according to our own self-definition, whatever we attempted, but strictly on the basis of the straitjacketing definitions they already held of us.[59]

The sheer drama of competitive elections, the uncertainties concerning what independence would really be like, and the pervasive fears of domination resulted in the politicization of ethnicity. Through this process, categories of identity became much more salient in the social consciousness, and gave rise to widespread anxieties and insecurities. The extreme case was Nigeria, with civil war the final consequence of newly politicized ethnicity. The sentiments that

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attended the bitter strife of the early 1960s were recapitulated, on the brink of civil war, with candor and eloquence by one of the northern delegates to a constitutional conference:

> We all have our fears of one another. Some fear that opportunities in their own areas are limited and they would therefore wish to expound [sic] and venture unhampered in other parts. Some fear the sheer weight of numbers of other parts which they feel could be used to the detriment of their own interests. Some fear the sheer weight of skills and the aggressive drive of other groups which they feel has to be regulated if they are not to be left as the economic, social, and possibly political under-dogs in their own areas of origin in the very near future. These fears may be real or imagined; they may be reasonable or petty. Whether they are genuine or not, they have to be taken account of because they influence to a considerable degree the actions of the groups towards one another and, more important perhaps, the daily actions of the individual in each group towards individuals from other groups.[60]

Concomitant with the politicization process was the elaboration of cultural ideologies. In the case of religious groups, these of course are deeply rooted in theology, sacred writings, and ritual. For ethnic groups, however, an ideological articulation must be created. This is to be found in the standardization of languages through grammars and dictionaries, in the codification of custom through ethnic monographs, and in the creative synthesis of the past through historical study. All of these lend dignity and worth to a cultural group. Cultural ideology-building in Africa began early in the colonial period, primarily by missionaries, but it was also the work of some amateur anthropologist-administrators. In the interwar period, the work of creating a cultural ideology became the domain of the professional anthropologist, usually someone from the metropolitan country. After World War II, it was internationalized, but especially Africanized.[61] Few, if any, consciously viewed themselves as creators of a cultural ideology; nonetheless, an intellectual elaboration of the identity occurred around their works.

There was also an important didactic function to be performed. Cultural identities are not innate, but acquired through a social and psychological learning process.[62] Although much of this can occur through the informal education of the kinship system, schools and other socializing agencies became available. During the heyday of the 1950s, ethnic associations often performed this role with considerable energy. One such emissary of cultural consciousness, former Ibo Federal Union general secretary B. O. N. Eluwa, noted the magnitude of the task; in his travels through eastern Nigeria during the period from 1947 to 1951, he found that many rural citizens "could not even imagine all Ibos."[63] David Abernethy aptly portrays the role of these didactic agents:

> What was the best course of action open to the urban migrant who was acutely concerned lest his ethnic group fall behind others in the struggle for wealth, power and status? Certainly the rural masses had to be informed of the problem. If the masses were not aware of their ethnicity, then they would have to learn who they really were through the efforts of "ethnic missionaries" returning to the homeland. These "missionaries" would also have to outline a strategy by which the ethnic group, once fully conscious of its unity and its potential, could compete with its rivals.[64]

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The fluid and multilayered nature of ethnicity remains, despite the higher levels of consciousness and ideological articulation. A handful of examples, of the infinite number that might be cited, will illustrate this point. In Nigeria, were the Ibo of the former Midwest Region really part of the same group as these of the Eastern Region? Their ambiguous reactions to the Biafra secession speak to the indeterminacy of this question. Are Kongo and Lari in Congo one group or two? Although both speak the same language and refer to a common historical tradition, the Lari of the Brazzaville region generally utilize that ethnonym, while recognizing affinities with Kongo culture more broadly. In Uganda, for some purposes and at some conjunctures, a "Bantu" categorization for most of the southern populations has had some social meaning in distinguishing them from northerners of different linguistic origin, dietary habits, and physical appearance. Yet for most purposes, "Ganda," "Soga," "Kiga," or "Gisu" was more relevant.

Most individuals, in short, have more than one cultural identity. Which has relevance will depend upon the situational context. So also will context determine the saliency and intensity of identities. In Nigeria, for example, in a climate of impending civil war, ethnic identities were incandescent. In the era of good feeling that followed the federal triumph and the generally successful reconciliation process, ethnicity was much more subdued. In Zaïre, it can be shown that in the last three decades, a change in the political arena has produced major changes in the categories of ethnic conflict. In the late 1950s, electoral competition first occurred in the cities, and categories of conflict reflected the ethnic images current in the urban center. In 1960 attention shifted to the national arena, and a different set of groups came into play, the game requiring the maximization of rural numbers. In 1962-63 new provinces were created, largely on the basis of ethnic self-determination, that brought yet other ethnic categorizations into play. The situation changed once again during the 1964-65 rebellions, when groups were forced to choose between insurgents and the national government, by a complex calculus of perceived affinity and the assessment of the relative strength of the two sides. Finally, the centralized, unitary state with a single political party in the Mobutu era removed the possibility of overt ethnic competition, and drove ethnicity underground.[65]

Yet another element of complexity is the quite rapid process of linguistic change in contemporary Africa. Perhaps the most important is the spread of regional lingua francas; languages such as Arabic, Hausa, Swahili, or Lingala have remarkably enlarged their geographical range in recent decades, and penetrated more deeply into the rural periphery. Perhaps this is why the irrepressible Libyan president, Wanis al-Qaadafi, can argue to Saharan populations, such as the Touareg and Toubou, that they are really part of the Arab community. In Tanzania, it was estimated that only 52 percent of the population could speak Swahili in 1942; more recent estimates are 90 percent or more.[66] A recent survey of secondary school students in Kisangani showed that not only nearly all spoke Swahili or Lingala (frequently both), but no less than 52 percent spoke Swahili as a maternal language, as did 10 percent for Lingala. When one considers that this adoption of the lingua franca as maternal language cannot extend back more than a generation or two at the most, and that both

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these languages were unknown in the region 120 years ago, the scale of change is remarkable.[67]

Much less clear than the mere fact of linguistic change are the cultural implications. Surely they will be substantial, and will partly reorder cultural geography. One may speculate that broad regional identities associated with the lingua franca will become relatively more salient.

* * *

Let us now draw together the threads in this essay by returning to the interrelationships of state, class, and ethnicity. The interaction between the three is the heart of the matter; though analytically distinct, these elements constantly interpenetrate in daily life. Although the discussion will proceed on general lines, it must be recognized that each nation-state arena has a unique class and cultural pluralism configuration, which in turn produces different outcomes.

The phenomenon of inequality is a useful point of departure. While inequality is as old as human society, in the contemporary world, its potential to generate conflict is intensified by the commanding moral force of the egalitarian precepts that permeate nearly all modern ideologies. James Coleman expresses this point well, when he places the drive for equality at the heart of the "development syndrome": "Whether viewed as a factual trend, a perceived technological possibility, or simply as the dominant aspiration underlying the drive for change, egalitarianism pervades all aspects of modern political life and culture and all forms of modern political ideology."[68] In one way or another, the public doctrine of the modern state, in Africa as elsewhere, sanctifies the equal status of all citizens, and in recent years this doctrine has been extended beyond mere legal equality to include social and economic dimensions.

The egalitarian concept invests both class and ethnicity with a transcendent norm in the pursuit of material interest.[69] In classical liberal thought, equality was a property to be measured at the individual level; in the more collective epistemologies of the present century, however, inequality is stigmatized in terms of social categories. Once the purely individualistic liberal conception of egalitarianism is set aside, the door opens for demands that equality be measured in terms of relative returns to ethnic communities.

Not only is equality measured increasingly in collective terms, but also the vast expansion in the range of state activity places many more of the causes of inequality within the public realm. Daniel Bell argues this point:

> The essential point about the change from market . . . to political decisions is that in the latter instance everyone *knows* where the decision will be made. . . . A market is dispersed, and the actors largely "invisible." In politics, decisions are made in a cockpit, and confrontation is direct. Inevitably, therefore, the spread of political decision-making forces the organization of persons into communal and interest groups, defensively to protect their places and privileges, or advantageously to gain place and privilege.[70]

Put otherwise, if there is a perception that a social stratum (workers) or an ethnic group is disadvantaged, the responsibility falls to the state.

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The most prestigious ideologies in the contemporary world—socialism, in its diverse forms, and liberalism—tend to place a negative valuation on cultural pluralism, and in different ways validate class-oriented perceptions of society. This frame of ideological discourse is of primary significance to the intelligentsia, politicized youth, and political leadership. No less does it seek to downplay cultural solidarity, labeling it a symptom of backwardness, a false form of social consciousness that impedes the mobilization of the popular sectors or citizenry-at-large for common purposes.

On the other hand, cultural solidarities have symbolic resources for communal mobilization that are much more powerful than anything operating under the guise of class. As A. L. Epstein puts it, above and beyond whatever objective factors sustain ethnicity lies "the powerful emotional charge that appears to surround or to underlie so much of ethnic behavior; and it is this affective dimension of the problem that seems to me lacking in so many recent attempts to tackle it."[71] Bell adds that contemporary ethnicity appears more salient than class, "because it can combine an interest with an affective tie."[72] The kinds of emotions, anxieties, fears, and insecurities that can be triggered by ethnic conflict have no real counterpart in class conflict. In the death-filled episodes of violent confrontation in independent Africa over the last two decades, only the 1964-65 Zaïre rebellions occurred primarily within a class-derived set of social perceptions, although here as well, ethnic elements interpenetrated.

This intensity of ethnic conflict exists despite the fact that inequality is much more clearly linked to social class—where it is indeed axiomatic. Ethnic inequality, on the other hand, is largely in the eye of the beholder. A belief that ethnic inequality exists can gain currency when substantial numbers of elite members of a given group become highly visible. In reality, the great majority of members of all groups are poor, and the social advantage of a given ethnic community is usually quite relative. Yet the connotations of domination suggested by a more numerous elite from one group awaken the deepest anxieties in the others.

One structural factor that binds together state, class, and ethnicity is the pervasiveness of patron-client relationships. These bonding mechanisms, encountered at all levels of society, occur within the metaphorical framework of kinship, though they do not necessarily imply real family ties. They are, however, usually internal to a cultural community. Deference and services are exchanged for protection and favor; there is at once intimacy and inequality.

The formation of patron ties in urban circumstances is partly necessitated by the nature of the state and the many everyday difficulties in dealing with it. An ordinary problem—obtaining a permit, avoiding a sanction—that may be extremely difficult for a poor person to resolve through routine channels, will be handled expeditiously when the appropriate intermediary patron intervenes. Coping with misfortune, access to schools, employment, and the like are among the innumerable problems besetting the urbanite, where help from a patron may be crucial.

The formation of patron-client ties is an unending process, and has no specific, ironclad rules. The client needs to establish some form of affinity to a

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patron; kinship is the most reliable basis for claim, though not the only one. Mere common ethnicity normally would not be enough; others, observing a patron intervening on behalf of a client, however, are quite likely to interpret the transaction as ethnic. The pervasiveness of the patron-client phenomenon tends to sustain a complex network of transclass affiliations. Some observers go further to argue that they are an engine transforming social class tensions into ethnic antagonisms.[73]

Embodied in these relationships is a prime contradiction of the contemporary state: it is at once hard and distant, soft and permeable. In its habits and operating modes, the state reflects the inertial perpetuation of its colonial past; in its command style, the domination that gave it birth persists. Observe a government office: it retains yet the preceptorial flavor of the days when clients and petitioners were mere subjects of its alien hegemony.[74] Yet *Bula Matari* hardness coexists with the myriad access points to the state that flow through the patron-client networks of the state bourgeoisie. Indeed, so pervasive are these networks, some observers argue that the state is fatally softened, and rendered incapable of imposing choices and priorities that are indispensable to state-directed economic growth.[75]

Certainly these networks operate partly to defuse the social antagonisms generated by the great gap in material well-being between the state bourgeoisie and lower social strata. The perception of this social inequality is very widespread. Yet many hope to gain some benefits, which would otherwise be denied, through the redistributive channels of patron-client networks—and some do succeed. Although such success does not remove the anger over formal distributive inequities, some of its sting doubtless disappears.

State, class, and ethnicity are all in a condition of flux in Africa today. No doubt many will accept the premise that the crux of societal conflict is found in the intersection between these three macrovariables. The vastly more difficult task is to go beyond this effortless observation to unravel the dynamics of their interaction in any given setting.

References

[1]Not the least of the paradoxes is that the one African state that stands as an exception to the independence-optimism equation is Libya, considered in 1952, when it became a sovereign state, as a hopeless ward of the international community. Libya today has the highest per capita income in Africa, and has become an expanding power in its own right.

[2]For some important recent conceptual discussions, see "The State," *Daedalus* 108 (4) (Fall 1979); J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20 (4) (1968): 509-92; Alexander Passerin d'Entreves, *The Notion of the State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); Perry Anderson, *The Lineages of the Absolute State* (London: NLB, 1974); *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, edited by Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (London: Camelot Press, 1969); John Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979); Patrick J. Riley, "The State as a Concept in Political Philosophy," paper presented to the Second Burdick-Vary Symposium, "The Formation of States in History and Theory," University of Wisconsin-Madison, April 1980; and Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978).

[3]See, for example, such classic studies of the evolution of sovereignty doctrine as F. H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty* (London: C. A. Watts, 1966); and Bertrand de Jouvenal, *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957). On the idea of nation and nationality, see Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1943); Rupert Emerson,

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From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977).

[4]These aspects of the state are the focus of the important and stimulating debate on the state that has emerged within the Marxist school. Useful recent recapitulations can be found in Bob Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 1 (1977): 353-73; David A. Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Erik Olin Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," *Monthly Review* 17 (5) (October 1975): 29-43, and 16 (6) (November 1975): 36-51. See also, Ernesto Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (London: NLB, 1977).

[5]See the useful bibliography in *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, edited by Peter Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1976). To cite only a few recent and influential works, Saul, *State and Revolution in Eastern Africa;* Issa Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); Michael G. Schatzberg, *Politics and Class in Zaire* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1980); Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); and Richard Sklar, *Corporate Power in an African State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

[6]For a useful recent resume of this debate, see the contributions in *African Social Studies: A Radical Reader*, edited by Peter Gutkind and Peter Waterman (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977).

[7]On this, see Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

[8]This is not the only way to approach class analysis; many students of class would find it excessively empirical and inductive. Those of a Marxist persuasion, in particular, would prefer a more deductive approach, deriving class from the combination of the dominant capitalist mode of production, understood within the international framework of imperialism and the survivals from precapitalist social formations.

[9]This definition is influenced by A. L. Epstein, *Ethos and Identity* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1978). The literature on ethnicity, as with class, is now very great. Recent works that are particularly valuable include Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); *The Politics of Cultural Subnationalism in Africa*, edited by Victor A. Olorunsola (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972); Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); *Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies*, edited by Leo A. Despres (The Hague: Mouton, 1975); Orlando Patterson, *Ethnic Chauvinism: The Reactionary Impulse* (New York: Stein and Day, 1977); Nelson Kasfir, *The Shrinking Political Arena* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, edited by Frederik Barth (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); *From Tribe to Nation in Africa*, edited by Ronald Cohen and John Middleton (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970); and Harold Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975). Fuller definitional discussion may be found in my book, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976).

[10]For elaboration on this point, see Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977).

[11]The term *Bula Matari* was coined to characterize Henry Stanley, who, as a state-builder in the service of King Leopold II, forged a path across difficult terrain around the Congo River rapids, for his caravans bearing dismantled steamers. Over time, the term became a designation for the colonial state and its European agents.

[12]From a different perspective, a related point is given intriguing consideration in Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," *New Left Review* 23 (July-August 1972): 59-81. Alavi argues that the colonial state was "overdeveloped," because it had to subdue the dominant classes in colonized society.

[13]Elizabeth Colson, "African Society at the Time of the Scramble," in L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Colonialism in Africa*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 31.

[14]*Le Congo Belge* (Brussels: Inforcongo, 1959), vol. 2, pp. 60, 82; Joseph Segers, *"L'économie congolaise hier, demain, anjourd'hui," Documents pour l'action*, 3, 15 (May-June 1963): 146-52.

[15]Dennis Austin, *Politics in Ghana 1946-1950* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 5.

[16]For a useful recent discussion, see *Slavery in Africa*, edited by Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977).

[17]Stanley B. Greenberg, *Race and State in Capitalist Development* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

[18]Documentation on this point may be found in *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*, edited by Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973); Mukenge Tshilemalema, *Businessmen in Zaire: Limited Possibilities for Capital Accumulation under Dependency*, Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 1974.

[19]A whole body of sociological literature was associated with this characterization; a repre-

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sentative example is *The New Elites of Tropical Africa*, edited by P. C. Lloyd (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).

[20]This is especially so in the Marxist literature; see, for example, Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*.

[21]For illustrative detail, see *East African Chiefs*, edited by Audrey Richards (London: Faber and Faber, 1959).

[22]A classic portrayal of this phase of working-class development is found in *Migrants and Proletarians* by Walter Elkan (London: Oxford University Press, 1960). See also Robert Bates, *Rural Responses to Industrialization: A Study of Village Zambia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).

[23]For an ingenious, though ultimately unconvincing, argument that, in reality, the peasant sector was never captured by the colonial state or its postcolonial successor, see Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

[24]For a useful overview of "peasant" as social category, see *Peasants in Africa*, edited by Martin A. Klein (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1980).

[25]The classic study of this process remains Polly Hill's, *Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963). See also Audrey Richards, Ford Sturrock, and Jean M. Fortt, *Subsistence to Commercial Farming in Present-Day Buganda* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

[26]The classic studies of the phenomenon of modern nationalism make this point clear. See, for example, Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*. For full development of these points, see my *Politics of Cultural Pluralism*.

[27]For careful inquest into the crystallization of European ideas about Africans, see Philip D. Curtin, *The Image of Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964); and William Cohen, *The French Encounter with Africans: White Response to Blacks, 1530-1880* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980).

[28]Aidan Southall, "The Illusion of Tribe," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 5 (1-2) (January-April 1970): 36.

[29]Raymond Apthorpe states this point unequivocally: "Certainly in Anglophone Africa, what happened was the colonial regime administratively created tribes as we think of them today." "Does Tribalism Really Matter?" *Transition* 7 (6) (October 1968): 18.

[30]Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974). For a comparative treatment, see Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980), especially pp. 22-49.

[31]Cited in J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," p. 565.

[32]Banque du Zaïre, *Rapport annuel*, 1967, p. 72; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Zaire: Current Economic Situation and Constraints* (Washington, D.C.: 1980), p. 79. Some of the latter figures are doubtless fictitious names inserted for payroll fraud schemes; nonetheless, the increase is very great.

[33]Ibid., pp. 2, 66.

[34]Bismarck U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt, *Towards Socialism in Tanzania* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979); Alex Radian, in *Resource Mobilization in Poor Countries: Implementing Tax Policies* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1980), demonstrates with International Monetary Fund data that until the 1960s the average less developed country figure was about 16 percent.

[35]U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *World Refugee Crisis: The International Community's Response* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 40-118.

[36]"The Nature of Class Domination in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17 (4) (December 1979): 531-52.

[37]See the provocative theory of the racial state in Greenberg, *Race and State in Capitalist Development*. See also, Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

[38]There are some analogies to the "service class" concept as it existed in the early modern Russian state; see the analysis by Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974).

[39]For some detail, see David J. Gould, *Bureaucratic Corruption in the Third World* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980); and my article, "Zaire: The Unending Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (1) (Fall 1978): 169-85.

[40]Bastiaan A. den Tuider, *Ivory Coast: The Challenge of Success* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 228-45; Bonnie Campbell, *West African States: Failure and Promise*, edited by John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 108.

[41]Hugues Bertrand, *Le Congo* (Paris: Maspero, 1975), p. 255.

[42]The term "informal sector" came into general use only in the 1970s. One of the first influential studies to employ the concept was *Employment, Incomes and Equality; A Strategy for Increasing Employment in Kenya* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1972).

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[43]Jeffrey Butler, Robert I. Rotberg, and John Adams, *The Black Homelands of South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

[44]For a fuller argument, see my *Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, pp. 98-139; and Brian Weinstein, "Language Strategists: Redefining Political Frontiers on the Basis of Linguistic Choice," *World Politics* 31 (3) (April 1979): 345-64.

[45]For some empirical evidence, see *Values, Identities, and National Integration: Empirical Research in Africa*, edited by John N. Paden (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980); and Fred M. Hayward, "A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom about the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana," *American Political Science Review* 70 (2) (June 1976): 432-51.

[46]For examples of the two images of Ethiopia, see—on the national side—Donald N. Levine, *Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), and on the "colonial occupant" theory, see "A Letter to the Cubans in Harar" (from the Oromo Liberation Front), *Horn of Africa* 2 (1) (1977): 9-12.

[47]Nzongola Ntalaja, *Urban Administration in Zaire*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975, p. 77.

[48]Reginald Green, cited by Gerald Helleiner in the presentation of his paper, "Economic Collapse and Rehabilitation in Uganda," African Studies Association, annual meetings, Philadelphia, October 1980.

[49]Research in progress in eastern Zaïre by two Zaïrian scholars, Bianga Waruzi and Vwakyanakazi Mukohya, suggests the importance of this group.

[50]A useful overview is found in *The Development of an African Working Class*, edited by Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen (London: Longman, 1975).

[51]The "labor aristocracy" thesis is particularly associated with Arrighi and Saul, expounded in *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*. They have subsequently retreated from this hypothesis; see Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa*.

[52]Some would urge a different conceptualization of the "working class," to incorporate a much wider swath of the urban poor, here classified as "informal sector." See P. C. W. Gutkind, "From the Energy of Despair to the Anger of Despair," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 7 (2) (1973): 179-98. Thus understood, the proletariat becomes a far more important social category than is suggested here.

[53]To employ the intriguing notion suggested by Albert O. Hirschman in *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[54]Hyden, *Beyond Ujaama in Tanzania*.

[55]For documentation on this point, see Crawford Young, Neal Sherman, and Tim Rose, *Cooperatives and Development: Agricultural Politics in Ghana and Uganda* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981). On the "kulak" argument, especially prevalent in debates over Tanzanian rural policy, see, for example, Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*.

[56]Schatzberg, *Politics and Class in Zaire*, p. 31.

[57]David Merrill Ewert, *Freire's Concept of Critical Consciousness and Social Structure in Rural Zaïre*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1977, provides interesting documentation on this point in rural Zaïre. In fact, it is no longer very likely in Zaïre that a youngster can make the leap from village school to university degree, but the conviction that the road is open persists, and is one important consolation for the demoralizing impact of the current socioeconomic crisis.

[58]For data on this point, see Schatzberg, *Politics and Class in Zaire*, pp. 33-58.

[59]Ilunga Mbiya Kabongo, *Ethnicity, Social Classes and the State in the Congo 1960-1965: The Case of the Baluba*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1973, chapter 3.

[60]A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria*, vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 14-15.

[61]There were a few very early examples of African contributions, such as Samuel Johnson, *History of the Yorubas* (London: 1897), or Sir Apolo Kagwa, *Basekabaka be Buganda* (London: 1901). More recent examples would include such excellent works as Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of Gikuyu* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1953); Bethwell Ogot, *History of the Southern Luo* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967); and Victor Uchendu, *The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965).

[62]Epstein, *Ethos and Identity*, p. xii.

[63]David Abernethy, *The Political Dilemma of Popular Education* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 110.

[64]Ibid., p. 108.

[65]I elaborated on this argument in "Ethnic Politics in Zaire," African Studies Association, annual meetings, Houston, November, 1977.

[66]M. H. Abdulaziz, in *Language Use and Social Change*, edited by Wilfred Whiteley (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 168-69. See also Whiteley, *Swahili: The Rise of a National Language* (London: Methuen, 1969).

[67]The survey was carried out by Benoit Verhaegen and his collaborators at the *Centre de Recherche*

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Inter-disciplinaire sur l'Education at the Kisangani Campus of the *Université Nationale du Zaïre*.

[68]James S. Coleman, "The Development Syndrome: Differentiation-Equality-Capacity," in Leonard Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 76-77.

[69]One of the few efforts to systematically examine class and ethnicity simultaneously is Pierre van den Berghe and George Primov, *Inequality in the Andes* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977).

[70]Glazer and Moynihan, *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, p. 145.

[71]Epstein, *Ethos and Identity*, p. xi.

[72]Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change," in Glazer and Moynihan, *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, p. 169.

[73]Bertrand makes this argument in *Le Congo*.

[74]In an interesting recent treatment by a Zaïrian scholar, Yamvu Makasu, in *"Political Learning: A Study of the Effects of Social Relations upon Political Knowledge: The Case of Ayos (Cameroon)* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1980), the Cameroonian state is conceptualized as "preceptorial."

[75]This argument is made by Goran Hyden in a paper to be published in the forthcoming volume *Ethnic Self-Determination and State Coherence: African Dilemmas*, edited by Victor Olorunsola and Donald Rothchild. See also, Robert M. Price, *Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

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COLIN LEYS

African Economic Development in Theory and Practice

THE CHARACTER OF AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT in the past twenty years is strangely obscure. This has a good deal to do with the size and diversity of the continent—Nigeria is booming, Ethiopia starving, and so on—but it is due even more to the filtration of the African experience through successive layers of interpretative theory. One can see this from the sort of questions people ask: Have the African economies become less or more "dependent" or "externally oriented"? How far is their new technology "appropriate"? Are they less vulnerable than formerly to "unequal exchange"? How far have "basic needs" been met? These are not primarily factual questions. They testify to the extraordinary degree to which African reality has been overlaid by theory. It is as if the poverty of so many millions in Africa were too painful to contemplate without being immediately set in the context of a theory that can somehow explain it, and at the same time show the way to ending it. The motive is good, but the pitfalls are many. Today, the prevailing view of African economic development is pessimistic—profoundly disappointed at the postindependence record, and gloomy about future prospects. This view, however, is a reaction to a previous moment of exaggerated optimism. Neither really helps us to understand what is happening in Africa. To be able to come a little closer to that reality, we need to stand back somewhat from the interplay of hopes and fears and theories that reflect and may so easily amplify them.

The Phase of Optimism

It is easy to forget just how unqualified was the optimism about African development that reigned in the early 1960s, just as the formal decolonization of Africa was being completed. Ten newly independent African countries were among the eighteen UN delegations that persuaded the General Assembly to declare the goal of the UN Development Decade to be "the attainment in each less developed country of a substantial increase in the rate of growth, with each country setting its own target, taking as the objective a *minimum* annual rate of growth of aggregate national income of 5 percent at the end of the decade."[1] For the Second Development Decade (1970-80), the target was raised to 6 percent, and in both decades, ambitious targets for industrialization were also set. These targets were far higher than the historical achievement of most of the industrialized countries; Britain's growth rate, for example, never reached a 2 percent

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average from 1853 to 1913, and even the U.S. and German rates of growth of gross national product (GNP) down to World War II were well below 5 percent a year on average.

What accounted for this optimism? Partly it was a result of the general optimism caused by postwar economic recovery, the unprecedented growth rates of Germany, France, and Japan, and the belief that in Keynesian demand management, combined with sound international monetary arrangements, a technique had at last been found that could maintain a permanently rising volume of international trade. There was also the example of the Soviet Union's spectacular growth between the wars, based on five-year plans, a technique also adopted by India after its independence. And there was the African leaders' keen sense of the waste of their peoples' human potential under colonialism, and the ambition to catch up with the industrial countries, by taking advantage of their technology and of the aid that was expected to flow from them in growing amounts.

The results of the two "development decades" in Africa have certainly belied this optimism. More than four fifths of the sub-Saharan African countries still fall in the low-income category of developing countries (with annual per capita incomes of less than $360 in 1978), and their average rate of growth per capita of 0.9 percent over the two decades was the lowest of all the regions of the Third World.[2] Worse, the World Bank's most optimistic forecast is that the African countries will experience only a one percent average annual per capita growth rate in the 1980s; more likely, they will on balance experience a slight decline, with a growing number of people in "absolute poverty."[3] It is true that gross rates of growth (undivided by population growth) were on average quite strong (though not up to the "development decade" targets): for the low-income African countries, the average annual growth of gross domestic product (GDP) was 4 percent in the sixties and 2.4 per cent from 1970 to 1978. For the eight African middle-income countries (above $360 per capita GNP), the figures were 4.4 percent and 3.7 percent.[4] Given the world recessions of the 1970s, these figures were not unimpressive; and there were great individual variations, with some African countries—not all of them oil exporters—enjoying much more rapid rates of growth. But there were also many countries that stagnated, and others that regressed disastrously—for instance, Angola and Uganda. In any case, given annual population growth rates closer to 3 than to 2 percent in most African countries, economic growth rates needed to be very high, by world standards, if Africans were to become better off. Moreover, statistical averages conceal severe inequalities, as seen in Table 1. Food production per capita has declined, and in the Sahel region, stricken by war and drought, aid agencies estimated that a million people would die of hunger and malnutrition in 1980 alone. Meantime, development aid has declined steadily from the levels of the sixties—especially U.S. aid, which fell from 0.53 percent of U.S. GNP in 1960, to 0.18 percent in 1980, compared with the Second Development Decade target of 0.7 percent. At the same time, African indebtedness rose. By 1990, the World Bank predicts, repaying and servicing old debt will use up over 80 percent of all new borrowing by the African countries. Grim scenarios prevail for the future of African resource depletion, pollution, regional cooperation, and the like.[5]

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Table 1. Inequality in Africa

	GNP per capita	Proportion of GNP received by Lowest 40 percent	Middle 40 percent	Top 20 percent
Tanzania (1967)	89	13	26	61
Uganda (1970)	126	17	36	47
Kenya (1969)	136	10	22	68
Sierra Leone (1968)	159	10	22	68
Ivory Coast (1970)	247	11	32	57
Zimbabwe (1968)	252	8	23	69
Gabon (1968)	497	9	24	67

Source: M. S. Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality," in H. Chenery et al., *Redistribution with Growth* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 12.

The Pessimistic Reaction—From "Modernization" to "Dependency" and "Basic Needs"

Instead of leading to a systematic theoretical critique of the basis for the earlier overoptimism, the gap between those expectations and experience led to an equal and opposite tendency to pessimism. The optimism had been rationalized by theories of "modernization." The pessimistic reaction was rationalized in terms of "underdevelopment" and "dependency," and given a practical expression in poverty-oriented development programs. It is necessary to place these successive theoretical systems in perspective.

Modernization theory was the outgrowth of a gradually expanding perception of the obstacles in the way of rapid growth in the ex-colonies. At the end of World War II, the emphasis was heavily, if not exclusively, on the shortage of capital. By the mid-1950s, it was recognized that the problem of capital absorption—that is, effective use of capital—was, if anything, more serious than the problem of capital supply. This view lay behind the increasing emphasis on development planning in the late 1950s. Experience with planning soon revealed, however, that implementing plans was more difficult than drawing them up. This led to increased concern with development administration, administrative and management training, and even to experiments with "infecting" Third World businessmen with "achievement motivation."[6] By the mid-1960s, it was apparent that none of these sectors could be isolated from the total social milieu, and there developed a concern with altering traditional values, attitudes, and social practices. Modernization theory denoted the sum of these perspectives. The mid-1960s were its high point. Social scientists working in Africa were among the most influential exponents of the modernization approach, according to which development consisted of a complex transition from traditional primordial society, based on multiplex, affective, and ascriptive relationships, to modern society, based on role separation, rational relations, and achieved statuses. At a certain stage in this transition, a "take-off" into sustained economic growth would become possible.

The main tenets of economic theory that belonged to this general outlook have been summarized by Killick:

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- Economic development is a discontinuous process of structural transformation.
- National poverty is self-perpetuating, with low income countries caught in a vicious circle of poverty. But, with the savings ratio as a rising function of income, growth tends to become self-sustaining above a certain critical level of income *per capita*.
- A "big push" or "critical minimum effort" is required to break out of the "low-level equilibrium trap" and achieve self-sustaining growth. . . .
- While the "big push" requires many inputs, its single most important ingredient is a massive increase in the ratio of investment to national income.
- Development entails industrialisation which, by choice or necessity, will concentrate on satisfying the home market for manufactures by substituting for imports.

Killick adds:

> With the probable exception of [the first] item, not one of these propositions would today command general assent among Western-based or trained economists. The evidence has refuted the ideas of a "poverty trap" and that high incomes automatically ensure sustained growth. Faith in the efficacy of a big push engineered by development planners and fuelled by massive investments in fixed capital has similarly faded. Both planning and import-substituting industrialisation are now regarded as having failed to deliver the benefits they seemed to offer.[7]

This tells us that these theories were wrong, but not why. It is commonplace to say that they were "Eurocentric," wrongly assuming that European (or Western) experience was valid for Africa—for instance, they tended to be obsessed with scale and with industry, neglecting the possibilities of small economic units and the centrality of agriculture. They were also excessively economistic—preoccupied with capital-output ratios, but incapable of analyzing the noneconomic determinants of such ratios, such as education and training, state administrative competence, or ethnic rigidities in labor markets. But a more fundamental weakness was that they rested on certain illusions that modernization theory made into an explicit doctrine. They assumed that the "backwardness" of the Third World was an "original" backwardness, a primeval backwardness that had once been universal and could be overcome by the transmission of capital and know-how from the industrial West. But this was profoundly misleading. The backwardness of Africa was a new form of backwardness, the product of colonialism. The technological backwardness of African agriculture, for example, had been *shaped* and even *developed* by colonialism. In the mid-nineteenth century, for instance, before colonial rule, H. Kjekshus estimates that the interior of what is now mainland Tanzania carried at least 4.5 million cattle; with regard to the coastal region, he cites a German officer writing in 1891 that "the still widespread opinion in Germany that you need only step outside of your door to shoot an antelope or a pheasant anywhere in Africa is based on a complete misunderstanding. The entire coast is as poor in game as can possibly be imagined." It was poor in game because it was supporting a rich agricultural and pastoral economy. Kjekshus adds, "Similar reports abound from areas that are today the country's major game sanctuaries"—areas now infested with the tsetse fly, where no cattle can live.[8] It was only after the introduction, under colonization, of rinderpest, smallpox,

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jigger fleas, and other scourges, followed by the retreat of people, the advance of the tsetse, and the forced development of export crops in the remaining areas of cultivable land, that Tanzania's agricultural backwardness acquired its modern form. And what development was achieved was done with virtually no new technical or capital inputs. Walter Rodney's comment that "the vast majority of Africans went into colonialism with a hoe and came out with a hoe" contains a very large element of truth. Similar observations could be made for African trade, African manufacture, and African administration in many parts of the continent. This is not to say that colonialism cut off a development that would otherwise have made Africa into a region of advanced industrial societies. It is only to say that, to an embarrassing degree, not only did modernization theory fail to see that African backwardness was shaped by colonialism, but it also failed to see how far the postindependence pattern of trade and investment, the patterns of aid given to local "elites," or the transfer of Western tastes, reinforced the backward, inegalitarian structures of the ex-colonial African economies.

In Africa, the theoretical reaction to modernization, strongly inspired by Latin American "dependency" writers—the *dependentistas*—began in the late 1960s, particularly after the Arusha Declaration of 1967 in Tanzania. The essence of this reaction was to shift from ignoring many of the external determinants of African development to seeing them as primary, and as almost wholly negative, inspired as they were by the interests of foreign capital and foreign states, not the interests of the population concerned.[9] In this view, the result was an "external orientation" of the African economies (geared to exporting primary commodities of low value and importing manufactures of high value); a process of "unequal exchange," which limited the development of "internal linkages"; and severe inequalities of income and wealth, which further limited the development of the domestic market, reinforced the political power of comprador ruling classes, and gave rise to chronic corruption, political instability, military coups, and so forth. And this process was aggravated, not relieved, by industrialization undertaken by multinational corporations, leading, among other things, to high rates of surplus transfer, the rising use of imported inputs, and capital-intensive industrial technology.

Out of the critique of modernization theory and the apparent ineffectiveness of many of the economic development policies associated with it, there emerged the so-called poverty-oriented, or "basic needs" approach to development. Developed largely within the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank, it was strongly influenced by a group of thinkers especially concerned with Africa (notably Hans Singer, Dudley Seers, Richard Jolly, and others), and popularized by Robert McNamara during his middle years as the Bank's president. Behind this line of thought lay an acceptance, though usually tacit, of much of the dependency viewpoint. The approach seeks to raise the living standards of the poorest inhabitants of Third World countries by means of policy packages—rural development, aid to the so-called informal sector, and so on—that will directly benefit them, without challenging the basic structures of the economy or the balance of political power (although it is sometimes implied that the relief of poverty will lead to both of these results), either because these are seen as unalterable, or because the proponents of such an

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approach are not enthusiastic about changing them. These thinkers are, however, distressed by the human costs of the present situation. "Redistribution with growth" (as an early version of this line of thought was aptly titled) represents the unhappy consciousness of international development orthodoxy. It is interesting to contrast the standpoint of this approach with the views of Paul Prebisch after more than half a century of work on the development of Latin America: "You cannot produce . . . fundamental transformation without changing the power structure. You cannot take the surplus from the private hands that have appropriated it without subduing their power. . . . In my view the fundamental thing is to change the power structure in the country."[10]

The dependency theorists and their epigones have undoubtedly identified many of the forces that explain the pattern of modern Africa's development. Case studies in virtually every African country testify to the reality of the structures to which dependency theory points, and the basic needs approach, which is so deeply indebted to dependency theory, has become a new orthodoxy. Contemporary views of African development are overwhelmingly colored by these orientations. Yet there is little doubt that they too obscure as much as they reveal. To read the African record, it is now necessary to remove this theoretical envelope in its turn.

The most important shortcoming of dependency theory is that it *implies* that there is an alternative, and preferable, kind of development of which the dependent economies are capable, but which their dependency prevents them from achieving—when this alternative does not in fact exist as an available historical option. The core meaning of "dependent development," or "underdevelopment" is that "the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others" in such a way that the development of the former is blocked.[11] But this blockage is not held to be absolute; after all, there has been some growth in almost all of the Third World countries, including the African countries. So what is said to be thwarted is some supposed alternative course of development, which would be followed if the countries were not dependent. This, however, is never specified—and for a good reason. Either what is implied is a superior (autonomous, inward-oriented) kind of *capitalist* development; for this to be helpful it would then have to be shown how an autonomous capitalist development could be expected to unfold without the inequalities and unevenness, the instability, crises, unemployment, and wars that have characterized early capitalism elsewhere—and to do it much faster than has ever been achieved before. Or the implied suppressed alternative is a *socialist* path of development: in this case, it would be necessary to show the social and political forces capable of carrying through such a strategy, and that it could reasonably be expected to be superior. In most African countries, this would be difficult, to say the least. There has to be something wrong with a conceptualization, the import of which is that the world should be other than it can be. This manifests itself in a radical ambiguity. Concerning Niger, for example, R. Higgot writes:

> groundnut production accounted for 65 per cent of all Niger's very feeble external revenue during the first decade of independence. As of 1976, however, uranium was accounting for the same percentage but of a larger absolute volume. . . . While this revenue bonanza makes Niger more solvent, and able to overcome some of the

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> distress of the drought period of the early 1970s, it also ties it much more firmly into a dependency situation within the world economy.[12]

One sees what the author is getting at. But, given that he does not see any alternative way of producing the uranium ore, or any alternative means of starting to raise the level of Niger's productive forces, is Niger's new *dependency* on the French Atomic Energy Commission, the Pechiney Mokta group, and others (which also became to some extent *dependent* on the government of Niger) a good thing or a bad thing? What is gained by focusing the discussion around the concept of dependency?

Dependency theorists have performed an important task of demystification. It was important to insist that all development has a definite historical and social character—that there is no such thing as development *sans phrase*, and that the development experienced in Africa is capitalist. It is important to avoid romanticizing a manufacturing development that consists of spending large sums on advertising to persuade Africans to eat Weetabix, costing twenty times as much and being one twentieth as nourishing as the maize meal they used to eat.[13] It is necessary to be alert to the multiple ways in which "periphery capitalism" involves economic, social, and political costs for periphery populations—the loss of surplus through unequal exchange in monopolistic markets or through transfer pricing, the hidden costs of "aid," the suborning of national leaders by foreign capital, and so on. But it is another matter to elevate a catalogue of periphery capitalism's many shortcomings into a doctrine of its *inability to develop* the periphery—relative to an implied alternative way of going about it, which is not in fact available.

This is not to say that there *are* no other options. The point is rather that dependency theory implies that there is some option, superior to what at present exists, when this is often not the case. Because of this, it fails to recognize that *some* of what is happening under dependent development is, after all, still development: painful, wasteful, and ruthless, like early capitalism everywhere, but development nonetheless. In some areas, exchange has been more or less generalized, production has been at least partly reorganized, wage labor has been increasingly detached from the land. In the sufferings of the masses—not just from famines and wars, but also from forced migration, cultural deprivation, humiliation, extortion, and insecurity—there is also a certain potential for advance. The failure to recognize and grapple with this renders dependency theory misleading and hence impotent in relation to those areas where the advance has occurred.

Three other shortcomings of the dependency approach also deserve emphasis. First, like any structuralist theory, dependency theory has tended to be historically weak. It is true that dependency theorists correctly reproached modernization theorists with being ahistorical, but the "history" to which the *dependentistas* themselves appeal is typically very linear and general, not to say universal. It presents the influence of the industrialized countries on the tropical world as a broad and continuous process of surplus extraction that has merely taken successive forms—from primitive accumulation through colonial monopolies, to sophisticated practices such as transfer pricing and monopoly pricing for technology transfers. In this perspective, little distinction is made between

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the different stages of development of capitalist countries at the "center," and the effects of these differences on relations with the periphery; or between the different resource endowments, scale, geopolitical significance, and above all, preexisting social structures of the various periphery countries. Today it seems clear that every country must be understood in the uniqueness of its own historical development and its own distinctive relations with the metropolitan powers if its development potential is to be understood.

Second, dependency theory has tended to neglect the significance of the cyclical nature of capitalist accumulation on the world plane. Dependency theory was in itself a product of the "long boom" from 1940 to 1970—or rather, of a particular phase of it. Between 1958 and 1965, a net flow of capital ran from the Third World to the United States, of the order of $16 billion, while there was also a growing net flow of funds out of the United States into Western Europe. From the standpoint of Latin America, where dependency theory was first developed, this seemed to portend a permanent exclusion from the industrialization process. This was theorized by A. G. Frank as merely an acceleration of the inveterate process of surplus transfer ("the contradiction of expropriation/appropriation"), and by Emmanuel as the "inevitable" movement of capital toward geographic areas of high demand for final products. It fell to Latin American writers such as F. H. Cardoso and O. Sunkel to point out, from the vantage point of Brazil in the late 1960s, that there had to be something wrong with this, because a veritable boom of mainly American private investment was occurring there. Cardoso, however, was too committed to the dependency framework to abandon it, coining the singularly unexplanatory term "associated dependent development" to deal with the reality that Brazil and other rapidly industrializing Third World countries seemed to represent.[14] But the truth was that Brazil represented a phenomenon that would become much more common as the European investment boom spent itself, and as Japanese competition in manufactures—coinciding with the first internationally synchronized recessions of 1970-71 and 1974-75—created excess capacity, a surplus of investable capital, and an attempt to restore profitability by shifting investment to areas that had higher rates of exploitation. In Africa, this tendency seems so far only to have affected significantly the Ivory Coast and South Africa, but there seems to be no absolute reason why it should stop there.[15]

Third, dependency theory has not been much more alert to the active principles of imperialism than modernization theory had been. Although anti-imperialist in intention, its focus on the structures of economic subordination tended to direct attention away from the impact of great power military and geopolitical intervention. This may well have been more decisive, especially economic and military support for political clients, and economic and military intervention against anti-imperialist forces, encouraging high levels of military spending and fostering military coups and wars. For instance, for the twenty-eight sub-Saharan African countries (excluding South Africa) for which estimates can be made, the real level of military spending rose *fourfold* between 1965 and 1977. In 1976 twenty sub-Saharan African countries were spending an average of 3.1 percent of GDP on their armies—not far below the level of the rich West European NATO countries.[16] For countries that were mainly among the

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poorest in the world, these were crippling expenditures. An important part of this expenditure was directly due to imperialist military threats, as in post-1974 Mozambique and Angola, or was the outcome of complex great power maneuvers, as in Ethiopia and Somalia. Mauritania was nearly crippled by its abortive colonial war in ex-Spanish Sahara, and Morocco may yet be.[17] Fourteen of the thirty-six sub-Saharan African countries have fought wars—civil or external—during the last twenty years; twenty (including some that have had wars) have experienced coups (some several).

All these considerations do not yield a more optimistic picture than that of the *dependentistas*, but one that is more complex and less generalized. The insights of dependency theory must never be forgotten, but must be separated from the utopian framework in which they have been cast. We must assess the African record in the context of the actual historical options; we must consider the actual historical forces—internal and external—at work in each country and region; we must take into account the cycle of accumulation and the reality of imperialist interventions of all kinds. The general result is likely to be much more complex, more diverse, and much more dynamic than most scenarios in vogue today suggest.

This does not mean that no general patterns are to be found, although the variety that constitutes the African reality emerges from almost any classification one cares to make. In 1972 Samir Amin classified the African economies into three groups—colonial trade economies, plantation economies, and labor reserve economies. For all its oversimplification, this schema had the great merit of grasping some essential distinctions between the different kinds of impact of colonialism on Africa, differences that imparted distinctively different dynamics to the development of the colonial economies, and it has been widely referred to since.[18] It is difficult to propose any simple typology that will be as serviceable in the 1980s. Table 2 classifies the African economies by two very rough measures of "endowment," and by the broad principles on which their development policies are based—the latter being important in themselves, and also a rough indicator of the actual balance of social forces at work in the countries concerned.

African Capitalism

If dependency is a new utopianism, a new "philosophy of poverty" based on a preoccupation with the "bad side" of periphery capitalism, does periphery capitalism have a "good side" that has been neglected? This is the essential argument of one of the earliest and most consistent critics of dependency, the late Bill Warren. In his posthumous book, *Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism*, he developed the argument he had first advanced in 1973, that the postwar development of the Third World has actually been a case of *successful capitalist development*—more rapid than in the industrialized countries, either historically or in the same postwar period; that the benefits of this capitalist growth have not been restricted to the richest minority; that unemployment has not on the whole increased; that "marginalization" is only a pejorative word for the process of increasing *integration* of new segments of the population into capitalist relations of production; that, in short, periphery capitalism has been performing its

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Table 2. Development Strategy—A Pattern of African Development

	Sahel Region		Mineral Exporting		Other	
Capitalist	Chad	(−1.4)*	Niger	(−1.3)	Ghana	(−0.8)
	Senegal	(−0.2)	Zaïre	(0.7)	Uganda	(−0.2)
	Upper Volta	(0.3)	Liberia	(1.6)	Sierra Leone	(0.4)
	Sudan	(0.6)	Mauritania	(1.9)	Benin	(0.6)
	Mali	(1.1)	Togo	(3.6)	Central African Republic	(0.7)
			Nigeria	(3.7)	Rwanda	(1.5)
					Burundi	(2.1)
					Ivory Coast	(2.4)
					Cameroon	(2.5)
					Kenya	(2.7)
					Malawi	(2.9)
					Lesotho	(6.0)
Socialist	Somalia	(−0.5)	Angola	(−2.1)	Mozambique	(0.1)
	Ethiopia	(1.3)	Guinea	(0.3)	Tanzania	(2.3)
			Zambia	(0.8)		
			Zimbabwe	(0.8)		
			Congo P.R.	(0.9)		

Source: *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, World Bank (Washington, D.C.: 1981)
*Figures in brackets refer to average annual rates of growth per capita 1960-79; the table excludes countries with fewer than 1 million population. For the Tanzanian figures, see reference 35.

historic task of rapidly developing the productive capacity of the Third World.[19] What Warren did not stress, but which is equally central to his thesis, is that capitalist development is, and always has been, uneven, contradictory, and costly in human terms. Its historically "progressive" character springs from a "grim, destructive, and oppressive logic."[20] Warren did not argue that the capitalist development taking place in the Third World was "nice" (though he considered that the middle-class anticonsumerist hostility to some of it was misguided and hypocritical).[21] He argued only that it was taking place; that no "nicer" form of capitalist development (free from social dislocation, unevenness, exploitation, unequal exchange, inequality, oppression, wars, and so on) has ever occurred or could occur; and that failure to acknowledge what was occurring could only handicap the masses of the Third World in their struggle to improve their lot, and eventually overthrow capitalism and replace it with communism. From this standpoint, dependency theory and the basic needs school appear as modern forms of "critical-utopian" and "bourgeois" socialism.[22]

There are various difficulties with Warren's position, yet it has the great merit of forcing us to look again, as unsentimentally as possible, at the African record, which has caused so much distress to all but the hardest-nosed neo-classical economists working on Africa. If we omit the mineral-exporting economies, where sudden apparent increases in the growth rate may be due (though not necessarily) merely to changes in prices or the level of mining activity, we get the picture in Table 3.

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Table 3. Non-Mineral-Exporting Capitalist Countries in Africa

	Population 1979 (in millions)	Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP (percent)		Life Expectancy at Birth (years)		Industry as Percent of GDP		Manufacturing as Percent of GDP	
		1960-70	1970-79	1960	1979	1960	1979	1960	1979
Sahel									
Chad	4.4	0.5	−0.2	35	41	12	11	4	8
Senegal	5.5	2.5	2.5	37	43	17	24	12	19
Sudan	17.9	1.3	4.3	39	47	15	13	5	6
Mali	6.8	3.3	5.0	37	43	10	11	5	6
Upper Volta	5.6	3.0	−0.1	37	43	14	20	8	14
Other									
Ghana	11.3	2.1	−0.1	40	49		21	10	
Benin	3.4	2.6	3.3	37	47	8	12	3	8
Sierra Leone	3.4	4.3	1.6	37	47		23		5
Uganda	12.8	5.9	−0.4	44	54	13	7	9	6
Rwanda	4.9	2.7	4.1	37	47	7	21	1	15
Burundi	4.0	4.4	3.0	37	42		15		10
Kenya	15.3	6.0	6.5	41	55	18	21	9	13
Ivory Coast	8.2	8.0	6.7	37	47	14	23	7	12
Cameroon	8.2	3.7	5.4	37	47		16		9
Malawi	5.8	4.9	6.3	37	47	11	20	6	12
Lesotho	1.3	4.6	7.0	42	51		15		2

Source: *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, World Bank (Washington, D.C.: 1981); and *World Development Report* 1981

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It is first of all clear that the overall real growth of output was substantial even in the 1970s, when world trade was faltering and the import costs of oil were rising so fast. It is true that some of the higher growth rates in the seventies (Malawi's, for example) were due to favorable terms of trade. But this is irrelevant, since unfavorable terms of trade also account for some of the weaker growth rates (Malawi also suffered a 14 percent *drop* in its terms of trade between 1960 and 1970). It is also irrelevant that so much of the growth was in export agriculture, so long as agricultural export markets exist and domestic ones do not; and irrelevant that this expansion was achieved by planting more acreage rather than by higher yields on existing acres, so long as that is the most profitable way to expand output.[23] There was also a significant growth of production in general, and manufacturing in particular (with the exceptions of Sudan and Uganda)—however "inappropriate," dependent, capital-intensive, and import-using it may have been. There were also substantial increases in life expectancy and in literacy, which would have been impossible if all the benefits of the growth that occurred had been entirely confined to the rich minority.

It is true that the levels of income achieved were very modest by world standards. But it is necessary for any Western observer to calibrate his observations of Africa carefully. Although life expectancy at birth in sub-Saharan Africa in 1979 was only about forty-seven years, compared with seventy-four years in the industrialized countries, it was nonetheless eight years higher than in 1960, an increase of more than 20 percent. Literacy registered an even bigger advance, from about 5 percent to about 25 percent of the total adult population over the same period. Millions of Africans remained in abject poverty, yet the poverty of many millions was less abject than it had been twenty years before. As P. Kennedy noted in Ghana in 1976,

> What were luxury goods for one generation tend to become subsistence goods, or at least "essential" commodities for the next. In Ghana today, the government is trying to control the distribution and therefore the price of a number of basic goods precisely because they are in such great demand. Some of these now seem to be regarded as "essential" goods, for example, washing powder, toilet soap and tinned milk, whereas this was not the case 20 years ago. Other commodities, too, like transistor radios, bicycles, toothpaste and the possession of good clothes, in addition to every-day clothes, appear to be widely owned and used in the towns by the poorer sections of the community.[24]

It is also important to have an appropriate time frame. The inarticulate premise of too much commentary is that Africa's industrial revolution should be capable of being accomplished in a generation or two. A recent study suggested, for example, that on the basis of recent trends it would take Kenya 201 years to begin to reduce the *absolute* number of people outside enumerated wage employment—with the implication that this showed the "limited dynamism that marks recent Kenyan employment growth."[25] But apart from the fact that "enumerated" employment is probably less than half of total wage employment in Kenya (a fact that itself indicates the spread of capitalist production relations ahead of the capacity of the state statistical service to record it), are two centuries really much too long for the conversion of the bulk of a country's labor force into wage earners (which, given the expected growth of population, is what this particular measure implies)? It also needs to be repeated that capitalist

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development is inherently uneven, both geographically and over time. For every success story in the African continent there are several failures. The chronic weakness of most of the Sahel economies, for instance, and their predicted stagnation for most of the 1980s, are as much due to the nature of capitalist development as are the success stories of countries such as the Ivory Coast.[26]

What this implies is that African capitalism has accomplished more than dependency theory allows—though in a limited number of places, and at an immense cost in terms of wars, famines, corruption, oppression, cultural deprivation, militarism, and foreign domination. But even this claim may be questioned. Are the advances that capitalism appears to have made in some places capable of being sustained? Are the best records of the sixties and seventies a reflection of easy options—more extensive agriculture, import-reproducing industrialization, and so on—that are now largely exhausted and that cannot be replaced? Are the gains of these years—such as they are—essentially precarious and about to be swallowed up in the inexorable growth of the African populations?

The debate on this question has so far revolved largely around the two fastest growing African economies (other than those with strong mineral exports), namely, the Ivory Coast and Kenya, the assumption being that if their growth cannot be sustained, the prospects for relatively poorly endowed African economies to develop further within capitalist relations of production must seem slight.[27] Both countries embarked at independence on an explicitly capitalist development policy, though not described as such; Kenya called its strategy African socialism, the Ivory Coast called it "planned, contractual and controlled liberalism."[28] Both opened their doors to foreign investment and encouraged domestic rural and commercial entrepreneurship. Kenya had the advantage of a relatively large settler enclave and an Asian-owned commercial sector, both of which could be Africanized. The Ivory Coast had received a much more modest stimulus from settler agriculture, but adopted a peculiarly close relationship with France, including very high levels of technical and capital assistance; it was the pivot of France's continuing commercial dominion of the former French West Africa.[29]

Those who see the Kenyan and Ivorian experience as evidence that capitalism can develop Africa, point to the relatively high rates of growth that have been achieved in these countries on the basis of an alliance between a local capitalist class and foreign capital. *Dependentistas,* on the other hand, consider this growth precarious, and as having been achieved partly by extending agricultural production in ways that have reached their limits, and partly by making most of the population pay more for their necessities through the protection given to a highly inefficient and often socially undesirable import-reproducing manufacturing industry. They see industrial employment rising slower than industrial output, and foreign exchange constraints eventually halting the advance that was achieved during the last two decades.

In spite of its interest and importance, this debate has struck many observers as inconclusive. The record of growth does have a lot to do with favorable commodity price movements, the expansion of world markets in the sixties, a French policy favoring Ivory Coast industrialization within the ambit of

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France's own domestic plan, and high-cost import-reproducing industrialization. On the other hand, it also has to do with increased commercialization of farming, rapidly expanding informal sectors in manufacturing, large transfers of know-how, and so on.

The real issue, however, is whether the capitalist expansion of these economies that has undoubtedly occurred is necessarily fated to come to a halt, not whether it is fated to encounter new problems, as it surely is. The dependency school takes these problems and elevates them to the status of a theory of "blockage." Their opponents see the problems as inherent in capitalist development, but see no reason to suppose that they cannot be overcome. For instance, the fact that imported branch-plant technology tends to minimize the share of manufacturing inputs obtained locally is frequently cited as a major reason industrialization leads to foreign exchange constraints, and not to the expansion of linked domestic industries. This is true, but it is not impossible for African host governments to force such plants to increase progressively over time the proportion of locally produced inputs that they buy, as has been done in Latin America. Another oft-cited problem is the falling rates of growth of agricultural output, leading (as in Kenya and Nigeria today) to rising food imports. This constraint too can be tackled by agricultural reorganization to raise farm productivity. Such possibilities, however, depend greatly on the exercise of state power, and it is here that the question of the class structures of these countries become especially important, since the exercise of state power expresses the balance of class forces in the dominant alliance or bloc, and the counterweight of opposing classes.

In this connection, the so-called national bourgeoisie in Kenya and the planter class in the Ivory Coast have been the chief focus of attention. Up to a point, this focus is correct. The nature of the "class of capital" is bound to be important for the nature and rate of capitalist development. Its significance, however, is easily misunderstood. Dependency theorists tend to look at the matter in the following way. Foreign capitalists have no interest in developing the periphery, but only in exploiting it for the profit of their companies at the center. Domestic, or peripheral, capitalists have an interest in developing the periphery (i.e., maximizing investment in their own countries), but lack the means and the know-how. Sometimes it is said that they lack the will as well. This perception of the African businessman as essentially a comprador, content to live parasitically as a commission agent for foreign capital, was crystallized in Frantz Fanon's savage appraisal:

> This native bourgeoisie, which has adopted unreservedly and with enthusiasm the ways of thinking characteristic of the mother country . . . will realize, with its mouth watering, that it lacks something essential to a bourgeoisie: money. . . . If the government gives it enough time and opportunity, this bourgeoisie will manage to put away enough money to stiffen its domination. But it will always reveal itself as incapable of giving birth to an authentic bourgeois society with all the economic and industrial consequences which this entails.[30]

Fanon was referring to something real. But is it *generic*, as he implied? Is it equally true of all African countries? Is it permanently true anywhere? Is it as true today as it was in the Africa Fanon knew at the end of the 1950s? There can

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be little doubt that in some African countries bourgeoisies have begun to form that have at least some capacity to organize domestic capitalist production. Their emergence, however, was strongly conditioned by the histories of the particular ex-colonies in which they have appeared. It is an oversimplification, but not a very misleading one, to say that in Kenya and the Ivory Coast, their advance was assisted by white settler enclaves, which pioneered a degree of internally oriented development, including the development of a wage-labor force under colonialism. These enclaves forced the more advanced African producers into economic and political competition with them, finally forcing them to take a leading role in their respective nationalist movements. Elsewhere in West Africa, the colonial trade economies produced, from an early stage, indigenous classes of *merchant* capitalists and petty traders. These different trajectories have left their marks on the different African capitalist classes, especially in the degree to which they are oriented to production rather than trade. These differences, however, can be exaggerated; the "logic" of capital probably works fairly quickly to elide them.[31] There seems no good reason to suppose that Nigeria will forever lack for manufacturing entrepreneurs, and Kennedy claims not to have found them scarce in Ghana in the late sixties. It is equally a mistake to think, in any case, that foreign capital is not interested in developing the periphery. What capital is interested in is not development, but its own expansion. When the conditions exist for profitable productive investment in the periphery, both foreign and domestic capital (no longer salivating for lack of money) become interested in it.

The emergence of such conditions has something to do with stages of growth—the commercialization of agriculture, the separation of workers from the land, the expansion of internal demand. But it also has to do with politics, and it is the *political* power of domestic capital that is at least as important as its capacity to organize production on its own. When circumstances permit an indigenous capitalist class to establish itself effectively in power, as in the Ivory Coast and Kenya, the conditions for capitalist development at the hands of both foreign and domestic capital are enormously enhanced. Such power is, of course, never limitless; in the Ivory Coast, for example, the mutual dependence of the Ivorian plantocracy, French capital, and the French state is reflected in the extremely cautious—but profitable—strategy pursued by Houphouet-Boigny in advancing national interests vis-à-vis French interests. But the emergence of African states capable of sustaining the conditions for capitalist growth—a measure of reliability in public administration, social control without repression so severe as to jeopardize stability, a nonarbitrary application of commercial and criminal law, and so on—is importantly conditioned by the political power exercised by a domestic class with substantial capital of its own at stake.

The real measure of the importance of a politically cohesive production-oriented domestic class of capital is the fate of various countries that for various reasons have lacked one hitherto: Zaïre, for example, and Nigeria, both rescued to a lesser or a greater degree by oil exports; Mauritania and Niger, which seem likely to forfeit much of the benefit that their mineral exports might bring at the hands of an effective local bourgeoisie; above all, Uganda. Here, the African capitalist class was politically divided, and the Ganda, who made up the most

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important section of it, were fatally ambivalent—economically, in their commitment to accumulation (as a result of the semifeudal relations of production in Buganda), and politically, in their inability to transcend the parochial confines of Ganda traditionalism, as was needed in order for them to secure a political basis for capital accumulation.

The Ugandan experience under Amin from 1971 to 1979 provides, in fact, a sort of negative object lesson in the substantiality of capitalist development in Africa. In office was a dictator whose political power rested at first primarily, and later exclusively, on force. Revenues were channeled increasingly into military expenditures, the trading sector was in effect seized and parceled out among army officers, soldiers, and their associates; the civil state apparatus, including its economic management branches, was decimated and demoralized. The conditions for simple reproduction, let alone expanded reproduction, were destroyed. The whole economic structure unraveled. Primary crop production continued, but on a reduced scale, and less and less produce was traded officially. By 1979 prices had risen about 2,000 percent above 1971 levels. Moonlighting and black market trading became essential for salaried workers if they were to stay alive. The advance earlier achieved by capitalism in Uganda—which had an average annual increase of GDP of 5.9 percent, or 2.2 percent per capita, in the 1960s—can be judged from the difference between 1970 and 1978-79 in these figures, as shown in Table 4. At the same time, it was the particular unevenness of capitalist development in Uganda that contributed decisively to the catastrophe of the Amin regime.[32]

Table 4. Output of Selected Products in Uganda 1978-79, as percentage of 1970

Fabrics	55
Soap	9
Matches	16
Cement	38
Corrugated iron sheets	7
Sugar	8
Cotton (officially marketed)	14
Coffee (officially marketed)	45
Blister copper	14
Goods forwarded by rail	13

Source: *The Rehabilitation of the Economy of Uganda*, Commonwealth Secretariat (London: 1979)

Two particular kinds of constraint on future growth loom large in the thinking of most dependency writers on Africa (including the basic needs school): the size of the internal market and agricultural productivity. These constraints are real. The limited size of most African domestic markets—even Nigeria's, after the oil boom—sets severe limits to successful manufacturing development, especially using imported technology geared to large production runs. Food production per capita was also falling in African economies generally in the late 1970s, posing a serious threat to further nonagricultural

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advance. The Ivory Coast suffered from the first of these constraints, Kenya from both. The former tackled the problem of market size by trying to become an exporter (of wood veneers and textiles) to Europe under the terms of the Lomé Convention. Kenya could not easily follow this route, because its textile firms were not European-owned, but largely Japanese and Indian; whereas it suited the French firms in the Ivory Coast to restructure their production there to serve their European markets, as the latter grew more competitive. Does this mean that Kenya's industrial growth will be blocked? To suppose so is to suppose that neither the multinational corporations, nor the Kenyan business class associated with them, are capable of devising new strategies to deal with the problem of market size—from new tax regimes to new foreign policy initiatives to restore the East African regional market, new initiatives in Europe, and so on. It is not obvious that this supposition is well founded.

Similarly in relation to agriculture. The problem of food production is technically soluble: in the opinion of one recent study,

> in relative terms, very little irrigation is being used, very few chemical inputs are used and almost no mechanization has taken place in Kenyan agriculture. . . . the easy options of Kenyan agricultural development have still not been fully utilized. High-yielding varieties of maize, millet and sorghum have still only been adopted by a minority of the peasants. . . . Also, the potential of high-yielding dairy cattle has not yet been fully exploited. . . . The potential of mixed farming has hardly been realized in Kenya outside Central Province.[33]

What is ultimately in question is the *political* possibility of reorganizing the relations of production in agriculture so as to raise productivity—implying, perhaps, an accelerated process of land concentration in the hands of a few capitalist farmers, and an accelerated increase of landlessness, or the development of state-subsidized irrigation for large-scale agriculture, and so on. There is no question that these are difficult hurdles to jump, but some African countries will find ways of doing so. On the other hand, only a limited number will, at least in the foreseeable future. It would be as mistaken to think that capitalism is in the process of developing all the countries of Africa as it is to suppose that it has not developed, and cannot develop, any of it.

Actually Existing African Socialism

Long before the academic debate about capitalism and dependency had even started in Africa, many African countries had come to doubt either their ability to develop within capitalist production relations, or the desirability of doing so, or both. A strong socialist strand existed in the nationalist movements of many, if not most, African countries, and the postindependence experience of Africa has provided it with plenty of reinforcement.

There are at least four different groups of African socialist regimes: (1) the regimes more or less directly descended from the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA), linked to the French Communist and Socialist parties for most of the 1940s—Guinea, Mali (1960-68), and the Congo People's Republic; (2) regimes that chose a "socialist" option out of a conviction, based on postindependence experience, that capitalist development was impossible, or not in the

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popular interest—Ghana (1960-66), Tanzania, Zambia, Somalia, and Benin;[34] (3) Ethiopia (since 1974), whose "socialist" option is a complex blend of the antifeudal movement, especially among the intelligentsia, and the Russian/Cuban military alliance; (4) regimes formed in anticolonial struggles—Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe.

Obviously, there is as much variety in African socialism as it actually exists (not as it is hoped to become) as there is in African capitalism; from enormously differing endowments to widely differing conceptions of the transition to socialism; from the rigid centralism of Touré's Guinea (at least until 1979) to the comparatively open and certainly undoctrinaire regime of Nyerere's Tanzania; from Ethiopia's enforced dependence on the USSR to Zimbabwe's current enforced dependence on the West. There remain, however, clear areas of convergence: public ownership of strategic industries; state or cooperative trading; limits on foreign investment; trade and aid orientations that include Comecon economies or China, or both; restraints on the emergence of indigenous capitalism; efforts to equalize private consumption; efforts to promote collective or cooperative farming; and most important of all in the long run, efforts to foster popular power in local as well as national institutions.

The economic growth record of the socialist countries is particularly hard to assess, in view of the additional obstacles placed in their way by imperialism—from France's attempt to sabotage the Guinean economy after 1958 to the subsequent abortive invasion of Conakry in 1970; from the aid penalties imposed on Ghana and Tanzania after their exercise of a "socialist" option to the assassination of outstanding leaders such as Mondlane in 1969 and Cabral in 1973; and the continuing burden imposed on Mozambique and Angola by South African military attacks. In the case of Zimbabwe, the British-dictated constitutional limitations on nationalization, the political power of the white bureaucracy and army units, the economic weight of the white working class and foreign capital, and the South African threat, all combine to make the practical potential of the regime's "socialism" acutely problematic.

But when all allowances are made, the general economic record of the African socialist countries has also disappointed sympathetic observers. Several of them have succumbed to antisocialist coups (Mali, Ghana, and perhaps Guinea-Bissau). In others, socialism has reduced itself largely to the nationalization of major foreign assets, combined with redistributive, welfarist, and normally agrarian rhetoric, more or less imperfectly matched by performance on the part of the single party or military leadership (e.g., Zambian "humanism"). Others have not yet really emerged from the trauma of the liberation struggle. In the socialist camp, Tanzania stands out, like the Ivory Coast and Kenya in the capitalist camp, as the focus of debate, because of its persisting socialist initiative and a relatively well-sustained growth rate unfavored by natural resource endowment.[35] What light does the Tanzanian debate shed on the possibilities of the socialist option?

As is well known, the Tanzanian initiatives took five principal forms: (1) democratization, (2) nationalization, (3) income equalization and measures to prevent the leadership from turning itself into a bourgeois class, (4) collective farming, and (5) national economic "self-reliance." By the standards of many African countries, Tanzanian efforts at democratic one-party government have

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been genuine, and the tendency to arbitrary administration has been contained. But only the regime's most uncritical apologists would maintain that elections have offered the voters any serious influence on policy development, or contributed significantly to raising their level of political consciousness; while attempts to introduce worker self-management, in 1971 through plant-level workers councils, and from 1976 through village councils, were largely neutralized by the growing bureaucratism and authoritarianism of the state apparatus. Nationalization has been a mixed success: on balance it seems probable that the state-run industrial sector has been relatively efficient, and the commercial sector rather inefficient (leading to some instances of reprivatization). A "leadership code" successfully blocked senior party and state officials from engaging in capitalist accumulation, income differentials between state employees were strikingly reduced, and the scope for private capital accumulation in commerce and farming was severely limited by the nationalization measures, credit policy, and so on. Socialist farming, however—evidently crucial, politically and socially as well as economically, in a country where 83 percent of the workforce is in agriculture—was unsuccessful as a voluntary program, and in 1973 was largely abandoned, to be replaced by forced "villagization," under—in theory at least—increasingly close state supervision. Combined with severe droughts, this led in 1974 to a catastrophic fall in agricultural output, including food output, from which the economy has not yet fully recovered. Compounded by the oil price increases in 1973, and then by the Ugandan war of 1978-79, this drop in output led to a period of intense austerity, increased reliance on authority to secure agricultural production, and the abandonment of at least a significant part of the hoped-for financial and commercial national self-reliance. As a result, foreign borrowing and technical and policy inputs from the World Bank and Western aid donors increased dramatically.[36]

Two broad schools of thought can be discerned in the debate about this experience. One holds that a society is "in transition to socialism if . . . [it is] . . . deliberately reshaping itself along more egalitarian and more participatory lines and . . . promoting cooperative and non-acquisitive motivations among men and women in their economic and other inter-relationships."[37] In this view, Tanzania is grappling manfully with the irreducible difficulties that stand in the way of all such endeavors. The other school holds that this conception of socialism is idealist—that is, it sees socialism as a matter of values and intentions (in Nyerere's own words, "socialism is an attitude of mind") divorced from the realities of the production relations that actually exist. These relations, inherited from colonialism, are capitalist, and the second school considers that capitalism has a logic that cannot be indefinitely defied without a fundamental crisis of production. It considers also that the crisis of the mid-1970s, while aggravated by the drought, is ultimately attributable to a failure to confront the basic contradiction between two principles on which productivity can be increased—either the drive for individual accumulation in a competitive market *or* the drive for accumulation by self-determining cooperative groups within a democratic cooperative commonwealth.

The initial form taken by this criticism was that the regime's socialism would prove empty unless it involved the mobilization of the poorest peasants

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and workers against the rich peasants and their employers, including the state bureaucracy (identified as a bureaucratic bourgeoisie). More recently, S. Mueller, in a forceful critique inspired by the postdependency debate, has emphasized the close parallel between Tanzanian policy and that of the populists (Narodniks) against whom Lenin polemicized at the turn of the century in Russia. The Tanzanian syndrome, she argues, has a distinctive logic: in the name of socialism, the development of an entrepreneurial class, whether in industry or agriculture, is thwarted; but peasant production, the basis of all economic advance, is thereby confined to the household plot and the hoe. No division of labor is possible; no significant productivity increase can be assured by state-provided inputs of seeds or fertilizers, given the heavy disincentives to individual advancement (state control of land and credit, opposition to the expansion of full-time wage labor, and so on). The result is stagnant or declining output, provoking fresh efforts of state control (appointment of village managers and village management technicians, reintroduction of minimum acreage laws from the colonial period, restrictions on population movement, corvée labor, and so on), and leading ultimately to efforts to break the bottleneck by the polar opposite of "African socialism"—large-scale capitalist farming financed by international capital (the World Bank in particular).

> Narodism stifles class formation and gives birth to a repressive state. It cannot be the vehicle for a transition to socialism, and no such process of transition is occurring in Tanzania. Narodism in that country has instead been the vehicle for pauperisation both at the economic and political levels. . . . Here, socialism has not triumphed over capitalism. . . . In Tanzania one is only viewing capitalism in its "least developed" and "worst forms." . . . With the extraction of relative surplus value precluded under this system, compulsion is the only way the state can squeeze greater surpluses from its poor and demoralised peasantry. This necessitates an increasingly repressive political and administrative system, which in turn reduces the opportunities for popular expression and political participation.[38]

It is difficult not to accept the main thrust of this analysis, in spite of its polemical tone and rather one-sided character; difficult not to recognize, through it, the theoretical basis for an understanding of "actually existing" African socialism,[39] of culturally and practically diverse experiences, from Tanzania to Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. If the avatar of African capitalism is a corrupt, arbitrary, and despotic regime presiding over economic regression, the avatar of African socialism is an increasingly hollow and parasitic form of domination by the state *apparat*, again leading to economic regression. Just as "in the colonies, there are more bourgeois-minded people than bourgeois," in the African socialist regimes, there tend to be more socialists than there is socialism. And not all that many socialists either, in some cases.[40]

But it is a mistake to dismiss the Tanzanian experience, or any other socialist project in Africa, as no *more* than a mutation of backward capitalism. Any such judgment involves an element of determinism that echoes that of the dependency school and must be rejected. To idealize actually existing socialism is useless; to minimize its significance is an equal and opposite error to that of failing to recognize the development that capitalism, in a few places, has brought about.

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The accomplishments of African socialism are not, on the whole, to be measured in terms of growth rates. They are primarily social and political, above all, in having posed the *question* of the form within which development is to occur, in having made it comprehensible to ordinary people that they do have collective historical choices that they may try to exercise if they will. The achievement of the Tanzanians and the Ghanaians in this respect is epochal. One can also say that the accomplishments of actually existing African socialism lie partly in its failures: to paraphrase Marx, what succumbed in these failures was not African socialism but the "persons, illusions, conceptions, projects, from which the idea of socialism in Africa was not free, from which it could be freed . . . only by a series of defeats."[41]

As with African capitalism, an adequate perspective on African socialism must be long-term and continental in scope. The Nkrumahist illusions of "state socialist" industrialization, which succumbed to the 1966 coup in Ghana, and the populist illusions of cooperative farming without class conflict, which succumbed to the forced villagization decision of 1974 in Tanzania, are lessons of history that belong to all the African peoples. The immediate beneficiaries of such failures are often implausible collections of military officers, posing as councils of National Redemption; but the long-run legatees are those in all African countries who have contemplated these experiences and are increasingly determined that the people as a whole should profit from them. To doubt this is to ignore the growth that has occurred, in spite of all the setbacks, in the awareness and understanding of labor leaders, students, and farmers in Africa over the last two decades, and to underrate the will and capacity for historical action that has been shown by ordinary people in innumerable boycotts, "holdups," strikes, "riots," and rebellions in all regions of the continent, to an extent that has not yet been adequately documented.

Political Perspectives

Implicit in these remarks are analytical and political judgments that should be candidly stated. Analytically, they rest on the assumption, which is still occasionally denied, that classes are forming in Africa, whose struggles will shape the future development of the continent. Politically, what has been said here rests on the view that the underclasses of Africa, whose logical tendency is toward socialism, must be supported in their struggles.

Neither of these judgments can be adequately defended, or perhaps even explained, in a brief compass. The formation of classes is bound up with the mere fact of capitalist penetration throughout the continent. To the extent that this process is incomplete, embryonic, and uneven, the development of the African classes is too. This does not make them less real. Those who doubt the historical significance of classes in Africa tend to contrast them with the classes of Europe, attributing to the latter a homogeneity and cohesion they have never possessed, and which they lacked most spectacularly when Marx first defined the class character of capitalism in the late 1840s. It is true that the African classes differ in many ways from classes in contemporary Europe or North America. The much earlier stage of capitalist development accounts for part of

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the difference. The specific histories of these countries, the forms taken by the prior stages of class struggle, and the distinctive class cultures and ideologies resulting from them, are equally important.

For example, the central and still very recent role played by the colonial state and foreign capital affected the genesis of the African capitalist, and especially the African industrial capitalist, to the extent that many observers have doubted his very existence—until one day he is encountered, buying out an import agency in Accra, establishing a factory in Nairobi, or owning a block of apartments in London. At the other end of the scale, migrant African workers, such as the cocoa and coffee farmworkers in Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and Buganda, have been "proletarianized" in circumstances that tend to neutralize them politically, like Turkish workers in Germany, or Mexican workers in California. But the increasingly stabilized workforces of the factories in Zaria or Nairobi, or the gold mines in Ghana, have accumulated traditions of political action that correspond very closely to the "corporate" level of consciousness that marked the earliest stage of the formation of the working classes in Europe and elsewhere. The nature of postcolonial electoral mobilization by parochial parties, now largely discredited, has left its mark in a fragmented political culture, in which class ties compete with multiple other forms of consciousness—ethnic, local, religious, and so on. Yet the economic evolution of the African countries has tended to throw their class character into sharper and sharper relief.

The large literature on the development of classes in Africa has not so far yielded much agreement on the specific character and tendency of class formation in Africa generally. The verdict is still open on whether the higher state bureaucracy constitutes in itself a new kind of dominant class; whether state employees as a whole form a distinct, privileged class, or constitute "aristocratic" strata within other classes; under what conditions peasants, who still form the great majority of the African populations, have acquired or may acquire a radical consciousness and the capacity for sustained political mobilization; what forces determine the evolution of the balance between class consciousness and ethnic, regional, or religious consciousness.[42] But few would now deny that class forces are critical for the fate of development in every African country, or that every development strategy has an inescapable class character.

As for the political standpoint from which African development has been considered here, it is, in intention at least, one of solidarity with the African masses who are impoverished and oppressed and who are in various ways struggling to overcome this—a protracted, partly conscious, partly unconscious collective historical aspiration and movement best captured in the expression, the African revolution. The most valid of all insights of the *dependentistas* is the recognition of the immense costs that people in Africa (and other regions of the Third World) have been paying for the capitalist development of at best some parts of the continent, in the interests of a narrow alliance of domestic and foreign capitalists. This process has generated many forms of resistance, and in the long run, this resistance is the basis on which any genuinely popular alternative development strategy will have to be founded. The weaknesses of the first African "socialisms" are, from this point of view, not really so different

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from those of the early European socialisms. They are, or were, the product of the masses' first encounters with capitalism, and perhaps were unavoidably conceived and implemented primarily by the educated middle class, whose aspirations on behalf of the masses tended to be counterbalanced by their willingness (often perceived as an inescapable necessity) to decide everything on their behalf. These utopian and often gravely compromised socialisms, I have argued, are not to be dismissed, but they cannot command unqualified support either. A commitment to the emancipation of Africa involves judgments as to the forces and projects that best represent the interests of the masses, that are most democratic, judgments that are as difficult to make in Africa as they are everywhere else. But the mistakes of those who really try to answer these questions will more often than not be generously forgiven.

The Western observer who adopts this position is often challenged to say what he or she would recommend "instead" of what this or that regime, capitalist or socialist, is doing or has done. This sounds like a reasonable demand, designed as it is to curb the pretensions of armchair criticism. Yet what the African revolution needs is not so much recommendations as support. Outsiders can contribute usefully to African policy-making, but too many of these efforts are vitiated by the weakness of the popular forces on which most progressive policies ultimately depend for their success—and this weakness is aggravated by the failure of too many in the West to extend to the African revolution even the most elementary forms of support. How many of these challengers have worked for the release of trade unionists detained in various African countries, or protested the shooting of students in Zaïre, or the hanging of Zimbabwean guerrillas by the illegal Smith regime—or even the lending of their own money by their own banks to the repressive racist state of South Africa?

* * *

This discussion may seem to have wandered far from the problem of economic development, but such is not really the case. The African peoples are extremely poor. Even if external conditions are favorable, most African regimes will be unable to do much more than moderate the poverty of most of their populations in the next generation. In reality, it is more likely that their fragile economies will be subjected to new stresses, arising from the global contradictions of capitalism and imperialism. Given that the productive capacity exists in the Western world to relieve this poverty entirely, and to initiate rapid increases in African productivity, this human waste is abominable as well as dangerous.[43] Yet in the last analysis, a solution will not come from anywhere but Africa. Those who envisage only long-term stagnation and decline forget that it is out of the crises and struggles to which these inevitably lead that new social forces, capable of new solutions, are gradually emerging.

References

Thanks are due to the Department of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, for help in preparing this article.

[1] *Year Book of the United Nations*, 1961, p. 229, italics added.

[2] *World Development Review*, World Bank (Washington, D.C.: 1980), p. 85.

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[3]Ibid., p. 12.

[4]Unweighted averages from Ibid., p. 112. The middle income sub-Saharan African countries are: Ghana (per capita GNP $390 in 1978), Cameroon ($460), Liberia ($460), Zambia ($480), Zimbabwe ($480), People's Republic of the Congo ($540), Nigeria ($560), and the Ivory Coast ($840). It should be added that, of course, growth rates are often poor indicators of changes in living standards. Even if we neglect the question of income distribution (which may become more unequal with growth of the GNP), a growth of GNP may have no effect, or an adverse effect, on domestic living standards, as has often been noted, for example, in the case of growth based on mineral exports or tourism. It is also necessary to recognize the dubious basis of many national income statistics. They are cited here because no better indicator of the development of the forces of production is available at present.

[5]A compendium of these is T. Shaw and M. Grieve, "The Political Economy of Resources: Africa's Future in the Global Environment," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 16 (1) (1978): 1-32.

[6]Some American foundation money was spent in Africa, though more in the Middle East and South East Asia, on training programs founded on the quaintly fantastic ideas of D. McClelland, as developed in *The Achieving Society* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1961).

[7]T. Killick, "Trends in Development Economics and Their Relevance to Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 18 (2) (1980): 368-69.

[8]H. Kjekshus, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History*, (London: Heinemann, 1977), p. 72.

[9]For example, the works of Samir Amin, Roger Genoud, G. Arrighi, C. Meillassoux, J. S. Saul, E. A. Brett, Walter Rodney, M. Mamdani, I. G. Shivji, J. Rweyemamu, P.-P. Rey, M. Cohen, G. Williams, and R. Howard.

[10]Interview with E. Crawley, *South*, January-February 1981, p. 32.

[11]The quotation is from T. Dos Santos, "The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of Dependence in Latin America," in *Underdevelopment and Development*, edited by H. Bernstein (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 76.

[12]R. Higgot, "Structural Dependence and Decolonisation in a West African Landlocked State: Niger," *Review of African Political Economy* 17 (January-April 1980): 57.

[13]R. Kaplinsky, "Inappropriate Products and Techniques: Breakfast Food in Kenya," *Review of African Political Economy* 14 (January-April 1979): 90-96.

[14]F. H. Cardoso, "Dependent Capitalist Development in Latin America," *New Left Review* 74 (July-August 1972): 83-95.

[15]On the Ivory Coast, see L. K. Mytelka, "Direct Foreign Investment and Technological Choice in the Ivorian Textile and Wood Industries," in "Trends in International Transfer of Technology," special issue of *Vierteljahresberichte der Entwicklungs-landerforschung*, edited by D. Ernst, March 1981.

[16]*SIPRI Yearbook* (New York: 1980), pp. 23, 31.

[17]By 1978, shortly before abandoning Tiris el-Gharbia to the Moroccans, Mauritania's military spending is said to have accounted for 60 percent of its overall budget (M. Bennoune, "The Political Economy of Mauritania: Imperialism and Class Struggle," *Review of African Political Economy* 12, May-August 1978: p. 50). In 1978 its public debt was 138 percent of GNP. Morocco's was $5.1 billion, up from $711 million in 1970, and equivalent to 40 percent of GNP.

[18]S. Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Origins and Contemporary Forms," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 10 (4) (1972): 503-24.

[19]Bill Warren, *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism* (London: New Left Review Editions, 1980), chapters 7, 8; "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialisation," *New Left Review* 81 (1973): 3-44.

[20]B. Beckman, "Imperialism and Capitalist Transformation: Critique of a Kenyan Debate," paper presented to the Conference on the African Bourgeoisie, Dakar, 1980, mimeo, p. 19.

[21]See Warren, *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*, p. 249: "The fact that purchase of consumer durables by low-income households occurs at the expense of public and perhaps other forms of consumption may be regarded as a distortion of resource allocation consequent to Western influence. But when did the poor ever know what was good for them? Would they actually opt for more collective (public) consumption if given the choice? No one knows, but it cannot be denied that most durable consumer goods—such as bicycles, sewing machines, motorbikes, radios and even television sets and refrigerators—significantly enhance the quality of life of poor households. It is only those who already possess such goods in abundance who feel it appropriate to suggest that it is undesirable for others to have them."

[22]Of critical-utopian socialists, Marx and Engels wrote: "The proletariat, as yet in its infancy, offers to them the spectacle of a class without any historical initiative. . . . Only from the point of view of being the most suffering class does the proletariat exist for them . . . . they are full of the most valuable materials for the enlightenment of the working class. . . . [But their] proposals . . . are of a purely utopian character"; while the "socialist bourgeois" were "desirous of redressing grievances, in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society. . . . They desire the

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existing state of society minus its revolutionary and disintegrating elements." *The Communist Manifesto*, in Marx, *The Revolutions of 1848*, edited by D. Fernbach (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), pp. 95, 93.

[23]Moreover, of the larger African countries, only the Ivory Coast seems to have been very significantly helped by sustained above-average levels of official economic aid.

[24]P. Kennedy, "Indigenous Capitalism in Ghana," *Review of African Political Economy* 8 (January-April 1977): 29.

[25]S. Langdon, citing F. Stewart in "Industry and Capitalism in Kenya: Contributions to a Debate," paper prepared for the Conference on the African Bourgeoisie, Dakar, 1980, mimeo, pp. 16-17.

[26]Capitalism does not cause the rains to fail—as far as we know—but it causes changes in land use that expose people to the risk of disaster when the rains fail, and it finds no profit in most developments that might permit the Sahel populations to reestablish their traditional symbiosis with their environment. See C. Meillassoux, "Development of Exploitation: Is the Sahel Famine Good Business?" *Review of African Political Economy* 1 (1974): 27-33; A. Baird et al., *Towards an Explanation of Disaster Proneness*, University of Bradford Disaster Research Unit, Occasional Paper no. 11, August 1975.

[27]As testimony to what has been said earlier about the dynamic nature of African development, the Ivory Coast is now expected to become self-sufficient in oil by 1982, and seems likely to become a mineral exporter thereafter.

[28]B. Campbell, "Capital Accumulation and the Post-Colonial State in the Ivory Coast," paper presented to the panel in "Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie or Ruling Elite," African Studies Association Conference, Philadelphia, 1980, p. 10.

[29] In 1978 gross official aid inflows to the Ivory Coast were $122 per capita, compared with $16 for Kenya, and an average for sub-Saharan Africa of $31.

[30]Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), pp. 143-44.

[31]Nonetheless, the embodiment of a class's economic and political capacities in its familial and social institutions and culture does exercise an independent influence. Apart from relatively early studies such as those by Samir Amin, P. Marris and A. Somerset, and S. Kaplow, this topic awaits proper investigation in Africa.

[32]See E. A. Brett, "The Political Economy of General Amin," *IDS Bulletin* 1 (7) (April 1975): 15-22.

[33]John Carlsen, *Economic and Social Transformation in Rural Kenya*, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies (Uppsala: 1980), pp. 223-24.

[34]We exclude Sudan, and should perhaps exclude others, whose socialism comes too close to the purely rhetorical variety of Tolbert's Liberia or the last days of Bokassa in the Central African Empire: "The Central African Emperor has decided to adopt the revolutionary and authentically African and nationalist ideas of the Libyan Arab Jamahirya." R. Delpey, *La Manipulation*, cited by M. Boli Richard in the *Le Monde* section of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 5, 1981.

[35]There is an apparent discrepancy between the decline in the volume of agricultural production that occurred in Tanzania in the mid-1970s and the growth rates of GDP shown in the national accounts and recorded in Table 2 above (see *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1981, p. 187). There may also be other reasons for the high overall growth rates apparently achieved, but it seems more likely that the figures are too high.

[36]Tanzania's external public debt rose from $248 million in 1970 to $1,095 million in 1978. *World Development Report* 1980, p. 138.

[37]*Towards Socialism in Tanzania*, edited by B. U. Mwansasu and R. C. Pratt (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p. 6.

[38]S. Mueller, "Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania," Socialist Register 1980, pp. 220-21. Comparisons of any sort between contemporary Africa and late Czarist Russia are apt to seem farfetched at first sight, but the similarities between the thought of the Russian populists on the fate of the peasantry after the emancipation of the serfs, and that of some contemporary theorists of the African peasantry, are striking (for a recent example, see G. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980). Lenin's study, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, provides the starting-point for the critique advanced by Mueller, as it does for the work of M. Cowen and others on the very different political development in Kenya.

[39]The phrase is Rudolf Bahro's, in *The Alternative in Eastern Europe* (London: New Left Books, 1978).

[40]The saying is quoted in Roger Genoud's important early study, *Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 52.

[41]Cf. Marx, "The Class Struggles in France," in *Surveys from Exile*, edited by D. Fernbach (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 35.

[42]A leading proponent of the view that the higher bureaucracy of the African state are forming

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themselves into a dominant class has been J. S. Saul (see, for example, his *State and Revolution in Eastern Africa*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1980). For convenient references to the now enormous literature on class in Africa, see *Review of African Political Economy* no. 19, September-December 1980, special issue on Consciousness and Class.

[43]This is the main burden of the Brandt Commission Report, *North-South: A Programme for Survival;* see pp. 12-17 and passim.

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MICHAEL ROEMER

Economic Development in Africa: Performance since Independence, and a Strategy for the Future

As African colonies moved toward independence during the late 1950s and early 1960s, a wind of optimism swept across the continent, propelling new and impressive efforts at economic development. Two decades later, the wind has died, and a fog of pessimism has settled on African development.[1] Europeans and Americans who became involved in African development have experienced a parallel shift of outlook. Although the professional economics literature on Africa was measured and cautious during the early 1960s, and departing colonial officers often prophesied stagnation and chaos, independence did inspire an infectious enthusiasm among Western foreign policy and development aid officials, technical advisers, volunteers, and others, who were turning to Africa for the first time. Much of that enthusiasm has been drained by twenty years of only sporadically rewarding effort. The World Bank, in its *World Development Report 1980*, uncharacteristically endorsed the melancholy mood by concluding that, "on average, [African] people are as badly off at the end of the decade [the 1970s] as they were at the beginning," and further, that sub-Saharan Africa "has the most disturbing outlook" of any region in the Third World, and may well be facing a *decline* in average incomes during the 1980s.[2]

My purpose in this essay is to describe a strategy of economic development, called an outward-looking strategy, that may promise better performance than many economists now forecast. The first section of the paper sets the scene by reviewing the development performance of sub-Saharan African countries since 1960; the second attempts some tentative explanations of the disappointing results of the last decade; the third explores the outward-looking strategy at length, focusing on its application to nonsocialist African countries; and the fourth, and last section, attempts to distill from the strategy those elements applicable to socialist development in Africa.

Development Performance since 1960

Over the period from 1960 to 1978, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for sub-Saharan Africa grew by less than one percent a year, according to World Bank figures.[3] At this rate, it would take more than seventy years to double average income. Worse, Africa's economies have stagnated during the 1970s. From 1970 to 1978, per capita GDP growth was barely positive; if

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Table 1. African Economic Growth, 1960-78

	GNP per capita, 1979 (US dollars)	Average Annual Growth Rate (percent per annum)				
		GDP per capita			1970-79	
		1960-70	1970-79	GDP	Agriculture	Industry
All developing countries	—	3.5	3.2[3]	5.7[3]	2.7[3]	7.4[3]
All low-income countries[1]	230	2.0	2.5	4.7	2.0	4.2
Africa south of Sahara[2]	411	1.4	0.2	2.9	1.8	3.3
(excluding Nigeria)	na	(1.6)	(−1.1)	(1.6)	(1.8)	3.3
Ethiopia	130	2.0[4]	−0.2	1.9	0.4	0.4
Ghana	400	−0.3	−3.1	−0.1	−0.2	−1.5
Ivory Coast	1,040	4.1	1.1	6.7	3.4	10.5
Kenya	380	2.7	3.0	6.5	5.4	10.2
Mali	140	0.9	2.3	5.0	4.2	4.2
Nigeria	670	0.6	4.9	7.5	−0.3	11.2
Senegal	430	0.1	−0.1	2.5	3.6	3.5
Tanzania	260	3.2	1.5	4.9	4.9	1.9
Zaïre	260	1.6	−3.3	−0.7	1.2	−1.1
Zambia	500	2.1	−1.5	1.5	2.3	1.5

Sources: World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, Statistical Appendix, 1981 (ADSA), pp. 8-9; and World Bank, *World Tables 1980* (WT), pp. 372-3

[1]GNP per capita $370 or below in 1979

[2]Excludes South Africa

[3]1970-77

[4]1961-70

na = not available

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Nigeria is excluded, Africans suffered a decline of over one percent a year during the 1970s, as shown in Table 1.

The record for individual countries is mixed, and suggests no general pattern. The growth (in per capita GDP) of oil-rich Nigeria has accelerated to 4.9 percent annually during 1970-79, while in copper-rich Zambia and Zaïre, income per capita has been falling rapidly since 1970 (Table 1). These cases can be explained largely by the dramatic shifts in the terms of trade for oil and copper exporters.[4] The Ivory Coast and Kenya, two market-oriented economies that have welcomed foreign investment, have enjoyed substantial growth rates in GDP since 1960, although in the Ivory Coast, immigration from neighboring countries has caused a decline in per capita GDP growth to only 1.1 percent during the 1970s. Ghana and Tanzania, two economies marked by government intervention, provide sharp contrasts in performance. Ghana is an egregious example of mismanaged resources, resulting in a decline in income per capita of 25 percent from 1970 to 1979. Tanzania, much more ambitious in its socialist interventionist strategy, has managed, despite drought and war, to keep per capita income growth around 1.5 percent a year during the 1970s.

Table 1 suggests that reduced growth in African economies may be due partly to slow growth in agriculture, where value added has been expanding at only 1.8 percent a year during the 1970s, much slower than population growth in Africa, and below the rate for agriculture in the rest of the Third World. Some countries have done well, especially the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, and perhaps Tanzania, but Ghana and Nigeria suffered declines in output over the eight years.[5] A second characteristic casts doubt on the growth of Ethiopia, Mali, and perhaps Tanzania: in these cases, agricultural and industrial output lagged behind GDP as a whole, suggesting that services, including government, led income growth. Since the output of government is measured by the cost of its inputs, especially wages, apparent growth may depend at least partly on reduced efficiency or higher costs of inputs.

Lower growth rates during the 1970s were not caused by reduced investment. Table 2 shows that sub-Saharan Africa devoted an increasing proportion of its GDP to investment over the whole period from 1960 to 1978, with no evident slowdown during the 1970s. The pattern was similar for the developing countries as a whole. This suggests that new capital was being used with decreasing efficiency; a given amount of investment, that is, yielded a smaller increment in output during the 1970s, compared to the 1960s. What is true for Africa as a whole is not true for all the countries in the sample. In Ethiopia, and especially in Ghana, investment declined as a share of GDP, helping to explain stagnation (in Ethiopia) and decline (in Ghana) in the incomes of these two countries. In Zaïre and Zambia, investment rose until 1970, and declined thereafter as copper prices fell. In the other countries, the investment share generally grew, dramatically so in the Ivory Coast and Nigeria. Although savings rose to finance growing investment for Africa as a whole, this was not true in all countries. Only the Ivory Coast and Nigeria saved substantially greater fractions of GDP in 1979 compared to 1960. In Mali, Senegal, and Tanzania, the investment share of GDP rose despite dramatic declines in the share of gross domestic saving from 1960 to 1979, suggesting a growing role for foreign capital in these countries.[6]

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One marked trend in all developing countries, and especially in Africa, is the increased role of government in the economy. For Africa south of the Sahara, the share of government consumption in GDP expanded from 10 to 13 percent over the eighteen years since 1960; all countries in the sample, save Ghana and Senegal, exhibited the same tendency. If government investment were added, the increases would be even sharper. Nor does this tell the whole story. Greatly expanded government ownership of producing enterprises, which has been a postindependence characteristic of virtually all developing countries, is not reflected in the consumption data.

Another cause of Africa's poor growth performance during the 1970s becomes evident from the trends in Africa's trade over the past two decades. Table 3 summarizes data for all non-oil-exporting African countries, except Egypt and South Africa. Exports grew slowly, under 4 percent a year for the whole period from 1960 to 1979, but just over 3 percent a year from 1970 to 1979. In the absence of highly efficient and rapid import substitution or large infusions of foreign capital, this modest growth of export earnings constrained imports to grow much more slowly than is required for rapid expansion of production and income.

The most striking feature of Africa's slow export growth, especially since 1970, is that it cannot be blamed on a slowdown in world trade. Africa's share of

Table 2. Investment, Saving, and Government Consumption, 1960-78

	Percentage Share of GDP						
	Gross Domestic Investment			Gross Domestic Saving		Government Consumption	
	1960	1970	1979	1960	1979	1960	1979
Developing countries	19	22	25[2]	18	22[2]	10	13[2]
Low-income[1] developing countries	18	—	26	16	23	9	11
Africa south of Sahara	16	20	23	13	21	10	13
Ethiopia	12	12	10	11	−4	8	17
Ghana	24	14	5	17	5	10	9
Ivory Coast	15	22	31	17	27	10	17
Kenya	20	24	22	17	15	11	20
Mali	14	15	15	9	−5	12	23
Nigeria	13	15	31	7	32	6	10
Senegal	16	16	21	15	2	17	17[3]
Tanzania	14	23	21	19	8	9	16
Zaïre	12	25	9	21	12	18	21[3]
Zambia	25	27	21	41	28	11	27

Sources: ADSA, p. 12; WT, pp. 384-85
[1]Per capita GNP $370 or less in 1977
[2]1977
[3]1978

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Table 3. Foreign Trade Performance, Non-oil-exporting African Countries, 1960-79[1]

	1960	1970	1979
Commodity exports ($bn)	3.73	7.34	23.97
Commodity imports ($bn)	4.99	7.43	28.52
Index of export volume[2]	100	158	208
Index of import volume[3]	100	133	174
Terms of trade[4]	100	111	94
Exports—Africa's share of non-oil LDC[5] total (percent)	16	17	11
Imports—Africa's share of non-oil LDC total (percent)	17	13	10
Reserves as percentage of imports	19	26	12

Source: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1980* (IFS)
[1]Excluding Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa
[2]Deflated by export unit value index for African non-oil exporters
[3]Deflated by import unit value index for all non-oil LDCs
[4]Ratio of unit value indexes from footnotes [2] and [3]
[5]Less developed countries

the exports of all non-oil-exporting developing countries shrunk significantly during the 1970s, from 17 to 11 percent. Had African exports merely kept pace with those of other developing countries, export growth would have been close to 8 percent a year. Africa may have been particularly unfortunate in exporting commodities that faced declining demand during this period, and the fall in Africa's terms of trade, by about 15 percent from 1970 to 1979, points to this explanation.[7] But the drop in Africa's terms of trade by itself could only explain about half of the decline in Africa's share of world trade. The balance must be due to declines in African production for world markets and its competitiveness therein. The numbers in the fourth column (1970-79) in Table 4 document the almost universally negative growth of Africa's export volumes. Yet even the fall in the terms of trade could have been attenuated had African countries developed the kind of flexible productive structure that permits more developed countries to switch from one export commodity to another, as world prices change over periods of a decade or more.

The export performance of individual countries, given in Table 4, shows a consistent pattern. For several countries—Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania, Zaïre, and Zambia—there were alarming drops in the contributions that exports made to the GDP. In all countries but the Ivory Coast and Mali, export volume fell from 1960 to 1979, and of course Nigeria benefited from oil price rises over the period. The underlying structural problem in slow export growth is well known: the concentration of export earnings in two or three primary commodities remained high in all cases, and little progress was made in adding manufactures to the list of exports. Indeed, in Nigeria and Tanzania, there was a substantial decline in manufactures as a share of merchandise exports.[8] In

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Table 4. Foreign Trade Indicators, Selected African Countries, 1960-79

	Ratio of Exports[1] to GDP (percent)		Real Growth of Merchandise Exports, (percent per annum)		Share (percent) of Manufactures in Total Exports		Share (percent) of Fuel in Total Imports[2]	
	1960	1979	1960-70	1970-79	1962	1978	1960	1978
Low-income developing countries	7	11	5.2	−1.0	na	na	6	11
Africa south of Sahara	22	23	5.9	−0.8	7[3]	4	6	8
Ethiopia	9	10	3.6	−2.7	2	1	na	12
Ghana	28	12	0.2	−7.2	4	5	5	16
Ivory Coast	37	35	8.8	5.2	1	7	6	10
Kenya	31	26	7.2	−0.5	na	13	11	18
Mali	12	16	3.0	6.7	2	1	5	14
Nigeria	15	25	6.6	−0.3	8	1	5	2
Senegal	40	34	1.2	−0.8	4	7	5	12
Tanzania	31	14	3.4	−6.6	14	6	na	19
Zaïre	55	30	−1.8	−1.1	2	na	na	18
Zambia	56	45	2.2	−0.7	na	0	na	16

Source: ADSA, pp. 14-16
[1]Of goods and nonfactor services, taken from national accounts data in constant prices (ADSA)
[2]Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (ADSA)
[3]1962
na = not available

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many countries, high taxes on traditional exports and overvalued exchange rates discouraged investment in any kind of production for export. This not only slowed export growth, but also retarded diversification into new export lines, and provided little incentive to invest in cost-reducing technologies.

Africa's disappointing economic performance since 1970 has been exacerbated by high and rising population growth rates—2.7 percent a year for Africa during the 1970s, compared with only 2.2 percent for the low-income countries as a whole.[9] Urbanization has been proceeding more rapidly than in other low-income countries, the urban population share for Africa south of the Sahara rising from 11 percent in 1960 to 21 percent in 1980. Yet over 70 percent of the workforce remain in agriculture. Although growing cities demand increasing shares of public investment, development programs, if they are to raise incomes of the large majority of the people, must be directed toward the rural areas.

Despite flagging economies and rising populations, African countries have managed to make significant progress in health and education, improving the quality of life for at least some part of their populations. From 1960 to 1979, life expectancy increased from thirty-nine to forty-seven years for sub-Saharan Africa. The number of physicians trained in that period has cut in half the ratio of population per physician, although the ratio remains high by world standards, even for poor countries. And the enrollment in primary school as a fraction of the eligible population has grown by 75 percent in Africa since 1960.

Africa's problem, however, is not simply economic growth but the distribution of its benefits. Data on income distribution in Africa barely exist, and no country has reliable information on changes in distribution over long periods. Yet it seems clear that the benefits of growth have been concentrated in the urban areas and among a minority of workers employed in the so-called formal sector, the educated middle class, government officials, and larger-scale capitalists.[10] This is not to say that other groups have not benefited at all. Some, like the small farmers in Kenya's high-potential zones, have done quite well. But on the whole, rural dwellers have lagged well behind urbanites, and incomes may well have become more concentrated since independence. This holds not only for the distribution of income, but for the benefits of improved health and education as well.

Some Causes of Sluggish Growth

No single article, let alone a small section of one, can do justice to the multifaceted causes of Africa's disappointing development since 1960. International causes have played a role. One of these is the rise in oil prices.[11] Others, such as reduced growth in the industrial economies that purchase most of Africa's exports and the substantial decline in foreign aid relative to African income and population, deserve mention. But the burden for African development rests on Africa itself.[12] The international environment can raise or lower the potential for growth, but it always leaves substantial room for nations to determine their own performance, in Africa as elsewhere.

Of the many domestic causes of slow economic growth, three seem to be most important and most relevant to this essay: import substituting, interventionist economic policies; shortages of trained and experienced African man-

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power, especially in administrative and technical jobs; and, in some countries, severe political instability.

Most African countries have followed Latin America and Asia in pursuing industrialization through import substitution. Economists have universally condemned this strategy as typically practiced.[13] Yet, although it is losing favor everywhere, is still widely in use in Africa. The fundamental problem with import-substitution strategies in Africa is that they focus development efforts on industrialization, although it is agriculture that remains the base of the economy and that employs the great majority of workers. Worse, the strategy is often self-defeating, in that it does not even develop industry beyond a certain point.

Briefly, the strategy erects high tariff barriers and import quotas to protect fledgling domestic industries, first in simple consumer goods like textiles and footwear, eventually in simple producer goods like paper products and paints. Behind their protective walls, industrialists worry less about cost efficiency than about staying in the good graces of officials whose administrative and political decisions are the most important factors in a firm's profitability. High-cost infant industries seldom mature into more productive, competitive ones. Unable to compete abroad, they remain limited by the small domestic market. Because they are allowed typically to import their inputs at relatively low tariffs, they exert pressure against the establishment of new producer goods industries that would at first produce at high cost behind new protective barriers. Many producer goods industries have large economies of scale and would not be profitable if confined to the home market, but they cannot hope to export because neither relative prices nor government policy effectively promotes exports. Thus industrialization tends to slow down once the simpler, smaller-scale industries have been established.

Import-substitution regimes typically include other policies that work against growth and the widespread distribution of its benefits. Most African governments, concerned with the political power of urban workers, legislate high minimum wages for workers in the formal sector, those employed by firms that can be policed under minimum wage regulations. At the same time, urban costs of living are restrained by controlling the price of basic foodstuffs. Interest rates are controlled also, in an attempt to reduce the cost of investment, and thereby stimulate it. And for a variety of historical reasons, exchange rates are maintained at "overvalued" levels, meaning that those who earn foreign exchange by exporting receive less local currency from the central bank than they would if the exchange rate were determined by the market.

These policies, which are typical of African countries as diverse as Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, have several pernicious effects. High wage rates, low interest rates, and overvalued exchange rates together act to encourage capital-intensive investment that limits employment, and thus confines the benefits of industrialization to a small group of urban workers, middle-class traders, and capitalists. Low food prices discourage farm production and limit farmers' incomes, while overvalued exchange rates, combined with high export taxes on primary products, discourage exports. Thus both the strategy of industrialization—which raises the prices of manufactures behind protective tariffs—and policies toward wages and food prices discriminate severely against the mass of rural dwellers. Low interest rates not only

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discourage saving, but encourage less efficient uses of investment as well, limiting growth on both counts. In the next section, I suggest a development strategy that is antithetical to these policies.

All African countries lack sufficient managerial, administrative, and technical skills to undertake the massive task of development contemplated at independence. It is not that Africa lacks the potential to develop sufficient cadres of well-trained people to carry out the complex tasks of developing a modern economy; rather, most African countries simply have not had the time to do so. Colonial governments did not train Africans for these tasks, which were reserved for Europeans. For most sub-Saharan countries, the job of educating and training managers, administrators, and technicians began with independence, barely two decades ago. Uma Lele observes that even in Nigeria, one of the most educationally advanced countries in Africa, only 10 percent of the eligible population were in secondary school in 1976, compared to more than twice that in South Asia, and five times that in the Philippines.[14]

Although many able Africans have been trained for the managerial and technical jobs of development since independence, the numbers remain small relative to the tasks they have been asked to perform. As these cadres have been built from virtually nothing, government has taken on new roles and expanded old ones. The first task was, of course, Africanization of the government, and then, of existing private industry. Development planning itself implied more activity than colonial governments had undertaken. Nationalization of foreign enterprises and the establishment of new publicly owned firms pushed government into entirely new areas, while rural development, provision of basic needs, and decentralization of government all multiplied the demands on the civil service.

When these demands are imposed on a country that educates a relatively small fraction of its population through secondary school, let alone university, the results are inevitable. Those who are educated are rapidly promoted, and moved from one job to another, as new problems arise in different organizations. Often they are asked to handle multiplying responsibilities beyond the capacity of even the most talented managers. The middle ranks are thinly staffed, often with undertrained and inexperienced people, causing inefficiency and mistakes and increasing the burden on the top ranks. These problems seem most acute in countries, like Tanzania, that have pursued many of the strategies that depend heavily on public administrators and managers: rural development, collectivization of agriculture, decentralized administration, and state ownership of productive enterprises.

The third underlying cause of sluggish economic performance is a political one, governmental instability. Africa is hardly alone among developing countries in experiencing coups, civil war, or social and political unrest, and in this respect, is probably no worse than Latin America. And Africa has had islands of stability. The Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia are still led by their founders, while Kenya has enjoyed an orderly transition. But these stable cases only emphasize the problem at the heart of Africa's inherent political instability. Political systems have not developed sufficiently to accommodate orderly transition from one leader to another. Leaders either hold on indefinitely, or they are toppled through extraconstitutional means.[15] For the most part,

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the latter circumstance has been the rule, and the examples of Ghana, Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Zaïre, and others dominate the political scene.

The impact on economic development hardly needs to be elaborated. Domestic and foreign investors everywhere are skittish about committing their resources under unstable conditions, the more so in Africa, because governments there intervene so heavily in the economy. Professional and skilled Africans are also the victims of disorderly political change. Many are exiled or leave for more hospitable climates, especially for international agencies and foreign universities, draining Africa of its scarcest resource.[16] Because orderly transition cannot be assumed, leaders and their political allies often confront economic policy, not as a tool of development, but as a weapon of political survival. They either distort economic policy to reward their immediate supporters and constituents, in ways that reinforce the pernicious policies described above, or they prepare for the uncertain future by enriching themselves against the day of political exile. Corruption of all kinds is a part of this political environment. This bleak, overly simple description of political behavior is neither universal in Africa, nor confined there, and some countries suffer from it worse than others. Indeed, it is even possible, under special circumstances, for such governments to see their survival in terms of prodevelopment policies, as has been true for Houphouet-Boigny, Nyerere, Kaunda, Kenyatta, and others. But it seems painfully clear that violent political change and the self-aggrandizement of political leaders have left their marks on African development.

A Strategy for African Development

The balance of this essay argues for the adoption of an outward-looking, market-oriented strategy, one that will correct the defects of the import-substitution strategy now widely in vogue in Africa, and depend less on the use of skilled government managers to propel development. Neither this nor any strategy can avoid the disruptions of political instability; indeed, like most strategies, it *depends* on stable government. Before exploring the outward-looking strategy, it is necessary to consider various, sometimes competing goals of economic development and the priorities among them.

The development literature and national development plans generally recognize six basic aims of economic development: rapid growth of income or consumption, modernization, self-reliance, rapid employment creation, the provision of basic human needs, and greater equality, among regions and among people or families. Not all these goals, and the subgoals they suggest, can be achieved with equal speed. Resources are scarce, and some goals compete with others: for example, modernization implies investments in urban industry that probably make it impossible to satisfy basic needs in rural areas simultaneously. Although planning of development strategies requires choices among goals, planning is also necessary to measure the trade-offs among these goals.[17] African policymakers must ultimately decide the priorities of their goals, based on knowledge of the trade-offs. But any writer should make his own choices explicit before prescribing development strategies.

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To keep this discussion manageable, I will concentrate on three goals: rapid income growth, self-reliance, and the equitable distribution of income. I will argue that the conflict between these goals is not necessarily severe. Modernization is really a subsidiary goal, one that follows eventually from growth, although the external trappings of modern urban centers and industries may take much longer to emerge under certain strategies that are favorable to both growth and equity. It must be said that African leaders often demonstrate a greater concern for realizing the goal of modernization than do many Western writers, myself included. Although employment creation is often treated as a separate goal, and does carry with it the important aim of participation in the development process, in fact it is really an instrumental variable, one that forms an important link between growth and equity, and that helps to moderate the conflict between those two goals. Finally, provision of basic needs is really about the priority and timing of investment in human capital, and about the way to approach equality in development. It will surface at various points in this essay, but only as an adjunct to the goals of growth and equity.

Of the main constraints to achieving these national development goals, capital (saving), foreign exchange, natural resources, and human skills, the latter seems pivotal in determining the nature of African development strategies. Shankar Acharya argues that strategies depending heavily on government intervention and administration are likely to fail in Africa.[18] If government cannot effectively direct and control development, the only alternative is to rely increasingly on market mechanisms to guide economic decision-making, and on private activity to implement development goals. Two distinctions are involved in this argument. First, market mechanisms, in which prices provide incentives for the actions of economic units, are preferable to administrative controls over individuals and enterprises. This dictum holds for both capitalist (really, mixed) and socialist economies. Second, private individuals and enterprises, directed by the market, can be harnessed more effectively to achieve national development goals than can government officials and agencies, even if the latter are guided by market considerations. Baldly put, in Africa, capitalist economies can probably achieve growth, equality, and self-reliance more readily than socialist ones, the point argued in this section. But socialist countries will also do better using market mechanisms instead of administrative controls, which is the subject of the next section of this paper.

In capitalist or mixed economies, markets determine production and consumption decisions in industry, agriculture, and many of the services. When prices, established by the market, approximate the relative scarcities of resources, they (1) help farmers decide how much maize to plant and how much fertilizer to use; (2) signal manufacturers when to import required inputs and when to invest in producing these inputs themselves; (3) stimulate exports of a wide variety of products; (4) help increase saving by households and allocate them to the most productive investments; (5) help create jobs in all sectors; (6) encourage small industries and small traders to provide needed goods and services; and (7) induce consumers to buy less of those things using scarce resources and more of those using abundant resources. This is not the place to explain how the market does these things, although some will be discussed below. The point is that these are vast areas of economic activity in which

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African governments have intervened, engaging one of their scarcest resources, human skills, and in which they need not have intervened, even to achieve their goals.

The market is no panacea. Certain pervasive features, which economists call "market imperfections," require government intervention: control of monopoly when it cannot be avoided; implementation of large investments that have substantial benefits external to the project itself, such as transportation systems, or power dams with potential for irrigation or flood control; regulation of activities that create external costs, such as pollution or the wasting of common, but limited, resources like forests and fisheries; promotion of infant industries. Other interventions may be justified by national development goals that markets typically cannot achieve: measures to help disadvantaged groups, such as indigenous traders in East Africa, to catch up with advantaged ones, in this case, the Indian traders; or measures that substantially equalize income and asset distribution over short periods. The boundaries between market mechanisms and government intervention are not fixed. Where goals such as redistribution, provision of basic needs, the more rapid advance of a particular group, or the reduction of foreign investment are given high priority, the boundary will shift in favor of government intervention. But even then, interventions can be designed that use market mechanisms—such as tariffs or investment incentives—to economize on administrative capacity. Thus the use of the market is not ideologically prescribed. It is, rather, one of the tools of public policy, and a very powerful one, that help guide the economy to achieve national goals.

In one respect, economists who respect the market mechanism as a powerful development tool may have been partly responsible for the interventionist tendencies of African governments. In the early 1960s, Western economists generally believed that African markets were poorly developed, that traditional farmers produced mostly for subsistence, that markets were isolated regionally, and that non-Africans dominated the cash economy. This view reinforced a prevailing belief among many African leaders that African economies were fundamentally different from those of Western countries. One part of this view was that African society had a successful tradition of cooperative behavior, in which land was held by the community, even though it was farmed by individuals, and income was shared with those in need. This belief in communalism led to attempts to articulate a distinct African socialism, a notion that at one time held in its sway such diverse leaders as Senghor, Nyerere, and Kenyatta.[19] Another part, less constructive and not as well articulated, suggested that somehow the laws of Western economics needed modification when applied to Africa. Even though these views of Western economists and African leaders led in different directions, they had one tendency in common: they supported a belief in central planning and in government intervention to make the economy work either better (Western economists) or differently (African socialists).

Revisionist writers of both the Left[20] and Right[21] have substantially changed our views of African economic history. Not much is left of the notion of traditional tribal societies, whose economies and cultures remained static for generations or centuries before colonization. Instead, a picture emerges of

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sophisticated African economies that, before the colonial era, traded actively among themselves and with the Arab economies of North Africa and the Middle East. The slave trade, Arab and Western, and colonialism destroyed these economies, colonial regimes organizing African resources for the benefit primarily of the metropoles. But colonialism never did stamp out market behavior, even in the most "traditional" places in Africa.[22] Farmers had evolved technologies that were well adapted to their particular environments, and so maximized output within this important constraint, that the risk of total crop failure, and therefore of starvation, was kept within acceptable limits. African agriculture generated surpluses that were traded both locally and long distance in well-organized markets.[23] Researchers have observed that nomadic herders, surely the epitome of "traditional" society, accumulate cattle for economic motives, including both risk aversion and profit maximization.[24] Any casual visitor to West Africa is struck by the active trading of market women, and the entrepreneurial skills of Ghanaian cocoa farmers and fishermen, in particular, have been documented by Polly Hill.[25]

The market is alive and well in Africa, and continues to spawn entrepreneurially gifted people. Most activity centers on trading, agriculture, and very small industry, and much of it is in the informal sector. This is simply a condition of underdevelopment: entrepreneurial activity was similarly concentrated in Europe before industrialization. Public enterprise is probably necessary at this stage in African history to pursue certain development goals. But the task before African governments should be to foster African entrepreneurs on a larger scale, rather than to work on the assumption that government enterprise is an adequate substitute.

If the scarcity of managerial and other skills dictates a market-oriented approach, the shortages of capital and, especially, of foreign exchange suggest an outward-looking strategy for African development. Aside from a few mineral-rich countries, Africa's most abundant resources are its land and its people. The outward-looking strategy would build upon these resources by encouraging production of a diverse set of foods and raw materials grown by labor-intensive, smallholder agriculture, both for export and home consumption. At the same time, the strategy would move gradually toward labor-intensive manufactures for export and the domestic market. It is in all respects the opposite of the inward-looking strategy of import substitution.

The outward-looking strategy is based on comparative advantage, in the sense that any commodity is produced that can compete in world markets, or at something close to the world market price for competing imports at home. Relative prices in the domestic market must reflect those in world markets, so that producers have an incentive to grow or manufacture products in ways that enable them to compete in world markets. This means that exchange rates need to be kept in line with domestic and world inflation, and devalued whenever necessary to stimulate production for export or efficient import substitution. Taxes on exports have to be modest to avoid discouraging producers, and governments must begin to shift tax burdens from export agriculture to other sources. Protective tariffs should be moderate, and decline gradually, forcing import-substituting manufacturers to increase productivity toward world standards, while quota restrictions should be avoided altogether.

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These policies place a high value on activities that save or earn foreign exchange and discourage those that use it. At the same time, low wages encourage the employment of labor on farms and in factories, and promote those industries that use labor most intensively, while high interest rates may stimulate private saving and will encourage the more productive use of scarce capital. These relative prices, imposed by the market, force private firms to allocate resources in ways consistent with the economy's needs and scarcities.

Over time, an outward-looking strategy should help to reestablish African smallholder, cash-crop agriculture as a dynamic sector in several countries. It should also establish manufacturing in fields in which African countries may have comparative advantage: labor-intensive manufacture of textiles, clothing, and wood products for export; processing of crops and raw materials for export; and manufacture of commodities like cement, glass, and eventually even steel and chemicals for the home market, as incomes grow and home demand rises to accommodate large plants in industries with economies of scale. The process of widening the domestic market can be accelerated dramatically if countries group together in common markets and cooperate in investment policies.

Government's role in such a strategy is twofold. The more difficult part will be to liberalize the economy, that is, to reduce controls and establish, and then maintain, the market environment in which an outward-looking strategy might flourish. Realistic and frequently adjusted exchange rates, reduced protective tariffs and elimination of quotas, wage restraint, high interest rates, and the other elements of a market-based strategy are all controversial measures in economies that have grown used to inward-looking policies and relative prices. Fundamental restructuring of any long-established set of prices challenges the participants in an economy who have grown prosperous and powerful under existing prices: successful manufacturers and importers; unionized labor; urban consumers; the civil service whose jobs and position in society sometimes depend upon administrative interventions; and the politicians themselves, who gain politically and financially from a system in which governmental favor is essential for success.

Eventually, as new policies encourage new lines of production and stimulate exports, different groups benefit, including small farmers and manufacturers, previously unemployed workers, and investors who take advantage of the new opportunities. These groups become the new constituencies for the government, and support its transformed policies. But it takes time for this support to emerge, and the transition can be a stormy passage for any government. One should not underestimate the difficulty of navigating this passage, especially in countries that have been plagued by coups since independence.

The only African country that has tried to cross this divide from inward-looking to outward-looking regimes is Ghana, especially under the Busia government in 1970-71.[26] It failed, partly because the army was looking for a reason to stage a coup, and partly because liberalization hurt, in the short run, precisely the urban constituency that created a favorable political atmosphere for the coup. For successful examples, it is necessary to look to Asia, where Taiwan and South Korea adopted outward-looking economic regimes in the early 1960s, with Sri Lanka following in the mid-1970s; and to Latin America, where Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Colombia made the transition in the mid-1960s.[27] Strong regimes are essential, and there is a tendency to believe that

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authoritarian ones alone can survive the change. However, the partial liberalizations of Sri Lanka and Colombia suggest that democratic governments can build a consensus conducive to liberalization, especially if previous governments have mismanaged the economy. Some African countries, such as Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Sudan, and perhaps even Nigeria, may have the capacity to do it.

The second aspect of government's role is a more familiar one in Africa: support, through government services or investment, for private activities that form the core of the strategy. Not only must government continue to provide agricultural extension service and credit to small farmers, but it must intensify its research on both food and export crops as well. Large-scale, intensive research on tropical agriculture is a comparatively recent development, especially in Africa, where a wide variety of crops, soils, and climatic conditions makes it necessary to conduct adaptive research for each locality.[28] Infrastructure must be provided, and social services extended to the rural areas. What government need not—indeed, should not—do is run state farms, spend resources trying to control what farmers produce and market, or take over transport and distribution services from those parts of the private sector that can provide them most efficiently.

Similar prescriptions apply to urban activities, such as manufacturing or banking. To push manufacturers toward world markets, government will have to make clear that it supports exporting. The "right" price signals are necessary, but not sufficient. Exporters will have to see that, to the extent government controls remain, these work for, not against, them; if political favors are done, as they inevitably are, they must favor exporters; embassies or trade offices have to provide market information and in other ways be responsive to exporters; infrastructure investments need to include facilities, like ports, designed to enhance export capacity. In South Korea, for example, tax collectors may wink at evasion by firms if they meet export expectations, but not otherwise, while foreign missions zealously pursue export interests in support of Korean manufacturers.

The outward-looking strategy that might work in Africa is related to, but not the same as, the one that has worked so successfully for the Asian "gang of four," South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and for Brazil.[29] Of these countries, only Taiwan and Brazil had the potential for an agriculture-based export strategy. For the others, the only abundant resource was labor, so labor-intensive manufactures became the foundation of their remarkable development over the past two decades. Africa is relatively well endowed with land, although much of it is not highly fertile. Some of the fertile land may be ecologically fragile, and considerably more research is needed to learn how to make these tropical soils more productive. If ecological problems can be contained, Africa can afford a less radical departure from its past economic structure than was true for the Asian gang of four. Building an export strategy from existing agriculture, although difficult enough, is much easier than an immediate shift to manufactures, and has other advantages for African development.

Ultimately, every modern economy, even those with rich agricultural bases, must industrialize to raise average productivity and living standards, and to improve its capacity to shift from one set of products to another in the face of

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changing world markets. The export-oriented strategy of the gang of four accomplished this by shifting all incentives toward labor-intensive manufacture for the world market. This led to rapid, sustained industrial growth, absorption of surplus labor in industry, and rural prosperity owing to a growing urban market for foods. Development was relatively egalitarian, because rapid employment growth and rural-urban balance are keys to an equal income distribution. An African strategy, based on production by smallholder agriculture for both home and world markets, with a gradual shift toward labor-intensive manufacturing, would yield similar benefits, with the advantage of concentrating first on the sector that employs the lion's share of the populace.[30]

Rural concentration will ameliorate the conflict between growth and equity for several reasons. First, the greatest disparity within any African country (save South Africa, perhaps) is not between labor and capital, but between rural and urban dwellers, a consequence of what Michael Lipton has called the "urban bias in development." The ratio of per capita income in urban, compared to rural, areas ranges from 1.5 in Ghana to over 9 in Zambia.[31] Economy-wide models demonstrate that one of the most sensitive variables for economy-wide income distribution is the farmers' terms of trade, the prices farmers receive for their production relative to those they pay for farm inputs and consumer goods. A market-oriented strategy is likely to improve farm prices as it replaces the import-substitution strategy that depressed them and kept urban prices high behind protective barriers.

A second key to spreading the benefits of growth is to ensure that growth creates enough jobs to absorb idle or underemployed workers, whether in agriculture, industry, or services. As Arthur Lewis pointed out years ago, when there is labor surplus, especially coupled with artificially high urban wages, the small urban labor force will reap the benefits of growth, but the unemployed and the rural workers will remain at low wages, because the industrial sector cannot absorb enough labor to reduce unemployment.[32] In Korea, rapid job creation in manufacturing and services did absorb this labor surplus, to the point that wages began to rise for the entire work force—urban and rural—by the late 1960s.[33] African industry is probably not ready for such a spurt in employment growth, but a vigorously growing smallholder agriculture, together with a shift to labor-intensive manufacturing, probably can do much to alleviate underemployment and move toward the absorption of surplus labor. A market-oriented strategy will also encourage the growth of small-scale ventures in all sectors, which tend to be quite labor-intensive, contributing further to employment generation.[34] To the extent that jobs are created in the rural areas, in agriculture and small-scale industry, the problems of migration to congested urban areas will be alleviated.

A third feature of market orientation is easy access by all participants, especially small-scale farmers, manufacturers, and traders, to the services that government provides. Under interventionist strategies, and especially under import substitution, administrative allocation and decision-making replace market allocation. With the best will in the world, administrators cannot hope to ensure that programs under their direction reach the myriad of possible participants who might benefit. For example, low interest rates lead to shortages of loanable funds and credit rationing; the largest, most influential firms tend to be favored by bankers under those conditions. With higher rates,

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more funds in the banks, and liberalized markets, the market screens out those whose investments are not so profitable, and access tends to be wider. Similarly, only the large and powerful benefit from import licensing, but under liberalized trade, anyone who can make productive use of imports can purchase them. Probably the best help for small industry, agriculture, and traders is not government intervention in their favor through traditional promotional schemes, but freer markets, in which their natural competitive advantages can be realized. Small units tend to be owned by the less wealthy, to employ more workers per unit of investment, and to operate outside of the concentrated modern sector. To the extent that these small units prosper, development is likely to be more egalitarian.

An agrarian-based outward-looking strategy also reduces the conflicts between basic needs and other goals of development, although it may not eliminate them. To the extent that the benefits of growth are widespread and, especially in the African context, reach into the rural areas, the aim of providing basic human needs to the poorest segments of the population is also served. Advocates of basic needs might, however, argue that at least two aspects of that strategy would not be served. Some have argued that promotion of cash crops has led farmers to neglect food crops, to the detriment of nutrition. However, the strategy advocated here does not emphasize one at the expense of the other. It suggests that farmers grow a variety of crops, depending on market prices and, ultimately, on comparative advantage. If export revenues are buoyant, both for the country and for the growers, purchase of foods should not be a problem. But if these foods are too expensive on world markets, or if farmers have problems purchasing the foods they need at prices they can afford, market conditions would dictate the planting of more food crops.

The second basic needs issue is more difficult, and gets to the heart of what may be an unresolvable problem for African development. Much land in Africa is not suitable for productive small-scale farming. Or, it is too remote from population centers to reward productivity-enhancing investments, and is either grazed by nomadic herds or farmed at low productivity. A market-oriented strategy is unlikely to make substantial inroads on the poverty of these areas for some time. Many of the integrated rural development programs of recent years have been aimed at these areas. There is no question that resources, including skilled manpower, spent on alleviating poverty in these low-potential areas could contribute more to growth if applied to regions of greater potential. Eventually, of course, higher national income will increase the potential to alleviate poverty in poor areas. But the wait may be too long on both ethical and political grounds. In all probability, there has to be greater emphasis on investments in human capital in these poor areas. But without productivity increases, such investments cannot be sustained. Even for resources invested in low-potential areas, it is important that some variant of a market-based, production-oriented strategy be used, although governments will probably have to intervene to a greater extent than in the more productive areas to supplement market forces.

Africa's few mineral-rich countries—notably Nigeria, Zaïre, and Zambia—have problems different from those in the predominantly agricultural countries I have been discussing. Although mineral resources suggest greater wealth and growth potential, they also lead to more sharply dualistic economies. In these,

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small enclaves of capital-intensive mines and oil fields produce a large share of exports, employing little labor; depress the local currency price of foreign exchange, discouraging other exports; set high wage standards, discouraging employment in other sectors; provide abundant government revenues that discourage fiscal restraint; and, especially for metals, transmit cycles of inflation and recession that make demand management extremely difficult. (In the case of oil, the problem is inflationary demand.) These may be "good" problems of abundance, but they are not easily solved, and mineral-rich countries often seem stuck in a structural dependence that many less fortunate countries manage to avoid. The escape from this dualistic structure can be similar to that described for other African countries, but in the face of relatively abundant revenues from oil or copper and a more deeply entrenched dualism, it takes an even more determined government to enforce the necessary policies.

The outward-looking strategy will not appeal to dependency theorists, such as A. G. Frank and Samir Amin, who view continued involvement in the capitalist world economy and continued structural dependence on agricultural exports as barriers to be overcome, rather than as opportunities to be exploited.[35] Two writers who have prescribed strategies for reduced dependence in African countries, Clive Thomas and Justinian Rweyemamu, focus on the problem of dependence upon primary exports, a legacy of the colonial period.[36] To overcome this, they suggest fundamental structural change, in which countries develop a fully articulated set of industries, including heavy industries, that are capable of utilizing domestic resources to produce primarily for domestic needs. Although both Thomas and Rweyemamu allow for exports of "surplus" manufactures, their strategy is essentially autarchic, a more complete version of import substitution than is commonly practiced. Such a reduction in trade dependence is, unfortunately, accompanied by an increase in dependence on foreign capital and foreign technical and managerial skills, because no African economy has the resources to implement such a strategy without outside help. Thus Tanzania, which has made self-reliance a national goal, and whose drastic decline in exports was pointed out earlier, has one of the highest per capita inflows of foreign aid in the world. For Thomas, the way out is to turn to socialist countries for these resources, avoiding deeper involvement in the capitalist world. Colin Leys, in his article in this issue, sees no escape for African countries from continued dependence on the capitalist world economy. Although some African countries could move toward self-sufficiency, very few of them can even contemplate a completely self-sufficient strategy, as prescribed by Thomas, because they are too small and lack many critical resources that must inevitably be imported.

But dependence is not merely being involved in international trade. It is, rather, being committed to trading only a few products, possibly in only a few markets, and being unable to switch among products as world market conditions change. Senegal and Zambia are extremely dependent countries in this sense. South Korea, on the other hand, exports a third of its GNP, but is in a fundamental sense self-reliant, because it has developed a wide variety of potential export industries and can adjust its output to compensate for such external shocks as the increases in oil prices. No African country today is self-reliant in the sense that South Korea is. But several countries do have the potential to broaden their export base, gradually substitute efficiently for many

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imports, and generally move toward more flexible economies that can adjust readily to changes in world market conditions. The outward-looking strategy suggested here is a means for doing so.

The bête noire of dependency theorists is foreign investment. Concern about the political and social influence of foreign investors, especially of multinationals, is legitimate. Indeed, the hard core of dependency theory may be the notion that national elites in developing countries have interests closely aligned with those of the capitalist countries, and foreign investors probably play a major role in bringing this alignment about. However, strong-willed leadership, of the kind implicitly assumed by all reformists or revolutionists of the Left, Right, and Center, can control foreign investment so that it serves national development.[37] In minerals exploitation, the "obsolescing bargain" has meant that, over time, as countries like Nigeria and Zambia become increasingly able to run their own oil and copper industries, they strike progressively better deals with foreign firms until, eventually, the minerals sector is nationalized. The frequently observed high, perhaps excessive profits earned by foreign-owned import-substituting firms are often due to the excessive protection granted by government, sometimes exacerbated by tax holidays or other inducements. The outward-looking policies suggested here would end such favorable treatment. If foreign investment were welcome, it would have to make its profits by meeting stringent market criteria, and in doing so, would contribute to economic development.

Writers of the Left, especially the dependency theorists, often point out that the problems of government mismanagement are endemic to capitalism. They argue that the kinds of government action required by a market-oriented outward-looking strategy—restructuring prices to reflect market incentives and the enforcement of market-based incentives on public enterprises—are inimical to governments that are themselves part of the capitalist system. Indeed, one of the problems of the transition to an open economy is that political leaders may have to work against their own private short-run interests to achieve it. But the strength of character required by such a strategy is certainly no greater, and may be considerably less, than that required by a thoroughgoing socialist reform or revolution. Neither can be accomplished without serious political risk, but politically safer strategies fail to achieve even minimally acceptable progress toward Africa's development goals.

A Socialist Variant of the Strategy

The market-oriented outward-looking strategy can be adapted in part to serve the needs of socialist countries, such as Tanzania, Mozambique, and Guinea, and to accommodate the public enterprises that abound even in Africa's mixed economies. In this section, we are concerned only with the distinction between the price incentives of the market and government control through administrative fiat; questions of private versus public activity are assumed to have been decided in favor of the latter.

The notion that price incentives should guide resource allocation in socialist countries dates back to an article by Oscar Lange in 1938, wherein he espoused a competitive economy consisting of government-owned enterprises, in which managers are charged with maximizing profits.[38] They would do this by

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behaving much as capitalist managers, seeking remunerative markets for their products, purchasing and using inputs to minimize costs, and investing in new capacity when profitable opportunities become evident. Consumer sovereignty is preserved. The role of central planners in this system is to set prices of all commodities and productive factors, so that supply is equated with demand in each market, and prices cover the full value of resources (the opportunity cost) to society. Prices may also be used to influence economic decisions in directions consistent with particular national goals and policies. Such a system presents some real theoretical and practical difficulties, but it is not unworkable. In fact, something like Lange's system was proposed by Eusei G. Liberman in the Soviet Union, though not implemented, and has been tried to a limited extent in Hungary and Rumania. China has been moving in that general direction since 1976. Yugoslavia's brand of market socialism goes beyond Lange, depending somewhat more on market determination of prices, and somewhat less on planner-decreed prices.

A full definition or description of socialism in Africa is beyond the scope of this article. Two characteristics are of particular interest: government ownership of productive enterprise, especially in industry, and promotion of rural equity. Public enterprises, often called "parastatals," have mushroomed in all African countries since independence. Governments, regardless of economic ideology, resort to parastatals for several reasons: (1) the pursuit of national goals, such as investment in undeveloped regions or provision of massive finance to industry, that would not be accomplished soon enough by market forces; (2) a desire to nationalize large foreign firms, such as the copper mines in Zambia, which local entrepreneurs and managers are incapable of running; (3) the need for a vehicle to accommodate foreign investment and technology or expertise, or both, in joint enterprises, in the absence of local entrepreneurs and managers who would be effective partners and counterweights to foreign interests; and (4) an unwillingness to encourage entrepreneurs and managers from economically advantaged minority groups, such as the Asians in East Africa and the Lebanese in West Africa. In addition, socialist countries use parastatals because they do not want to encourage the growth of a national bourgeoisie.

If governments approach their enterprises in the spirit of Lange's dictums, public enterprises in all economically productive sectors can be managed to fit within the outward-looking strategy. Each parastatal should be given a specific task—produce cement, manage an irrigation scheme, develop a hydroelectric facility—and then charged to maximize their profits, that is, to run the firm as efficiently as possible. To ensure this, managers and workers should be given incentives based strictly on profitability, and these should form a substantial part of their income. If nonefficiency goals—such as investment in a disadvantaged region—are considered essential, the added costs of pursuing these objectives should be calculated and subsidized by government, so that the firm's profits and employees' bonuses are not adversely affected, and government knows the opportunity costs of such activities. Capital should be made available to firms only on market terms, at interest rates reflecting the scarcity of capital, and government should insist on dividends that reflect its own opportunity costs. Once government sets the generally defined tasks of the enterprise and

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establishes the rewards system, it must refrain from interfering in the management of the enterprise, except to promote, demote, or fire managers based on their success in earning profits.

If profit-oriented public firms are set within a competitive market context, they will behave substantially like private firms. The competitive environment can be established easily enough in mixed economies, in which private firms are permitted to compete with government enterprises, or in socialist countries, if several public firms are established in each sector. Where markets are small and the economic size of the firm large, as is true for most African countries in many industries such as chemicals, cement, or motor vehicles, there are two alternatives. Either government can permit the import of competing goods at close to world prices, forcing the public enterprise to achieve efficiency on a world market standard if it is to earn profits, or government planners can set prices, as Lange proposed, at similar levels with similar outcomes. The shortage of trained officials in Africa, together with the tendency of political and bureaucratic processes to incorporate noneconomic considerations, argues strongly against the latter approach. All the advantages of an outward-looking strategy suggest a liberalized import regime as part of a general strategy of market-determined prices, exchange rates, and interest rates. In other words, the public enterprise simply replaces the private firm as the implementer of development activity, but other elements of the outward-looking strategy remain in place.

Public enterprises are unlikely to be perfect substitutes for private firms, especially in entrepreneurial drive, so the outcome of outward-looking strategy using public firms is likely to differ from one depending on private industry. It also seems likely that a government opting for public ownership will use its control to pursue nongrowth, nonefficiency goals to a greater extent than a more capitalist government. But these goals can probably be attained with greater efficiency under a market-oriented strategy than if government depends on administrative controls.

The outward-looking strategy can also contribute to the goal of rural equity that is stressed by socialist countries like Tanzania and Ethiopia. Small farmers in both Taiwan and South Korea benefited from rapid outward-oriented growth, first, because both countries imposed thoroughgoing land reforms a decade before rapid growth began, and second, because their market-based strategies offered small farmers access to credit, farm inputs, and both domestic and foreign markets. The question for socialist countries like Tanzania is how far beyond land reform the country should go to ensure equitable relationships in rural areas, without sacrificing the pecuniary incentives to which African farmers have responded historically.

In Tanzania, at the high-water mark of rural socialism during the early 1970s, the *ujamaa* program went beyond land reform, to collective farming for a large fraction of village land. Poor harvests, due partly to *ujamaa* and partly to drought, caused a retreat to block farming, under which each family farmed its own plot of village land. To a nonexpert observer of African agriculture, block farming would seem to be the limit to which socialist organization can go without destroying the incentives for farm families to invest in their land, adopt improved technologies, and manage resources carefully. Even if to preserve

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equity successful farmers are not permitted to purchase their neighbors' land, at least there remains the incentive of benefiting from the productive management of one's own plot. Nor are state farms an answer, as their dismal performance in Ghana and other countries demonstrates. The dual problems of providing able managers of large farms and motivating workers who do not own the land seem insurmountable.

To motivate small farmers, socialist governments need to ensure remunerative prices for agricultural products, despite the contrary interests of urban workers, and a flexible, effective marketing system that reaches into every corner of the country. State marketing corporations cannot provide these services adequately. There are good reasons for socialist (and capitalist) governments to promote cooperatives, state trading companies, and rural credit institutions. But the private trucker, wholesaler, and moneylender, the much-maligned middlemen, should be allowed to coexist, to provide competition, alternative channels for the farmers, and some services seldom offered by parastatals. When state agencies are given monopolies, agricultural marketing costs inevitably rise, as they did in Tanzania.[39] A competitive environment is essential to reduce the spread between farm gate prices and those paid by consumers, and thus to ameliorate the competition between city and village for income shares.

This prescription may not sound much like socialism, especially to governments like Tanzania's that have well-articulated socialist policies. But if the ultimate goal is greater equity based on rural prosperity, some compromise with socialist principles is probably inevitable in Africa. Rural capitalists there will have to be, but small ones, who can pass the rigorous tests of competitive markets.

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[3]All data in this section come from the World Bank's *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, Statistical Appendix (ASDA) (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981), and *World Tables 1980* (WT) (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1980), or from the International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1980* (IFS) (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1981). Figures exclude South Africa. This calculation and all subsequent ones use 1970 weights. If 1978 weights are used, because the fastest growing countries, especially Nigeria, have greater weight in the average, African growth rates are significantly higher. For example, GDP per capita grew at about 1.6 percent a year based on 1978 weights. At that rate, income doubles in forty-four years.

[4]For Nigeria, the ratio of export to import prices (the net barter terms of trade) more than tripled from 1970 to 1979; for Zambia and Zaïre, they fell to less than half their 1970 value (ADSA, p. 20).

[5]The World Bank cautions that agricultural data for Africa are especially unreliable. It particularly questions Tanzania data, which show subsistence agriculture growing at an unbelievable 8.6 percent a year from 1973 to 1979, while monetary agriculture is measured at 2.8 percent growth, despite contradictory data showing steep declines in the production of the major cash crops (ADSA, p. 52).

[6]Data on savings are notoriously unreliable, because they are calculated as the difference between large aggregates—investment plus exports minus imports—which are themselves subject to errors of measurement. Note, too, that gross domestic saving, reported by the World Bank, includes

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retained earnings of foreign corporations operating in the country. Hence, these data should be treated as only roughly indicative of trends.

[7]The fall of 15 percent is exaggerated by the use of a particularly good year, 1970, and a bad one, 1979, for the end points. Over the two decades since 1960, Africa has suffered only an 8 percent drop in its terms of trade.

[8]For Tanzania (and probably for Kenya), the break-up of the East African Common Market played an important role in the fall in manufactured exports.

[9]See the essay by Joel Gregory and Victor Piché in this issue for a detailed exploration of Africa's demographic trends.

[10]Michael Lipton, in *Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), finds this urban concentration of investment and the benefits of development to be nearly universal in the Third World, and explains why this should be so.

[11]See the essay in this issue by Willard Johnson and Ernest Wilson.

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The Resources of Tropical Africa

THE MOST IMPORTANT FACT about the natural resources of tropical Africa is that we are still profoundly ignorant about them. First, relatively little is known of the minerals Africa possesses, and second, there is only slight knowledge and little in the way of technology concerning how African agriculture can best exploit the continent's soil and climate conditions. In minerals, finding, delineating, testing, and making an appreciation of the costs and benefits of exploiting the minerals hidden in the African countries are problems that have yet to be solved. In agriculture, because the existing advanced technology was developed mainly to handle the problems and characteristics of temperate zone agriculture, we still have not developed the optimum varieties for most African crops, nor do we know the best cultivation practices and how to cope with tropical weeds, pests, and other predators.

Two other important constraints on the development of African resources are transport costs and "security." High transport costs, which from the beginning of modern times have inhibited development of African resources, persist. The scarcity of natural harbors; the lack nearly everywhere of navigable river access to the interior; the African plateau, cut by deep valleys, that dominates most of tropical Africa and makes the building of roads and railways very costly; the fierce tropical rains that threaten the rapid erosion of road and railways—all require massive investment in transport facilities if any appreciable volume of cargo is to be moved.[1] The result is that even on those rare occasions when a particular mineral can be exploited with a relatively small investment in the mine, the total investment is likely to be high—often in the range of hundreds of millions of dollars—because of the need to invest in a railroad, road, or port.

In Gabon in northwest Central Africa, there is a very large deposit of nearly a billion tons of proven reserves of rich iron ore. It is separated from the ocean, however, by some four hundred miles of tropical rain forest and swamps. A detailed study, financed by the United Nations, was begun in 1960 to study the economic feasibility of building a railroad across Gabon, to make possible the exploitation of the iron ore and to help develop the practically uninhabited interior of the country. After years of work, it became clear that the economics of such a railroad were dubious at best, and the World Bank and other international financial sources refused to finance it. Taking advantage of its oil revenues, the government of Gabon decided to build the railroad on its own.

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The first hundred miles were completed in 1978; the second are expected to be finished by December 1982. By 1986 or 1987, a branch is expected to reach Gabon's manganese mine, which now exports its ore by cable car to the Congo Republic's railroad. Sometime in the mid-nineties or around the year 2000, if the government persists in this endeavor, and oil prices remain high, the railroad should reach the iron ore. By this time, the costs will total in the billions of dollars—this, for a country that is estimated to have a population of well under one million.

To combat high total investment costs—except in the case of high unit values like diamonds or gold—a large volume of minerals must be transported to achieve unit costs that are low enough to make a mining operation economically justifiable. Further, for the extraction of a mineral deposit in tropical Africa to be economic, it has to be several times richer in content (that is, in percent of the desired metal contained in the raw ore) compared to deposits in the United States or Canada.

Because the size of mining investments tends to be so large in Africa, governmental policies vis-à-vis investment and the treatment of company staff have even more than usual importance. For example, no corporate management with any feeling of responsibility for corporate shareholders or the future of the corporation will embark on an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars in any country where the risk of expropriation without adequate compensation appears to be unduly high. Consequently, an additional inhibiting factor to the development of Africa's mineral resources, for at least the last twenty years, has been the political-administrative environment over most of the continent.

As we shall see, the extraction of oil is the exception, for at least two reasons. The major oil companies, and even those classed as minor, are so colossal, that even an investment of several hundred millions of dollars in a single project is relatively small compared to a company's total resources. For Exxon, the biggest, an investment of $1 billion is less than one percent of annual gross receipts. Standard Oil of Indiana, a "minor," invests around $7 billion a year. Giants such as these can risk African-size projects without jeopardizing the life of the company. Second, the timing of the risk in oil is different from that in mining. Oil-extraction requires huge capital outlays early in the game, and with success, there is a rapid payout. Thus high and continuous investment to sustain output over the entire life of the mine is required.

A belief in the richness and easy exploitation of African resources has persisted from early times, beginning with the stories of King Solomon's mines and the gold of Ophir. Despite repeated discouragements, the myth endures. The exploration of the coasts of Africa began shortly before the discovery and exploration of the two Americas. Yet North America was thoroughly explored, opened up, settled by immigrants, and the United States was well on its way to becoming an industrial power before the sources of the Nile and where the Niger came to the sea were even *known*.

Africa remained an unknown, undeveloped continent for so many centuries, and so little is known even today about Africa's resources and how Africans can best exploit them, for good reasons. Excepting only the North African countries at the top of the continent and South Africa, Swaziland, and Lesotho on its southern tip, Africa, with over 75 percent of its 30 million square kilometers in

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the torrid zones, has a climate that is predominantly tropical. The equator almost exactly bisects the continent, there being about 4,000 kilometers (2,500 miles) from the equator north to the shores of the Mediterranean and 3,800 kilometers (2,300 miles) to the southern tip. The tropical climate and its effects, added to the other difficult geographical features (scarcity of harbors and of rivers navigable from the coast) isolate tropical Africa from the rest of the world and most Africans from one another. Yellow fever and malaria levied a heavy toll of death on all visitors to tropical Africa. Trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), carried by the tsetse fly, killed horses and cattle, and thus made travel to the interior impossible using animal transport. Commerce depended on human porters, the most costly and inefficient of all transport systems. Consequently, little commerce other than in gold and diamonds (commodities of high value and small bulk) and slaves (a commodity with legs) was economically possible with the interior in most of tropical Africa before the invention of the costly, but disease-impregnable, iron horse.

Minerals

The tropical climate still inhibits the discovery of mineral resources. Although there is no rational basis for believing that countries in the tropics have poorer or fewer mineral resources than those in the temperate zones, a relatively small portion of the known reserves of the world's minerals has in fact been found so far in tropical countries.

Contrary to current popular assumption, the total mineral resources of the world are enormous. "Known reserves," the figures quoted in nontechnical discussions, are but a tiny fraction of the total of any mineral in existence, for it is not worthwhile to explore for minerals, and go through the process of boring, sinking shafts, and taking and analyzing samples on any mineral occurrence that is not likely to be utilized within a manageable span of years. The U.S. Geological Survey estimated, for example, that at the current world rate of consumption, there are around 840 million years of copper in the world's crust. Even supposing that only one tenth of one percent of the amount in the top one kilometer of the earth's crust is ultimately recoverable, there are still 340 years of world consumption of copper available. However, the figure for known reserves in 1974 amounted to only forty-five years consumption. Briefly, the size of the known reserves estimate depends not only on the knowledge of the existence of a given mineral, but also on the willingness and ability of governments and investors to spend money to prospect for and to prove a deposit, the technology available to bring the mineral to market, and the price at which it can be sold.

Over the centuries, the main African minerals of any continuing economic importance have been gold and diamonds. South Africa today is the predominant world producer of gold, having an output of some 23 million ounces, almost three times larger than that of the second producer, the Soviet Union. Zimbabwe and Ghana together produce less than one million ounces.

Ghana was a gold producer for centuries before South Africa, hence its original name of Gold Coast. During the 1970s, political instability and

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economic mismanagement led to a decline in Ghana's gold output by over a half. Surveys have found a belt of gold deposits stretching from the coast to near the northern border. The government would like to take advantage of this potential and raise gold output from its current level of under $200 million to between $1 and $1.5 billion, at today's attractive prices, by the year 2000. Yet this requires attracting around $3 billion of foreign investment capital, and training or attracting sufficient qualified personnel.

Africa produces the bulk of the world's diamonds, too. Again, South Africa is the leading producer in terms of value. Zaïre produces more in terms of carats, but 90 percent are lower-value industrial diamonds, rather than, like South Africa's, gem diamonds. Diamonds are the main export of Botswana, Sierra Leone, and the Central African Republic, and are important for Namibia, Ghana, Angola, and Zaïre.

Copper is now the main export of Zambia (600,000 tons in 1979) and Zaïre (400,000 tons). Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa are lesser exporters. While Zambia's exports are practically all refined copper, Zaïre's exports are now mostly in crude form. Zaïre's refined copper exports are around 100,000 tons, well below half of capacity. In Zaïre, there are rich copper-cobalt deposits that have been known for at least sixty years, but that have not yet been developed.

Zaïre and Zambia are the world's leading producers of cobalt, an important hardener and strengthener of steel, used, for example, in jet engines. The United States imports about 95 percent of the cobalt it uses, three quarters coming from Zaïre. In 1960 Zaïre produced 10,000 tons, more than half of the world total, and Zambia, with 2,200 tons, more than a tenth. Output in both countries has gone up (Zaïre, 15,000 tons in 1979; Zambia, 3,100 tons), but output outside of Africa (principally Australia, the Soviet Union, and Cuba) has increased even faster. Zaïre is still the world's leading producer, but its output now is about 40 percent of the world total, and Zambia's, the world's second producer, is about 10 percent.

Liberia, Mauritania, Angola, and Swaziland are also significant exporters of iron ore. Liberia, with an export of 20 million tons a year, is by far the most important. The pattern of development of African iron ore exports mirrors that of cobalt and other minerals. In 1960 Liberia and Australia were on a par, Liberia producing 3 million tons of iron ore a year, Australia, 4 million. By 1980 Australia's capacity increased to around 100 million (slightly greater than that of the United States), but Liberia's, at 24 million tons, was only a quarter of this. Brazilian capacity shot up to around 90 million tons a year during this period also. A new project in the Amazon basin is scheduled to produce another 40 million tons a year for export by around 1985.

Manganese is essential in making steel, and the United States imports 98 percent of the manganese it uses. In 1960 Ghana exported 500,000 tons of manganese ore a year; in 1979, only 300,000. Zaïre went from 400,000 tons to well under 100,000. Gabon opened a manganese mine in the early sixties, and has since maintained a fairly steady export of around 2 million tons a year. Meanwhile, Australia's output has grown from 100,000 tons to 1 million, and South Africa's, from 1 million to over 5 million tons.

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So far as is known, Africa has the largest and least exploited reserves of bauxite in the world. The principal African producer of this mineral, the raw material of aluminum, is Guinea. Bauxite is converted into alumina, which is then exported. In spite of his extreme left-wing orientation, President Sekou Touré was able to reach agreement with international aluminum companies for the exploitation of these deposits, with the help of a loan from the World Bank. Sufficient large-scale investments have been made in Guinea to increase bauxite output from 1.4 million tons in 1960 to 12.5 million in 1979. The government, through its policy of encouraging further foreign investment, hopes to secure a substantial expansion of bauxite mining and of alumina output, and to get a smelter built to convert some of the alumina into aluminum. Since 1960 new deposits of bauxite have been found in Australia, and rapid progress has been made in exploiting them, output rising from a mere 70,000 to 28 million tons.

The most important of the other nonfuel minerals is chromite. Metallurgical-grade chromite is used in making chromium and stainless steel, and the United States imports 90 percent of its requirements. In Africa, chromite is produced in South Africa (the world's leading producer), Zimbabwe, and the Malagasy Republic. Output in Zimbabwe, after reaching nearly one million tons in the early seventies, runs at around the 500,000 tons-plus level of 1960. For the Malagasy Republic, chromite is a new export. Output began in 1965, and since that time has varied between 130,000 to 220,000 tons a year. South African output during this period has increased greatly, from 800,000 tons in 1960 to over 3 million in 1979.

The outstanding Black African success story in mineral development in recent years is Botswana. Botswana was among the last of the African countries to become independent (1966), and with its largely desert or semidesert territory, was extremely poor. The United Kingdom had to finance half of the current expenditures of the government, while capital expenditures were completely dependent on external aid. Luckily, the government has been stable and well run. Nickel-copper and diamond deposits have been discovered in Botswana and were developed in the late seventies. Thus, by 1980, Botswana, with a small population of under one million and two rich mining developments, had a gross national product per capita of over $600, ranking above most of the less-developed countries in the world.

That it is possible to review so briefly the most important African mineral developments points to how relatively small these developments have been. The tropics impact significantly on the rate of exploitation. In temperate zones, most of the mineral-bearing rock formations that have been exploited are exposed at the surface. In the humid tropics, the climate's violent weathering effects tend to bury the mineral-bearing formations under an overburden of soils. Minerals such as dolomite, limestone, gypsum, and salts of potassium are relatively soluble, and as a result, are hard to locate in high rainfall areas. Most of the mineral deposits that have been found and exploited in the tropics are the surface concentrations formed from the weathering action of the climate. Examples are bauxite (which is found in a large number of African countries and mined, for example, in Guinea, Ghana, and Sierra Leone), some iron ores (Zimbabwe), manganese (Gabon, Ghana, and Zaïre), nickel (Zimbabwe), tin

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(Nigeria and Zaïre), and diamond placers (Sierra Leone, Ghana, Zaïre, and Namibia). It was only about thirty years ago that prospecting techniques became sufficiently advanced to make possible substantial new discoveries of minerals well below the surface.

There are additional technical problems. The geophysical and geochemical techniques for securing knowledge about the basic geology of areas were worked out for the most part for conditions in the temperate zones. In the tropics, the basic parameters are different, so a different structure of reference has to be developed for them. Even the instruments used have to be adapted for tropical conditions—in the humid tropics, extremes of heat and humidity can quickly ruin sensitive instruments that have not been designed to cope with such conditions.

Although mineral development in tropical Africa has been slowed essentially by technological reasons, as the technology—knowledge, techniques, and instruments—improves, it will become easier to discover the mineral resources of Africa. There remains, however, one other highly inhibiting element—the governmental-administrative environment. Investors prefer to invest in countries with stable governments, at least those with a minimum level of administrative competence and predictable legal systems.

Up to 1960, technological factors and high transport costs were the main factors retarding African mineral development. Since that time, insecurity has been the major factor keeping new material exploration and development in tropical Africa to such a slow pace. In 1960 African bauxite reserves and hydropower potential clearly pointed to Africa as the place where the major expansion of the aluminium industry sector (bauxite, alumina, aluminum) of the world would take place, and some promising starts were made—aluminum in Ghana and Cameroon, and bauxite and alumina in Guinea. But investor interest soon shifted to the discovery and exploitation of bauxite and the development of aluminum output in Australia. Similarly, virtual stagnation of copper output in Zambia and Zaïre over the last decade contrasts strongly with the rapid growth in earlier years and the continuing growth in Latin America.

Africans do not yet have the critical mass of managerial and technical skills in mining that are necessary if their mineral resources are to be found and developed without help from abroad. South Africa and Zimbabwe have been the exceptions, and here, white Africans have provided the necessary skills. Elsewhere, and also in Zimbabwe if the whites migrate, reliance has been placed on expatriates. Since independence, previously existing mines have been nationalized in nearly all countries. Yet despite nationalization, expatriates, whether recruited as individuals or provided as a team by an international mining company, still form the key cadre that keeps the operation going.

These remarks can be pointed up by the situation in Zaïre, which, with Zambia and Zimbabwe, is one of the three major nonfuel mineral producers in Black Africa. Zaïre presents all the problems in exaggerated form, and hence, they are easier to identify. Economic mismanagement, widespread corruption, which President Mobutu himself calls the "Zaïrian sickness," and insecurity—have all contributed to economic retrogression during the last decade. The output of refined copper, a principal export, runs from a quarter to a half below the preindependence level. There are a number of unexploited copper-cobalt

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deposits that were discovered as long ago as 1920. The development of one of these, the Tenke-Fungurume deposit, began in 1975 with an estimated development cost of $500 million for an output of 130,000 tons of copper per year. In a few months, the estimated costs shot up to $900 million, largely because of higher transport costs, and the development of the mine was stopped. Deterioration of the internal railways and roads owing to lack of maintenance and repairs makes service slow and costly. This, plus the long rail distance to the available ports, means that delivery time for necessary equipment and parts takes from six months to a year or more. Cobalt, being of higher value, at a high enough price can be exported by air freight. Cobalt output has gone up by about 50 percent since independence.

Zaïre, as already mentioned, also produces manganese. The Benguela Railway, however, which runs through Angola—making it the shortest route to the sea—is closed for the most part because of civil war in Angola, and the alternative routes through Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, or Zaïre itself are too costly for the value of the ore to support. Consequently, manganese ore has for several years been stockpiled at the mine.

Experienced and trained expatriates are difficult to recruit to work in mining in Zaïre for many reasons. Among these are the lack of career prospects, because the policy is, understandably, Zaïrianization as soon as possible; personal security that is less than assured; difficult living conditions; government administration that is inefficient; and the fact that the foreign exchange portion of expatriates' salaries often goes unpaid for months at a time.

When all those factors are put together, it is not surprising that a deposit like the Tenke-Fungurume was considered uneconomic to develop, even though its ore averages 5.6 percent copper and 0.45 percent cobalt, whereas in South Africa, a mine like the Palabora mine has been profitable at an ore content that is only one fourteenth as rich (0.4 percent copper).

Although forecasting is always dangerous, it is possible to assert with reasonable confidence that there will be no major increase in the exploitation of nonfuel mineral resources of most of tropical Africa before the year 2000. The lead time between discoveries and the beginning of large-scale mining usually is measured in decades. Since 1960 there has been a drastic decline in exploration in most of tropical Africa. American and Canadian mining companies in recent years have been spending over 80 percent of their exploration expenditures in the United States, Canada, and Australia. European mining companies similarly have turned their main attention away from Africa, toward finding mineral resources in industrialized countries. Brazil, which itself is rapidly becoming industrialized, and a few other Latin American countries are the main exceptions to the present aversion of the large mining groups to exploration and investment in the less developed countries.

Even if a sea change in the investment atmosphere in the African countries, and in the willingness of the large mining companies to undertake exploration in tropical Africa, were to occur in the next few years, substantial increases in output of any newly discovered minerals could not take place before the year 2000. Some increase in output could take place sooner, of course, from the exploitation of mineral deposits that were discovered up to the mid-sixties and that have not reached the stage of exploitation as yet.

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Energy

OIL

It is only in energy, mainly oil, that any appreciable progress has been made since independence in beginning to identify and exploit new African resources. But what has been done to date as far as tropical Africa as a whole is concerned is merely a beginning. In 1960 oil output there was negligible. As of 1980, Nigeria had become a major oil producer, with exports of over 100 million tons a year, at 1981 prices equivalent to around $30 billion. It is expected that three new fields will be ready to begin producing in 1982.[2] Other significant producers were Gabon (10 million tons), Angola (8 million tons), the Congo Republic (3 million tons), Cameroon (2 million tons), and Zaïre (1 million tons).

For Nigeria, oil earnings have made possible an enormously increased investment effort as well as a means of quickly increasing the levels of government services for its vast population of around 80 million. For the other oil producers, oil is a highly important foreign exchange earner; it has kept Angola going since independence. These countries have been able to escape the oil price catastrophe that since 1973 has pushed most of the rest of Africa into balance-of-payments crises and a retardation or actual halt to economic development. For example, Tanzania in 1972 spent 10 percent of its total export earnings of $290 million for oil. In 1980 severely restricted oil imports cost $280 million, or 45 percent of total export earnings of $620 million, and were in large part responsible for a stagnant standard of living. For the oil-producing countries, of course, the steep increase in oil prices has meant a revenue bonanza.

Oil has also been discovered in West Africa off the coasts of Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Senegal. Ghanaian output in 1980 was 200,000 tons, and Ivorian output, 50,000 tons. The Ivorian fields appear to be of large proportions. The first strike was made by Exxon in 1977, with production beginning in 1980 from proven reserves of 50 million barrels. Phillips Petroleum is leading a group spending several hundred million dollars in drilling some fifteen miles off shore. Ivorian output is expected to increase rapidly and to transform the Ivory Coast's balance of payments. It is probably not entirely a coincidence that the Ivory Coast has had one of the most stable and best administered governments in Africa. Oil products cost the Ivory Coast about $1 billion, or around 40 percent of total export earnings in 1980. This year the country expects to be self-sufficient, and hopes to be earning $1 billion a year from oil exports by 1984.

All this, however, as important as it is for the countries concerned, still represents only a small start in the exploration for oil and in the development of tropical Africa's oil-producing potential. In the United States, which is less than half the size of tropical Africa, around thirty thousand wells are currently being drilled each year, with a total to date of over two and a half million wells. In tropical Africa, there are fewer than one hundred wells being drilled per year today, and the total drilled to date are in the neighborhood of one thousand. Based on what geologists know about Africa—and it must be reemphasized that Africa is still relatively unknown—about a quarter of the land area and most of

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the offshore of tropical Africa consists of sedimentary basins that potentially could hold oil and gas. The vast bulk of this is still unexplored.

In Eastern Africa, Sudan, for example, may have the largest oil-bearing sedimentary basin in the world, and this was completely unknown until the last decade. Standard Oil of California, after spending over $200 million in exploration, has found enough oil in Sudan to justify spending another $200 million to build a refinery for processing about 500,000 tons of oil a year, worth about $100 million. As a result, three other oil companies have come in to explore for oil. Active exploration is also going on in Somalia and Kenya by several companies that have been encouraged by early promising seismic indications.

Most of the African areas require predevelopment studies. Surface geological studies already made need to be updated by modern geophysical methods, using aeromagnetic, gravimetric, and seismic techniques.[3] In this way, the most promising sites for exploratory drilling can be located. Exploratory drilling is a high-risk activity, and depends on whether those who hold risk capital are willing to invest it in African countries.

HYDROPOWER

Hydropower is one of tropical Africa's most important potential assets. The physical formation that helped keep interior Africa isolated from the coast for millennia—the great central plateau with rivers plunging off it near the coast—gives Africa the greatest undeveloped hydroelectric potential of any continent in the world. The World Energy Conference in 1974 estimated the gross theoretical hydroelectric capacity of tropical Africa at over 400 million kilowatts, or about four fifths of the grand total potential of all the developed market countries (United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). With practically all of the major sites in the United States and Europe—where cheap hydropower can be produced in substantial volume—already utilized, what was once an obstacle to African development has become an important potential asset.

The greatest hydroelectric potential in Africa is in Zaïre (132 million kw.), Madagascar (64 million kw.), Cameroon (23 million kw.), Tanzania (21 million kw.), Gabon (18 million kw.), and Sudan (16 million kw.). Kenya, Uganda, Upper Volta, the Central African Republic, and Niger also have considerable potential.

Hydropower can eliminate the need to use expensive imported oil for the production of electricity. The problem, however, is to find a market for this potential electric power. The domestic market being too small to utilize the huge block of power that a large project must generate to be economic, the solution is to look toward exporting it. Either the power itself or power-intensive commodities must be exported. In the latter case, new industries must be created that depend on consumption of large quantities of cheap power, such as aluminum, other electrometallurgical industries like ferrochrome, and the electrochemical industries.

This has been the basis for the building of a small number of large power projects in Africa in the last thirty years. Kariba, on the Zambezi River between

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Zambia and Zimbabwe, which created the world's largest man-made lake at the time, provides power for copper mines and electrolytic copper refineries in Zambia, for ferrochrome production in Zimbabwe, and for the copper industry in Shaba province in Zaïre, as well as for other purposes. The Volta project in Ghana is largely devoted to providing power for an aluminum smelter as well as for exporting power to Togo, Benin, and the Ivory Coast. Cabora Bassa, one of the world's largest hydroelectric plants, in Mozambique, downsteam from Kariba, exports power 850 miles to the power network in South Africa, and provides around a tenth of South Africa's electricity.

These projects and the few others that already exist use only a small fraction of the total potential. The problem here again is the need to put a large amount of investment capital at risk for a long period of time, in places where there are reasonable doubts as to its security. To utilize economically the power potential of a large project, hundreds of millions of dollars must be invested in the power project itself, and hundreds of millions more in building the highly capital-intensive industry to use the power. In the event of trouble, it is not possible to uproot a dam, dig out the underground power house, and evacuate them both by helicopter.

COAL

Unlike the situation in hydropower, very little is known of tropical Africa's coal reserves. Total coal deposits (geological resources) there were estimated by the 1977 World Energy Conference at around 110 billion tons. But of those, only 6 billion tons are believed to be exploitable under present technical and economic conditions. These African resources amount to 3 to 4 percent of U.S. reserves. Although South Africa's geological resources are now estimated as equal to those of Black Africa, her exploitable reserves are eight times greater. In Black Africa, Botswana's coal resources are by far the greatest, with geological resources of 100 billion tons, and recoverable reserves of 3.5 billion tons. Of the other countries, Swaziland (1.8 billion tons) and Zimbabwe (0.8 billion tons) have the most important recoverable resources. The only important coal mining taking place in tropical Africa—around 3 million tons a year—is in Zimbabwe. It is quite likely that as a result of exploration, new coal deposits may be found.[4] But again, the problems of transport costs and the large minimal investments necessary will inhibit development, as they have inhibited exploration. In the foreseeable future, other than the possible export of coking coal from Zimbabwe, tropical Africa will not be able to compete in export markets with the highly organized, enormous volume American, Australian, and South African coal industries.

Agriculture

Farming is the dominant economic activity of tropical Africa; it provides everywhere the means of livelihood to the vast majority of the population. It also produces between 40 and 60 percent of the gross national product in all countries, except Botswana, Gabon, and Zambia, where mining is particularly important. Around three quarters of the African people still live on farms; in

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Burundi, over 95 percent. African exports are still largely products of agriculture. For most of tropical Africa, economic development is closely tied to progress in exploiting its agricultural potential. Yet, a principal problem in such exploitation is the lack of knowledge, except in the case of a very few crops, of how best to farm efficiently in the tropics.

Tropical Africa does not have a single homogeneous tropical climate. There is, in fact, a continuously variable succession of climates that blend and overlap. A wet equatorial climate, in which rain falls in all months, and totals 200 to 300 centimeters (75 to 120 inches) a year on the average, is the rule across most of the center. North and south from this area there is an alternately wet and dry tropical climate, the dry periods tending to grow increasingly longer as one goes farther north or south. Finally, there is the dry tropical climate, characteristic of the Sahara and the Namibia deserts.

All of these different tropical climates are characterized first by the fact that they are not temperate—that is, moderate. Rainfall is usually too much or too little, and at most one can be certain only of its unpredictability and violence. It is not surprising that we call torrential showers "tropical rains." Second, there is no frost; the average temperature in the coldest month is at least eighteen degrees Celsius (64°F.). Continuous heat and the absence of frost mean life and reproduction are not stayed by the great executioner of nature, winter. Life in most parts of the tropics thus takes on an infinite multiplicity of forms, and there is fierce competition for survival. The conditions are right for rapid evolutionary change as species adapt to new opportunities, with a consequent high probability that any new plant or animal, introduced by man and grown in considerable numbers, will soon be attacked by a new enemy adapting rapidly from some existing form.

Cultivated plants are threatened by weeds, parasitic fungi, insects, spider mites, eelworms, and virus diseases. After harvest, storage pests and rats move in. In some areas, millions of weaver birds attack crops. Gigantic swarms of desert locusts in Western and Eastern Africa, and red locusts in Southern, Central, and Eastern Africa, are a major, recurrent threat to crops. Constant research against new threats is therefore necessary if any major increase in agricultural output is to be achieved.

Tropical soils, with the exception of alluvial or recent volcanic soils, are poor and contain little organic material. Even in dense forests, soils are thin, although equilibrium is maintained by the return of elements to the soil by decaying plants and trees. If the forest is cleared, the soil is soon exhausted by two to three years of crops. For this reason, African farmers in the humid tropics developed "shifting," or seminomadic, cultivation. A farm is hacked out of the forest, cultivated for a few years, and allowed to revert to bush again.

Most African farmers still have to depend on human muscle power to cultivate their fields. Over most of tropical Africa, the transition to ox or horse-drawn mixed farming, with the resulting enormous gains in efficiency and output, could not take place because of the tsetse fly. Trypanosomiasis, the disease carried by this fly, is deadly to cattle and horses, and has still not been mastered. Where the fly has been pushed out, constant vigilance and control measures are necessary to keep the fly from coming back. Where the fly is absent, there are innumerable other parasitic, infectious, nutritional, toxic,

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metabolic, and organic diseases that affect livestock. Intestinal parasites result in retarded development of young animals, reduce yields of meat and milk, and diminish the working capacity of draft animals.

Not only are the farmer's crops and livestock damaged by tropical diseases and predators, but the farmer is as well. The average farmer in tropical Africa is infected by at least two different types of parasites. He or she will usually have had, or be currently subject to, attacks of malaria or schistosomiasis (bilharzia, or liver fluke), a debilitating disease that may affect up to half the African farmers. Hook worms, roundworms, pinworms and whipworms are widespread. Millions have filariasis, spread by the bite of mosquitoes, onchocerciasis (river blindness), spread by the bite of a black fly, or guinea worm, spread by infected drinking water. Sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis), kala-azar (leishmaniasis), dengue, trachoma, cholera, and leprosy are also economically significant. Most of these diseases have not been brought under control; in fact, the necessary research effort to do so has barely started. Only in 1975 was a coordinated international effort begun to try to discover, develop, and apply new technologies for the control of six of these diseases. The Special Program on Research and Training in Tropical Diseases, co-sponsored by the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development Program, and the World Bank, is concentrating on malaria, schistosomiasis, sleeping-sickness, filariasis (including river blindness), leishmaniasis, and leprosy.

It is not only these "exotic" tropical diseases that blight African life. When tropical Africa was opened up to the rest of the world, among the first immigrants were diseases new to the continent such as measles, small pox, and tuberculosis, and these were as devastating to human life as Arab slave traders or colonial punitive expeditions. A large part of the mortality and sickness in tropical Africa today is caused by diseases that also exist in temperate climates. Many of the diseases are more difficult to resist in the tropics because of the warm temperatures the year round. These temperatures allow large populations of insects to live for most or all of the year and permit a much more rapid multiplication than in colder climates. The house fly, for example, spreads bacillary dysentery and other diseases. It takes forty-four days for the fly to develop from egg to adult at sixteen degrees Celsius (62°F.), but only ten days at thirty degrees Celsius (88°F.). The difference in the number of days means a difference in the potential birth of millions of flies. But that is not all. Parasites, such as malaria, that carry out a part of their development within an insect carrier (such as the mosquito) are also "ecothermic"; that is, the speed of their development and multiplication within the insect host varies directly with the temperature.

Most of the African rural population, consequently, are dragged down by parasitic diseases and constantly besieged by other sicknesses. It is hard for anyone from an industrialized, temperate climate to have a real sense of what most African farmers must endure. Probably the closest anyone can get to this is to imagine having to work day in and day out while in the grip of a perpetual, severe cold or the first stage of flu.

The African farmer has had to survive by using human muscle power in a difficult environment, coaxing crops out of a soil that is rapidly being depleted

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of its nutrients, and surrounded by the enormous fecundity of minute life that is trying to feed off big life. It is no wonder that the exploitation of Africa's agricultural potential still awaits accomplishment.

The picture I have painted of Africa's agricultural potential thus far is bleak, since I have presented only the main causes that keep African farmers poor. This is largely because existing agricultural technology, which was developed mainly for temperate zone agriculture, cannot cope with the problems of tropical African agriculture or exploit the particular tropical advantages. These do exist. First, sunlight energy for plant growth in the humid tropics is 60 to 90 percent higher than in humid temperate regions. Consequently, plants in tropical rain forests produce as much as three to five times more organic matter each year than do plants in temperate forests. The absence of winter, once pests are controlled, can extend the length of the growing season, and if water is available, may make it possible to grow as many as three or four crops a year. The very multiplicity of species could help in developing new and better crops and livestock.

The key to unlocking this potential is, of course, research. Until very recently, there has been little research on tropical agricultural problems other than on some export crops and, most recently, on tropical wheat and rice. Only in 1971, as the result of an initiative by the World Bank, was the comprehensive Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR) on tropical agricultural problems set up by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Bank, and the UN Development Program (UNDP). CGIAR sponsors and mobilizes international financial support for centers in the tropics and subtropics worldwide, doing research on crops and animals that account for over three quarters of the food supplies of the less developed countries. In Africa, there are centers in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Liberia.

The international research effort is not enough by itself. Individual countries and regions must do adaptive research, and the farmers must apply the results. India provides a good example of what can be done in this regard. Based on the new varieties of wheat and rice developed by CGIAR institutes, India succeeded during the seventies in moving from a situation in which she had trouble feeding her teeming population in normal years, and in bad years was saved from famine only by massive foreign aid, to one in which she is self-sufficient in food. A failed monsoon in India results merely in a drawdown in the ample reserves built up in years of good crops. This achievement may of course be reversed if India's population continues to multiply rapidly.

Owing to the many variations in climate and soils, and the small stock of scientific knowledge available, progress in taking advantage of African agricultural potential is bound to be very slow. Considerable success, however, has already been attained in developing improved strains of maize and sorghum. A great deal has been accomplished also in the tree crops, such as bananas, cocoa, coffee, oil palm, rubber, and tea. Tree crop cultivation has few of the problems of tropical agriculture mentioned above. The plants shade and protect the soil, and come close to achieving the same equilibrium with the soil and climate as did the original forest. Since tree crops provide a permanent farm, the results of research to increase productivity and income can be applied more easily.

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Perhaps even more important, there has been a great deal of research on these crops usually elsewhere in the tropics, but also, in some cases in Africa, beginning in the colonial period.

An outstanding example is rubber. The trees and the system of cultivation and processing developed in Malaysia made natural rubber competitive with synthetic rubber made from oil even before oil jumped in price. Similar technological opportunities exist in the other tree crops. Cocoa is grown in the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, and other African countries. Coffee is grown in many African countries, but principally in the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Oil palm is a West African crop, but is also grown in Cameroon and Zaïre. Tea is mostly an East African crop. Bananas come from the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Somalia; rubber is a long-time export from Liberia and Zaïre, but now is also being developed in other West African countries.

While the cultivation of tree crops provides an opportunity for many African countries to develop their agricultural resources, only a few governments have encouraged their farmers to do so. The Ivory Coast and Kenya in Africa, like Malaysia in Asia, have paid attention to their agriculture, and in doing so, have made impressive progress, compared to their neighbors, in exploiting their agricultural potential for local consumption and for export.

* * *

The myth that Africa possesses enormous and easily exploitable resources is likely to survive any balanced objective appraisal of the facts such as this discussion has attempted to be. The myth has served a useful purpose—and continues to do so—for many different interests over the last century. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it was diligently peddled by European imperialists and colonial officers to persuade reluctant ministries of finance and parliaments to back the grabbing of African territory and to pay for the minimum of infrastructure required. At the same time, financiers and stock market speculators, busily floating African concession companies at handsome profits for themselves, led the investing public into the shearing shed with similar fabrications of easily exploitable African riches.

After World War II, the myth was picked up by African nationalist leaders, who roused the people by placing the blame for their poverty on foreign exploitation. That Great Britain, France, and Belgium relinquished their tropical African colonies, from which they were supposed to be drawing so much wealth, with so little reluctance disturbed the myth not a whit.

The myth continues. It is now sustained by the apologists for the Republic of South Africa. These people clothe their support for South Africa by greatly exaggerating the importance of South African minerals to the noncommunist world. A second group of myth-sustainers are the radical "neo-colonialists" and "dependency" theorists. African governments discovered that nationalizing foreign-owned companies did not result in an outpouring of wealth for their peoples; the "dependency" theories serve the useful purpose of placing the blame on the industrialized world for the disappointment of proindependence expectations. According to this set of theories, the African countries are kept

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poor and under the control of the industrialized world by their continued economic dependence on it, through their exports of primary products and their imports of manufactures. There is no doubt that countries that are exporters of primary products (such as minerals and agricultural products) have special economic problems. But most of tropical Africa's problems are more fundamental and closer to home than this particular aspect of their economies.[5] The hard economic reality is that the countries of tropical Africa have major real problems in developing their resources. As I tried to make clear in this paper, the indications are that the resources exist to make substantial African economic development possible, but that they are not easily exploitable. There are real difficulties to overcome—both natural and man-made. It is no service to the African nations to ignore or make light of them.

References

[1]When in 1980 the leaders of nine Black African countries of Southern and Central Africa met in Zambia at a conference on economic development, they agreed that highest priority should be given to around $2 billion worth of harbor, railroad, road, aviation, and telecommunication projects.

[2]In 1981 exports dropped drastically owing to Nigeria's slowness in dropping its price in response to the oil oversupply during the year.

[3]Just ten years ago, no one would have considered it worthwhile to drill in the American Rocky Mountains western overthrust belt, yet today new knowledge has made it the most important new field discovered in the continental United States in the last twenty years.

[4]The estimate of South Africa's exploitable resources doubled, for example, between 1977 and 1981.

[5]The United States to 1914, Japan to 1939, the Soviet Union today, and the extremely wealthy Arab oil producers of the Persian Gulf all fit the stereotype of primary product exporters under the dependency theory.

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EMMANUEL A. AYANDELE

Africa: The Challenge of Higher Education[1]

To observers of the African socioeconomic landscape, the voracious appetite of African countries for formal education in the past twenty-one years is a unique, but puzzling, spectacle. In their determination to make up for decades of the Rip Van Winkle affliction visited on their hapless continent by British, French, Portuguese, and Belgian colonial rulers—for whom the education of the African was not a priority—independent African states have been devouring Western education with a speed and gusto that makes no allowance for its healthful digestion in relation to society's social and economic well-being. Over the years, education has gobbled up between 10 and 30 percent of national budgets, the unit cost of primary education in some countries being equivalent to the per capita income!

Statistics tell the tale of the explosive rate of growth of formal education in contemporary Africa. At the primary level, the number of pupils skyrocketed from 19,153,000 in 1960 to 33,852,000 in 1969, and to 51,748,000 in 1977. For secondary schools, the figures were 1,735,000, 4,921,000, and 10,449,000; and for tertiary institutions, 180,000, 472,000, and 1,095,000.[2] This quantitative expansion has not, however, been matched by qualitative results: societies faced with the unnerving phenomenon of unemployed primary school graduates, and the economically ruinous desertion of the rural world—and farming—by the literate for congested urban centers. For there has been no correlation between education and economic development, between production of human resources and jobs, between planning and training. In the belief that education is the open sesame to economic transformation and modernization, African governments adopted, with faith and hope, the credo: "Seek ye first the kingdom of knowledge and all other things shall be added unto you."

The scales, of course, have begun to fall from the eyes of African rulers, as they witness the monumental nonfulfillment of a dream promoted in unvaryingly enthusiastic language at periodic continental conferences between 1961 and 1976.[3] This chimerical dream was attainment by 1980 of "universal, compulsory, and free" primary education, with 30 percent of successful primary school graduates going on to secondary education, and 20 percent of these graduates continuing on to higher education, "mostly in Africa itself."[4] Close to the target year, the gulf between promise and achievement was very wide indeed, and an exceedingly poor advertisement on the global plane, for only 40 percent of the children of primary school age were attending school,

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only 15 percent of secondary school age children were attending these schools, and only 1.5 percent of young people age twenty to twenty-four were registered in institutions of higher learning. Africa, in short, compared miserably with other parts of the world. Figures for the United States were 98, 92, and 44.5 percent; for Europe, 97, 65, and 16.7 percent; and for Latin America, 75, 55, and 5 percent.[5]

The African situation is compounded by two crucial factors. First, a population growth that cannot be matched by economic development is neutralizing *pari passu* the frenetic efforts of African governments. Based on an annual rate of growth of 2.7 percent—one of the highest in the world—the 1975 population of 401.3 million will more than double at the turn of the century to 816,131,000,[6] with 46.4 percent of that population expected to be under the age of fifteen. It requires no prophetic insight to see that the training of such a huge number of education-hungry youngsters will be one of the toughest challenges to statesmanship in Africa. Second, African states are caught between the Charybdis of wishy-washy education for the many and the Scylla of qualitative, but "elitist," education for the few. The former—which most politicians prefer—is part of the philosophy of social justice, the greatest good for the greatest number. For in the words of the Ministers of Education in 1976, "Education is an inalienable right which all [citizens] should be able to exercise."[7] The alternative and more rational "elitist" policy harbors the serious danger of paving the way for the emergence of a "two nations" syndrome—a highly educated, privileged minority lording it over completely illiterate, but more than potentially restive, masses.

It is in this context that the challenge of higher education to contemporary African states should be understood. But first, a prologue: neither the tradition of scholarship nor the concept of higher education is new in Africa. In the wake of Christianity, literacy had by the end of the fifth century produced, in the Maghreb, African bishops (St. Augustine), intellectuals (Lanctatious), and theologians (Tertullian) of international stature in Christendom.[8] Under the banner of Islam, which had swept through the littoral of Mediterranean Africa by 683, literacy had, by the end of the eighteenth century, produced, north of the tropical forest, scholars and medical scientists (Averroës), philosophers (Ibn Khaldun), erudite jurists (Ahmed Baba), and historians (Muhammad Kati).[9] And as a by-product of the Islamization of the northern third of the continent, higher institutions of learning flourished in Quarawiyin,[10] Jaghbub, Cairo (Al Azhar), and Timbuktu (Sankore University).

Yet the university in the Western tradition is a recent phenomenon. The oldest—a product of Anglican philanthropy and the only one until the founding of Cairo University in 1908—is the University of Sierra Leone. As Fourah Bay College, it was affiliated with Durham University in England in 1876, and produced its first graduates—three in number—two years later. The half dozen universities in 1960 have multiplied at a breathtaking rate, the most recent count of eighty revealing that nearly all African states—the exceptions being the smaller Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) states—boast of at least one university. The distribution, of course, is anything but even: Nigeria, with a fifth of the continent's population, has twenty, followed by Egypt with eleven, and Sudan and Morocco each with five. And they vary in size and facilities, too, the twenty

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North African universities together statistically ahead of the sixty south of the Sahara in student population.[11] Many of the universities are very small, with less than one thousand students each, and constitute an uneasy burden on their countries' budgets. On the whole, only about twenty-five of the institutions have attained the optimum size of British "red-brick" universities, but a few are quite large. The University of Cairo has more than sixty thousand students; the University of Tunis, twenty-one thousand; the Université Nationale de Zaïre, twenty thousand; and the Université Mohammed V in Rabat (Morocco), eighteen thousand. Other universities that have hit the ten-thousand mark are the University of Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), the Université Nationale de Madagascar, the Université de la Côte d'Ivoire, the Université de Dakar, and the University of Khartoum. Nigeria's universities located at Ibadan, Ile-Ife, Lagos, Nsukka, and Zaria belong to the same category.

University expansion in contemporary Africa is an example of reason receding before emotion and desire, of political considerations, rather than financial wisdom, determining the location and establishment of universities. Hence the preference by countries, in some cases by governments in the same country, of having many weak institutions rather than fewer, but strong, ones. The open-door policy of Dakar University beckoned citizens of neighboring Francophone countries in West Africa, but national pride, defined by colonial boundaries, led them to choose national universities. And despite the high promise that the University of East Africa would become a mega-multiversity for the whole region, after six years of uneasy experiment, Kenya appropriated the campus in Nairobi, Uganda that in Kampala, and Tanzania that in Dar es Salaam. The marriage of convenience of the University of Botswana-Swaziland hit the rocks of sacrosanct national frontiers, even when it was clear to both countries that a divorce would mean permanent debilitation. And in the name of evenly sharing the "national cake," the Federal Republic of Nigeria has decided to punctuate each of its nineteen states with a federal university, in total disregard of cost and integrated national planning.

The price of provincial or national pride has been very high. For governments, higher education has become a most expensive enterprise, a perpetual financial drain, with its demand for European-type physical facilities, subsidized European-type living quarters for staff and hostels for students, and a salary structure that bears no relationship whatsoever to social justice in the country. For African universities are elitist pockets of prosperity in the midst of mass poverty. Yet compared to universities in the developed countries, except in a few cases, the teaching and research facilities are substandard, the quality and number of staff are less than ideal, and research dividends are discouragingly low. Finally, salaries are not competitive enough to attract senior academics from the developed countries.

The truth of the matter is that, for good or ill, higher education has become a "high-growth" industry in Africa, the one area where practically all targets of national development plans have been exceeded substantially. The rate of expansion, it should be repeated, is on a collision course with development objectives. Yet, largely because of the albatross of municipal responsibilities, such as the provision of water, electricity, and on-campus residence for the majority of students, African universities are unable to admit each year more

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than a small percentage of qualified candidates. It is this situation that has sent Africans fleeing the continent in all directions—as far afield as Tasmania, Sri Lanka, and Japan—in search of the "golden fleece." Hence, the thirty thousand Africans in the United States, the twenty thousand in France, the ten thousand in Britain, the three thousand each in Canada and West Germany,[12] and the twenty-seven-odd thousand in Eastern Europe, as of December 1979.[13] Given the stupendous burgeoning of education at the primary and secondary levels, the survival-of-the-fittest status of admission into African universities is bound to grow worse and worse, with a consequent rise in requests for admission to universities in Europe and North America.

For all the gargantuan effort to educate African society, in record time, out of the quagmire of underdevelopment to the twentieth century, the statistics on higher education reveal that, as in education generally, Africa is the most backward region of the world. Its universities, unit for unit, are the smallest in number of any other major world region, and it continues to have the lowest ratio of students enrolled as a percentage of the twenty-to-twenty-four-year age group, Asia having four times the number of university students per capita, and Latin America five.

The statistical evidence becomes more pronounced when Africa is juxtaposed with the United States, which has about 53 percent of Africa's population but about twenty-five hundred four-year institutions. There are more universities in each of the states of Ohio, Texas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, nearly double in California, and nearly triple in New York, than in all Africa put together. The 1,568,000 postgraduate students in the United States in 1977 were 43.1 percent more than all the students—1,095,000—in tertiary institutions in Africa, which enrollment was in turn 9.6 percent of the 11,286,000 students in U.S. universities and colleges in that year.[14] In other words, on a per capita basis, the United States has thirty-five times the number of students in Africa.

A prominent and crucial feature of the evolution of the eighty universities is their affinity with former colonial metropolitan countries in Europe. Thus the fifty universities in Anglophone countries, the twenty-six institutions in Francophone states, and the two universities in former Portuguese Africa have inevitably been modeled on British, French, and Portuguese patterns. That English, French, or Portuguese has become the lingua franca of the various African countries, most of which are plagued by a babel of tongues, has only served to strengthen this state of affairs. With the prominent exception of Mediterranean Africa, where Arabic is the recognized lingua franca (though French or English is used as the teaching medium in the universities), the languages of the European conquerors of Africa have become, for good or ill, permanent legacies, with all the attendant cultural implications for educational development on the continent.

This is not to say that African universities are wholly prefabricated importations from Europe. The African environment has of course shaped them, giving them a character of their own, in the direction, one would hope, of making them truly African in essence. And this necessary process of naturalization has been going on without undermining in any way the universal elements of the university as the theatre for the cultivation of intellect, the pursuit of scintillating scholarship, the liberation of the human mind, and for teaching and

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research. And although owing to financial and other constraints, many universities in Africa have yet to reach this ideal stage, it is the preeminent goal of the directors of African universities.

This is the reason African universities have been concerned about international certification of their academic standards; why they have importuned scholars in Europe and America to audit their academic programs and facilities as both examiners and participants in staff recruitment; why they spare neither effort nor funds to scour the globe for the best available staff; and why they reach out to universities and government agencies in Europe and North America for linkage agreements and staff training.

Yet the international character of African universities is not entirely a matter of necessity or expediency; for many, it is a deliberate choice, part of the belief that a truly good university should open its doors to academics of all races, that the academic staff are a form of international currency. Arising out of this belief is the notion that knowledge itself is an international currency. This belief has made African universities, by refusing to limit their conspectus of peoples to their national frontiers or continent, much less insular in their study of human society. Hence their curricula in the arts and social sciences focus on peoples in the wider world, giving students a more informed and healthier understanding of man in Europe and North America than one finds in universities in these two developed regions.[15] In my judgment, the global nature of the content of study in African universities is one leaf their counterparts in the developed societies could borrow with profit.

What dividends have African communities been reaping from higher education? What contributions have universities been making to the intellectual, social, and political life of independent Africa? What are the major problems facing these institutions of higher education in Africa? And how can the developed regions of the world assist the continent in its attempt to use universities as the vehicle for launching African society into the last decades of the twentieth century?

One basic fact to bear in mind is that, as imported institutions, African universities are evolving in a state of unprecedented cultural fluidity, volatile politics, and modern economic challenges. The universities of Europe and the New World evolved organically within a unified culture and in response to social and economic values that grew out of industrial and technological revolutions. African universities, on the other hand, were born into a society desperately in search of self-identity, a society trying simultaneously to recover and reassert traditional values and to enter the mainstream of the global culture being created by Western technology.

The most visibly significant contribution of African universities to independent Africa by far is the way they have made the independence of African states an increasing reality, by producing high-level manpower for the public services. Consequently, every country has, in varying degrees, been able to indigenize the civil service, the spinal cord of government, at a pace and to an extent beyond the wildest imagination of the former colonial rulers. With an expanding bureaucratic machine in their control, Africans provide not only the hands, but the heads, for the administration of independent Africa. Nothing illustrates the size of the manpower needs of the continent more than the automatic

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absorption of university graduates into the public and private sectors. Yet, although their output increases yearly, their facilities are strained to the limit, and the demand for high-level manpower continues to exceed the supply—despite the five-digit annual supplement from Europe and North America.

In the more advanced mixed-economy countries like Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Egypt, indigenes are being moved from the lower levels upward into business management, though only a few have reached the upper echelons, where policy decisions are made. State-owned enterprises and governments in Africa are the biggest investors; here, indigenes are in complete control of policy and management, relying on experts from outside the continent as consultants only. In so-called socialist states like Tanzania, Guinea, and Algeria—where nationals are not allowed to become "capitalists," and the role of the multinationals is restricted—the extent and quality of business management performance by indigenes is neither more nor better than that of their colleagues in mixed-economy states. In both classes of economy, it should be emphasized, Africans have yet to emerge as captains of industry: they remain low-profile entrepreneurs, mostly in the area of distribution.[16]

Although Africans still have a long way to go before they can begin to take control of their economies, the considerable measure of indigenization that has been achieved—not to talk of the rapid strides in professional areas like law, accountancy, architecture, and quantity surveying—is, to a great extent, to the credit of African universities. High-level manpower is so sorely needed, that the "unemployed graduate" in the humanities, the bugbear of India for decades, and about which Cassandras have been warning, is nowhere on the horizon.[17] The potential for a glutted market in certain categories of overproduced talents is of course there, and certainly deserves the attention of educational planners in Africa. But as of now, and as far as conservative projections are concerned, in the language of a recent study for the U.S. government, "there is a continuing need for African manpower development, a need greater than that of any other major world area."[18]

The ability of African universities to produce manpower in all categories, however, is simply not there. Apart from the small number of graduates in the sciences, some professional and technological disciplines are either not available in universities, or only poorly so. In some measure, polytechnics and colleges of technology have been trying to fill the gap by training students in quantity surveying, town planning, accountancy, architecture, engineering, and hotel management. Unfortunately, however, the necessary industrial environment and complex management facilities for practical experience are few or nonexistent. And certainly outside the province of universities is the training of middle-level manpower—artisans, technicians, model farmers, community development leaders, and paramedical staff. In these areas, the shortage in Africa is even more critical.[19] Thus the problem for African governments is not so much the long overdue upgrading of facilities for the training of such personnel, as raising the status—and with it, the morale—of graduates of the technical colleges to the same level as that of university graduates.

In the academic area of curriculum-design, in which they should excel, African universities have been rather a disappointment, for they have not

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operated within the parameters of the desire and struggle of contemporary Africa for self-realization and self-creation. They simply are not in the vanguard of the cultural renaissance that should pervade, and thus determine, their curricula.[20] In this regard, the late Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was merely talking in the air, though speaking an obvious truth, when he said, "A fundamental objective of the university must be the safeguarding and the developing of the culture of the people it serves."[21] No less overblown were the statements of those African Ministers of Education who in 1976 spoke of the virtues of the vernaculars for the evolution of African nations, and called for the "full and complete restoration of the national languages as languages of instruction," which would reconcile the African "with his environment and his integration into society." These languages, they went on, would "place the educational effort in a new dialectical relationship which ensures the dissemination of culture and knowledge in society and the intellectual emancipation of the community by the elimination of any elite status."[22] Good talk. But the conflict between precept and practice was instantly demonstrated when the Haile Selassie I University ignored His Imperial Majesty's declaration and adopted English as the language most convenient for teaching and for achieving national unity in this multiethnic country, and then hired an Englishman and a Swedish historian of Ethiopia as savants of the cultural heritage of Ethiopians. As for the pious declarations of the Ministers of Education, they were put into "dead file," and promptly forgotten.

That African countries cannot use the lingua franca problem as an alibi for not championing the cultural emancipation of the continent is clear from their indefensible failure to give Africa's cultural heritage the centrality it deserves in their curriculum. Had they been willing to make the necessary effort, they would have retrieved a great deal of Africa's cultural heritage, which, happily, has proved to be extremely resilient, and which continues to be the world in which the silent majority of Africans live, move, and have their being. Largely because they were educated in other countries, away from their own culture, many African academics lack an adequate emotional attachment to the African past, and are therefore not committed to a detailed and comprehensive survey of the cultural heritage of African society. True, the curriculum in the arts and social sciences is impressively Africa-oriented, but it is yet to be *African*-oriented. It is not an accident that most of the materials on which the academic merits of the curriculum rest have been authored by non-Africans. Indeed, Africa is par excellence a region where most of the textbooks in the secondary schools and tertiary institutions are the work of non-Africans—that is, Europeans and Americans.

And this applies to research, too. It is ironic that one finds *outside the continent* the largest team of researchers on African studies, the largest and most comprehensive works on Africa and Africans being published,[23] and the largest audience and readership with a keen appetite for African studies. Indeed, without the financial help of foundations and international donor agencies outside Africa, many of the Institutes of African Studies of African universities would not exist.

Yet it is self-evident that the addition of an African dimension and flavor to the sum total of world knowledge requires that the universities recognize that

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the problems posed by African studies are *primarily* African and therefore demand an African solution. The themes, emphasis, perspectives, and orientation of the writings and research of Africans so far produced on the continent show clearly that it is only from within Africa that the study of Africa can come. This is as it should be. Africans have a special responsibility that outsiders, no matter how well intentioned and technically able, cannot discharge. Their distance from their hearth notwithstanding, African scholars are psychologically and emotionally more drawn to their continent and cultural heritage than foreigners. In the understanding and interpretation of evidence of and about African culture and institutions, in historical appreciation and the use of oral traditions, oracles, myths, legends, and works of art, and in the analysis of the human drama in African society, African scholars have an advantage over others, and are thus more likely to get at the truth than non-Africans.

This is not to say that the academic interests of non-Africans should be curtailed: on the contrary, these interests should widen increasingly. For African studies requires all hands on deck, the leaven of foreign perspectives, and the virtues of cross-cultural focus and interpretations. The African dimension at this time is but minimally present, and the necessary balance must be restored by Africans nurtured in the unique experience and tradition of the continent.

Thus, despite the efforts made by African universities to give their curricula an African cast, they remain for the most part centers for the diffusion of Western culture. To use a biblical metaphor, although they have "left Egypt" in abandoning the cravings for "Britishness" or "Frenchness" or "Americanness," African universities are still far from Canaan, still far from becoming essentially African. This is why the training of Africans outside the continent has in no visible way made them more Western than their colleagues trained at home. The monolith that is their class—an overprivileged minority, "anointed" by university degrees—is by no means undermined. As such, they constitute a *new* class of human beings, mentally and culturally. Sandwiched between the indigenous world and that of the white man, they master neither, nor are they fully acceptable, or at home, in either. Culturally they are amorphous, a class of Africans with an English, French, or American veneer. Or, in the language of Léopold Sédar Senghor, the one statesman who understood that African nations must be erected on the base of their own culture, the educated elite in Africa are no more than "photographic negatives of the [former] colonizers."[24]

In the world of research, many Africans are yet to achieve full mental emancipation. To do this, they must cease being mere imitators and burglars of other peoples' methodologies and research techniques, and instead, become originators. Hence, African Gamaliels are few and far between, and internationally endorsable centers of academic excellence to which non-Africans can pay homage are yet to emerge. Hence, in comparative terms, only a few publications by African scholars can be celebrated as tours de force. Hence, the economist or sociologist has yet to discover theories or models and produce vocabularies evolving out of the peculiar African situation, to be learned by American or French scholars. Hence, the consultants in teaching hospitals have yet to grasp that the *sine qua non* to the successful introduction of medical science to Africa is understanding the African psyche in relation to its milieu. Hence,

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the historian has yet to focus his mind and skill on the illiterate majority, on oral evidence, family and clan totems, ballards and institutional evidences of the African past, rather than on African-European relations, with their emphasis on the miniscule class of the educated elite.

In terms of the quantity and quality of the scholarship emanating from Africa, the universities are remarkable more for what they have not been doing than for what they have done. Put bluntly, the African creative genius is yet to unravel itself; the sphinx is yet to solve its own riddle. Certainly, there is substance in the observation of a Francophone educator that "the university [in Africa] is not society's thinking head—seldom in the vanguard of educational reform. . . . The university is yet to participate in the liberation of the long inhibited indigenous creative genius."[25]

Since universities are expected by governments to make significant contributions to nation-building, it is by inspiring society to an informed and rational appreciation of their cultural heritage, as the only enduring and valid foundation on which African nations should be built, that these cynosures must play their leading role.[26] For in a sense, Africa's crisis is above all a cultural crisis.

It may be that African universities are victims of a very cruel dilemma. As centers of knowledge, they are expected to be at once purveyors of knowledge from all the corners of the globe and to lead African society from the captivity of ignorance to the storehouse of knowledge—the Promised Land—the application of which will bring African society socially and materially into the modern era. This implies the invasion of Africa by science and technology, and the compulsion to change old ways. In short, the educational problems of Africa must be tackled in the context of rapid social change, which implies the pummeling, perhaps the pulverization of traditional values. The question is, How can Africa become once again African at the same time that it becomes modern, at a time when the forces of modernity throughout the world are working to reduce the major differences among all men to minor variations in marginal aspects of human life?

Nevertheless, it is natural that a continent that, to a large degree, has lost its past without yet finding its future should look to the classroom in search of its identity. Since education is the means by which African leaders expect to create the new Africa, it is not surprising that universities are being asked to show the light, to perform what may very well be an impossible task. After all, African universities were not founded on the basis of Africa's past becoming its destiny.

The political implications of universities for African society are fascinating. First, by and large, they enjoy absolute freedom of the intellect and are free to design and teach what they like, in whatever manner, as an intellectual exercise. In this sense, there is uninhibited academic freedom in African universities. It is when teachers and students attempt to go beyond the university walls—that is, attempt to influence politically the wider world of society—that they are deemed to have gone *too* far, in which case they are given no quarter. Academics and politicians are all members of the middle class, but the relationship between education and power is not a direct one. Although universities have contributed to the educational upgrading of politicians—in some countries, graduates are increasingly entering politics—the politicians are more powerful than the

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better-educated academics, and they see universities as potential centers of "destabilization" in an environment where volatile politics are the norm.

The view of politicians is that the university teacher goes beyond his bounds when he becomes interested in conventional politics, except where the university is—as in Tanzania, Guinea, and Algeria—an extension of the one-party "socialist" state. In such states, university teachers are cogs in the wheel of the state. As employees of the state, to act otherwise is to run the risk of being fired or flung into jail. In the same manner, undergraduates who attempt to play the role of spokesmen for "the masses," or indulge in bread-and-butter agitation for more privileges for themselves, are readily cut down to size by closure of their university. This treatment is invariably therapeutic, a reminder to these beneficiaries of "elitist" education that further agitation would merely postpone their assured and coveted automatic absorption into the Establishment.

For it is important to emphasize that, as of the present day, university staff and students are, socially and culturally, members of a tiny, privileged minority of society—at public expense. Though dollar for dollar the African don is at a disadvantage compared to his colleague in Europe or the United States, he enjoys certain fringe benefits. He lives extremely well compared to the masses, though less well than the politician-ruler, who, as heir of the colonial ruler—whom he outrivals in opulence and prodigality—lives especially well. And the student? He is in most cases a government-sponsored scholar enjoying free board and lodging and free tuition, only a rung away from the final thrust to the upper bracket of the Establishment.

Second, perhaps the most significant fact is that African universities have not been arsenals of ideas, or nurseries of ideologues who could provide a compass for African rulers in their nation-building effort. In a continent that is monumentally barren of sublime original political philosophy, derivable from the traditional world-view and sociocultural realities that cannot be wished away, social scientists have a fertile, virgin field. But rather than apply themselves to the African terrain, African scholars, with very few exceptions, have borrowed made-abroad models and ideas that Africans cannot be expected to feel at home with.[27] Is it any wonder that ideas have come from statesmen and political parties, rather than academics? Intellectually, the distinguished poet-philosopher-statesman, Léopold Sédar Senghor, former president of Senegal, is a loner.[28] Next to him is the more prosaic and pragmatic Julius Nyerere, whose watered-down version of Maoist ideology has been the national philosophy of Tanzania for more than a decade.[29]

It is essential to explain the lack of popular appeal of the Marxist ideology that is occasionally mouthed by cranky staff and student sloganeers in African universities. Outside the "socialist" states of Algeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Guinea, the majority of students in African universities are not ideology-hungry nor so radicalized as to be uncritical of certain measures of government. As I have already stated, they are preoccupied with earning their degrees and thus gaining entry to the kingdom of the privileged few. Outside the university, Marxism has come to grief, because Africa is not a *tabula rasa* on which any ideology can be written. Consequently, as an exotic doctrine, Marxism has more than ordinary rivals in Islam, with its doctrine of the social obligations of the faithful to the underprivileged, and communalism, with its credo of social

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responsibilities in the extended family and clan. No less a deterrent to Marxism is the preemptive policy of social welfarism adopted routinely by all African states in the areas of education and health. Nor should one overlook the neutralizing, leveling effects of meritocracy, which is sweeping through the continent.

Even without political diversions, African universities have more than enough problems, funding being at the very root. Compared with universities in the developed countries, African universities, with very few exceptions, are fledglings bedeviled by inadequate library and laboratory facilities for students, inadequate staff, and lack of research opportunities. These problems need little elaboration, as international donor agencies who are only too familiar with them can attest. Only one point is called for to underline the seriousness of the situation: *there is not a single discipline in which African universities are self-sufficient in staffing*.

The Macedonian calls of African universities to international donor agencies and universities in the developed countries are genuine and are bound to increase, not only because of the inadequate funding of existing institutions by governments overburdened with other priorities, but also because the irrational expansion of university education is bound to continue for many years to come. For the crisis of ever-increasing numbers of students crammed into inadequate facilities is minor compared with the problem posed by the hundreds of thousands of qualified candidates for whom no places can be found. If only to defuse a potential revolution, African states would still find it difficult to arrest the explosive rate of growth of university education, a state of affairs that would further aggravate the unevenness and disharmony of national development. Already, the eighty universities are more than double the thirty-two that higher education experts at Tananarive in 1961 projected as appropriate and feasible for the continent by 1980.[30]

As for assistance from the developed countries, the signs are not very promising: although the spirit is willing, the purse is weak. Governments in these countries see the requests for funding only in the context of "aid" to African countries. And in this context, African governments do not put universities near the top of their shopping list! In any case, African states, like Lazarus, could in the best of times hardly expect more than crumbs from Dives' table. But now that this is no longer as sumptuous as it used to be—even the America of the "Great Society" becoming a weary titan—the African Lazarus can expect only smaller and fewer crumbs.

But African universities have other problems, staffing being the most serious. The wide gap in salaries of academic staff in Africa and the developed countries is a deterrent to recruiting able staff from Europe and the New World. In Africa itself, other public and private sectors that can pay higher wages and offer more generous perquisites have begun to attract highly qualified personnel away from the universities. Indeed, some universities find it difficult to encourage suitably qualified graduates to choose an academic career, since the first degree by itself can obtain managerial or entrepreneurial positions that are more financially rewarding and less mentally exacting than teaching and research.

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Expatriate scholars in African universities, it should be noted, do not seek permanent employment, and usually desire to return home at the earliest opportunity. For scholars at home who are already tenured, short-term tours of not more than two years are the preference. The regular staff contend with anxieties such as the insecurity that political instability brings, as befell Uganda under Idi Amin; a sense of isolation; facilities and conditions of work; and family considerations such as children's education. Fortunately, the old notion that the African climate is especially treacherous to the health of the white man is no longer current.

The problems that African universities face are bigger than can be solved on an individual basis or on the national platform alone. International cooperation both on regional and continental levels is not only long overdue, but imperative. The necessity for a united effort was perceived as long ago as the early days of independence when it was hoped that higher education would "ensure the unification of Africa,"[31] and that expensive faculties like medicine and veterinary science would be joint enterprises across national boundaries. But the prospect of concerted effort in higher education remains today as remote as it did in 1961 when this wish was so ardently and hopefully expressed.

REFERENCES

[1]This analysis does not include South Africa.

[2]*UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1978/79; 1980.* These works of industry give figures as accurately as possible under the circumstances; while they may not be 100 percent accurate, the patterns they indicate are valid.

[3]Conferences on various aspects of education in Africa were held in Addis Ababa (1961), Tananarive (1962), Nairobi (1968), Dakar (1974), and Lagos (1976).

[4]Damiba Aime, *Education in Africa in the Light of the Lagos Conference* (UNESCO, 1976), p. 8.

[5]*UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1980.*

[6]Annual rate of growth is estimated at 3 percent from the eighties. See *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1978/79.*

[7]Aime, "Declarations of the Lagos Conference," in *Education in Africa,* p. 48.

[8]B. H. Warmington, *The North African Provinces from Diocletian to the Vandal Conquest* (Cambridge, England: 1954), pp. 103-11; J. O. Ojoade, "Reflections of African Social Life in the Literature of Roman Africa from the Second to the Fifth Century A.D.," Ph.D. dissertation (Ibadan: 1970).

[9]*The Cambridge History of Islam,* vol. 2A, part 7, edited by P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis (Cambridge, England: 1977).

[10]The Islamic University of Al Quarawiyin at Fez (Morocco) was established in the ninth century and celebrated its 1,100th anniversary two years ago.

[11]In 1960 North African universities had 108,500 students, in contrast to 11,500 in the rest of Africa. In 1977 the figures were 867,345 and 227,655.

[12]Charles M. Lyons, "Africa's Overseas Students," *World Higher Education Communique* 3 (1) (1980): p. 6.

[13]Central Intelligence Agency, "Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954-79: A Research Paper," Table A-8, October 1980.

[14]Nancy B. Dearman and Valena White Plisko, *The Condition of Education* (Statistical Report, National Center for Education Statistics) 1981 Edition, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 142, 146.

[15]This is a feature of university education in Africa that has not received due notice. Yet a casual examination of courses in African universities clearly reveals the global outlook that in many countries reaches down to the upper classes of secondary schools. In Europe and North America, in contrast, courses on Africa are optional and not many undergraduates are interested in studying peoples outside their continent or outside the Northern Hemisphere.

[16]Frantz Fanon, *Toward the African Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); James M. Mittelman, *Ideology and Politics in Uganda from Obote to Amin* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University

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Press, 1975); Marnia Lazreg, *The Emergence of Classes in Algeria: A Study of Colonialism and Socio-Political Change* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976).

[17]One individual who has paid attention to manpower development since the fifties is Frederick M. Harbison, at one time a consultant to governments in Africa. See a study he did for the Overseas Liaison Committee (American Council on Education), *A Human Resources Approach to the Development of African Nations*, where he predicted that by the end of the seventies, most African states would have completely Africanized their strategic positions "in both public and private sectors," and that Africa would begin to have talent for export and "brain drains" similar to that of India and some South American countries (p. 15).

[18]"The African Manpower Development Project: An Evaluation" (unpublished manuscript) by the Overseas Liaison Committee (American Council on Education). I am grateful to Dr. Charles M. Lyons, Director of the OLC, for making this document available to me.

[19]Ibid.

[20]One prominent African scholar who sees the problem very clearly is Professor Ali Mazrui of Michigan State University. See his "The African University as a Multinational Corporation: Problems of Penetration and Dependency," *Harvard Educational Review*, 45 (2) (May 1975): 191-210.

[21]Emperor Haile Selassie's address at the inauguration of Haile Selassie University, in L. G. Cowan, James O'Connell, and David A. Scalon, *Education and Nation Building* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 303.

[22]Aime, *Education in Africa*, p. 49.

[23]It should be noted that publishing in Africa is monopolized or controlled by publishing companies based in Europe and, to a very less extent, in the United States, the two regions being in full control of the machinery for the processing and distribution of knowledge. As of now, no government or university in Africa can compete with them.

[24]J. L. Hymans, *Léopold Sédar Senghor: an Intellectual Biography* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971), p. 16.

[25]Aime, *Education in Africa*, p. 24.

[26]For a full treatment of this theme, see the chapter "African Studies and Nation Building," pp. 286-305 in my *African Historical Studies* (London: Frank Cass, 1979).

[27]See Mazrui, "The African University," p. 203, for a few examples. In addition to the use of stereotypical Marxist approaches, sociologists have been using models of Max Weber, Paul Tillich, and Emile Durkheim.

[28]Hymans, *Léopold Sédar Senghor*.

[29]Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism: Uhuru via Ujamaa* (Darel Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968).

[30]Staffing of African Universities and International Cooperation (Reports of an international organization that met in Berlin in May 1966, and published there the same year).

[31]*The Development of Higher Education in Africa* (Reports of the Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa, Tananarive, September 3-12, 1962) (UNESCO, 1963), pp. 69-70.

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JOEL W. GREGORY AND VICTOR PICHÉ

African Population: Reproduction for Whom?

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE—a rapidly increasing population and the move away from rural areas to the cities—has long been cited as one of the fundamental causes of African poverty, a theory that appears to us to be simplistic and based on inadequate facts. In this essay, we will challenge this neo-Malthusian paradigm, and argue that demographic change—and poverty—in Africa are instead parts of a larger process of peripheral capitalist development. Cries of "overpopulation" only distract attention from questions about this development process and its implications for the vast majority of African women and men.

Knowledge of African Populations

In any analysis of African demographic data, three important factors must be kept in mind: the quality of the data; the lack of historical information; and diversity. We will begin by examining these elements briefly, and then, following a concise overview of African population, will consider each of the basic components of demographic change—fertility, mortality, and migration.

DATA SOURCES

Africa is undoubtedly the region of the world most lacking in adequate sources of demographic data. The demographer's conventional sources—censuses, birth and death registers, and sample surveys—are urgently in need of supplementation by more complete bodies of data. Censuses are just now becoming commonplace in Africa, somewhat of an irony, when we consider that some of the first enumerations were made in Africa—in Egypt, in the time of Menes.[1] Many of the former British colonies have conducted censuses since early in this century, and most of the former French colonies only completed their first censuses in the 1970s.[2] At least three countries, Chad, Ethiopia, and Guinea, have yet to take a census.[3]

Vital registration, the systematic recording of births and deaths, is even more sporadic. No country in Africa comes close to complete registration, although some cities and regions, and some subpopulations, now have fairly complete systems.[4] The search for alternatives has led to the invention of sample registration, where certain geographical areas of a country are chosen, in a more or less statistically representative fashion, as the focus for high-quality

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pilot studies.[5] Parish registers are an alternative to civil registration of births (baptisms) and deaths in Africa, and analysis of the few parish registers that do exist has begun to provide useful historical information.[6]

Vital registration normally provides the numerator, and census data, the denominator, for various measures of fertility and mortality. Where either or both of these sets are missing, a demographic survey can provide estimates. Such sample surveys have been widely used in Africa. The massive round of surveys conducted in the Francophone countries between 1954 and 1965, for example, provided one of the largest bodies of data on African populations in existence.[7]

Although other sources rarely conform to the exacting requirements of conventional demographic methods, they do provide supplementary data, and are often the only basis for the historical study of African populations. These sources range from archeological remains to satellite photographs, and include information available in oral tradition, travel accounts, studies of food production, soils, and the climate, and colonial administrative reports.[8] The latter, including as they do tax and administrative censuses, village lists, military conscription statistics, and voluminous data on forced labor, are the most promising for the study of population change since 1900. The local and regional reports that accompany these statistics permit demographers to appraise the quality of the often incomplete numeric data.[9]

Three major qualitative problems need to be underscored. First, the precise knowledge of age, which is fundamental to demographic analysis, is difficult to establish, for the month and the year of birth are not necessarily significant information in African cultures. More important in the African conception of time and age is chronology and hierarchy: Who or what came first? Thus, although the relative age of one individual to another can be established, the precise age of an individual must often be estimated. At the same time, demographic data collection—in all its forms—does not easily permit the identification of "relative age," since all three types of data collection are based on the observation of individuals or households, and not on community observation, a tool more common to the anthropologist.[10]

Without consistent vital registration, retrospective questions on the number of births and deaths must be asked in censuses and surveys. This poses a second problem, because retrospective questioning results in underestimation owing to forgetfulness and mortality. Respondents often forget births that were quickly followed by infant deaths. The birth of someone who subsequently emigrated is also not remembered, nor is, obviously, that individual's death.[11] And of course, mortality and emigration remove prospective respondents.

A third major problem is posed by language. Finding the correct translation for a phrase or a concept in a series of African languages, many of which are unwritten, is difficult. Although an adequate translation from English, French, Portuguese, or Spanish may be found in two geographically contiguous languages, for example, the translations may not be identical. Thus there may be different responses, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the same question. In addition, an adequate translation for some concepts in European languages may not be found in some African languages. The stress on individual attitudes in Western social demographic research, for example, will find only dim echoes in

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many African languages, owing to the more collectivist value systems of most African cultures.

AN OVERVIEW OF AFRICAN POPULATION

Africa's population, which has more than tripled in the last fifty years (Table 1), is today 30 percent larger than that of Latin America and the Caribbean, but it is less than 20 percent that of Asia, and only 10 percent of the world's total. In fact, of the fifty-five nations and territories in Africa, only thirteen have a population of more than 10 million, and only six—Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Zaïre, South Africa, and Morocco—have more than 20 million. Nigeria, with an estimated population of nearly 75 million, is the continent's largest country. Fifteen nations and territories, on the other hand, have a population of less than one million.

The rates of natural increase (crude birthrates minus crude death rates) in many African countries are among the highest in the world. The average annual rate in 1978 for the African continent was 2.7 to 3.0 percent, while that for Latin America was 2.3 to 2.4 percent, and for Asia, 1.8 to 2.0 percent.[12] Table 2 summarizes the overall rates for Africa and its regions. With one exception, the differences among regions within Africa are not striking. The lower fertility of many Central African societies produces a slightly lower rate of natural increase in that region. Yet the variation of rates within regions and countries is large. Within Central Africa, for example, national rates of natural increase vary from approximately one percent per year in Gabon to well over 3 percent in Zaïre. In what seems to be a general trend, rates of natural increase have been growing over the past two or three decades. Both gradually declining mortality and occasional increases in fertility probably contribute to this change. Unfortunately, little is known about growth rates in earlier periods, but we can assume that they were much lower. It is also possible that rates fluctuated considerably.

Table 1. Population of Africa and Its Regions,* 1920-79 (in millions)

	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1975	1979
Africa	141	164	191	219	273	352	401	458
North	–	39	44	52	66	86	97	107
West	–	48	58	65	80	102	115	137
East	–	46	54	62	77	100	114	130
Central	–	21	23	26	32	40	45	52
Southern	–	10	12	14	18	24	28	31

Sources: United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook* (New York: 1961, 1965, 1975), and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Summary, World Population 1979* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980)

*The regions of Africa as defined by the United Nations are as follows: *North:* Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Western Sahara; *West:* Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta; *East:* British Indian Ocean Territories, Burundi, Comores, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe; *Central:* Angola, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaïre; *Southern:* Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland

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Table 2. Annual Rates of Natural Increase, Africa and Its Regions, 1950-77 (in percentages)

	1950-55	1955-60	1960-65	1965-70	1970-77
Africa	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.7
North	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.8
West	2.2	2.4	2.7	2.8	2.7
East	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.8
Central	1.7	1.9	2.3	2.5	2.3
Southern	2.3	2.4	2.7	2.7	2.8

Sources: United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook* (New York: 1977), and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Summary, World Populations 1979* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 18

Population growth means increasing densities. These data can be calculated, as shown in Table 3, from the preceding data. Regional differences are striking, and only begin to suggest the even greater intraregional variation, ranging from less than one person per square kilometer in parts of the Sahara and the Kalahari to several hundred per square kilometer in parts of the East African highlands. Crude density figures, however, without relevant data on land, rainfall, and technology, mean very little.

One final characteristic of African populations is their young age structure. High fertility, in particular, is responsible for populations in which between 40 and 46 percent of all people are under fifteen years of age (Table 4). This extremely young population means that a large proportion of people are economically inactive. Yet this is somewhat offset by the young age at which people begin to work in predominantly rural economies.

FERTILITY

African fertility levels are the highest in the world, yet there are tremendous regional and social variations, and some areas are even plagued by sterility.

Table 3. Population Density, Africa and Its Regions 1930-77, Inhabitants (per square kilometer)

	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1975	1976	1977
Africa	5	6	7	9	11	13	14	14
North	5	5	6	8	10	11	12	12
West	8	9	11	13	17	19	19	20
East	7	9	10	12	16	18	19	19
Central	3	3	4	5	6	7	7	7
Southern	4	4	5	7	9	10	10	11

Sources: United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook* (New York: 1977), and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Summary, World Populations 1979* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 18

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Table 4. Age and Sex Structure of the Population, Africa and Its Regions, 1975

	Males			Females			Both Sexes			Sex Ratio
	<15	15-64	65+	<15	15-64	65+	<15	15-64	65+	M/F (100)
Africa	45%	53%	3%	44%	53%	3%	44%	53%	3%	99
North	45	52	3	44	53	4	44	52	3	101
West	45	53	3	45	52	3	45	53	3	100
East	46	52	2	44	53	3	45	52	3	98
Central	44	54	2	42	55	3	43	55	3	96
Southern	42	55	3	40	55	4	41	55	4	97

Source: United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook* (New York: 1975), pp. 140-41

High Fertility—Since the 1960s, the crude birthrate has oscillated between 45 and 47 births per thousand for the whole of Africa (Table 5). The five regions—North, West, East, Central, Southern—show some differences. For the period 1960-77, Southern and North Africa had the lowest birthrates (41-43 per thousand), followed very closely by Central Africa (42-45 per thousand). West and East Africa have the highest natality (around 48-50 per thousand). U.S. Census Bureau data show basically the same pattern, with somewhat lower estimates for Southern Africa. There is more intraregional than interregional variation. For instance, in West Africa, Benin shows a birthrate of 54 per thousand and a total fertility rate of 7.2; in Sierra Leone, the rates are 39 per thousand and 5.1 (Table 6). In Central Africa, the variation is greater, from 54 per thousand and 6.8 in Chad, to 29 per thousand and 3.5 in Gabon. Sterility and subfecundity, or the low physiological capacity to conceive, would seem to account for the low levels there.

These general levels of fertility are higher than in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia. Regional crude birthrates vary from highs of nearly 40 per thousand, to lows of under 20, with total fertility rates varying from 5.5 to under 3. A few individual countries do approach the higher African rates. In

Table 5. Crude Birthrates,* Africa and Its Regions (per thousand)

	1955-60	1960-64	1965-70	1965-76	1965-77	1978
Africa	47	47	46	47	46	45-47
North	45	43	48	44	43	42-43
West	48	52	49	49	49	48-51
East		47	43	48	48	46-50
Central		42	45	45	44	44-48
Southern		42	41	43	43	36-38

Sources: United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook* (New York: 1961, 1965, 1970), and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Demographic Estimates for the Countries and Regions of the World* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980)

*The number of births per year over the total midyear population, ×1000

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Table 6. Some Examples of Intraregional Variations of Crude Birthrates (per thousand) and Total Fertility Rates in Africa

	Crude Birthrate	Total Fertility Rate*
West		
Benin (1961)	54	7.2
Ghana (1960)	46	6.3
Sierra Leone (1963)	39	5.1
East		
Kenya (1969)	50	7.0
Uganda (1962)	44	6.0
Central		
Chad (1964)	54	6.8
Gabon (1960-61)	29	3.5
Zaïre (1955-58)	44	5.8
Southern		
Namibia (1960)	44	5.7
Swaziland (1966)	53	6.9

Source: O. Adegbola, "New Estimates of Fertility and Child Mortality in Africa South of the Sahara," *Population Studies* 31 (3) (November 1977):480-86

*The average number of children that would be born to a woman if during her entire reproductive lifetime she conformed to the age-specific fertility of a single year

Central America, for example, Honduras and Nicaragua have birthrates of 47 per thousand and fertility rates near 7.[13]

Fertility Differentials—Fertility rates are notably diverse, not only from country to country, but also among different subpopulations. This diversity can be correlated with sedentary-nomadic and rural-urban life patterns, and with social class. It will be well to keep in mind that sterility, age at marriage, birth intervals, and breast-feeding also play a role, intermediate between the social structure and fertility, in contributing to the complexity of fertility differentials.[14] Once again, we must caution that these differentials are often blurred by the poor quality of data. Furthermore, these differences do not by themselves explain much, and therefore need to be studied within a more general historical and economic context.

In general, the fertility of settled populations is much higher than—sometimes twice—that of nomadic and seminomadic populations.[15] Variation in the pattern of childbearing is notable. Nomads have more childless (i.e., sterile) women. Those who bear children begin at later ages, stop earlier, and have longer intervals between births. A shortage of males leads to conjugal patterns that tend to depress fertility: high proportions of women are unmarried; marriage occurs at a later age; and there are more broken marriages. At work also are medical and physiological factors: rates of pregnancy loss are higher among the nomads; the incidence of venereal diseases and malaria is also higher;

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duration of breast-feeding is two to three times longer; and nutritional standards are lower.

The most studied fertility differential is the rural-urban one. There seems to be agreement that African fertility is higher in rural than in urban areas,[16] although some evidence indicates that in the early stage of modernization, urban fertility rates may actually be higher owing to earlier weaning and shorter periods of postnatal abstinence.[17] One model links urbanization and fertility, and suggests that some factors increase fertility, while others tend to depress it.[18] The net effect of urbanization on fertility will thus vary. In the first stage of urbanization, fertility is lower than in rural areas, owing to unbalanced sex ratios and the attraction of infertile women to the city. In the second stage, urban fertility may be higher. Urban fertility may once again be lower in the third stage, because it is assumed that populations primarily engaged in nonagricultural activities will choose to have smaller families.

The experience of Nigeria illustrates that the question of rural-urban fertility differences is still open to debate. In 1966 and 1969 fertility was higher in urban than in rural areas of western Nigeria.[19] In 1973 this relationship was corroborated using survey data from eastern Nigeria.[20] A study in 1980, however, concluded that the data used in the first two surveys were inconsistent and contradictory.[21]

Most studies of fertility differences between social classes employ a socioeconomic status index (schooling, income, occupation). In Nigeria, for example, the "ideal" number of children—as well as the number actually born—was lower for respondents with higher levels of schooling, income, and occupation.[22] There is an increase in the rejection of a large ideal family size as we go up the socioeconomic scale.[23] Studies of occupational differences in Lagos[24] and schooling differences in Ghana, Upper Volta, and Niger[25] show the same trend. A recent study in Sierra Leone shows a negative relationship between women's schooling and female labor force participation, on the one hand, and fertility, on the other.[26] There is some recent evidence, however, of a positive relationship between schooling and fertility, particularly for women with primary schooling, as opposed to those with no formal instruction.[27]

Sterility—Subfertility and sterility are major problems in many parts of Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, as many as 10 percent of the population may be affected by subfertility.[28] The particular significance of sterility in Central Africa, where it often coincides with the ecological space of specific ethnic groups, has been identified by A. Romaniuk.[29] Recent estimates reconfirm the low fertility of Central Africa, in an area extending from the west coast of Gabon and Cameroon through northern Zaïre and the Central African Republic into the southwestern part of Sudan. Parts of Mozambique, Botswana, and Swaziland are similarly affected.[30] In general, venereal disease is said to be a major cause of subfertility in Africa, although one study indicates that malaria appears to be more important in some areas.[31]

MORTALITY

Our information on mortality levels, trends, and differentials is far from complete. The main characteristics of African mortality include high overall

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levels of mortality, high infant mortality with a concomitant effect on fertility, and mortality differences according to rural or urban residence and social class.

High Levels of Mortality—Some of the highest levels of mortality in the world are found among African populations, life expectancy at birth in general being between thirty-eight and fifty-four years.[32] The crude death rate overall is around 20 per thousand (Table 7), while the rates for North Africa and

Table 7. Crude Death Rates, Africa and Its Regions (per thousand)

	1956-60	1960-64	1965-70	1965-75	1965-77	1978
Africa	25	23	20	20	20	17-18
North	23	19	17	16	15	13
West	27	29	24	24	23	18-21
East		21	18	21	21	18-20
Central		24	24	23	21	19-21
Southern		19	17	16	16	12-13

Sources: United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook* (New York: 1961, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1977), and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *World Population, 1979: Recent Demographic Estimates for the Countries and Regions of the World* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980)

Southern Africa appear to be somewhat lower. In Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia, similarly high death rates are quite exceptional. In Asia, crude death rates average between 12 and 15 per thousand; in Latin America, they are generally below 10 per thousand. Furthermore, life expectancy at birth in Asia and Latin America is higher, ranging from the mid-fifties in the former, to the high sixties in parts of the latter.[33]

Although there are few statistics on the causes of mortality in Africa, malaria is frequently identified as the biggest killer. Communicable diseases—yellow fever, smallpox, tetanus, diphtheria, and tuberculosis—are also important.[34] In a recent survey in two rural areas of Nigeria, men and women were asked about their illnesses. The order of frequency of reported complaints was fever (mostly malaria), dysentery, measles, respiratory diseases, and to a lesser extent, cholera and smallpox.[35] Finally, although maternal mortality has received little attention, it may be important, particularly where fertility is high, pregnancy intervals short, and medical facilities rare.[36]

Infant mortality rates in Africa are high, although again there are important differences between countries. As reported in official sources such as the *United Nations Yearbook*, they are probably underestimated. The overall infant mortality rate in Africa is approximately 200 per thousand,[37] a much higher figure than the official estimate of the World Health Organization of 120 per thousand.[38] Figures from a few countries will illustrate the regional differences.[39] For West Africa, the probability of dying before the age of two ranges from one in three in Upper Volta to one in five in Ghana. In Central Africa, it is one in four for the Central African Republic and one in five for Zaïre. In East Africa, the highest probability is one in four in Mozambique; the lowest, one in seven in Malagasy.

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There may also be a distinct pattern of infant and child mortality in Africa. Studies in Senegal, Upper Volta, Niger, and Ghana, for example, found that mortality is very high between the ages of one and five, almost as high as during the first year of life,[40] perhaps because of the dramatic loss of maternally communicated immunity that results from weaning at age two or three, and the lack of an appropriate substitute for mother's milk.[41]

The Relationship between Child Mortality and Fertility—This is undoubtedly an important relationship. The arguments in general stress the influence of high infant mortality on high fertility, noting the impact of infant death on subsequent birth and the short interval between the two.[42] Two explanations are suggested. In the first, the relationship is said to be physiological: the death of a child means that breast-feeding stops, which implies that ovulation resumes and that an early conception is possible.[43] The second approach emphasizes the parents' desire to replace a deceased infant.[44] Both explanations are criticized by J. Harrington, who suggests that a short birth interval means that a child has been weaned because of pregnancy, and that the probability that the child will die is therefore increased.[45] Thus it is not the relationship that is in doubt, but the cause of it.

Mortality Differentials—Mortality levels are related to specific social and economic conditions. One indicator of mortality differentials is place of residence, that is, whether one lives in a rural or an urban area. Infant mortality in many African cities is around 100 per thousand, while it is often over 200 per thousand in rural areas.[46] Lower urban mortality is usually associated with the availability of modern medical services and higher standards of living.[47] Another indicator of mortality differentials is socioeconomic status. In Algeria, for instance, infant mortality varies with the economic characteristics of the head of the household: peasants have the highest infant mortality (160 per thousand) while salaried workers and merchants have the lowest (111 per thousand). Yet even among salaried employees, the children of unskilled workers have a rate of 152 per thousand compared to 107 per thousand for skilled workers.[48]

The most important differences in mortality are related to the education of mothers.[49] In Nigeria, infant mortality levels were two-and-a-half times higher for mothers without schooling than for those with schooling.[50] Explanations commonly offered are that educated mothers are less fatalistic about illness and more ready to adopt new child-care practices, including improved nutrition, and that they are more capable of manipulating modern institutions. Also, educating women changes the traditional balance of familial relationships (e.g., toward child-centeredness).[51] These speculations need to be more fully documented, because education is indicative of a whole array of factors, such as income, occupation, access to health services, and so on, which all suggest that lower rates of mortality are reserved for the privileged few.

MIGRATION

This third component of population change is the most difficult to quantify, for not only does migration pose particular problems in terms of data collection,[52] but the various forms of African migration are evolving rapidly.

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Demographic knowledge of migration prior to this century is limited, although archaeology and linguistics provide some clues regarding certain major patterns over the long term.[53] Studies of the slave trade have produced considerable information on forced mobility, probably the most important form of migration from the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries. P. D. Curtin's estimate for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is nearly 8 million, with another 1.5 million traded earlier.[54] R. Austen arrived at an estimate of over 9 million for the trans-Saharan and Indian Ocean trade, which was spread over twelve centuries.[55] All these figures, however, are contested.[56] The demographic significance of the trade lies not only in the absolute population losses, but also in its impact on the age and sex structure. Slaves were most often young adults, most frequently male, in the case of the Atlantic trade, and female, in the case of internal and trans-Saharan trade. Although research in these areas continues, it is safe to conclude that the forced migration of slaves was probably the single most dynamic component of African demography in the 200 to 300 years preceding colonial conquest.

Present-day patterns of migration were established in the colonial period. During that time, the need for workers gave rise to several specific mechanisms for recruiting people, most often young adult males: taxation, forced labor, and military conscription. The demand for labor was greatest in four sectors: the construction and maintenance of the economic infrastructure, the development of commercial agriculture, the growth of mining, and the colonial army. In all four, the concentration of activities in certain zones and the virtual nonexistence of activity elsewhere made it necessary to bring labor to the place of work. Recruitment, however, was not without its problems. Armed resistance was common in early colonial times, and throughout the period, substantial numbers of people fled.

Migration took various forms, much of it temporary. Short-term mobility was necessary for local public works—the maintenance of roads, buildings, telegraph lines, and so on—projects that lasted for a few days or longer. Migration lasting for several months or several years—larger-scale construction projects such as roads, railroads, ports, or service in the colonial army—was also frequent. Seasonal movement between regions of peasant agriculture and commercial agriculture was yet another form of temporary mobility. Finally, long-term migration, sometimes permanent, to zones of agricultural development, to mining regions in Central and Southern Africa, and to the major cities also took place.[57]

By the time of independence in sub-Saharan Africa, most of the major contemporary migration networks were established. The relative importance of specific flows, however, has changed over the past quarter century. At least six forms of contemporary migration can be identified: colonization of unused or underutilized agricultural land; migration to areas of commercial agriculture; movement to mining regions; urbanization; intercontinental emigration to Europe; and refugee movements. A great deal of this migration is temporary, but a growing proportion is long-term or permanent. Men continue to predominate in most migration streams, but women are increasingly mobile. Rural areas are still the major origins of out-migration, but the growth of urban centers has led to interurban migration. Although the national boundaries

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drawn by colonialists remain permeable, political constraints to international migration are growing.

Land colonization is spread throughout the continent. Two well-known large-scale irrigation projects begun during the colonial period are the Geizera scheme in Sudan and the Niger "delta" project in Mali. Independence in Kenya brought a series of land reform measures to restore to Africans underutilized land in the European-dominated highlands. A major restructuring of land ownership and use is an essential policy of the revolutionary government in Zimbabwe. In West Africa, the sparsely settled southwestern region of the Ivory Coast is currently the target of huge public investment: government officials hope to extend the "Ivorian miracle" to yet another region of their country by attracting international capital and labor from Upper Volta, Mali, Guinea, and Liberia. In neighboring Upper Volta, the gradual eradication of onchocerciasis (river blindness) has permitted an ambitious settlement program in the Black, White, and Red Volta River valleys, with colonists coming primarily from the Mossi plateau. A parallel attempt to redevelop the agricultural potential of northeastern Libya—the Jabal Akhdar in Cyrenaica—includes considerable economic incentives for in-migrants.

Migration to areas of commercial agricultural production, the most important form of mobility in many areas of Africa, is not a recent phenomenon. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, migrants came to the Kano close-settled-zone in Hausaland and to the cocoa regions of present-day southeastern Ghana and southwestern Nigeria. In the first case, in-migrants were often slaves, toiling alongside domestic labor for the commercial production of food crops; in Ghana and southwestern Nigeria, migrants became property-owning producers or formed various sharecropping relations with established farmers. Commercial agriculture, however, has grown most rapidly since the late colonial period, and the demand for migrant labor has risen dramatically. The peanut-producing regions of Senegal and Gambia attract substantial numbers of seasonal and permanent migrants from neighboring Guinea and Mali, and from within the Senegambia. The coffee and cocoa regions stretching from the Ivory Coast east to Cameroon are major destinations for temporary and long-term migrants from inland. In the highlands of eastern Central Africa—from Uganda to Zaïre—many migrants move between areas of peasant production of food for family consumption and zones of commercial production of tea and coffee. The copper belt of Zambia and the Shaba province in southern Zaïre are the destination not only of migrants seeking work in the mines, but also for farm laborers who produce food for sale to the copper-belt labor force. Finally, the white-controlled agricultural sector of the South African economy has long been a major destination for Africans from South Africa, as well as from Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi.

Movement to mining areas was well-established by the beginning of World War II. Recruitment of new labor for the mines of Zaïre, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa has undergone change, as political and military tensions have grown between white-dominated South Africa and the African-led frontline states. With independence, Mozambique and Angola suspended South Africa's recruiting privileges. The boycott of Rhodesia after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence meant that migrants from the frontline countries were forced

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to enter Rhodesia illegally. Skilled and unskilled labor have moved into the petroleum-producing regions of Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria, but are less important numerically.

Urbanization is perhaps the most studied form of contemporary migration in Africa. Although it is the least urbanized of the world's major regions, Africa is nevertheless experiencing extremely high rates of urbanization. The percentage of population in localities of 20,000 or more inhabitants is shown in Table 8;

Table 8. Percentage of Population in Localities of 20,000 or More Inhabitants, Selected Countries of Africa

North (1967)	23.9	East (1967)	7.6
Algeria (1966)	26.5	Ethiopia (1970)	5.7
Egypt (1966)	38.2	Kenya (1969)	7.4
Morocco (1971)	30.6	Madagascar (1970)	9.9
Sudan (1964-65)	6.4	Malawi (1966)	2.7
Tunisia (1966)	23.6	Tanzania (1967)	5.1
		Uganda (1969)	5.1
West (1967)	11.7	Zambia (1969)	26.8
		Zimbabwe (1970)	16.6
Ghana (1970)	17.7		
Guinea (1960)	6.6	Central (1967)	11.4
Ivory Coast (1960)	7.0		
Mali (1962)	4.7	Angola (1960)	7.0
Niger (1963)	1.3	Cameroon (1962-64)	6.6
Nigeria (1963)	14.0	Zaïre (1970)	20.8
Senegal (1960-61)	22.5		
Upper Volta (1970)	4.7	Southern (1967)	40.7
		South Africa (1960)	35.4

Sources: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Demographic Handbook for Africa, 1978* (Addis Ababa: 1978), pp. 35-38, and H. I. Ajaegbu, "Urbanization in Africa," in *Population Education Sourcebook for Sub-Saharan Africa*, edited by K. Udo (Nairobi: 1979), p. 88

these data indicate very low levels of urbanization. The urban population in 1960 (cities of 20,000 and more) was only 13 percent of the total; in South Asia, the equivalent figure was 14 percent; in East Asia, 19; in Latin America, 33; in Europe, 44; and in North America, 58.[58] Rural-to-urban movement, however, is proceeding at a very rapid pace. In almost all countries, annual rates of urban growth are over 5 percent; in half, the rate is closer to 10 percent or more.[59] This means that even after allowing for growth through natural increase, African cities are expanding from in-migration at rates ranging from 2 percent to well over 10 percent per annum. This means too that rural growth is being somewhat slowed by out-migration.

Intercontinental movement is a major form of migration only for North Africa. Migration from North Africa to Europe—in particular to France, and to a lesser extent to the Netherlands and Belgium, and more recently to Spain and Italy—parallels the massive savanna-coastal migration streams in West Africa,

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and the migration to the mines, farms, and cities of Central and Southern Africa. This intercontinental migration brings unskilled and semiskilled workers to the European labor market, usually with temporary visas.

Refugee movements loom ever larger as another type of African migration. With the evolution of political and economic conflict, and in the face of economic and ecological crises, estimates of refugee movements must be constantly updated. Africa now has perhaps the world's largest refugee problems; in 1964 there were said to be 400,000 refugees; three years later, one million; in 1979, the estimate was 4 million.[60] At present, the most important origins of outward refugee movement are probably Chad, devasted by fifteen years of civil war, and the Horn of Africa, where drought and the Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Somalian wars have generated huge numbers of migrants. Cameroon and Sudan have received most of the Chadian refugees, while Kenya and Sudan are the principal international destinations of refugees from the Horn. Other refugee movement should be noted, such as the migration of freedom-fighters and others from South Africa and Namibia, and the Saharoui refugees in the Western Sahara.

The final form of movement is return migration. Not really a category in itself, return migration is a characteristic of all forms of mobility, because a certain percentage of those who leave their homes eventually return. Circulatory migration has long been a major phenomenon in Africa. The reasons for return migration are complex. Economic factors at the destination—wage levels, job security, and housing—and at the origin—land availability and family responsibilities—seem to be the most important. But political and institutional constraints also oblige people to return, including many of those in Europe, and especially those in Southern Africa.

Interpretations of African Population and Development

At the risk of oversimplifying, we can identify two main approaches to the study of population and development: neo-Malthusian and materialist. Neo-Malthusian analyses suggest that population growth is a major obstacle to economic growth; slowing down population growth is therefore a necessary initial step in an economic strategy. This approach stresses the oversupply of labor, and views population growth as an independent variable determining economic growth. The materialist analysis sees population primarily as a dependent variable that subsequently has an impact on the growth of production. Production forces expand owing to factors other than population growth, and population changes primarily in response to material conditions.[61]

POPULATION AS A CRUCIAL DETERMINANT OF DEVELOPMENT

For many years, the neo-Malthusian paradigm has been the only one used for the study of African population and development. The two themes emphasized—rapid population growth and rural-to-urban migration—are perceived as serious obstacles to economic development, and are therefore analyzed from the point of view of developing appropriate policies.[62]

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Rapid Population Growth—

> For the purpose of this exercise, I start from the proposition that rapid population growth in the developing world not only is undesirable for development ("modernization") and all that [that] implies for human welfare (education and literacy, health and nutrition, income and income distribution, status of women, human rights), but it is undesirable enough to warrant intervention by public policy.[63]

This observation is doubly remarkable: not only does it come from a leading proponent of family planning, B. Berelson, but it expresses the problem in unmistakable terms. *Rapid population growth is undesirable for development*, which is defined as modernization, and includes almost all aspects of human welfare.

What is the logic behind this bold statement? The early work of A. Coale and E. Hoover presents the basic hypothesis: whatever the indicators of economic development (per capita output, allocation of income, marginal rate of savings, and so on), low fertility is always more beneficial than high fertility.[64] This model serves as the starting point for most research on population and development, and remains largely unchallenged.[65]

Beginning with this general postulate, research on population and development in Africa has built on three principles. *First*, fertility should be the focus of population policies. In reality, population change is the result of natural increase (births minus deaths) *and* net migration (immigration minus emigration). Two principles, however, are commonly accepted: that emigration is not a way to limit population growth, and that the reduction of mortality is a universal objective. In order to slow growth, therefore, only fertility, and immigration, for those countries experiencing inward movement, can be manipulated by population policies. A *second* premise is that changes in attitudes about fertility can precede behavioral changes.[66] The goal of research is to identify those women who, although still of reproductive age, desire no more children. Those women represent the potential clientele for family planning. They are also demographic innovators, and thus can play an important "modernizing" role.[67] This leads to the *third* premise, diffusion, or the spread of ideas and behavior downward from innovators to other women, from modern to traditional women, from urban to rural women.

A brief summary would not be amiss: rapid population growth is detrimental to economic growth; fertility must therefore be reduced; family-planning programs are then necessary to convince people to change their attitudes (to prefer smaller families), and eventually to modify their behavior. Ultimately, knowledge and practice of family planning will be diffused by a demonstration effect.

This model is derived from demographic transition theory, which is based on Western experience, and which suggests that modernization leads first to declines in mortality, then to declines in fertility, the time lag between the two being due to cultural and attitudinal factors ("traditional" values). During this time, population growth rates are high.[68] The condition of the population before transition is one of high mortality and higher fertility. High death rates are due to poor diets, primitive sanitation, and inadequate medical practices; high birthrates are due to social beliefs and customs, and to the economic

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advantages of numerous children. Development leads to a reduction in death rates because of more regular food supplies, law and order, and the "other fairly direct consequence of economic change." In the period that follows, birthrates decline because of the decreasing importance of the family unit of production and, therefore, the decreasing advantages of a large family.[69] The process leads to the reestablishment of a demographic equilibrium at much lower levels of fertility and mortality, as shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1. The Demographic Transition

This model is empirically and theoretically misleading. Empirically, one must ask several questions. Why declining rates? Why not cyclical rates, particularly in the long run? Why falling mortality followed by falling fertility? Why not, for example, falling mortality and unchanging fertility? What is the relative importance of nutrition, sanitation, preventive medicine, curative medicine, law and order, and so on in the decline of mortality? Are customs and beliefs determinants of fertility, or are they part of the ideology that reinforces fertility?

Furthermore, the implicit theoretical underpinnings of the model are significant. The theory unites functionalist sociology and liberal economics. The unifying links are (1) the equilibrium status before and after (and the regularity of movement from one to the other) and (2) the rationality of individual actors who adjust fertility to declining mortality and to changes in economic production. The unidirectional movement from family-organized labor for rural production to individually earned incomes in urban production (a

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sine qua non of liberal, modernizing theories of development) is the key explanatory variable for fertility decline.

This theory as applied to Africa has been criticized, but not discarded. At most, it has been modified.[70] Criticism of the theory for its Western, elitist, urban emphasis has prompted research that focuses on the household. In traditional society, high fertility is shown to be rational, because children are important assets for the household economy. Net intergenerational wealth flows, for example, favor parents over children in terms of costs and benefits.[71] This approach still concludes with the demographic transition theory, although it turns attention from the urban elite to the rural masses, and from social psychology to economic anthropology.

Another modification of fertility analysis is based on the rural development approach.

> The central hypothesis is that the greater the extent to which the rural population is participating in development, the earlier and more rapid will be the decline in overall fertility and population growth rates.[72]

Again, focus is shifted from urban to rural development, defined here as "improved rural incomes widely diffused." This approach thus provides a partial alternative to transition theory. It accepts two premises—fertility must be reduced, and such a reduction will be advantageous to development—but rejects two others—that high fertility is caused by beliefs and values, and that "modernization" of these beliefs and values can proceed independently of changes in the rural economy—by suggesting that only genuine rural development for the masses will cause fertility decline, owing to the rising costs and the declining economic value of children. Yet in reality, the adoption of new agricultural technology is often limited to large farmers at the expense of small ones, who benefit from few or no gains in agricultural productivity. The value of children for agricultural labor, therefore, remains high, and with it, fertility.[73]

Rural-Urban Migration: The Search for an Optimum—Unlike the neo-Malthusian study of fertility, where analysis concentrates on one central hypothesis—high fertility as an obstacle to development—the approach to migration and urbanization is more ambiguous. All observers admit the necessity of some rural-to-urban movement, but there is disagreement as to how much is good for development.

The recognition that some rural-to-urban movement is necessary arises from the theoretical heritage of liberalism and functionalism. A basic premise of liberal economic theory is that the factors of production (labor, capital, and land) are distributed unequally in space and that this causes labor to move to where its remuneration will be greatest. In the case of developing economies, cities are the primary areas of higher wages, but so too are certain zones of commercial agriculture.[74]

Sociology has developed similar arguments. The concept of modernization is linked closely to urbanization and industrialization.[75] For those who assign "underdeveloped" and "developed" to two opposite ends of a continuum, modernization is the means of moving from one to the other, the latter pole, of

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course, being the more desirable one. For a society to achieve modernization, rural-to-urban migration must occur.

> The experience of the world's developed nations reveals that urbanization is a necessary process in economic modernization. Today the most developed economies are those countries where the urban population predominates. . . . one cannot help but associate the process of urbanization in Nigeria with the growing modernization of her economy.[76]

Yet there are two points of view among those who analyze the role of migration in this context. First, there are those who say that the obstacle to development and modernization is one of an inadequate supply of labor; therefore, additional migration is needed. Second, there are those who maintain that the obstacle is a question of inadequate *demand* for labor; therefore, there is too much migration. Witness, for example, the debate over backward-sloping labor supply curves, the so-called African target worker, who migrates for a short period of time to earn a limited amount of money for a specific need. He or she then returns to the security of the village economy. This behavior poses a dilemma: if higher wages attract more workers, the labor supply becomes even more unstable, accumulating its targeted income in an even shorter period of time.

Those who maintain that the obstacle to development is rather a problem of demand for labor emphasize the "problem of excessive rural-urban migration in the context of rising urban unemployment."[77] This conventional approach is ambiguous and inconclusive.

> The growth of cities is a necessary prelude to industrial growth and to modernization of Africa's economy; on the other hand, too rapid urbanization without parallel urban and social planning may lead to poor living conditions, unrest among individuals and social and political instability.[78]

It appears, therefore, that rural-to-urban migration is necessary if development and modernization are to occur. Sometimes, however, there is too little, and sometimes too much!

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM[79]

This is a recent perspective that focuses on African peripheral capitalism to understand better the nature of development in the various regions and spheres of the economy. A discussion of African peripheral capitalism is necessarily historical.

Precolonial African Societies—Capitalism in Africa was superimposed on a domestic mode of production.[80] These domestic economies were based on the basic subsistence activities of agriculture, cattle-raising, and crafts. Access to land—collectively owned and managed—was determined by social relations based on household membership or dependency on a household unit. Land was made productive through the direct application of human energy. The household and its dependents made up both the productive and reproductive unit; production and consumption took place primarily within this unit. The key

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element in the survival and success of the household and its dependents was its labor force: the more people of working ages, the greater the production.

The dynamics of African domestic economies must be analyzed both in terms of production and reproduction. The principal task of the agricultural domestic economy was to keep the productive cycle going. Given the small size of the productive units, as well as mortality, sickness, and accidents, the survival of the domestic economy clearly depended on its capacity to replenish the supply of new productive members through procreation or recruitment.

That African societies sought to maximize fertility should not obscure the fact that we consider the demographic process—fertility, mortality, and migration—as a whole. Reproduction of labor is the unifying concept that gives meaning to these three conventional operational demographic processes. Given high *mortality* levels, reproduction of the labor force within domestic economies is assured through high *fertility*, made possible by marriage arrangements in which the *mobility* of women is a crucial element, and by the coercive *mobility* of slaves and other clients to add to the productive and reproductive capacities of these societies.

The central role of women in domestic economies cannot be underestimated. Not only did they guarantee the biological reproduction of the household labor force, but they contributed significantly to the daily reproduction of the household's labor power as well. This made the peaceful exchange of women between lineages, or their capture, one of the most fundamental characteristics of domestic economies. The male elders controlled these matrimonial relations. This male-dominated gerontocracy determined not only the relation of biological reproduction, but also controlled the use of the household's labor for agricultural, cattle, and craft production.

There were, however, sources of conflict and contradiction in these societies. The existence, for example, of a ruling patriarchy that appropriated power, and sometimes surplus production, for its personal benefit was the focus of considerable conflict between generations and sexes. Equally important in terms of conflict was the existence of slavery.[81] Various forms of captivity and involuntary submission reinforced the labor supply of the domestic economies. In addition, the raiding of less powerful groups provided a valuable commodity for exchange, the slave. Slavery and other patron-client relations, however, were not the foundation of precolonial African economies; they were a supplement to domestic relations of production. The domestic mode dominated relations of production, and the slave, even while being a captive, was encouraged to integrate himself or herself into the lineage system.[82] The domestic economies of nineteenth century Africa were far from self-sufficient. Slaves themselves were one of the principle commodities exchanged with both Europeans and Africans. But trade with the exterior, with societies increasingly incorporated into a world capitalist economy, did not change the fundamentally domestic basis of production in most sub-Saharan African economies.

Although precolonial historical accounts of demographic behavior are rare, anthropological studies of so-called traditional societies support the hypothesis of high fertility.[83] These data show high fertility levels, and these were assured through early marriage—particularly for women—universal marriage, and remarriage norms. Marriage is thus best understood in the context of the high

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values placed on fertility, the main object of marriage being procreation. What consolidated a marriage was the birth of a child, and this was a woman's guarantee of tolerance and acceptance in her husband's household.[84]

The Penetration of Capital—In the late nineteenth century, capitalism was introduced into these African societies, and began to take over as the dominant form of production. Yet this was a different kind of capitalism from that in Europe.[85] For example, the "freeing" of the labor force did not necessarily proceed in the same way that it did in earlier capitalist economies. Domestic social relations were not totally transformed into capitalist ones. In fact, the coexistence of noncapitalist and capitalist production was an essential feature of peripheral capitalist development. Noncapitalist production was not eliminated; rather, it was restructured and dominated by capitalist relations of production.[86] As a unit of economic production, the household and its dependents, for example, continued to produce for part of its own needs; the same size unit, however, was no longer able to provide for as great a proportion of its needs, and was obliged to sell part of its labor power to survive; some members, temporarily or permanently, moved out of domestic production and into capitalist production, selling their labor for wages. In advanced capitalist societies, the costs of *reconstituting* labor on a day-to-day basis, the costs of *maintaining* labor during periods of inactivity (unemployment, old age, sickness), and the costs of *reproducing* new labor (raising children to the age of economic activity) are all largely assumed by the capitalist sphere in the form of *direct* salaries for reconstituting, and *indirect* salaries for maintaining and reproducing, the labor force.[87] In peripheral capitalism, the noncapitalist sphere underwrites most of the costs of the indirect salary, and often pays some of the direct salary (food sent from rural areas, for example, to household members working in nearby towns). Peripheral capitalism, therefore, creates a situation of labor exploitation that is particularly favorable to capital, and where the costs of labor are only partially paid by the capitalist sphere.

The articulation of different relations of production (capitalist and domestic) was realized through alliances between dominant classes:[88] the capitalist bourgeoisie, the male gerontocracy of the domestic economy, the commercial elite that assured trade between precapitalist and capitalist spheres prior to the penetration of capitalism, the commercial farmers in certain regions, the large slaveowners, and others. Meanwhile, the dominated class, the domestic "peasant" producers, was inextricably drawn into an ambiguous and marginal class role: the household and its dependents became a source of domestic and proletarian labor. Individual members moved back and forth between the two class roles, were obliged in fact to do so. Other dominated classes, including ex-slaves, were also drawn into this circular movement between capitalist wage labor and noncapitalist production.

But it would be simplistic to assume that this heterogeneous economic system (coexisting modes of production, classes, and circular mobility) was created without force and conflict. Such a system was certainly not created by the spontaneous evolution of the domestic economy toward capitalism. Colonialism was obliged to force the family and its dependents into selling part of their labor to emerging capitalism. In the case of Africa, the role of the colonial administration was crucial; without coercion in the form of taxes, military

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conscription, and forced labor, domestic labor would have undoubtedly resisted wage employment with greater success. The role of the colonies was bluntly stated in 1923 by the French Minister of Colonies Sarrault:

> The colonies exist only for the metropolis. From the economic point of view, a colonial possession is only, for its metropolis, a "privileged marketplace" where the metropolis extracts the necessities which she needs and imposes the products that she manufactures. As far as the human being is concerned, the "Colonial Pact" uses it and maintains it in "infancy." . . . The indigenous person, black or yellow, is less a man than an instrument of labor, which is only valuable while it works, and that one rejects once it is broken.[89]

The changes caused by colonial labor policies continued to erode the domestic economy. This erosion took several forms. The absence of part of the labor force, during part or all of the year, caused a decrease in craft production. This deterioration in turn accelerated the development of a market for manufactured consumer goods. Increasingly, cash was needed to purchase these goods. An additional sum of labor power had therefore to be sold to purchase goods that were no longer produced because a portion of the household labor supply had been sold. The structure of local demand was thus both changed by and itself changed the local offer of labor in the capitalist marketplace. These changes caused the emergence and growth of a proletariat, yet at the same time brought about the development of trade in manufactured goods that increased the power and wealth of the local and long-distance merchant classes.

But to see the effects of capitalist penetration only in terms of labor mobility and growth of capitalist production of consumer goods is to ignore what was happening in the agricultural sector.[90] As an alternative, or in addition, to labor migration, the household produced cash crops. This was not a spontaneous development. The deterioration of craft production and the necessity to pay taxes obliged the household to find sources of cash income. A commercial crop permitted the household to supplement cash revenues gained through migration, or to substitute cash agriculture for migration.

In summary, African peripheral capitalism can be characterized as being the asymmetrical articulation of social relations of production—dominant capitalist relations and dominated domestic relations. Yet the domestic mode no longer conserves its precapitalist character. Domestic production provides a cheap way for the capitalist sphere to reproduce its labor force, but the domestic sphere itself cannot provide for its own subsistance. Capital profits from cheap labor to produce goods and services at a very low cost, while the domestic sphere loses it precolonial autonomy.

The Demographic Process of Contemporary Peripheral Capitalism—The reproduction of the labor force implies an important role for demographic, or biological, reproduction. The family, not the individual, is the basic unit in these demographic processes. The household economy in peripheral capitalism, even with production restructured and dominated by capitalism, still functions as the key to reproduction of the labor force. Natural increase is the household's response to its double need for labor: work *in* the household economy for subsistence needs and for petty commodity production, and work *outside* the

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household in the capitalist sector. Migration is determined by the household's need for cash income: that part of the revenue that cannot be assured by producing crops for cash must be sought by selling labor power to the capitalist sector. Given the spatial concentration of capitalist economic activities in certain zones, migration is almost always a necessity.

The principal form of temporary mobility is circular: out-migration from the rural household economy into regions of industrial, mineral, and agricultural wage employment, then back again to the rural economy. As we have seen, this type of mobility is sometimes seasonal: from subsistence domestic agricultural production to industrial agricultural production in "complementary" seasons of the year.[91] Or the migration can be for a short-term or medium-term contract, which is often the case in the mining sector as well as in the agricultural sector. Or the move can be for a longer period of time, but with no unemployment or retirement compensation paid. Circular mobility is often repeated, with individuals "commuting" between domestic labor and wage labor.

Temporary mobility is an essential strategy for the survival of the household, and it is a key element in the articulation of noncapitalist and capitalist production.[92] Temporary migration is the most important form of labor mobility in African peripheral capitalism; it provides workers for the large proportion of jobs that call for low skills or no skills at all. A certain portion of jobs in the African economy, however, are semiskilled and skilled, and thus require a more permanent labor force. Since these jobs are usually concentrated in cities, they have given rise to a small urban proletariat.[93] For the moment, African peripheral capitalism makes widespread use of very low skill levels and pays low salaries. Until higher salaries are made necessary by changes in the technology and the composition of capital at the periphery, many migrants will return to the noncapitalist sphere after spending a certain amount of time in low-paying, low-skilled jobs.

Out-migration does contribute to the deterioration of the rural domestic economy. Perhaps the most important negative effect is the loss of a substantial portion of the young, physically strong, highly productive labor force. Even if the absence is only seasonal, migration of the young reduces the productivity capacity for off-season craft and agricultural activities; if the absence is longer, agricultural production itself is affected.[94]

The transition to peripheral capitalism has far-reaching effects on domestic relations of production, and therefore on relations of reproduction. In this context, fertility must remain high, and may even increase, in response to the double necessity of supplying migrant labor to the capitalist sector and reproducing for the domestic economy. Fertility plays an essential role in supplying sufficient labor for the survival of the domestic economy. One recent set of studies illustrates this basic hypothesis.[95] Within the household unit of production, children represent the main source of new labor power, and as such, render high fertility not only rational, but essential. Lowering fertility would jeopardize the domestic production (and reproduction of the domestic economy) that is essential for the survival of those who are salaried, but earn just enough for their day-to-day maintenance, and of those who are, or will become,

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unproductive. Given present conditions of development, the result of lower fertility might be greater impoverishment, famine, and perhaps even increased morbidity and mortality.

In reality, fertility behavior cannot be analyzed without a concurrent analysis of mortality.[96] The household, as we have seen, adjusts its fertility in response to both its needs for labor power and to high mortality. What does peripheral capitalist development imply for mortality? Not only is there much higher mortality than in advanced capitalist societies, but there are as well relatively few social groups that succeed in obtaining relief.

Yet there are at least three exceptions that can be postulated. First, there is the expectation that the elite in Africa will experience much lower mortality. A second expectation is that there will be a decline in mortality in some areas of these countries (cities and towns, as well as more developed regions), an improvement resulting from demands made of and by the national bourgeoisie for certain health and related services. In fact, these are two examples of differential mortality that we observed earlier. A third expectation is that, on occasion, capital itself will discover the usefulness of lower morbidity and mortality in its own quest for accumulation. This last hypothesis has been explored in the case of malaria.[97]

As for the "structure" of mortality—age and cause of death—it is closely associated with the level of mortality. The lower the life expectancy, the greater the relative importance of infectious and parasitic diseases, and influenza, pneumonia, and bronchitis. The higher the life expectancy, the greater the importance of degenerative illnesses. The first group of diseases obviously takes a heavy toll among the young, while the degenerative illnesses are much more common at older ages. The ratio of deaths from infectious and parasitic diseases to all causes of deaths is an index of "public health development."[98] If pressure to reduce mortality exists, public health measures, including vaccination and improved water and sanitation, can lead to a dramatic change in the structure and, therefore, the level of mortality in a very short period.[99]

The materialist approach suggests that these differences in the structure of mortality are not the result of unhealthy "natural" environments in peripheral countries and in poor neighborhoods, nor conversely, the result of healthy "natural" environments elsewhere. Rather, these differences reflect efforts to improve health, sanitation, nutrition, and housing among certain classes, and in certain countries, regions, and neighborhoods. In those places where the dominant classes are concentrated, the rate of mortality during the first five years of life will be much lower.

GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE POPULATION-DEVELOPMENT DEBATE

The debate on the relationship between demographic and economic change is not merely academic. Ultimately, the debate is political. There are three official positions on population growth: (1) to promote policies and programs to reduce population growth rates; (2) to support family-planning programs for "nondemographic" reasons; and (3) to exclude policies that reduce growth rates, and to provide no official support for a family-planning program. A recent study reviewed twenty-two development plans of the 1970s.[100] The main results are shown in Table 9, which correlates official positions with those

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Table 9. Population Policy and Problem Recognition in 22 African Development Plans, with Official Government Positions

Official Government Position	Planning Position: Recognition of population problems, with policy to reduce population growth	Planning Position: Recognition of population problems, but no policy to reduce population growth	Planning Position: No mention of population problems, and no policy to reduce population growth
Policy and program to reduce population growth rate	1970[1] Botswana 1966 Kenya 1965 Mauritius 1968 Morocco 1964 Tunisia		
Support of family-planning program for nondemographic reasons	1970 Nigeria 1971 Swaziland 1972 Uganda	1970 Tanzania	1971 Algeria 1972 Mali 1966 South Africa 1970 Sudan
No policy to reduce growth rates and no official support for a family-planning program		Burundi Togo Zambia	Cameroon Ethiopia Ivory Coast Mauritania Senegal Somalia

Source: B. M. Stamper, *Population and Planning in Developing Nations: A Review of Sixty Development Plans for the 1970s* (New York: 1977), pp. 72-73
[1]Dates refer to the year the official position was adopted

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adopted in the development plans, referred to in the table as "planning positions." Five countries have both official and planning positions that define population as a problem, and have policies to reduce population growth: Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, and Tunisia. Three others have neo-Malthusian planning objectives—Nigeria, Swaziland, and Uganda—but no official policies except support of family planning for nondemographic reasons. Another four recognize population problems in their plans: three have no official policies whatsoever—Burundi, Togo, and Zambia—and one officially supports family planning for nondemographic reasons. The remaining ten countries make no mention of population problems in their plans, although they support family planning for nondemographic reasons.

Another study provides information on seven other countries.[101] One country, Ghana, has an official policy to reduce the population growth rate; the six others—Benin, Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Zimbabwe, and Zaïre—officially support family-planning activities for other than demographic reasons. Finally, in 1976 Senegal adopted an official policy to reduce its growth rate.

To recapitulate: twenty African countries fall into the category that defines the neo-Malthusian position very broadly—that is, population is recognized as a problem, whether policies are implemented or not.[102] This leaves approximately thirty others. Of these, at least four can be said to be pronatalist—Madagascar, Malawi, Gabon, and the Central African Republic. It appears that only one government, Algeria, has taken a different stand.[103] For the remaining twenty-five countries, there is either no information available or they make no official mention of population as a problem.

In most cases, population policies address only the problem of reducing population growth and ignore migration. Yet population growth policies are less widespread than those related to population distribution. As one review puts it, issues "associated with population distribution have been an obvious concern of most sub-Saharan African governments."[104] Unfortunately, and perhaps not without significance, there exists no systematic review of these policies. According to one UN inquiry, twenty-six African governments were implementing policies to reduce internal migration, designed specifically to discourage rural out-migration. These strategies promote (at least in intent) rural development by allocating resources to the agricultural sector, either to small-scale farming or to larger capital-intensive schemes. Few of these policies, however, have achieved their spatial redistribution goals.[105]

Speculation About the Future[106]

An imprecise knowledge of the past and the lack of an appropriate analytical framework have hindered demographers in their attempts to think about the future of Africa's population. In Table 10 we have the results of two sets of projections, both showing a doubling of Africa's population by the end of the century. The projections are based on the component method, where first natality and mortality rates are projected into the future, and then the two are combined to estimate medium (a moderate decline in both births and deaths), high (a slow decline in births and rapid decline in deaths), and low (a rapid decline in births and a slow decline in deaths) rates of growth. Migration, the

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Table 10. Estimates of the Total Population of Africa and Its Regions, 1975-2000 (in millions)

	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
Africa						
Medium hypothesis, UN	401	461	532	614	708	814
Medium hypothesis, Census Bureau	399	459	531	614	709	814
High hypothesis, UN	402	463	537	626	732	856
High hypothesis, Census Bureau	399	460	534	622	727	847
Low hypothesis, UN	401	458	523	596	672	747
Low hypothesis, Census Bureau	399	458	525	560	678	759
Regions—Medium hypothesis, UN						
North	98	113	130	150	171	192
West	115	132	153	177	206	238
East	114	132	153	178	207	210
Central	45	51	58	67	76	88
Southern	28	32	37	43	49	56

Sources: United Nations, *Les perspectives d'avenir de la population évaluée en 1973* (New York: 1979), pp. 15, 94, 98, and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Illustrative Projections of the World Populations to the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: 1979) p. 17

third component of population change, is for all practical purposes ignored, not only at the continental and regional level, but even at the levels of individual countries.[107]

The use of longitudinal methods leads to relatively conservative projections, a function of biological inertia. As we study the levels and structure of mortality, for example, we find that owing to biological constraints, the evolution from one generation to the next is slow and regular. And although fertility evolves more rapidly, it too is constrained structurally by the reproduction of past generations: the number of couples able to procreate depends in large part on how many women were born fifteen to forty-five years earlier. Of the three components of demographic change, migration has been known to vary the most rapidly, in large part because of the *lack* of biological constraints.

In the short term (five to ten or perhaps fifteen years), the evolution of population is often within the bounds of high and low alternatives. In the longer term, projections are much less reliable. Given their technical basis, this unreliability is hardly surprising, for the nonbiological factors that influence mortality, fertility, and migration assume an increasingly important role in the long term. The concept of inertia that underlies longitudinal projections is based on the analysis of continuities; socioeconomic discontinuities (famines, wars, revolutions, industrial crises, and so on) that profoundly affect the evolution of the population are difficult to integrate into the techniques of projections, and are not even systematically studied by most demographers.

The high, medium, and low variants of the natality and mortality hypotheses of both the United Nations and Bureau of the Census assume a decline in birth and death rates over a twenty-five-year period. This assumption comes

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from the theory of demographic transition, as discussed earlier. Demographers use this theory to explain past trends, to evaluate present performance, and to think about the future.

* * *

To summarize briefly, we have attempted to explain our hypotheses about demographic behavior in Africa by beginning at the level of the household economy rather than at the aggregate level of population growth rates (overpopulation, overurbanization, and so on). Since population growth is the result of a complex, dynamic process involving fertility, marriage, mortality, and migration, it is necessary to assess the social and economic significance of these phenomena before analyzing the effects of population growth.

Put succinctly, our argument goes as follows. Capitalist penetration in Africa creates certain labor requirements, which the state satisfies through policies that force African peasants out of the rural household economy. Yet wages in the capitalist sector are extremely low, working conditions are oftentimes brutal, and social security is nonexistent, so that peasants must continue to engage in household production to ensure survival. Migration is the demographic manifestation of the articulation of the capitalist and domestic spheres of production. As for fertility, there is the double pressure of reproducing labor both for the capitalist and domestic economies—and this in the face of high mortality.

If, at the household level, demographic behavior—that is, population growth—is understood as a concrete manifestation of peripheral capitalist development and exploitation, how can such growth be logically interpreted at the national level as detrimental to development—or as stated in our opening paragraph, as one of the fundamental causes of African poverty? If population growth is a survival strategy in the face of exploitation, in what way does it work against the amelioration of living conditions? The neo-Malthusian drama is one of science fiction—and a very cynical one at that—wherein the reaction of ordinary people to exploitation is portrayed as being the cause of their poverty. The real drama takes place elsewhere: the exploitation of these people by the national and international bourgeoisie, an exploitation that underlies the material conditions of peripheral capitalist demography.

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[89]A. Sarrault, *Mise en valeur des colonies françaises* (Paris: 1923), pp. 84-85.

[90]See, for example, M. L. Mazoyer, "Développement de la production agricole marchande et transformation d'une formation agraire en Côte d'Ivoire," p. 162, and P. P. Rey, "Les formes de décomposition des sociétés précapitalistes au nord Togo et le mécanisme des migrations vers les zones de capitalisme agraire," both in *L'Agriculture africaine et le capitalisme*, edited by S. Amin (Paris: 1975).

[91]See, for example, J. Rouch, *Migration au Ghana* (Paris: 1965), p. 53, and R. M. Prothero, "Foreign Migrant Labour for South Africa," *International Migration Review* 8 (1974): 5.

[92]M. Burawoy, "The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor: Comparative Material from Southern Africa and the United States," *American Journal of Sociology* 81 (1976): 1050-86.

[93]T. Gerold-Scheepers and W. M. J. Van Binsbergen, "Marxist and Non-Marxist Approaches to Migration in Tropical Africa," in *African Perspectives* no. 1 (1978): 27.

[94]E. P. Skinner, "Labour Migration and Its Relationship to Socio-Cultural Change in Mossi Society," Africa 30 (1960): 383, and A. Ahianyo-Akakpo, "L'impact de la migration sur la société villageoise: approche sociologique (Exemple: Togo-Ghana)," in *Modern Migration in Western Africa*, edited by S. Amin (London: 1974), pp. 158-59.

[95]Caldwell, "The Economic Rationality of High Fertility," and "A Theory of Fertility: From High Plateau to Destabilization," *Population and Development Review* 4 (1978): 553-78.

[96]These ideas are more fully developed in our forthcoming article, "Inequality and Death: Some Hypotheses Regarding Advanced and Peripheral Capitalism (Quebec and Upper Volta)," *International Journal of Health Sciences*.

[97]H. Cleaver, "Malaria, the Politics of Public Health and the International Crisis," *The Review of Radical Political Economics* 9 (1) (1977): 93-94.

[98]J. Bourgeois-Pichat and C. L. Pan, "Trends and Determinants of Mortality in Underdeveloped Areas," in *Trends and Differentials in Mortality*, Milbank Memorial Fund (New York: 1956), p. 12.

[99]E. E. Arriaga, *Mortality Decline and Its Demographic Effects in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 33.

[100]B. M. Stamper, *Population and Planning in Developing Nations: A Review of Sixty Development Plans for the 1970's* (New York: 1977).

[101]D. Nortman and E. Hofstatter, *Population and Family Planning Programs* (New York: 1978).

[102]These are: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaïre, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[103]This official position was expressed by President Boumédienne as early as 1969: "We are not in favor of false solutions such as, for example, birth control. In our opinion, this is only a means to avoid the problems, instead of looking for positive and effective solutions, such as the creation of employment for adults, schools for children, and better social services for all." *El Morijahid* (Algeria), June 20, 1969.

[104]C. A. Miro and J. E. Potter, *Population Policy: Research Priorities in the Developing World* (London: 1980), p. 13.

[105]Ibid., pp. 13-14.

[106]This section borrows from J. W. Gregory, "La démographie africaniste ou la recherche d'une technicité qui devient biais idéologique," in *Les faux prophètes de l'Afrique ou l'Afr(eu)canisme*, edited by A. Schwarz (Québec: 1980), pp. 195-208.

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[107]"In order to simplify the problem of making population projections for individual countries and regions, the assumption has been made that there will be no migration from one country to another between 1975 and the year 2000." U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Illustrative Projections of World Population to the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 14. "For the most part, international migration is an arbitrary component in demographic projections. . . . we have admitted that there existed and that there will continue to exist important international migration between . . . North Africa and Western Europe. . . . One expects, however, a considerable decline in migration between North Africa . . . and Western Europe." United Nations, *Les perspectives d'avenir de la population mondiale évaluées en 1973* (New York: 1979), p. 12.

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The "Oil Crises" and African Economies: Oil Wave on a Tidal Flood of Industrial Price Inflation

THE FLOOD OF HIGH IMPORT PRICES that swept over African economies in the 1970s severely imbalanced their international payments accounts, knocked African development plans out of their traditional moorings, and nearly drowned the new states in a sea of debts. The flood broke dramatically on the African consciousness with the OPEC price increases of 1973-74. Diatribes in both the industrial and developing worlds charged OPEC with capriciousness in the motives and methods of the oil price hike and singular culpability for the economic devastation that followed. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's famous "Age of Interdependence" speech to the United Nations, in September 1974, exemplifies the attitude of OPEC's critics:

> the high cost of oil is not the result of economic factors. . . . Rather, it is caused by deliberate decisions to restrict production and maintain an artificial price level. . . . [A result is] to magnify the despair of the least developed who are uniquely vulnerable to exorbitant prices and who have no recourse but to pay. What has gone up by political decision can be reduced by political decision.

Implicit in speeches of leaders like Kissinger was the threat that Robert W. Tucker stated explicitly—armed intervention against the Arabs, specifically in the coastal area from Kuwait to Qatar.[1]

African spokesmen, decrying what some called "economic assassination," echoed voices raised in the industrial world charging OPEC with increasing the prices without cause or concern. Although African leaders and the media acknowledged that the causes for their increased import bills were indeed complex, they nevertheless believed that "whether this plight is attributable to . . . increased . . . oil prices or other factors . . . is academic. . . . Africa needs emergency assistance."[2] "The oil weapon," they said, is "intended for use against Israel's allies [but] instead [has] hurt those who supported the Arab cause."[3] The Africans thought the crisis was real only in its consequences, and not in its causes.

That African economies have been injured is evident enough. Even in the stronger ones, the debris of unfinished development projects, devastated development plans, and the severe erosion of mass, if not elite, hopes for a bright economic future give grim testimony that something important has happened. The proud, if somewhat meaningless and relatively modest, achieve-

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ments of aggregate per capita growth rates of about 1.6 percent during the 1960s dropped to less than one percent during the 1970s, with the prospect of near stagnation for the 1980s, especially for the non-oil-exporting African countries. Food production has fallen to critically low levels in a number of countries, and debt burdens are sacrificing such a large and rapidly growing share of exports, that some countries are fully exhausting their margin of investable surpluses. Notwithstanding the substantial reductions in the amount of petroleum imported, a number of countries now pay six to nine times what they paid a decade ago for their oil imports. When we take into account the considerably diminished foreign exchange earned from some of their nonoil exports, due to falling prices and shrinking markets, the gravity of the situation becomes even clearer.

The Africans were wrong, however, both in their perception of the reasons behind OPEC's actions and the relative importance of oil prices in their swollen import bills. Internal factors that African leaders were slow to control, in fact, also contributed to the "oil crisis," and these errors in perception, by obscuring the part these factors played, perhaps intensified and prolonged the impact of the crisis.

A major point of this article is to delineate the proportional role of rising oil prices in determining the size and character of the floods that have swept over Africa, not only as a matter of fairness to the OPEC countries, but to permit as well a realistic assessment of the choices African countries have in formulating energy policies.

We believe the oil price increases were a cresting, turbulent wave atop a more fundamental tidal flow of rising costs that had been caused by inflation and economic crises in the industrial world. We should keep in mind that there were several succeeding waves of price rises and that each caused the base tide to rise ever higher. There were two periods when oil price increases had a concentrated impact on the global economy: in 1973-74, the time of the initial OPEC increases, and in 1979-80. These were periods of acute crisis for Africa, but there were intermediate periods of shock and stress as well, perhaps of greater significance there than elsewhere in the world. We believe too that the specific character of the flood varied significantly from one country to another, and what is even more crucial, that the differing internal characteristics, as well as purchasing and other energy policy decisions of the affected countries, helped determine the impact of the price increases.

We will discuss the characteristics and the interaction of three factors that contributed to the devastation that occurred to African economies in the 1970s: (1) the price increase wave that hit these countries; (2) their internal economic, financial, and energy characteristics, and (3) purchasing and energy policy choices that have been made in response to the crises, and others that are still needed.

Characteristics of the Flood

The characteristics of the two major price rise waves that inundated Africa in the 1970s were essentially, though not exclusively, determined by external factors. The OPEC price increases, coupled with decisions by the major

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international companies regarding purchasing, insuring, refining, storing, and delivering the oil or its derivative products, played a major role in determining how large and how sudden the price increases for a given African country would be. The historic pattern of interaction between the purchasing country and the international system, which determined the extent of that country's reliance on petroleum for industrialization and communication, was also relevant. The impact was affected too by some internal factors and decisions that determined the extent, source, and timing of petroleum purchases. The great differences among the affected states that these factors point to counsel caution in assessing the impact of the crises on "Africa." Which Africa? The one represented by Nigeria?—which *exports* two million barrels a day! Or that represented by Kenya?—which is entirely dependent on imports, but *reexports* in turn 7,000 barrels a day to its neighbors! Or Africa as represented by Chad?—which imports an insignificant quantity of oil!

There are, however, energy-relevant structural, political, and cultural similarities and continuities among African countries that must be taken into account, for African societies, whether postcolonial or not, share many of the features of very poor economies, or those that are enclaves, externally dependent, or dominated by a single commodity. They would still be poor, underproductive, and externally dependent even *without* the energy crisis or the other external shocks of the seventies.

As a whole, Africa produces about 7 percent of world energy but consumes only 3 percent. The continent is thus a world reservoir of natural and energy resources. Most of its potential commercial energy resources, however, are not developed, and those that are, are destined for the export market, usually in unprocessed form. Africa exported 5.26 million barrels a day of crude oil in 1979, but its forty refineries exported only about 200,000 barrels a day of refined products. Refineries in other countries thus gained the value added.[4]

The overall economic situation mirrors some of these same conditions. A number of African economies, such as Ghana and Zambia, rely heavily on the uncertain performance of one or two export commodities. (Certain others, however, such as Cameroon, Kenya, and the Ivory Coast, have four or five major export commodities.) International commodity markets were especially uncertain in the seventies, starting the decade in boom conditions but collapsing half-way through, a circumstance that was both cause and consequence of the oil crisis itself. The various external shocks of energy and economic fluctuations, combined with the severe domestic structural problems and the decisions of local leadership in many African countries, brought about increased continental economic differentiation. As a result, African economies are now less similar to one another than they were a decade ago.[5]

In the following section, we will examine first the characteristics of the price increase waves to identify their size and patterns of growth, and then analyze the causes of the increases in the context of import and export price changes. Later on we will examine internal characteristics of the importing states that may have affected the impact of the crisis, and the way the impact was shaped and affected by the immediate emergency responses taken by the African states concerned.

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1973-74 WAVE—GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

The economies of all the non-oil-exporting poor countries were hard hit by the increase in oil prices in 1973-74. Worldwide, the net increase in their payments to oil sellers has been estimated at over $12 billion during the first year.[6] The overall increase in their current accounts deficits was $20 billion, bringing the total to $32 billion. Thus, the net amount of the oil bill increase was about a third of the total LDC deficit in 1974, but perhaps half of its increase.

The sources of data show marked variations in the estimates of the net aggregate increase of the oil bill for the less-developed countries (LDCs).[7] The above figures were developed by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which published a special and quite detailed study of the flow of financial aid from OPEC members and the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries to the LDCs in the wake of the oil crisis. The widely cited *African Contemporary Record* (for 1977-78) seems to have based its estimates on this source, or one common to both it and UNCTAD. On the other hand, a study of African-Arab relations, which is especially critical of the Arab role, argues that the total net increase in the cost of oil to the non-oil-exporting LDCs was $12 billion (using OECD sources), but that the net transfer of money for these Third World consumers to OPEC suppliers was $10 billion.[8] Its authors do not even take note of, let alone explain, the discrepancy. Several French and African journals also give the $10 billion figure for the net change in deficits due to oil.[9]

Similar variability exists between the estimates of the oil price increases that were experienced specifically by the African non-oil-exporting countries. Part of the problem here may derive from the lack of precision in defining which countries are meant by "Africa." Some reports exclude the North African countries. The Arab sources may further exclude Mauritania, Sudan, and Somalia, because they are members of the Arab League and therefore ineligible for Arab aid to "Africa" under the official program of African-Arab Cooperation developed between the two regions at the Cairo Summit Conference in March 1977.

Focusing specifically on the African states (presumably Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan are included in these figures), OAU (Organization of African Unity) spokesmen claimed that the increase in African oil payments amounted to $600 million for the first year of the crisis.[10] Arab League analysts, however, put the figure at only $450 million.[11] On the other hand, a respected Arab scholar at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, drew on UN Energy Office figures to estimate that the increased deficit due to the cost of oil of twenty-nine African countries was $797 million for the first year of the crisis, yet further on states that the oil bills of the "Black African" states increased by $1.3 billion.[12] A European scholar estimated $800 million for the increased oil bill,[13] while other Western sources have put the figure at more than $1 billion.[14] We take the UNEO figures as the most reliable, although its methods remain unclear. Only a thorough analysis of national accounts, country by country, would settle the matter, but such data are unavailable to us.

The above aggregate estimates refer only to the increase in the direct cost of imported petroleum and petroleum distillates. There were also *indirect* cost

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increases for items that have substantial petroleum inputs. Chemical fertilizers were significantly affected, and some imported manufactures were also directly affected by the cost increases of petroleum, such as papermill products, glass products, hydraulic cement, structural clay, and a number of metal products. The OECD has estimated that increases in the cost of such imported manufactures and agricultural inputs accounted for additional aggregate cost increases to the LDCs of about $10 billion during 1974.[15]

As we have indicated, the balance-of-trade position of the LDCs deteriorated by about $20 billion during the first year of the crisis. The combination of direct and indirect petroleum cost increases apparently could be blamed for all of this. In reality, however, two other factors must be added in. Stagflation in the industrial countries continued; the cost of industrial goods imported from them by the LDCs rose by about 40 percent between 1973 and 1975.[16] Markets for exported goods from Africa and the other LDCs were likewise depressed. Overall, the LDC terms of trade were estimated by the Overseas Development Institute in London to have deteriorated by 12 percent in 1974 alone.[17] For Africa, however, the critically important factor is that most of its states lacked the minerals that, with some exceptions such as copper, continued to experience some price buoyancy. The "most seriously affected" countries, twenty-five of which were African (1975), out of forty-one, were not helped by such mineral and other "hard commodities."[18]

It is also worth noting that prior to these crises, African and other LDCs were attracting less and less of both official economic assistance and private capital investment, and were experiencing lower growth rates. The year before the oil crisis, the "most seriously affected states" in Africa received an average of about $7 per capita per year in foreign aid, whereas the remainder of the African states—nineteen—received an average of $14.[19] In 1975 private capital flows to the low income countries were assessed by the World Bank to be about one fourth the level of those to the middle income countries, and fell to about one fifth in 1980.[20] These levels are probably representative of the private capital flows to the African states involved, if not more favorable.

Combined, these various factors produced lower growth rates in the African economies in the years leading to and during the first phase of the oil crisis. Fewer exports and lower margins for adjustment to the oil cost increases followed. Africa suffered more than most of the LDCs, even though its terms of trade had remained fairly stable over the longer period since independence.[21] The Overseas Development Institute noted that the LDCs generally remained remarkably strong, but that Africa was an exception:

> In the circumstances . . . the overall [LDC] growth rate of 3% per annum in 1974-78 was not unsatisfactory, a result assisted by [their] limited reliance on fuel imports, favorable weather, and an ability to bolster imports by borrowing abroad. *Indeed, the relative buoyancy of the Third World helped the [developed countries] out of their depression.* But there were considerable differences within the Third World. Developing Asia, especially in the richer countries, actually experienced growth. In Latin America and *Black Africa it was a different story.* The growth of per capita incomes in Africa was only about 1% per annum in 1974-78 . . . against nearly 3% in 1967-73.[22] (*italics added*)

Oil price increases were not the main problem for African states, however. Petroleum products made up a relatively small share of the total import bill,

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generally not more than 10 percent before the 1973 wave hit. Oil as a percentage of imports increased 8 to 18 percent during the first wave, and some of the hardest hit states, like Kenya, found themselves paying a quarter of their import bill for oil by the end of 1974.[23] On the other hand, the continuing inflation on goods exported from the industrial world (the other 75 to 85 percent of the import bill)—an inflation of 15 to 20 percent a year in the immediate aftermath of the crisis—would generate aggregate cost increases in the nonoil sectors about as large as those in the oil sectors. The increase in unit value of all imports by these states was about 75 percent for the same period, partially offset by price increases in Africa's own exports in the years prior to the full impact of the oil price wave.[24] Indeed, the commodity boom of the early seventies was stimulated in large part by the very inflation that not only provided much of the base for the tidal wave, but also for the oil price increases that would ride atop it. The rising level of import prices overall far outstripped the impact of the oil component. This was a particularly important fact for states such as Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal, which had general import inflation rates of from 120 to 240 percent between 1973 and 1975, only a quarter of which, at most, could be attributed to oil products. The overall deterioration in terms of trade for the non-oil-exporting African countries was 23 percent between 1973 and 1975.

It was also the relationship between, on the one side, the African and other LDCs and, on the other, the industrialized markets and sources of capital, in addition to the "oil crisis," that contributed greatly to the size, character, and impact of the price wave that hit the former, and weakened their ability to meet these cost increases from their own exports. The short-lived commodity price boom in the early years of the 1970s had allowed them to build up their reserves, but they were forced to draw these back down, and then to borrow very heavily to pay their international bills.

SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 1973-74 WAVE

Examination of the oil price increases experienced by selected African countries—in terms of the unit cost increases of the crude oil actually imported, as distinct from the price increases at the wellhead—and of source countries and amounts of oil purchased, reveals a number of variations that call for special attention. The patterns of these variations suggest that the character of the price increases varied from place to place, irrespective of any obvious characteristics internal to these countries, and that factors other than the OPEC increases for crude oil were involved.

A number of sources of information about the "oil crisis" have argued vehemently that the OPEC price increases devastated the economies of the LDCs; what these sources seem to have in common, however, is obvious antipathy for OPEC, perhaps more specifically, for Arabs. With respect to African countries, the London-based *African Contemporary Record*[25] provided data probably drawn from OECD sources. At about the same time, an article in the *PetroEconomic File*, which is also based in London, provided figures for "Oil Exports and Imports for Selected Non-OPEC LDCs, 1973, 1975," and castigated particularly the Arab members of OPEC, especially "those Arab countries who like to masquerade as 'progressives,' drumming up support for 'causes' such as the fate of the Blacks in southern Africa." The article argued that "the figures for oil imports and

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exports (including petroleum products) for the first two years after the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 proves that the higher price for oil accounts for the major share of the additional burden that the poor nations have had to carry since then."[26] Curiously, however, the latter source provided "oil" cost figures hardly in accord with those provided by the first one. In most cases, they were considerably higher. The same is true for a book by V. T. LeVine and T. Luke[27] that is unremitting and one-sided in its attack on the Arabs. They draw on IMF (International Monetary Fund) figures to calculate increases in net oil bills for 1973-74 that show total cost increases for Kenya at about a third higher in 1974 than the *African Contemporary Record* figures for the two years 1973-75. Their figures are also out of line with those provided by Michael Lyall of Chase Manhattan.

In the following tables, the states examined were selected (among those on which data were available for crude oil imports) to represent some of the major categories of African states—whether they are a part of the Arab world or not, located near suppliers or not, part of the English-speaking or French-speaking zone, and richer versus poorer in their economic and energy resource endowment.

Taking the more conservative figures of the *African Contemporary Record*, we see from Table 1 that almost every country mentioned was increasing its expenditure on imports of oil even prior to the OPEC increases. Moreover, each experienced substantial increases in the share of their own domestically produced income required to pay for this oil. These price increases ran generally between 50 and 60 percent. It is important to bear in mind here that such increases are not in keeping with what was happening to the price of *crude* oil at the time.

Table 2 gives the per unit cost changes just prior to and during the first oil price increase wave. It also provides information on the changes in the quantity

Table 1. Changes in Total Costs for Imported Petroleum Products for Selected African Countries (in percentages)

	Total Cost Change			Change in percent of GDP[1]			
	1972-73	1973-75	1975-78	1972-73	1973-75	1975-78	1972-78
Ethiopia	70	271	27	50	300	25	650
Ghana	63	227	188	50	244	16	500
Kenya	59	237	16	63	235	15	525
Malawi	35	300	31	43	290	31	629
Morocco	62	249	255	67	247	25	622
Sierra Leone	57	218	11	54	215	11	439
Sudan	59	222	13	43	230	15	443
Tanzania	57	232	23	50	233	20	525
Uganda	33	258	19	40	271	19	520
Zaïre	57	236	17	43	250	14	471
Zambia	54	230	6	67	220	6	467

Source: Compiled from figures given by *African Contemporary Record*, 1977-78, p. C198
Original figures in current market prices
[1]Gross Domestic Product

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Table 2. Unit Price, Changes in Price, and Quantity of Crude Oil Imports, 1972-79

		1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Cameroon	$/ba		3.29	10.86	11.68	11.60			
	DP%	−4[1]	−5	+230	+8	−1			
	DQ%			+16	−55.5	+31			
Ghana[2]	$/ba	3.08	4.27	14.93	12.76	13.32	16.66	14.86	18.53
	DP%		+38.6	+250	−14	−5	+17.6	−5.1	+25
	DQ%		−4.5	+14	+6	−6	+4.7	−15.5	−46
Ivory Coast	$/ba	3.10	3.85	10.69	13.47	12.41	14.53	15.18	
	DP%		+24	+178	+26	−8	+17	+4.5	
	DQ%		−17	+78	−10	+650	−86	−3	
Kenya	$/ba	2.24	2.48	9.15	11.37	12.29	13.49	13.81	
	DP%	+16	+11	+269	+24	+8	+10	+2	
	DQ%	−2	+9	+3.5	+1	−12	−1	−5	
Liberia	$/ba	2.86	3.58	12.24	11.81				
	DP%	−3.4[1]	+26	+240	−4				
	DQ%		−2	+34	−13.4				
Morocco	$/ba	2.88	3.26	12.04	11.57	11.63	13.23	14.36	
	DP%	+19	+13	+269	−4	+.5	+14	+8.5	
	DQ%	+8	+30	+14	+1.5	+7			
Senegal	$/ba	3.22	3.97	11.88	12.62			12.76[3]	10.19[3]
	DP%		+23	+199	+6				−20[3]
	DQ%		+15	+7	−3				−32[3]

Sources: Compiled from United Nations *World Trade Statistics by Commodity*, Item 33 or 331, except the figures marked 1, which are from the UN-ECA *Africa Statistical Year Book;* the figures for Ghana (marked 2), which are from the Republic of Ghana *Budget Proposals* for 1979-80, December 20, 1979, Table X; and the figures marked 3, which are from Government of Senegal, *Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique*, nos. 290-91, November and December 1979. The various sources often show slight discrepancies when data are presented for similar years.

DP = change in price

DP = change in quantity

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of crude oil imports (in the case of Cameroon, with very small amounts of partially refined products included). In comparing both tables for 1972-73, percentage unit price increases for crude oil appear too small to account for the overall expenditure price increases for the whole category of "oil" imports as indicated in Table 1. (Given the very similar patterns of usage for final petroleum products in these countries, we can assume that the figures are for a fairly uniform grade of oil.) Generally, the unit price increases were about 25 percent, with two states—Kenya and Morocco—showing increases of only half that. Cameroon shows an actual decline in unit prices. It is equally significant that the quantities of imported crude declined in most of these states. Even where there were quantity *and* price increases, however, such as for Kenya, Morocco, or Senegal, the combination of the two still could not produce total cost increases equal to more than a third of the figures given in Table 1, much less the other sources mentioned above. There are not sufficient data for categorical assessments, but it seems probable that the much higher increases in total oil expenditures are for refined products. Just as in the United States, these costs in Africa far outstrip the level of increase in the cost of the crude oil. Most of the oil purchases in Africa in the early period were made by, and channeled through, the international oil companies; thus these companies, by charging more than their own costs for crude, and making even more money from downstream processing, are perhaps responsible for these substantial increases.

It is significant, of course, that even the price of crude oil imports increased significantly in 1972 and in 1973. From Table 2 we also see that there is no evident pattern regarding the type or situation of countries experiencing the precrisis unit price increases. Several French-zone states showed substantial increases, but French-zone Cameroon showed a decline. Several English-speaking states, in both the British and American zones, showed equally high increases. Only Morocco, itself an Arab state, was spared a very sharp rise in 1973, but it had one of the higher price increases in the following year. We do not have sufficient data on unit price changes among the individual source areas for these countries during the 1972-73 period to determine if this factor is the key explanatory one.

Unit price increases in the 1974 period were notably smaller than the increases in the posted price of OPEC crude, which for 1974 averaged about 300 percent over 1973. For the African states, it was about a fourth to a third less great. In our sample, the average (unweighted for amount of imports) was about 250 percent, with only Ghana showing an increase higher than 270 percent in that year. The Ivory Coast and Senegal had relatively modest increases of less than 200 percent. Transportation costs seem not to be an important factor, judging from the experience of neighboring Ghana and the Ivory Coast. The former got much of its oil from considerably more distant sources (such as the Soviet Union) than the latter (which imported from Iran and Iraq). In addition, both purchased oil from local West African suppliers in roughly equal proportions.

One factor in the discrepancy between African per unit cost rises for imported oil and the rises in posted OPEC prices may be due to time lags between the purchase agreements and the delivery. Oil purchased in mid-1973,

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for example, may not have arrived until 1974, and would be priced at the earlier levels, thereby reducing the overall cost figures for that year.

The differential in unit price increases seems to be the result of the interaction between two additional factors, one definitely external, the other, subject perhaps to some internal decision-making. The first—external—factor was the general pattern of prices higher than the world average being charged to the African states. The second was the great price variation between sources and the considerable shifting among these sources by the African states. The second pattern may have resulted from independent decisions by the international oil companies handling the imports, or may have involved government decision-making.

That the average price of crude oil imports to Africa probably started out, and remained, higher than the world average is indicated by the pattern in our sample of prices in Table 2. These averaged $2.90 in 1972 and $3.50 in 1973, and $11.70 in 1974. Wouter Tims reported that "the average f.o.b. price of Saudi Arabian light crude oil during 1974 was $9.78 a barrel; this implies an average f.o.b. price for all OPEC crudes of around $10.25 a barrel." Tims put the 1973 average Saudi price at $3.08 for 1973.[28] Having started with a bit higher price level, the suppliers could afford to raise oil prices less steeply in Africa than elsewhere, yet still leave it even more deeply submerged.

With regard to the considerable variations in price among sources, Tables 3a and 3b give a comparison of the sources and prices for Ghana and the Ivory Coast. The Ivory Coast shows considerable flexibility in its "selection" of source areas. Whether this reflects calculated government decision-making, the work of the companies, or simply a frantic search among any available source is not clear. Nigeria was an important source for both countries, despite the premium quality of Nigerian crude, which is reflected in the prices paid by the Ivory Coast and, curiously, to a noticeably lesser degree—with the exception of 1974—in those paid by Ghana. Nigeria, moreover, disappears from the chart altogether for the Ivory Coast in 1976. The Ivory Coast, which had argued for détente and dialogue with South Africa out of fear that instability in Southern Africa would favor the Communists there, turned to the Soviet Union for the largest single share of its oil imports in any of these years. It was a shrewd

Table 3a. Sources and Unit Prices for Ghana's Crude Oil Imports (in dollars)

	1972	1973	1974	1975
Algeria	2.99		15.32	
Central African Republic		4.12		
Libya			14.91	13.08
Iraq		6.18		15.06
Nigeria	2.73 (38%)	3.54 (56%)	14.96 (42%)	12.69 (48%)
Tunisia	3.14			
USSR	3.94	3.30 (21%)	14.96 (28%)	
Average	2.90	3.65	15.00	12.69

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Table 3b. Sources and Unit Prices for the Ivory Coast's Crude Oil Imports (in dollars)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Algeria				14.54			
Burma				13.67			
Gabon	3.0	3.55	5.48	10.85			
Iraq	2.95	3.46	10.81	12.92	12.63	14.43	15.35
	(44%)	(50%)	(45%)	(12%)			(23%)
Iran			11.53	13.20	12.69		14.18
Nigeria	3.25	4.53	12.09	14.63		14.82	15.66
	(49%)	(36%)	(32%)	(35%)		(38%)	(35%)
Norway					13.91		
Oman							13.52
Saudi Arab				13.91	12.34	13.95	
					(27%)		
USSR					12.36		
					(63%)		
Venezuela						15.37	15.02
Average	3.10	3.85	10.69	13.47	12.41	14.53	15.18

Source: Compiled from UN Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D, Category 331 (percentages in parentheses are proportion of total imports from that source)

move, the Soviet oil prices that year being among the lowest of the lot, as they had been the previous year for Ghana.

THE TIMING OF IMPORTS

Cutback strategies adopted by some states in our sample during the earlier phases of the oil crisis simply worsened its impact, by delaying purchases until prices had risen even higher. These states perhaps hoped that the price increases would be temporary, or that financing could be found on better terms later on. Most of the African states continued to regard the OPEC price increases as part of the Arab oil boycott against the supporters of Israel. Since almost all the African states had broken off their relations with Israel, they felt they were an irrelevant and ill-chosen target for what they saw as a weapon in the Middle-Eastern War. Indeed, many Arab spokesmen, by using rhetoric that gave credence to such an erroneous view of the causes of the price increases, reinforced the African perception that the price increases were temporary.

Cutbacks in crude oil imports weakened the impact of the price rise for some states such as Ghana, which, after having cut back oil imports by 5 percent in 1973, continued to hold them down in 1974 and 1975 (See Table 2—DQ%). On the other hand, other states that had also cut back in 1973, such as Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Liberia, expanded them significantly the following year. The Ivory Coast had the greatest increase, 78 percent, followed by Liberia with 34 percent, at a time when the average price of crude oil imports increased 178 percent for the Ivory Coast and 240 percent for Liberia. Kenya, Morocco, and Senegal had not been quick to respond to the crisis, but were able to keep subsequent increases modest, thus moderating what was for them, nonetheless, a serious situation.

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THE 1979-80 WAVE

Despite some superficial similarities between the wave of rising import prices that hit Africa in 1979-80 and the earlier one, much more of this later wave can be attributed to oil. This is so, whether we consider only those imports that fall directly into the petroleum category, or those products in which petroleum figures substantially. The impact of this second wave of increases on the African economies will probably be different, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The percentage increase of the oil component in the total inflationary wave was smaller in 1979-80 than in 1974 (see Table 2), but the flood beneath it, which had not generally receded from the earlier rises with respect to either oil or other imports, was much deeper. Moreover, the circumstances that now affect the financing capabilities and sources of African countries in the 1980s are much less favorable.

The price for crude oil had declined in 1976, even in nominal terms, for a few African states, and the real value of oil had certainly fallen. On the world scale, it could still be said at the beginning of 1979 that "since January 1974, the basic price of a barrel of oil has risen just 33 percent, less than the value of the dollar has fallen. At the time of the price increases of December 1978, OPEC's revenues, adjusted for inflation and exchange rate change, [were] 22 percent below the level of five years earlier."[29] Incidentally, the author of these words then went on to quote David Stockman, then a Congressman from Michigan, to support his argument that the primary cause of the post-1973 inflation had been the monetary policy of the industrial world, led by the United States, in response to OPEC actions: "A change in the relative price of one commodity cannot cause the general price level to increase."

In an effort to restore the declining value of their crude oil, in terms of the dollar, OPEC ministers met at Abu Dhabi at the end of 1978 and agreed on an increase in the price for marker crude oil of only 14.5 percent. They were attempting to index the price of crude oil to the inflation levels in the industrial economies, but the increases that followed were much higher, and also reflected a desire to achieve some kind of parity between crude oil prices and those of alternative fuels. All these factors combined with the 7 percent reduction of total available supplies caused by the Iranian Revolution—and panic reactions to that situation—to result in price increases by the beginning of 1981 that averaged about 175 percent over the 1978 price level in current dollar terms, and between 35 and 40 percent in real terms.[30]

Somewhat like the 1973 scenario, African oil purchasers had already experienced modest oil price increases in the two years prior to the steep price of 1980, and had cut back their imports. By the time the full crest of price increases hit them, it is likely that pent-up demand had again led to increases in the quantity of oil purchased. We lack data that are sufficiently recent and detailed to delineate the various components of the resulting increases in balance-of-payments deficits. Moreover, as Tables 4a and 4b indicate, estimates and assessments of the size of the deficits and of the changes in oil bills vary widely among reputedly authoritative sources, and sometimes within the same institution.[31]

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Table 4a. Oil-Importing LDCs—Estimates of Balance-of-Payments Deficits (in billions of dollars)

	1973	1974	1975	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
McNamara[1]			39.5		27		61	
World Bank[2]							70	
International Monetary Fund[3]				21	32			
Central Intelligence Agency[4]						36	52	57
Other	11	32	28					

Table 4b. Oil-Importing LDCs—Estimates of Oil Costs (in billions of dollars)

	1973	1978	1979	1980	1981
McNamara[1]	7	32		67	
World Bank[2]				49	
Central Intelligence Agency[4]			28	41	50
World Bank[5]			29	52	

[1]Robert S. McNamara, president of the World Bank, speech to IMF/IBRD, September 30, 1980, as reported in *The Middle East Economic Survey*, October 1980
[2]From *Petroleum Economist*, January 1981
[3]From IMF 1979 *Annual Report*, section on Exchange Arrangements
[4]From ER M 80-11 10080, January 29, 1980, unclassified (Its figure of $52 is based on an oil price of $30, which proved to be low, as was the 1981 assumed oil price of $33.)
[5]From *Petroleum Economist*, October 1980

The African share of the oil cost increases for the oil-importing LDCs cannot be determined precisely from the data currently available. It is likely that African countries cut back their oil imports in 1979, since their total import volume shrunk considerably in that year.[32] Had these countries experienced price increases equal to the average increases in official OPEC prices during that period, the oil bill for a selected sample of countries constructed by the Chase Manhattan Bank would have shown a rise from the 1978 level of $1.2 billion to a level in 1980 of about $3 billion. African states may have fared worse than the average rates would suggest, however, because as marginal purchasers, they may have had to rely more on the spot market, or on company suppliers that were faced with surcharges for various reasons. Such premiums ranged from $3 to $7 a barrel in 1980.[33] World Bank estimates of average OPEC price increases have ranged somewhat below the 147 percent figure we are using, and at about 137 percent, would have brought the oil bill of these seventeen African importers up to a level of about $2.8 billion. The Chase Manhattan Bank staff itself estimated the increase to be 130 percent, which would have brought it to $2.7 billion.

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In any case, unlike what it was in the previous period, the percentage increase in average oil prices is roughly on a par with the rate of inflation in the African import bill generally. The unit value index for imports by the twenty-two African countries in our own sample of UNCTAD statistics increased by about 140 percent from 1978 to 1979, in relation to the already high import prices these countries faced in 1975.[34] Although oil imports accounted for a much larger share of total African imports in 1979-80 than in 1974-75, for only the very hardest-hit countries, such as Kenya, was this as much as 50 percent. Precise and detailed figures are not available, but judging from the UNCTAD figures reporting total (developing) African imports from the OPEC countries, crude oil imports were about one third the value of total imports in 1979, and were even slightly higher the year before. For most African importers, therefore, the rise in the cost of their nonoil imports is still likely to be *as much* of a problem as the rise in the cost of their oil imports.

Raising prices for their own exports apparently did not help African countries to pay the increased costs of their imports. Figures from UNCTAD sources, available only through 1979, indicate a slight improvement in the average purchasing power of the exports of twenty non-oil-exporting African countries from 1978 to 1979, against a sharp decline in their overall terms of trade.[35] The CIA, on the other hand, made predictions for a more recent performance—but on the basis of what proved to be low oil prices—that the value of exports from the whole of the nonoil LDC group would rise by 13 percent in 1980, but that it would be entirely offset by the rising cost of oil.[36] The UNCTAD figures revealed significant improvement in the terms of trade until 1979, but little change in the purchasing power of exports for these countries since 1975.[37]

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES

A crucial dimension of the oil crisis in the industrialized world has been the role of the major international companies, especially the "Seven Sisters," which dominated the industry until the mid-seventies. Inexcusable one-sidedness marks almost every assessment of the oil crisis with respect to them. In the industrialized world, studies such as that already cited by Michael Lyall of Chase Manhattan Bank charge that OPEC "gives not a fig" for the protestations of the rest of the world about ratcheting petroleum price increases.[38] This and other such studies of the oil crises in Africa mention not a word about the role of the companies, not only before the 1973 crisis, but right up even to the 1979-80 crisis.

Occasionally, even business-oriented sources in the industrial world have reported enough about the role of the companies to permit some balance in the blame that is bound to be cast in these issues. Jacques de Larosiere, managing director of the IMF, has pointed out that "for something like 15 years, the industrial world and other parts of the world were building their wealth on declining oil prices."[39] This occurred because until 1972 "the major international oil companies had a near stranglehold on the business," as Robert D. Hershey, Jr., has noted. "They owned the OPEC oil fields: they dictated—sometimes even reduced—the price they paid for the oil, and they decided how

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much oil would be produced and where it would be produced. They were the all-powerful middlemen."[40] In those years, no outcry was heard from Western bankers and economic analysts.

Even with reversion of ownership to OPEC countries—which has not yet been completed for some OPEC members, even in the upstream activities—the international companies have managed to profit enormously from the OPEC price increases and to contribute importantly to the impact of the oil crises. For example, the 1973-74 OPEC increases would have raised the average price increase for a gallon of gasoline by only six cents in the United States. Yet prices rose, on the average, about twenty cents between mid-1973 and mid-1974.[41] This increase represented the shift by the major oil companies, as crude from the Middle-East ceased to be extraordinarily cheap for them, from depending on overseas crude oil as their source of profitability, to relying on downstream sources in storage, shipping, refining, and retailing. It should be remembered that production costs ran from four cents to fourteen cents a barrel in the Middle East, compared to U.S. costs of about $2.50 a barrel.[42] Court records in Canada reveal that some companies lied and cheated to hide their profit increases, backdating sales and disguising sources of crude.[43] This paid off handsomely for the oil companies—at the expense of the American consumer. The February 24, 1975, issue of "Report on Oil Companies," published by Morgan Stanley & Company, noted, "The year will pass into the record books as one of 'obscene' profits."

Apparently, however, these overseas profit gains for the major companies were made mostly from processing and other downstream activities, at least in Africa. We have no precise information about increases in company profits from oil sales to African countries, but the figures we have already examined relating to the increases in per unit costs of crude oil suggest that the increases were not higher, in fact were a bit lower, than the increases in OPEC posted prices. The African price figures were generally a bit higher than the posted OPEC prices, but this was even more the case before the oil crisis than after, so that the impact of the change itself was alleviated a bit. The companies apparently had already been making a very lucrative return on these sales, and with the price explosion, were less able to do so, or less insistent, at least during the early phase of the oil crisis. The major oil companies no doubt made decent, perhaps even indecent profits abroad, for they often fended off attacks in the United States on their profits by claiming that they arose from overseas operations.

To summarize, during the early years especially, OPEC decisions were responsible for only a minor portion of the import cost increases for African states. The larger share of the increases was the result of a combination of factors over which neither OPEC nor the Africans had much control: inflation in the cost of industrial goods; the African need to import mostly distilled petroleum products; the role of the international companies. Some factors that magnified the crises for some states were subject to significant African decision-making, however, such as the quantity, and choice of source and the timing, of crude and perhaps distillate imports. Although these factors had only marginal impact, their role has been mostly ignored.

We turn next to the more general internal characteristics of the African economies and to the broader policy choices that confront African leaders.

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The Economic and Policy Topography

The nature of the impact of import price increases was determined internally both by the economic characteristics and the governmental actions of the affected societies. We consider these as "topographical" features of the economy-energy system interaction. How do energy and economy factors interact? First, an African government's ability to increase and diversify its energy supply, and improve its energy efficiency, hinges on its access to capital and other resources. Second, the level and structure of economic development will also shape the character of energy demand. African countries that are more developed will have more complex demand patterns than less-developed ones. Finally—in a more dynamic sense—future energy strategies in African countries will follow economic development strategies. An import-substitution strategy will require a different energy strategy than one that promotes exports. Tanzania's decentralized, agricultural development strategy will necessarily generate different energy requirements than Zaïre's, which emphasizes more centralized extractive industries. Energy strategies will differ in both design and implementation requirements according to the physical location of energy needed; the quality of energy needed; its transportation requirements and costs; the mix of sources as between electricity, petroleum, coal, or solar, and between traditional fuels such as charcoal or wood; and the mix of technical and administrative skills required. Relatively rich African countries will of course have a different energy strategy than poor ones.

In this section we try to capture the variety of energy-economy interfaces in Africa by means of a matrix (Figure 1) that has energy resources (especially oil) along the horizontal axis, and economic development (GNP per capita, economic structure, character of the domestic market) along the vertical. Our principal concern here is with the oil *importers*, quadrants 2 and 4 of Figure 1, with only

ECONOMY \ ENERGY	*High*	*Low*
High	(1) Algeria Nigeria	(2) Kenya Ivory Coast Zimbabwe
Low	(3) Gabon Angola Congo	(4) Senegal Ethiopia Sahel countries

Figure 1. The Energy-Economy Matrix

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summary attention given to African oil exporters like Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon. The matrix is meant to be suggestive, not definitive, in its treatment of the energy-economy interface. Its purpose is to demonstrate how the two are related in many ways, not to argue that one country or another belongs in quadrant 2 or 4. Nevertheless, Kenya and the Ivory Coast do fit squarely in 2, and Senegal and Ethiopia in 4. We will therefore take them as exemplars of those cells and examine them in some detail, only occasionally referring to others in their quadrants.

LOW ENERGY-HIGH DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES

Countries that fit this category, such as Kenya, the Ivory Coast, and Zimbabwe, do not have significant commercial oil production, but their *relative* economic strength has thus far enabled them to continue to import oil at roughly the same levels over the past several years, at the same time that they finance development of conventional and nonconventional energy sources domestically. Although oil has weighed heavily on their balance of payments, these countries have managed to sustain a modest annual increase in growth. They have also promoted considerable oil exploration, the Ivory Coast showing some success, and thus have the potential for moving from one energy-economy quadrant to another through the judicious use of expertise and capital—and some luck.

Economic Features—By African standards, this group has relatively high GNP/per capita ratios, with well-developed national markets and growing manufacturing sectors. Between 1960 and 1979, per capita GNP rose by 2.7 percent in Kenya, to $380, and in the Ivory Coast, by 2.4 percent, resulting in the much higher figure of $840, although the latter has a much smaller population. Both Kenya and the Ivory Coast have relatively good infrastructures, with especially good road transportation in Kenya. Agricultural production is more diversified than in other African countries. A relatively well-educated cadre of Kenyans and Zimbabweans, and a growing number of Ivorians, make effective economic and energy planning more likely. And that urbanization tends to be high in these countries puts pressure on social, economic, and energy services. Each of these factors—high growth, urbanization, good transport, and an expanding industrial sector—pushes upward not only energy demand, but also general economic production, and helps give this category its particular energy configuration.

Energy Features—Energy consumption is relatively high, and its continued growth in these states reflects their general economic strength (Table 5). By 1978 energy consumption per capita (in kilogram of coal equivalent) was 139 in Kenya, and 357 in the Ivory Coast.[44] Yet, although both held their rates of growth of commercial energy consumption to moderately low levels during the 1970s (3.5 for Kenya, and 5.5 for the Ivory Coast), Kenya had the more impressive performance of restraining energy consumption during the 1960s. Kenya was a poorer economy and achieved less growth overall, but matched the Ivory Coast's growth in the energy-intensive industrial and manufacturing sectors. This category of countries is dependent on imported oil to meet their

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Table 5. Basic Energy—Economic Indicators

	Import Dependence (percent of total commercial energy) 1975	Imports as Percentage of Export Earnings 1976	Consumption (in kilograms of coal equivalent, per capita) Rate of Growth of Commercial Consumption 1960-74*	1974-79*	Commercial Consumption 1976	1979*	Woodfuel Consumption	Population mid-1977 (in millions)
Kenya	97	31[1]	3.3	3.5	152	180	430	14.6
Ivory Coast	98	10	14.5	5.5	380	234	322	7.5
Senegal	96	15	4.7	12.4	156	266	265	5.2
Ethiopia	96	27	14.	−5.3	27	20	352	30.2
Nigeria	[exporter]	10567[2]	9.4	1.4	94	83	430	79.0
Gabon	[exporter]	n.a.		1279.			1013	0.5

Source: James Howe and Frances Gulick, *Fuelwood and Other Renewable Energies in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, March 31, 1980, pp. 32-33)

Figures under columns marked with asterisks are from the World Bank's *World Development Report*, 1981.

[1]From the UN *Yearbook of International Statistics, 1979*

[2]Refers to oil exports as a percentage of nonenergy exports.

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domestic consumption. Because Kenya, the Ivory Coast, and Zimbabwe are among the more developed countries of the continent, the international oil companies tend to judge their national markets as sufficiently large to warrant domestic refineries. This enables each country to import greater proportions of crude oil instead of the more expensive refined products, and in turn to export refined oil products to landlocked neighbors.

Oil imports nevertheless weigh heavily on them. Oil as a percentage of total Kenyan imports went up from 24 percent in 1977 to 39.5 percent two years later, in effect forcing the country to cut back on other imports to continue paying the higher oil prices. Despite a generally good performance in restraining the growth of fuel imports, both Kenya and the Ivory Coast lack a coherent energy plan, and were slow to treat the problem as one requiring policy planning. As recently as April 1980, an assessment of Kenya's potential appeal to foreign investors could say only that "a committee has been established to advise the government on a suitable energy policy, but it is difficult to see where cutbacks can be made."[45]

Our categorization is based mainly on the presence or absence of petroleum. In neither Kenya, the Ivory Coast, nor Zimbabwe was oil or gas being exploited in amounts significant enough to affect the national energy balance. Exploration has been done in Kenya and the Ivory Coast, but thus far there have been interesting finds only in the latter. Kenya also has geothermal resources, and of course, all have the potential for improving their consumption of traditional woodfuels, but not without ecological dangers. Kenya's scheduled investments in these areas appear to be inefficient: planned ethanol plants there will cost $175 million, many times the cost level per unit of output of plants elsewhere.

Energy Policy Futures: Paying for Alternatives to Imported Oil—Beyond the rhetorical declarations of OPEC, African, and OECD heads of state lies one single, irrefutable fact: energy costs money. It means altering priorities for government spending and influencing private investors as well. The countries in quadrant 2 have more active economies and thus their investment demands are greater. These countries are relatively good lending and investment risks for private investors, and they are often targets for foreign aid.

One impact of the oil price hike was to expand the incentives for oil companies and governments alike to invest risk capital in the search for oil. Here low energy-high development countries have an edge over low energy-low development countries, all other things being equal. Oil companies prefer to work in countries with well-developed national markets and good transportation and financial infrastructures, features shared by both Kenya and the Ivory Coast. In addition, oil companies prefer to explore in countries in which governments seem willing to abide by their own legislation in their treatment of the companies. Here, the political-risk factor plays a part, and here again Kenya and the Ivory Coast have done well. The government in Abidjan is ranked sixth and that of Nairobi seventh in the regional ranking prepared by the magazine *Institutional Investor*. Favorable evaluations, however, are not the monopoly of capitalist and stable low energy-high development countries. At the other end of the political spectrum, the meticulously reliable socialist government of Angola also gets high marks.

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It is likely that recent finds off the coast of Abidjan by a consortium led by Phillips, which includes a 10 percent participation by the national oil corporation Petrocie, will provide a 500-million-barrel reserve, and permit production levels that will make the Ivory Coast a net exporter around the mid-1980s. This source currently produces around 3,000 barrels a day, and the area is viewed by company and government officials alike as having tremendous potential.

Kenya's program is less astute and less farsighted (especially in its failure to train nationals before a major find), and they have had less luck in finding oil onshore, despite the $10 million capital investment by Shell-BP, which yielded a series of dry holes. The large Shell-BP group in that country has since terminated drilling. Apparently somewhat worried about attracting more exploration activity, the government has invited the World Bank to review and make recommendations on the provisions of its national oil code. Cities Services is already engaged in some exploration offshore near Kenya's border with Somalia.

Although worries over oil may keep government officials and businessmen awake at night, other energy sources in these countries have ample room for further development. Soaring oil prices have provided the impetus for African governments to invest in these other sources. The continent, for example, is abundantly endowed with rivers, and thus has a rich potential for generating electricity by harnessing these resources. Long before the oil crises, the bulk of the external bilateral and multilateral energy assistance to Africa was in the form of electricity and power, as Table 6 makes clear. If the figures for private investment and lending were added to those for official lending, the bias toward power would be even greater. Kenya has developed the Tana River at several sites, and the Ivory Coast has developed the Bandama and Sassandra rivers to

Table 6. Current Bilateral and Multilateral Energy Assistance

	Project Type	Number	Amount (in millions)
Kenya	Power systems	10	$200.379
	Rural electrification	3	1.577
	Fossil fuels recovery	1	20.000
	Energy planning/TA	2	2.893
	Renewable energy	8	1.349
	Forestry/Fuelwood	2	20.148
	Geothermal	6	55.024
	Miscellaneous	2	5.443
Total			306.831
Ivory Coast	Power systems	7	84.852
	Rural electrification	1	0.022
	Forestry/Fuelwood		18.000
Total			102.874

Source: T. Hoffman and B. Johnson, *World Energy Triangle* (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1981), p. 186

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expand hydroelectricity's share of power generation in that country from only 12 percent to 62 percent in 1980.[46]

Low energy-high development countries are also more likely than other oil importers to have the wherewithal to finance experiments in certain kinds of nonconventional energy resources such as gasohol. Kenya and Zimbabwe have become involved in this area. The former is well on the way, with a multimillion-dollar program to reduce oil imports by using domestic vegetable substitutes. In our research in Nairobi, we found that the Kenyan Treasury, concerned with the hemorrhage of foreign exchange, helped gain government support for a gasohol project to be built jointly with a private entrepreneur. The project, which is expected to produce annually 20 million liters of alcohol (plus large amounts of other products), will soon be commissioned in Kisumu at a cost of at least 900 million Kenyan shillings ($115 million). The local press has branded the project a huge white elephant, because it had languished for several years under bad management, until it was reorganized and new managers brought in. This is a good example of how governments in countries with investable surpluses and indigenous entrepreneurs can rush to start new high technology capital-intensive energy projects, only to find that these projects are beyond their initial institutional capacity. Another potential area of conflict in Africa (as in Brazil, where such projects are widely touted) is between food-crop production and gasohol-crop production. Unless such programs are given careful consideration, they can have regressive social impacts, benefiting urban automobile owners, but penalizing rural food consumers.

The problems of competing uses of land and scarce managerial skills confront government energy policymakers as well in relation to traditional fuels. How can governments promote tree plantations and reforestation programs without taking valuable land away from food production? Countries in this category, with their high rates of urbanization and need for improved commercial agriculture, have special problems of land and population pressure that bear directly on this dilemma. Kenya has begun to work on this problem by considering new plantings in agriculturally marginal areas—for example, in ravines and valleys. It is faced with an annual fuelwood consumption of 22 million tons, with only minimal efforts made toward replacement. Kenya is also trying to integrate forestry and woodfuel programs into its agricultural extension services.

LOW ENERGY-LOW DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES

Here we see clearly the effects not only of low domestic commercial energy supplies, but also the shortages of capital and manpower caused by low levels of economic development. These countries have among the lowest per capita income and energy consumption in the world. The principal point is not that these countries do not have domestic oil resources (neither do Japan and Taiwan), but that they have very few developed resources of any kind.

The countries present a paradox of sorts. On the one hand, their populations were the least affected by the oil shocks because most of their people live on the margins of the monetized sector, and hence use few, if any, petroleum products. Yet, at the aggregate national level, these are precisely the countries

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most seriously affected by the oil crises in terms of national accounts and government expenditures on other imports. They have little foreign exchange and rely very heavily on imported oil for their key transportation and industrial sectors. The sharp price hikes cut deeply into their already meager national treasuries, forcing hard choices between energy financing and economic financing. These governments had to decide whether their money would be spent on energy or education, on imported fuel or imported food. In many cases, the choices were postponed from 1973-74 until much too late in the decade, more than a few African leaders continuing to believe that the oil price hikes were merely political and temporary. To see them through the crisis, they relied on external borrowings and government deficit-spending. By 1980, however, the chips were being called in.

If there is good news in any of this, it may be that, in the long run, if these countries with much less invested in oil-based, "hard-path" energy systems can muster the political will to make fundamental adjustments in their economies, they may be better able to weather the stormy transition to a postpetroleum world.

Economic Characteristics—Low energy-low development countries are the largest group in our survey, and it is thus more difficult to give a "representative" picture of them. To give a sense of the variety but also to demonstrate underlying similarities, we have included one West African country—Senegal—with a small population, and one East African country—Ethiopia—with a fairly large population. GNP in these countries is low, with Ethiopia at $130 per capita at the low end of the scale, and Senegal with $430, just beyond the upper end of a category the World Bank calls Low Income Countries. Ethiopia's growth of GNP per capita between 1960 and 1979 was 1.3 percent, and Senegal's was −0.2 percent. National markets in such countries are shallow and dispersed, and have rudimentary infrastructures. Education is quite limited, adult literacy in our two examples being about 15 percent in 1975.

Energy Characteristics—The domestic fuel supply mix of these countries is undiversified, with the traditional sector relying almost entirely on fuelwood, and the modern sector, on imported oil. Thus for these low energy-low development countries, woodfuels consumption as a percentage of total energy in 1976 was 93 percent for Ethiopia, 94 percent for both Upper Volta and Tanzania, and 63 percent for Senegal. In 1975 energy imports as a percentage of total commercial energy were 96 percent for Ethiopia, 100 percent for Upper Volta and Tanzania, and 95 percent for Senegal.[47]

Most of these countries are deficient in currently viable nonoil commercial energy alternatives that would make fuel-switching a real option: hydroelectric resources, for example, are limited, and coal is scarce. Niger does have ample reserves of uranium, although these are "energy" reserves in name only; the foreign exchange earned by exporting uranium helps to pay for oil and other imports. Similarly, the short-term prospects for traditional fuel substitution is limited, but the medium to long-term prospects are more hopeful.

Low energy-low development countries have a double energy crisis—in oil and in woodfuels. Both are serious: the former, for the modern transportation and industrial sectors; the latter, for the residential and agricultural sectors.

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Although the oil crisis is especially a problem for urban areas, the fuelwood crisis is a problem for both urban *and* rural areas. Everyone uses wood and charcoal for cooking, and shortages of either can have income effects in town and in the countryside. One estimate finds that urban populations in some low energy-low development countries use fuelwood and charcoal in the following percentages: 96, for Gambia; 80, for Sudan; and 82, for Tanzania.[48]

Energy Policy Futures: Alternatives to Imported Oil—These countries have had to rely on external borrowings and assistance to pay for conventional, nonconventional, and traditional fuel projects, most of which are supply-increasing, not demand-reducing, projects. In the Sahel region especially, external donors have actively promoted nonconventional energy projects such as solar stoves and photovoltaics. Table 7 shows the kind, number, and costs of energy projects in Senegal.

Conventional energy projects, mainly electric power, account for the lion's share of energy funds here as they do for low energy-high development countries. Renewable energy projects, however, receive a significant portion of this financing, reflecting the international donor community's growing concern with both the plight of the traditional African rural community and the market (and research and development) potential that such communities offer for importing solar technologies.

An interesting example of international cooperation in commercial energy (and other services) is the progress now being made by the Senegal River Basin Authority, a consortium of several West African countries (among them, Senegal, Mauritania, and Mali) that share the Senegal River. A multipurpose project for flood control, navigation, and irrigation, as well as hydroelectricity, that has been planned for a long time, was finally spurred on, in part, by the anticipated power supplies that will replace imported petroleum.

The search for oil is under way in a number of the low energy-low development countries that we have not been able to examine in detail here, including Chad, Somalia, Mali, and Sudan. Many wells have come up dry; others have uncovered small fields whose export potential is marginal. Some of these countries are landlocked and have weak infrastructures. They are finding that oil companies are reluctant to invest risk capital precisely because the exploration and production costs are high and the likelihood of finding export-

Table 7. Bilateral and Multilateral Energy Assistance (by project type) for Senegal

	Number	Amount (in millions)
Power	3	$94.880
Energy planning	4	3.604
Renewable energy	17	12.895
Forestry/Fuelwood	2	1.340
Total		112.719

Source: T. Hoffman and B. Johnson, *World Energy Triangle* (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1981) p. 32

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size oil fields negligible. One industry source estimated that an oil pipeline through a country like Chad would cost roughly $1 million per mile. Still, the shifting economics of oil makes potential returns on once marginal fields now attractive. For example, the Senegalese government, with World Bank support, is encouraging exploration of the heavy oils that lie off its coast. Senegal is also investing in an expansion of its refining capacity to lessen the need for distilled product imports, and to cut oil consumption, has raised gasoline prices to the consumer and has heavily taxed luxury automobile ownership. Nonetheless, Senegal had one of Africa's highest rates of growth for commercial energy consumption from 1974 to 1979.[49] Other countries, such as Tanzania, are also relying on the World Bank to support exploration and development of conventional sources such as oil, gas, and coal.

Efforts to develop renewable nonconventional and traditional energy resources for the rural and urban low-income consumer are especially important in the low energy-low development countries. Although many projects are still in the experimental stage, they bode well for the long term. Three commonly accepted priorities among donors and many government officials are:

1. Accelerated development of Africa's largely unharnessed water resources, to provide electric power, irrigation, and some oil-saving transport facilities
2. Large-scale fuelwood plantations, village and household woodlots, and other firewood supply and conservation programs, with investment priority equivalent to the closely related goal of food self-sufficiency
3. Expanded research, development, and demonstration of a wide range of decentralized renewable energy systems, including generous assistance for local manufacturing of component parts, to test and promote their effectiveness in meeting rural development needs[50]

Senegal has been able to attract the kinds of projects described in points 2 and 3, in part because of its unusually large number of skilled cadres. It has been especially active in developing public and private institutions to promote solar energy, and these institutions have received considerable international support. It maintains an energy research station in Dakar that tests equipment, from sand and clay stoves to solar water stills and photovoltaic cells. The problem in Senegal, as elsewhere, however, is to get the improved or new technologies out of the laboratories and into the traditional households.

HIGH ENERGY AFRICAN COUNTRIES

To round out our discussion of the effects of the oil wave as it swept across Africa, we will finish with a few words about the oil exporters. These include not only OPEC members—Nigeria, Gabon, Algeria, and Libya—but also net exporters like the Congo Republic, Angola, Egypt, and Tunisia.

Nigeria and Algeria, two of the major high energy-high development countries, are among the high capital absorbers within OPEC: that is, their large population size demands considerable capital investment in the most basic

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infrastructures—roads, buildings, education, and so on—and they easily spend as much money as they earn. At the other end of the African exporting spectrum are Gabon and Congo, high energy-low development countries, with populations so small (about 500,000 for Gabon, and one million for Congo), that "development" in the usual sense is not likely for some time. These countries typically have a small, modern capital, with the rest of the country highly forested and underdeveloped. Each kind of exporter has a very different long-term potential, with the long term better for Nigeria and Algeria, the high energy-high development countries.

Like the net oil importers, the exporting countries suffered from the indirect and secondary impacts of the import price flood. However, these negative results were somewhat offset by the gains derived from the OPEC-led price increases—with prices rising over 1,000 percent over the decade—from which they all benefited. Higher prices also led to increased exploration for additional oil and gas reserves that might not have occurred at the old price levels.

In Algeria and Nigeria, with their larger populations and more developed domestic markets, the government has actively explored other energy avenues, from nuclear to solar. There are specialized government agencies in each country working in these areas, and university studies and research abound. In Congo, Gabon, and Angola there is less commitment to nonconventional and traditional fuels.

African exporters share many domestic features with less energy-blessed African states. All are underdeveloped countries, despite a modern mining export sector. Nigeria's per capita GNP, for example, is only $670, less than that of the Ivory Coast, a non-oil-exporter. The principal energy gains of the exporters is an enhanced oil *supply* benefit, and the good fortune of having a high-priced export commodity.

Some Common Challenges of Energy Policy and Management

It is important to keep in mind that the absence of petroenergy resources did not prevent Japan, which imports 99.7 percent of its oil supplies, from becoming the world's second most powerful economy. An important lesson in this for Africa is that countries with strong economies can obtain sufficient energy supplies through oil imports and by developing domestic alternatives.

Africa is thus faced with the expensive dilemma of trying to continue to import expensive foreign oil as it tries to develop expensive domestic alternatives to imported oil. The World Bank has estimated that to expand domestic energy supplies to maintain economic growth, LDCs will have to invest about $40 billion a year through the end of the century. In Africa alone, the price tag on developing natural gas for domestic use will be $18.3 billion over the next decade. Some of this capital will be provided by private corporations. A recent survey of major U.S. companies by *Platts Oilgram News* found that annual investment in Africa will increase from $997 million in 1979 to almost $6 billion in 1982—the largest increase anywhere outside of the United States and Canada. Nevertheless, much of the cost of domestic energy development in oil, in other fuels, and facilitative infrastructures will be borne by the countries themselves.

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Following the 1973-74 crisis, all the African countries borrowed heavily to maintain not only their oil imports, but their more general consumption levels as well. In the future, however, all these countries will have to go beyond such short-term financial adjustments, to seek longer-term, more structural adaptations that will demand serious changes in consumption patterns and in political institutions and behavior.

In many ways, the institutional problems that African governments face in the energy sector are similar to those they face in other policy areas such as transportation or food. To respond successfully to the new international economic environment, all importers must begin to adjust their national political economies. Important changes must be made in the character and structure of domestic production, changes that turn away from its current energy intensiveness especially, and move in the direction of a general development strategy that is less oriented toward external tastes, buyers, and suppliers. Failing this, opportunities for internal creativity and the maximum use of the resources they do have will go unrealized.[51] The problem is not simply, perhaps not even mainly, a shortage of capital. A recent OECD study concludes that with gross domestic investment rates around 18 percent, augmented by foreign assistance, the principle constraint on development may be the effective use of available resources.[52] Basic improvement probably requires new energy institutions, a new self-consciousness about energy policy, and a clearer view of the links between energy and the economy than we have seen in Africa in the recent past.[53]

We believe there are five basic requirements for an effective energy policy that African countries must meet. *First*, most countries need to create, through merger of existing agencies or from scratch, a central energy ministry capable of initiating new programs, executing them, and acting as an advocate for them. This includes making other ministries sensitive to the energy implications of their own activities.

Second, such an agency, and especially its top personnel, must develop an integrated view of the energy sector as a whole. The power sector, for example, is still important, but its role might have to be redefined by the new ministry as one that complements the potential contributions of petroleum, coal, solar, water, or biomass sources of energy.

Third, governments need to build up their own knowledge and skills in two priority areas, the first of which is petroleum. In the past, when prices were low and supplies secure, responsibility for importing, buying, transporting, refining, and retailing petroleum and petroleum products was *de facto* assumed by the foreign oil companies. Now, when prices are high and supplies often precarious, governments are being forced to act directly with regard to both price and security. Exporting governments now more often insist on a state agency at the importing end, thereby limiting (though not eliminating) the major oil companies as go-betweens. To respond to these new import imperatives, and to be able to benefit from them, African countries need to have more of their people become knowledgeable about the petroleum industry. Also, the expansion of domestic oil and gas production requires people in government who "know the ropes" and can negotiate effectively with the international companies, who still have a corner on the expertise required for exploration and production.

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The other priority area, new and renewable energy sources, is important because there are resources that rural and low-income people can use right now, and that over the long run will probably provide the energy foundation for their economic development. As with petroleum, however, this is an area to which governments in Africa have given little or no attention. Woodfuels have been almost a free commodity. This is, of course, less and less the case, and African governments must now develop new and imaginative ways to organize institutions to provide energy supplies and services to rural people, including such conservation services as improved cooking stove technology. Clearly, appropriate extension services could play a large role in any effort like this.

Fourth, African policymakers must establish more effective links between the economic and planning sections and the energy agencies of the government. Economic planners and ministers of finance must be made more sensitive to the many impacts that industrial or agricultural investments may have on the energy budget, and energy planners (in government and in national firms) must be made more aware of the macroeconomic impacts of their energy decisions. Further, the operating ministries of housing, health, and industry must be made aware of the role that solar and other kinds of nonconventional energy technologies can play in their own areas of responsibility.

Fifth, governments must begin to reach across national borders to find solutions to problems that are regional in scope. These include integrating national power grids, common refinery or oil-purchasing arrangements, and regional R&D/commercialization centers for new technologies.

In thinking about appropriate policy and institutional responses, we need to keep in mind that a country's energy options will be shaped by its position within the energy-economy matrix. For example, low energy-high development countries tend to be richer in human resources than low energy-low development countries: one has only to look at the number of university graduates from Kenya and Zimbabwe and contrast it with the graduates in most of the Sahelian countries. The Ivory Coast's prosperity has enabled it to expand rapidly what was once a very weak educational base, and it is likely that this trend will continue. Given the differences in their national endowments—a historical situation—low energy-low development countries will need to devote considerable attention to new and renewable resources. Low energy-high development countries will also need people knowledgeable about such areas, and thus must also allocate education and staff resources between conventional energy domains (oil, gas, electricity) and other nonconventional ones, such as gasohol. Their skills base, however, is larger, and they have more abundant funds to meet their needs.

Fortunately, many of the international aid agencies and the governments themselves have begun to wake up to this problem of institutional development. The UN Conference on New and Renewable Energy signaled the need to develop an institutional framework within which energy investments and choices can be made. The World Bank has also launched studies of sixty countries that stress the planning-institutional and management aspects of energy in Africa. These studies suggest that, in some cases, before the Bank makes serious loans in this sector, the country receiving the loan be sufficiently organized so that imported capital, bilateral and multilateral foreign loans, and

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aid can really make a difference. The number of African officials now seeking support for institutional development from the developed countries, and the number on training courses overseas, perhaps testify to this new energy awareness.

All of the most extensive training courses and R&D will come to nothing, of course, if there is not the political will to improve the national energy balance. Thus far, only a handful of countries in Africa have begun serious efforts to change themselves for the long haul. Most African governments, like their counterparts on every other continent, have concentrated on decrying the occurrence of the crisis, and on borrowing abroad to pay for continually growing levels of imported oil. Their hope that the problem will go away before the loans fall due is a false one.

Relying on oil to fuel "development," defined as big cities and imported industries, may paradoxically lead to less development, defined as human well-being. It is this ludicrous equation—more money spent on oil imports to achieve development equals less development—that the new political and social strategies must redefine. Political will is necessary not only to build effective dikes against new floods of rising prices, but to build the economic development structures of Africa on higher ground as well.

* * *

The tidal floods that swept across Africa during the 1970s were a complex composition of energy and other cost elements. In most countries, the oil price rise was a turbulent wave sitting atop an already rising swell of import costs. In some countries, the 1972 and 1973 crude oil volumes and prices were moving in the same direction; in others, they were moving in opposite directions. When the 1973-74 wave hit—however it hit—different countries showed great diversity in their economic capacity to absorb some impacts, and in the agility, astuteness, and seriousness with which government officials and politicians responded to the crisis.

The more economically developed importing countries, typically devoting a higher percentage of their total imports (and export earnings) to oil, nonetheless were able to absorb the shocks. In the LDCs, it appears that while fewer people were directly affected by the *energy* impacts, the aggregate *economic* impacts, direct and indirect, worsened their already precarious position. The magnitude and scope of the impacts varied, as did the responses of African governments between 1973 and 1981; yet there were policy continuities in all countries during that period, and there will be similarities in the policy challenges they confront in the future. The first and most important such challenge is to face up to the need for fundamental adjustments.

Some African governments were able to moderate the impact of oil price rises through judicious purchasing and favorable government-to-government oil deals with the exporters. Thus far, however, they have failed to move seriously on the energy front as a whole. The most immediate official governmental response was to borrow from international sources to pay for oil imports, but essentially, there was no genuine domestic reorganization of the African energy sector. Government rhetoric, whether at home or on the international scene, cannot substitute for investments of capital, management, and political commitment.

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There was a very real lack of political commitment to a new domestic energy agenda during much of the 1970s, and many African countries still lack two other critical ingredients for an effective energy policy: capital and management skills. There simply is no escaping the fact that, pushed by the import price flood, energy systems in underdeveloped countries are now enormously expensive in terms of money and manpower. Whether the energy sources are conventional (oil, gas, and electric power), nonconventional (photovoltaic cells or gasohol), or traditional (fuels such as charcoal and wood, whose use has been improved)—each of these systems will cost poor African countries a great deal of money, which, like oil itself, is increasingly scarce and increasingly expensive.

What is clear is that the African and other non-oil-exporting LDCs face a very bleak economic outlook in the years ahead, owing, as Robert McNamara stated in September 1980, to a combination of oil price increases and continuing recession in the industrial markets. His predicted levels of oil bills were considerably higher than other available estimates at the time, including ones from the World Bank itself (see Table 4), and his estimates of the financing needs of the oil-importing LDCs therefore may also be somewhat higher. He may well be right, however, in predicting that these will rise from about $21.4 billion in 1978 to nearly $52 billion in 1980. More important was his admonition to the LDCs that, unlike its performance in the previous period, the real price of oil would not only continue at high levels but would in fact rise at perhaps a rate of 4 percent a year for the foreseeable future.

What makes the situation particularly distressing for the LDCs now is that their prospects for borrowing their way through even a short-lived crisis are greatly reduced, and the crisis itself clearly is to be long term. The poorest countries, which in Africa currently have over 140 million people to provide for, are likely to experience a decline in their absolute levels of monetized income of about 0.3 percent a year during 1981-85. Growth for the other African states will be virtually nil. All these countries are now considered poor risks by lending institutions. Not only is OPEC assistance less than is needed, but it is falling. So too are the aid levels of the OECD countries, which, in any case, are considerably smaller a percentage of their GNP. Currently, of course, the United States is threatening to renege even on its commitments to the multilateral lending institutions, and has indicated an unwillingness to support a special lending facility to encourage energy-source diversification project development in the LDCs. The importing countries are already so exposed to debt and debt-service burdens, that major private lenders are showing increasing reluctance to further extend themselves. The multilateral agencies will have to pick up the slack, but will have to borrow from OPEC countries to do it. The sacrifice to pay for current and accumulated import costs is being pushed onto future generations at a level and rate that seem unconscionable.

Africa is even less favorably positioned to solve its energy and import cost and balance-of-payment problems than the rest of the world's LDCs. The richer countries will have to help, not just the OPEC countries, which already do more than they are given credit for, especially when we consider that much of the multilateral support, and even of the private lending institutional support, is based on their inputs. OPEC and OECD both can and must do more than they are doing (and the industrial world is lagging in meeting its duty of support even

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more than the OPEC countries) to ease the financing strain associated with the oil and nonoil price increases, and in continuing to diversify their energy sources as well as their economic resources. For both, the advantage is the same—a basis for healthy economic partnership between these three worlds.

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[32]See UNCTAD *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics*, 1980 Supplement, TD/STAT.9 Table 7.2. The average index of quantity of imports for twenty-two of the larger African states (including North Africa, but excluding Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, and excluding Zimbabwe) fell by 21 percent from 1978 to 1979. The index is related to imports in 1975.

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Africa—Challenges and Responses: A Foreign Policy Perspective

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE of a continent as beset with controversy as Africa. Even its name has certain controversial implications. Is Africa a racial term?—as Ali Mazrui has argued. If so, perhaps the continent should be known as Africa-Arabia. Or, would Africas be more suitable?—a name suggested by Alfred Silbert.[1] By way of contrast, no one today uses "Asia" to suggest a continental consciousness. Rather, one speaks quite explicitly of the Japanese, the Chinese, the Vietnamese, and so on, each designation being clearly understood to pertain to the characteristics of that particular national identity alone.[2] And although "Latin America" evokes a collective image, it nevertheless provokes no controversy, for each nation of Central and South America is perceived as a distinct entity, with a distinct past, present, and future.

Is Africa one? Which Africa? Such questions crop up repeatedly when one speaks of Africa. And it is no wonder, for as a continent, Africa is distinguished most of all by what can only be called its pluralities. *First*, in contrast to other continents, Africa has a multitude of states—fifty-four, compared to thirty-six in Europe, twenty-three in Asia, and twenty-eight in the Americas. *Second*, the level of political maturity, defined in terms of years of independent existence, covers a wide range—from such nominal ex-colonies as Ethiopia (1936–41) and Liberia (1847), through the states that emerged in the 1960s, such as Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and others, to those that achieved independence in the 1970s, such as Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Not to be overlooked, of course, are the two states that await liberation—Namibia and South Africa. *Third*, economic conditions in Africa run the gamut from the poorest of the poor to the "middle powers"[3] in terms of gross national product, per capita income, and level of industrialization. *Fourth*, the continent is culturally diverse, almost bewilderingly so. The major divisions of Arab/Berber, Negroid, and white are subdivided into Nilotes, Bantu, and others. Added to these are further subdivisions along national (ethnic) lines. *Fifth*, neither the capitalist nor the socialist camp can put *all* of Africa safely in its column, for African states have shown a striking independence of mind in choosing an ideological system for their economic development, and are less rigid in the application of these ideologies, more willing to experiment. Some, such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, have opted for mixed economies, and this middle-of-the-road stance is reflected in their foreign policy objectives,

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which favor neither East nor West in the struggle for world domination.[4] Then there are those which are committed to capitalism for their domestic development, and to its triumph worldwide as well, such as Liberia, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Kenya. Again, some states, such as Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, have chosen socialism and actively seek its success through their foreign policy objectives. Finally, there is the case of Tanzania, which is committed to socialism domestically, but which quite clearly understands that neither the socialist nor the capitalist camp is as selfless as it purports to be in its international objectives. Thus, in its foreign policy, Tanzania steadily steers a middle course between the two. *Sixth,* and finally, the Tower of Babel pales beside the myriad of languages in Africa—some, vestiges of the colonial past; others, spoken from time immemorial by innumerable native tribes. Taken all together, Africa's many diversities give to Pliny the Elder's dictum, "*Ex Africa, semper aliquid novi,*" the ring of everlasting truth.

Such diversity, however, should not blind us to a very real African collective identity, although it may often be to the advantage of one country or another to deny its existence. As a comparison, to say that Christ stopped at Eboli[5] would undoubtedly lead to various kinds of sociologic, economic, even domestic political deductions about Italy—but it would certainly not lead one to question the existence of an Italian "state." Such a comparison, it will perhaps be argued, is not entirely valid, because Italy is a state and Africa is a *continent* of states. Yet particular factors that exist in Africa, and in the Third World generally, lead Westerners to draw certain negative conclusions, while the existence of these same factors in Europe and other parts of the world does not as inevitably and inexorably do so. *Intellectual* colonialism, it would seem, continues to survive long after political colonialism has been laid to rest.

Such intellectual colonialism can clearly be seen in reference to territorial boundaries in Africa. These were imposed on Africans during the colonial era as the continent was carved up, artificially cutting across subnational (ethnic) groups. Yet although such artificial boundaries are of course not unique to Africa, the misconception that they are simply one more case of something "new" coming out of Africa dominates the literature.[6] Apart from Australia, most boundaries in the world *are* artificial—the result of wars, treaties, and so on—and for the most part, boundaries within Latin America, Europe, and Asia also cut across subnational groups. Yet this fact is largely ignored. The present artificial partition of Central Europe arising out of World War I and World War II is in fact much more recent, and hence "newer," than the legal partition of Africa, which dates back to 1884-85.

Western Europe too has its share of political, economic, cultural, and ideological pluralities, yet this has not prevented the emergence of a distinctive West European viewpoint on most international issues nor the emergence of a Western Alliance consensus from time to time on these same kinds of issues. Diplomats who, for various reasons, disagree with a particular resolution of the forty-seven member Organization of African Unity often point to the few dissenting African states as proof that there is no African viewpoint on a specific issue. Yet what is important is not the misconception of any one diplomat—or even a host of diplomats—about a collective African identity, but whether

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Africans perceive themselves as evolving a collective personality to protect their continent's international interests. Of equal importance is to determine whether their perception of "collective" means "identical" or "aggregational." Obviously, a collectivity arising out of a basketful of one kind of fruit—similar or identical national interests—as opposed to a basketful of dissimilar fruits—an aggregation—would suggest at the very least the evolution of a collective African identity at the international level.[7]

The African states are unquestionably aware of the pluralities that characterize their continent. The crucial question, however, is: Do the African states perceive of these as impediments to the coalescence of mutual interests and the evolution of a common role and a common stand in international affairs? More important, *have* they developed a common personality, have they evolved and articulated shared interests in this arena?

To a great extent, this is a behavioral, not an ideological, issue. Slavery and colonialism, which indescribably and immeasurably damaged almost every aspect of African life—including the African psyche—had yet another consequence, one that is still operative today. Nothing creates the sense of "us" as effectively as the existence of the "other." This is especially so when it is the "other" who makes the distinction, and does so to "our" detriment. At which precise moment did the consciousness of being "African," as distinct from being Fulani or Ashanti or Mandinke, arise? Almost instantly, with the first encounter between Europeans and blacks, according to Julius Nyerere, president of Tanzania: "Africans, all over the continent, without a word being spoken either from one individual to another or from one African country to another, looked at the European, looked at one another, and knew that in relation to the European they were one."[8] Yet there is no evidence that a system of alliances was built up to resist the early attempts at slavery and colonization.[9] In Alex Haley's "historo-fiction," blacks boarded the slaveships as Fulanis and Mandikes, and through the travails and suffering of their trans-Atlantic voyage, were transformed into Africans.[10] To the contrary, the slave traders, by and large, found it easy to pit one group of Africans against another.

Almost certainly, Pan-Africanism—the consciousness that "we are all Africans," and the political consciousness of unity in opposition to others—started simultaneously as both an ideology and a movement among Africans in the diaspora and among those in Africa.[11] Clearly, not nationalism, but *supra*nationalism—the consciousness of an identity of interest that cuts across ethnic lines and colonial boundaries—is the preeminent development growing out of black-white contact in Africa. Early examples of this phenomenon were the National Congress of British West Africa and the West African Students' Union. That movements and parties catering to local interest developed is without dispute.[12] Yet supranational and subnational movements together brought about the triumph of national movements and parties that were themselves hybrids of supranationalism and nationalism.

When Kwame Nkrumah in 1958, fresh from his anticolonial victory, summoned a conference of independent African states[13] and an All African Peoples Conference,[14] the legitimacy of the Pan-African ideal that motivated these conclaves was implicitly accepted. Such was the hold of supranationalism.

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It set the framework for the debate among the African states, guaranteeing that it would not be on *whether* an African international institution would take form, but what that form would be. Out of this supranationalism, within three years of the mass independence of African states, the Organization of African Unity was born. Unlike the Organization of American States, which was built around an imposed external order, the OAU was a genuine and autochthonous Pax-Africana.[15]

It may be well to pause briefly at this point to say something of the inclusion of the Arab states into the OAU. Granted that Pan-Africanism is an outgrowth of supranationalism and that supranationalism is in turn a consequence of the contact between blacks and whites in Africa—how, then, do the Arab states fit into the OAU? According to Mazrui, Africa is an Afro-Arab continent.[16] Does Pan-Africanism then include Pan-Arabism? Logically, yes; politically, no. The OAU did indeed call for a break in diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973. But the OAU resolution is not in itself sufficient evidence to prove that Pan-Arabism in fact controls Pan-Africanism, for until 1973, the OAU had steadfastly refused to accede to Arab demands on the Middle-East question. The OAU resolution responded to a specific situation—the Israeli occupation of Egyptian territory—and was part of the worldwide recognition that Israel was no longer the underdog in the Middle East.

It was in fact the United Nations that acted as the catalyst for the inclusion of Arab states in the OAU. The history of African-Arab interaction, a history written in slavery, trade, and religion, predates European colonization of Africa by several centuries. In 1956, seven years before the formation of the OAU, President Nasser spoke of Egypt as the gateway to Africa and the gatekeeper of the African political soul.[17] But what rhetoric could not accomplish, interaction between the Arab and the African states did. Working together within the United Nations on such problems as the Middle-East crisis, the crisis in the Congo in 1960, and the general problems of decolonization, the Arab states—especially Egypt—and the African states—especially Ethiopia, Liberia, and after 1957, Ghana—discovered a community of interests that made the inclusion of the Arab states into the OAU a painless political decision.[18]

If the formation of the OAU in 1963 represented a victory for the Fabian, functionalist wing of the Pan-Africanist movement, Article II of its Charter represented the articulation of the collective (identical) interests of African states. It put into five brief points all of the national and international aspirations of Africa:

- To promote the unity and solidarity of the African states
- To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the people of Africa
- To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and independence
- To eradicate all forms of colonialism in Africa
- To promote international cooperation, having due regard for the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

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Africa unquestionably achieved a considerable success in institutionalizing its consciousness of unity—yet, how has this affected Africa's international relations? At independence and throughout the ensuing years, crucial issues have engendered diverse views, oftentimes so widely divergent as to threaten the polarization of Africa. Yet on each occasion, the OAU, after full debate, reached a consensus or a majority decision. This came to be known as "the African position," and its adoption not only influenced events on the continent, but usually had international consequences as well.

CONTINENTAL

So central are the issues that come before the OAU, that member-states seldom abstain from voting, except on a technicality of courtesy. This happened, for example, during the special OAU summit on Angola in 1976. Because of their special roles, Ethiopia—the host country—and Uganda—whose leader Idi Amin, was chairman—refused to vote in what was a tie vote. Once the summit was over, however, Ethiopia quickly declared her support for one side.

Usually, there are four possible divisions on an issue: (1) those who favor it strongly; (2) those whose support is half-hearted; (3) those who oppose it lukewarmly; and (4) those strongly against it. After an OAU decision is made, the tendency is for those in the middle categories to become firmly committed to the decision. Domestic or foreign pressure may often be the reason these countries have taken the middle position. Accepting an OAU decision out of loyalty to the organization, therefore, is an easy way out of an uncomfortable position. Those in the fourth category can either accept the majority decision; disobey it clandestinely, while publicly denying that they are doing so; or disobey it openly and defiantly. As I will show, only a handful of African countries have chosen the third option.

INTERNATIONAL

The existence of an OAU position has special utility in the international arena. To begin with, for those states and individuals who genuinely find African issues too complex to comprehend fully, the OAU position is obviously helpful in identifying the African viewpoint.

Again, certain political problems in the Third World are still—unhappily—seen in cold war terms. Thus another's position can easily be discredited by giving it an ideological label opposite from one's own. If you are anticommunist, for example, and also anti-MPLA *(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)*, you can vilify the MPLA by labeling it "communist." Such a move can be successfully neutralized, however, by demonstrating that the MPLA position on a particular issue coincides with the OAU position. Thus it would be an African, *not* a communist, position.

Taking the OAU position can also be helpful to political pressure groups in certain Western democratic societies, where attempts are often made to discredit groups that support African liberation movements by portraying them as "hapless tools of communism." That the OAU exists, and takes unequivocal positions on African issues and causes, enables groups sympathetic to these

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causes to use the OAU position in rebutting charges based on ideological grounds.

Often, non-African countries, for reasons of their own foreign policy objectives, disagree with an OAU consensus. When they do, they take one of the following courses: they deny that an African consensus exists, or misrepresent the views of those African states who only half-heartedly support the decision, or present the view of the minority with whom they agree as being the authentic African view. The OAU position often frustrates these attempts.

On the broader international stage—the United Nations—the OAU itself, rather than any position it takes, clearly influences Africa's international relations. Under its Charter, the United Nations theoretically has jurisdiction over any matter that is not subject to the domestic jurisdictional clause of Article 2(7). Because of the existence of the OAU,[19] however, and its jurisdictional claim over *all* African disputes, African states have been encouraged *not* to take their grievances to the United Nations. Furthermore, the secretary-general, by arguing that the OAU is the proper forum for African disputes, often successfully resists the pressure exerted on him to bring such problems to the United Nations.

Would the terms of any UN resolution on an African problem be enriched by the great variety of outlooks that would be brought to it?—as it is sometimes claimed. Would its airing in the glare of international publicity and in the light of so much presumed objectivity neutralize the passions surrounding the dispute, enhancing the chances for settlement? Perhaps not. For the United Nations more often than not is the jousting field for the antagonists in the cold war. This, together with the fact that no member-state can act as the world's conscience—for none is unblemished—means that an extra dimension is often added to, and thereby intensifies, disputes brought before the United Nations. The existence of the OAU has to some extent helped to insulate African disputes from these unhelpful and unwelcome intrusions.

As illustrations of these points, I shall consider three crisis issues among the many that have faced the OAU since its inception: the civil war in Nigeria, dialogue with South Africa, and the Angolan civil war.

THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

At the outset of the war in 1967, Nigeria took the position that it was a domestic affair entirely and that the OAU should not interfere. Biafra took the opposite view. But the war had more or less continental implications, because the same fissiparous tendencies that underlay the conflict in Nigeria existed in other African states.[20] Several of these states felt compelled, therefore, to support publicly the government of Nigeria, hoping thereby to bolster their own governments.

At the 1968 Kinshasa summit of the OAU, the Nigerian crisis was not discussed formally, but a resolution condemning secession—in effect, supporting the Nigerian side—was adopted by acclamation. Two interpretations can be given to this action. Either the OAU, following the UN norm, construed "discussion" and "appeal" as noninterference,[21] or it read the noninterference

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clause of Article III as a prohibition against member-states rather than the organization itself.

The OAU never wavered in its support for the Nigerian side. Eventually, Tanzania and the Ivory Coast recognized Biafra. But despite both increasing criticism of Nigeria by some African states such as Senegal, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Zambia, and some covert support for Biafra by Benin (then Dahomey), Tanzania and the Ivory Coast stood alone in their support of Biafra. The OAU position held until the end.

The OAU position had two consequences in the international community. Enormous domestic pressures to take "humanitarian" pro-Biafran positions were brought to bear on several West European governments. Yet, regardless of how strongly they felt about the humanitarian aspects of the war, few European governments believed that the Biafrans would be victorious. But to have openly supported Nigeria for this reason would have been a cynical display of realpolitik. Hence, most European governments hid behind the pro-Nigerian OAU position.

The pro-Biafran lobby then sought to bring the issue before the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations provides only two routes to a UN hearing. First, a state or a group of states can bring an issue before any UN organ; none, however, stepped forward in the Biafran case. Second, the secretary-general, under Article 99 of the Charter, has the power to bring a matter before the world body. He declined to do so in this case, arguing instead that the OAU was not only competent to deal with the matter, but that it was already doing so.[22]

DIALOGUE WITH SOUTH AFRICA

In 1971 the Ivory Coast spearheaded a move in the OAU to begin a dialogue with South Africa to end apartheid there.[23] After an acrimonious debate, carried on in an atmosphere that was intensely confrontational, the OAU voted overwhelmingly (23 to 6, with 4 abstentions) in favor of a resolution prohibiting the organization itself and its member-states from engaging in dialogue with South Africa. The Ivory Coast, Malawi, and to some extent Kenya have openly defied the OAU on this issue. Several other states, especially neighbors of South Africa, such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Zambia, continue to maintain their extensive economic links with that country, although they are extremely apologetic about these connections. More important, these ties have not weakened their commitment to the continental anticolonial, antiracist crusade. The rest of Africa has scrupulously carried out the OAU resolution.

Despite the lack of disciplinary or enforcement provisions in its Charter, the legitimacy and power of the OAU are unquestioned. This case demonstrates that amply. The OAU refusal to sanction dialogue with South Africa obliged those states whose economic survival depended on their ties with South Africa to separate economic from political considerations. Second, even for the handful of states who were convinced that dialogue with South Africa ought to continue, the prohibition on economic relations with South Africa was crucial. The OAU resolution effectively blocked any hope of recruiting more African states to the

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cause. And without a majority of the member-states converted to the cause, the OAU was powerless to influence the course of African-South African relations.

THE ANGOLAN CRISIS[24]

In a nutshell, the Angolan crisis was precipitated by the power vacuum left by Portugal when, at Angolan independence, it failed to hand over its power—that is, to grant legitimacy—to any one of the three nationalist groups, the MPLA, the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). The OAU thus faced the choice of a coalition government made up of these groups, or a government headed exclusively by the MPLA, which was widely regarded as the most effective of the three. The United States was ostensibly in favor of a coalition government, but in reality, it wanted to keep out the MPLA, which it regarded as controlled by Marxist elements at home and by Moscow from abroad. Nigeria, on the other hand, viewed the financial and military assistance given the MPLA by the Soviet Union as simple opportunism—a move to fill the vacuum left by the US policy of denying military assistance to African liberation movements.

The OAU followed its usual policy in these cases—to work for a government of national unity. It did this with the full support of the government of Nigeria. In July 1975, however, when a new government took power in Nigeria, a reassessment of Nigeria's foreign policy led to the decision to break with the OAU by recognizing the MPLA as the government of Angola. It hoped then to convince the OAU to do likewise.

What was—and perhaps should have remained—an intra-African dispute became a diplomatic battle royal between Nigeria and the United States for the political soul of the OAU. An unprecedented number of diplomatic missions were sent out both by Nigeria and the United States to African states, often crossing paths, appealing, pressuring, and promising—the United States going one step further by attempting to discredit Nigeria[25]—all aimed at persuading other African states to adopt one position or the other. The dispute, perhaps inevitably, spilled over into Nigerian-US relations, plunging them to bitter, almost inconceivable depths.

At the 1976 first special OAU summit held on Angola, at Addis Ababa, the OAU was split equally between pro-MPLA and anti-MPLA supporters. It was, in effect, paralyzed. Yet there was some small Pan-African victory even in this: the OAU had, for the first time, resisted the overtures of a superpower to endorse its position on an African issue. The summit also marked the emergence of Nigeria as a regional power, because although the OAU was the target, Nigeria and the United States were the two countries at odds. Nigeria, finding strength in both arrogance and national pride, chose to compete with the world's most powerful country in asserting its foreign policy coming-of-age,[26] and carried in its train a large number of other African states. The majority's recognition of the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola thus assured its membership in the OAU.[27]

The US tactic had all along been to paint the members of the MPLA and its supporters as Communists. But this tactic lost credibility when Angola gained admission into the OAU. The overwhelming majority of African states are

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conservative, and to label their action in this case as communist-inspired seemed at the very least to be illogical. The OAU action also buttressed the criticism of US policy by its allies in Europe and Latin America (and by those at home), who could now claim that by recognizing the MPLA as the government of Angola, they were not acting to promote communist interests, but simply aligning themselves with the views of Africans—reasoning that was difficult for Washington to fault. After all, to do so would be to claim to know what was best for the Africans better than the Africans themselves!

Clearly, the OAU is the indispensable ingredient in the evolution of an African viewpoint. Were it not for its voting procedure, where lukewarm support, influenced by the majority decision, often turns into firm commitment, the views of some African states could have been easily misrepresented. And without the OAU, the orchestration of visits to Washington by the handful of states supporting the US position would have succeeded in passing off the views of the minority as the majority opinion.

Angola's admission to the United Nations, the opposition of the United States notwithstanding, followed as a matter of course its admission to the OAU. In fact, the OAU succeeded in taking the initiative away from the United States—and isolating it—in the United Nations over this issue. Let us look for a moment at a comparable conflict in the United Nations: a dispute over who was to represent the government of the Congo in the world body in 1960, three years before the birth of the OAU. The result of the rancorous, acrimonious debate in the General Assembly—the African states being bitterly divided among themselves—was the recognition of the US-backed Kasavubu government. It is easy to predict that had the OAU been in existence then, such a debate would never have taken place. Further, the OAU would have gained the support of the rest of the Third World and the Scandinavian countries.

"NONSUCCESSES"

At this point, one could legitimately ask whether we are not seeing here only favorable evidence from selected success stories. What about Chad, for instance, or Western Sahara? It is my contention that these countries *cannot* be termed failures for the OAU, for the OAU does not claim to resolve conflicts. The Cubans, *not* the OAU, provided the military muscle that put the MPLA into power in Angola. Nigeria's military machine, *not* the OAU, won the civil war in that country. Rather than resolve conflicts, the OAU insulates them from non-African factors, and in doing so, ensures their resolution by sheer exhaustion—of either or both parties.

Furthermore, in its role as mediator or conciliator, the direction in which the OAU is leaning can often be discerned. A careful analysis of the OAU position on Western Sahara shows subtle condemnation of the Moroccan position. Hence its recommendation for a referendum to allow the inhabitants to exercise their right of self-determination—in effect, checking Morocco's drive to annex the territory.

On its face, the Chadian civil war is difficult to present as a success for the OAU. Yet the longest surviving government that Chad has known since 1975 was set up in Lagos under the auspices of the OAU in 1979. This government is

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also the most broadly based one that Chad has had since independence in 1960. Although the OAU has not fully succeeded in eliminating France as a factor in Chadian politics, it *has* succeeded in fielding a peacekeeping force in Chad.

If we were to judge the OAU by the same standards applied to the UN, the EEC, the OAS, and NATO, we would find that it has done just as well, if not much better, in handling its problems. We have only to recall Cyprus, the Middle-East crisis, the India-Pakistan crisis, El Salvador, and other such critical world problems to appreciate this. Were we to judge it as if it were a nation-state, however, with all the powers of coercion available to such an entity, certainly the OAU could be faulted. But how valid would that judgment be?

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

For most of this essay, I have focused on the institutional mechanism for articulating African foreign policy objectives within and beyond Africa. To some extent, I have sought to base an explanation for the success of African foreign policy objectives in the existence of the OAU. We should not overlook, however, other foreign policy considerations to explain the success of these objectives.

One great, overriding concern is that with racism—especially apartheid—and colonialism. This concern is quite obvious when one analyzes the speeches and resolutions introduced by African leaders in the United Nations. It explains, perhaps, the unity of action and purpose shown by the African states on issues that come before the OAU. Regardless of the original reluctance of some Francophone African leaders to seek independence, there is no doubt that the legitimacy of all independent African states is buttressed by radical and anticolonial values. Even the most reactionary and repressive of African governments will, for domestic consumption, at least, pay lip-service to the anticolonial struggle. A similar argument can be made for the antiracist cause.

That most of the issues involving Africa to come before the United Nations are based on antiracism and anticolonialism accounts in large measure for the solidarity of African states within the world body. This also explains the support that African causes command there. Countries in Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean who have been victims of colonialism, and who are still at times targets of racism, are extremely sympathetic to African causes. The Scandinavian countries—luckily without a colonial past and with no worldwide commitments to bias their decisions—have proved receptive to African causes at the United Nations. Western nations have also not been totally impervious to them. Perhaps this is owing to the guilt complex arising out of their colonial and racist past; perhaps more, because these causes are not without merit.

African causes in the United Nations are also the beneficiaries of the US-USSR cold war rivalry, which led to the intense courting of African states, with the superpowers often supporting African causes in an attempt to outsmart—or not be outsmarted by—the other. This rivalry tends to radicalize conservative African states, since it would be impolitic to be "outradicalized" on an African cause by a non-African state.

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The support that African causes have received in the United Nations can unquestionably be described as successful. Is this because the African states have achieved their objectives? The answer is partly yes. The intractable problem of colonialism in Zimbabwe and the former Portuguese empire has been solved. The South African strangehold on Namibia has been loosened considerably. And there is an enforced UN arms embargo against South Africa. In another vein, the 1962 General Assembly Resolution regarding permanent sovereignty over natural resources gave legitimacy to the concept of the New International Economic Order. These achievements have not come about on a one-to-one basis through African pressure. Rather, African pressure at the United Nations created a general atmosphere conducive to the achievement of these objectives. For example, the combination of the liberation wars in Africa and the military coup d'état in Portugal led to the decolonization of the Portuguese territories in Africa. But this could not have happened without the seemingly endless debates and resolutions in the United Nations that demoralized Portugal and isolated it from the rest of the world.

African states, of course, have not achieved all of their objectives, nor will they in the near future. These will come, as for many other nations, only with the passage of time. But the continent will hold to its course steadily, and its recent record gives confidence to those who believe that its major goals will be accomplished.

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[2]This does not ignore attempts being made to foster the spirit of Asianism. See Jusuf Wanandi, "Third World Conflict and International Security: A Third World Perspective," paper presented at the 22nd Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Stresa, Italy, September 11-14, 1980.

[3]For a discussion of the concept of "middle powers," see my paper, "The International Power System and the Emergence of the Threshold Powers" (unpublished), delivered at the inaugural conference of the World Association of International Relations scholars, Athens, 1979.

[4]See my article, "Nigeria's Position in Africa and in the World," *Osterreich ische Zeitschrift Fur Au Benpolitik* 4/80, pp. 343-48. See especially p. 343 for the refinement of the nonalignment doctrine.

[5]Carlo Levi, *Christ Stopped at Eboli* (Harrap, 1976).

[6]See *African Boundary Problems*, edited by C. G. Widstrand (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969).

[7]This is turning the theory of functional integration on its head. Plans for a common market or economic community always assume that economic interests are complementary and not identical. The evolution of a true collective interest, on the other hand, assumes that the interests are identical. Hence, if the five states in an organization are all cocoa producers, it will be easier to evolve a collective interest with regard to the price of cocoa, whereas if two are cocoa producers, two zinc producers, and one a petroleum producer, the collective interest would only be collective in the sense of a potpourri of everything produced—more of a shopping list.

[8]Julius Nyerere, "Africa's Place in the World," Symposium on Africa, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts, 1970, p. 149.

[9]"Africans did not in every instance take up arms against the whites who during the nineteenth century began systematically to acquire territory. In many areas Africans were understandably naive, and became aware of the nature of the European incursion only after it was too late to prevent the elaboration of an apparatus of administration. Elsewhere Africans perceived the situation correctly, but withdrew instead of attacking. Or, as a result of the defeats inflicted on African armies by Europeans, they negotiated in order to avoid further conflict." Robert Rotberg and Ali Mazrui, *Protest and Power in Black Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. xviii.

[10]Alex Haley, *Roots* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976).

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[11]Cf. Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism* (London: Pall Mall, 1962); C. F. Andrain, "Pan-African Movement: The Search for Organisation and Community", *Phylon* no. 23 (Spring 1962): 5-17; and my *Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience* (Ibadan: University Press, 1974).

[12]Rotberg and Mazrui, *Protest and Power in Black Africa,* pp. 145-54.

[13]See Chimelu Chime, *Integration and Politics among African States: Limitations and Horizons of Mid-term Theorising*, (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977), especially pp. 143-46.

[14]Ibid., pp. 146-50.

[15]A. A. Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967).

[16]A. A. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1977), p. 1.

[17]A. Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Buffalo, N.Y.: Smith, Keynes and Marshall Publications, 1959).

[18]Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations,* pp. 130-55.

[19]It is debatable whether the OAU is a regional organization under the ambit of Article 55 of the UN Charter. Although the uncertainty is a matter of legal importance, it has had very little practical effect. See T. O. Elias, *The Charter of the O.A.U., American Journal of International Law* 59 (2) (April 1965): 243-64.

[20]See John De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), and my book *The British Press and The Nigerian Civil War: The Godfather Complex* (Ibadan: University Press, 1979), NIIA Monograph Series no. 2, pp. 1-28.

[21]See my article "The Organisation of African Unity and the Concept of Noninterference in Internal Affairs of Member-States," *British Yearbook of International Law*, 1974, pp. 379-400.

[22]Statement by Secretary-General U-Thant, "If the Heads of African States have asked all members of the United Nations and all members of the O.A.U. to refrain from any action likely to endanger the peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria, I do not see how the UN member-states, or for that matter the Secretary-General, can be actively involved." UN Monthly Chronicle, no. 6, February, 1969, p. 39.

[23]The issue was earlier resolved by the Lusaka Manifesto, which had stated, "We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to violence against human dignity which is perpetuated now by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of the struggle, even at the cost of some compromise."

[24]For a more extensive discussion, see my *Angola and Nigeria: A Study in the National Interest*, Geneva 1975, Graduate Institute of International Studies Conferences, no. 16; and Abiodun Sotunmbi, *Nigeria's Recognition of the MPLA Government of Angola: A Case-Study in Decision-Making and Implementation* NIIA Monograph Series no. 9, 1981.

[25]A rumor floated within one of the British political parties about a Soviet payoff in gold to a Nigerian leader, in exchange for MPLA's recognition, was given very wide circulation in the world press. The disinformation was later traced to the CIA. The British politician most responsible for disseminating the news in London lost his political career later on owing to a sordid criminal case. U.S. activities in the Angolan dispute are the background for the Clark Amendment, which imposed congressional curbs on U.S. "black-bag" activities in Angola.

[26]Even though the Cuban troops were there, victory was still not assured at this point, having only just cleared Luanda. Hence the Cuban military presence is not responsible for the historical phenomenon just analyzed.

[27]Only Senegal has refused to recognize the MPLA.

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HEDLEY BULL

The West and South Africa

I

THE UNITED STATES under the Reagan Administration has come to align itself more closely with the Republic of South Africa. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, has said that the United States "seeks to build a more constructive relationship with South Africa, one based on shared interests, persuasion and improved communication."[1] The hectoring, scolding tone that the Carter Administration adopted in relation to Pretoria has been dropped. Gone is the emphasis on meeting the aspirations of nonwhite South Africans for human rights, and on "viewing African problems in North-South terms rather than in East-West terms." Instead, there is a new stress on meeting the Soviet threat in Southern Africa, on the West's stake in the South African economy, and on interests shared with South Africa in nonviolent constitutional change, in the prosperity generated by the free enterprise system, and in resistance to international terrorism. On September 1, 1981, the United States cast the only negative vote against a UN Security Council resolution condemning South Africa's incursion into Angola, France voting for the resolution and Britain abstaining (it is widely believed that the incursion itself took place with U.S. encouragement or connivance). In ruling circles in South Africa, there is evident satisfaction that the bleak winter of the Carter Administration has drawn to a close, and a new springtime has broken out, in which the policy of the leading Western power is being shaped by persons whose view of world affairs has much in common with their own.

It is true that the Reagan Administration's South Africa policy, insofar as we can yet speak of its having one, is not wholly new, but in some respects a return to the line followed during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Then, also, the United States (following the option selected by Henry Kissinger from among those set out in the now celebrated White House study of African policy, NSSM 39) chose to give priority to its "tangible interests" in South Africa, Rhodesia, and the then Portuguese-ruled territories of Angola and Mozambique, as against the political interests it had in distancing itself from them. Then, also, a Republican administration was reacting against the priority its Democratic predecessors had assigned to satisfying the expectations of black African states and of black American voters; the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations' Africa policies, like those of the Carter Administration,

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reflected the previous involvement of some of its leading personalities in the civil rights movement. The Nixon and Ford Administrations also sought to moderate public disapprobation of South Africa's racial policies in the interest of a policy of "communication" with South Africa.

Yet it is also true that on the most fundamental issues of policy toward South Africa, there is continuity between the Carter and Reagan Administrations. Despite its rhetorical disapproval of South Africa's internal policies, President Carter's government maintained the economic links that are vital to the white minority regime's survival, doing nothing to discourage investment in the country, and in 1978 used its veto to defeat a UN Security Council resolution proposing mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. On the other hand, the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement," a policy of engagement in the whole region and not just in South Africa, does not apparently mean that the United States will cease to press for reform of South Africa's racial policies, or that it will abandon the mandatory arms embargo that the Security Council imposed on South Africa in 1977, although the embargo will be interpreted more flexibly. Indeed, Crocker has denied that the new policy involves any "tilt" toward South Africa, and his much quoted statement that "in South Africa it is not our task to choose between black and white" clearly does not mean that the United States will be neutral as between the apartheid policy and the goal of extending the rights of black South Africans.[2]

Thus it would be wrong to assume that the Reagan Administration is extending unqualified support to the government of South Africa, or giving it carte blanche to work out its own internal policies and approaches to neighboring countries. Whatever the ideological inclinations of President Reagan and his entourage, certain realities will have to be taken into account: the requirements of America's relations with black African states, for which a country's policy toward racist South Africa is the litmus test determining their own attitudes to that country; the black American vote, potentially (even if by no means yet actually) as crucial a determinant of American foreign policy as the Jewish-American vote, and now being mobilized more effectively than ever before in relation to African issues, a situation that President Reagan cannot afford to ignore; a Congress still equipped with vast powers with which to frustrate the presidential conduct of foreign policy, augmented during the post-Vietnam assault on "the Imperial Presidency," and not yet discarded; a public opinion widely said to be less supportive of the president in matters of foreign policy than domestic policy, soon to be tested in the 1982 midterm elections; the views of the West European allies, whose economic stake in Southern Africa is greater than that of the United States, whose influence in the region is still large, and whose dissent from some of the main features of President Reagan's foreign policy has now been clearly established.

Nevertheless, there has been a sharp change at least in the style and rhetoric of U.S. policy toward South Africa, for which a price will have to be paid in terms of America's standing in Black Africa and in the Third World at large. Those who are shaping U.S. policy appear fully cognizant of this fact: "We fully recognize," Crocker has said, "that this approach, in Namibia and Angola and throughout the region, makes us a convenient whipping boy on issues that are

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highly emotive. But this is a price that can be paid if it produces results."[3] The results for which he is looking clearly include a process of internal political reform in South Africa itself, and South African cooperation in implementing Security Council Resolution 435, calling for South African withdrawal from Namibia and UN-supervised elections. His statement is open to the interpretation that if these results are not in the event forthcoming, the policy of "constructive engagement" will cease to be justified, and will then have to be modified. David Abernethy has distinguished between two interpretations of the new policy: one, that Washington is giving Pretoria a "mandate to stall," because criticism from the United States will cease, whatever policies are adopted by South Africa; the other, that Washington's new line is in the nature of an experiment that will be terminated if South Africa does not respond constructively in a short period of time.[4] We do not yet know which of these interpretations will prove to be correct.

What we do know is that the government of P. W. Botha has not fulfilled the hopes, aroused when he came to power in 1978, that it would initiate a policy of fundamental political reform. After the collapse of the Vorster government's policy of détente with South Africa's neighbors, during the Angolan war, some believed that the new prime minister would now address himself to the problem of South Africa's status as an outcast, by going straight to its roots in the country's internal policies. The recognition of black trades unions, the removal of some job reservations, and the appointment of a new advisory body, the President's Council—which included Indian and colored (but no black) members, and was authorized to make recommendations on constitutional change—appeared to give some substance to these hopes. So did his calling of an election in April 1981, which was widely interpreted as a bid for an electoral mandate for a change of course.

No significant shift has in fact taken place.[5] On the basic issue of black political rights, it remains the government's position that these can be achieved only within the "homelands," to which all blacks are notionally assigned. In 1981 Ciskei became the fourth such "homeland" to accept formal independence (in succession to Transkei 1976, Bophutatswana 1977, and Venda 1979), thus depriving those blacks born in the area, descended from persons born in the area, or connected with it by linguistic affiliation, of their rights as South Africans (or rather of their potential rights, for their actual ones are few enough). Nor has the Botha government moved on the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts, the Group Areas Act, separate amenities, or other aspects of so-called petty apartheid. The result of the April 1981 election, so far from providing Botha with a mandate for change, was to leave him more vulnerable to the strengthened *verkrampte* wing of the National party, and from the breakaway Reformed *(herstigte)* National party, farther to the right. The victory of black African nationalism in Zimbabwe, reaction against the recognition of black trades unions, concern about mounting guerrilla infiltration, and indeed, the encouragement derived by conservative forces from the Republican victory in the United States in November 1981—all appear to have contributed to this development.

Nor does the Botha government seem at present to be moving toward agreement on UN-supervised elections that would bring SWAPO to power in

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Namibia. Since 1977 discussions have been taking place between South Africa and the five-nation Western Contact Group (the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada) to seek agreement on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435, calling for elections under UN supervision, and South Africa's withdrawal. These discussions had reached a standstill with the collapse of the January 1981 Geneva Conference on Namibia, when the Reagan Administration sought to breathe new life into them through bilateral talks with the South Africans, said to center on constitutional guarantees for minorities in an independent Namibia and the precise nature of UN supervision of an election. The objective of the South African government has been to exclude SWAPO from participation in an election that most observers believe it would win. Thus the way would be paved for the victory of the South African-sponsored Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, in an election that would be the Namibian equivalent of the "internal settlement" of March 1978 that brought the Muzorewa government to power in Rhodesia. Failing that, South Africa apparently prefers to prolong the process of discussion indefinitely, and with it, the military struggle against SWAPO, of which the August 1981 military incursion into Angola was part. There is a school of thought in South Africa that believes the country's security interests would be best served by withdrawal from Namibia and the concentration of defense efforts within a Fortress South Africa. Yet it would be politically ruinous for Botha to agree to a process that would bring SWAPO to the frontiers of the Republic, thus completing the ring of hostile black states to South Africa's immediate north, and providing fresh encouragement to the forces of black revolution within South Africa itself.

South Africa's policy in Namibia has still to be seen in the context of a "constellation of southern African states," centered on the Republic, an idea that emerged in 1979.[6] In its early formulations, the idea implied that existing economic links in the field of trade, transportation, and migratory labor between South Africa and the other states in the region would provide the basis for links in the political and security fields also, and even for some form of "confederation." The constellation would comprise the "independent homelands" and Namibia, after its separation from South Africa, but also the former British High Commission territories, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, Rhodesia as it then was, and possibly others. In fact, the constellation idea in its original form foundered on the basic hostility of all the genuinely independent states in the region to political association with South Africa; Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland declined to be connected with it, and the emergence of Zimbabwe, under the leadership of Robert Mugabe, and hostile to South Africa, dealt it a crushing blow. The emergence of the Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC)—a group of nine OAU (Organization of African Unity) member states, launched originally by the five Frontline states in 1979, dedicated to reducing the economic dependence of the region on South Africa, and enjoying Western aid for this purpose—has provided a potentially powerful "counterconstellation." The "constellation" itself, as formalized at present, comprises only South Africa and the first three "independent homelands." But the idea of a continuing South African hegemony, or suzerainty, over the other states in the region still plays a part in South African

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official thinking, and has a continuing basis in economic realities. At meetings of the "constellation," the Windhoek government of South West Africa has been given observer status.

The South African government toward which the United States is drawing closer, therefore, is one that is not moving in the direction of sharing political power with the black majority, or taking any significant steps toward dismantling the apartheid system. Nor does it yet seem ready to cooperate in a process of withdrawal from Namibia that would be acceptable to the United Nations, or even to the five-power Western Contact Group. Those who favor a policy of cooperation with South Africa, however, do not necessarily assume that Pretoria will oblige the West by embarking on internal reform and quitting Namibia. They rely on the following five arguments, which, if they are correct, hold good whether Pretoria responds in these ways or not. *First*, it is said, the West's principal strategic interest in Africa, that of resisting the encroaching power of the Soviet Union, requires that it align itself with the Republic as the strongest anti-Soviet and anticommunist power on the continent. *Second*, the West's great economic stake in South Africa, especially access to its mineral resources, is said to be best assured by the continuation of the present regime, or at least by a gradual and peaceful evolution away from it. *Third*, it is claimed the moral obloquy that the world, including the West, heaps upon South Africa, fails to recognize the unique predicament of white South Africans, and judges them by standards that we are not willing to apply to others or to ourselves. *Fourth*, it is argued, those who call for an end to the present regime assume wrongly that the alternative to it is a liberal, multiracial state of which we in the West could approve, rather than some form of black authoritarian rule, probably Marxist in form, or a condition of protracted anarchy, in which the human rights of South Africans of all races will be realized even less than they are now. *Fifth*, although a *rapprochement* with South Africa will impose a price on the West's relations with black African states, the Third World, and the United Nations, this price is said to be worth paying, because the West in the recent past has sought to appease Third World demands to the extent of compromising its own values, and this tendency should be put into reverse. None of these arguments is convincing, but all of them deserve to be taken seriously.

II

The oldest argument for collaboration between the West and South Africa is that they have a common strategic interest in resisting actual or possible threats from the Soviet Union. It formed the basis for naval cooperation between Britain and South Africa under the Simonstown Agreement, terminated by the Wilson Labor Government in 1964; for naval visits by the United States in the Johnson period; for fluctuating arms transfers by Britain, France, and the United States until the late 1970s; for cooperation in the intelligence field that probably still continues; and for periodic proposals by pro-South African lobbies in Western countries for a South Atlantic alliance to deal with a possible Soviet threat to the Cape route. Since the Soviet-backed Cuban interventions in

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Africa in the mid-1970s, there has been a revival of the idea of the need for strategic collaboration, and covert expression of it in U.S. backing of South African interventions in Angola.

The Soviet penetration of sub-Saharan Africa is a development to which the Western powers cannot remain indifferent: it imposes an objective East-West dimension on African affairs, whether Western policymakers choose to view them in this light or not. Nor is it enough to say that African nationalism or the Pan-African continentalism of the OAU can be relied upon by itself to expel or contain Soviet penetration when it occurs—as the Egyptian or the Somali actions in terminating ties with the Soviet Union are at times said to demonstrate—at least if this means that the Western powers need do nothing but stand aside and allow local factors to operate. When great powers intervene in the affairs of small powers, sometimes no countervailing factors can be found that are powerful enough to contain them. In these circumstances, local factors have a chance to operate against the great power intervenor only if other great powers are able to step in and hold the ring. In this sense, at least part of the solution to the problem of Soviet intervention in Africa can be provided only by the Western powers.

But far from being a source of strength to them in their attempts to contain Soviet encroachment in Africa, the Western countries' association with South Africa is possibly the greatest handicap under which they labor. For to be associated with the white supremacist regime is to be connected with a standing insult to black African man, and there is no other object against which African peoples, African states, and the OAU are more united, both symbolically and in a practical way. South Africa sees itself as engaged in a common struggle with the West against the Soviet Union and the contagion of "Marxism" in Africa; but the more the Western powers countenance such a view, the more they dignify the Soviet Union in the eyes of black Africans, and discredit their own position.

In Black Africa, the Western countries are at a disadvantage in that it is essentially against them that the African struggle for independence, equality, and dignity has been directed. For it is the countries of Western Europe that were the colonial powers in Africa, and that from the 1940s to the 1970s fought, in their different ways, a rearguard action against the anticolonial revolution. It is these same countries, together with the United States, that have wielded dominant power in the postcolonial era in Africa—economically, culturally, and in some cases, militarily—and have been the target of the campaign against neo-colonialism or dependence. It is these same countries that maintain the economic, social, and diplomatic links with South Africa that enable it to survive and prosper, and to present itself as part of the Western world.

The Soviet Union, by contrast, is not the inheritor of any colonial position in Black Africa (by contrast with the situation in Asia, where it is indeed the inheritor of the empire of the tsars, and vulnerable in a way in which the Western powers no longer are). The Soviet Union has no position of economic dominance in postcolonial Africa that makes it the target of a struggle against neo-colonialism. And it has no diplomatic links with white supremacist South Africa, no stake in the South African economy, nor links with it, apart from its alleged covert cooperation with South African business in fixing gold and diamond prices.

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The Soviet Union, not being an essential target of African nationalist revolt, has been free to play the role of ally, by supplying political support, ideological inspiration, arms, and most recently, combat support. Its doctrine of national liberation, calling not merely for political independence, but also for socialist reorganization, has alienated conservative elements in some African countries. Its enemy, China, vies with it for the role of patron of African liberation movements. And its position in Africa is now formidable enough to have engendered some of the animus against external domination previously reserved for the Western powers.

But the Soviet Union has been remarkably successful as the ally of African national liberation, especially where the struggle has been a violent one, as in the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia. It is a common Western error to imagine that the indignation aroused in the West by Soviet and Cuban interventionism in Africa is also felt, or should be felt, in Black Africa. In fact, black African states largely support the view of the Soviet Union and its allies that they have been engaged in Africa in counterintervention against an endemic and vastly more formidable Western interventionism, expressed in colonialism itself, in the French military presence in former colonies, in economic dominance, and in support for South Africa. By contrast with the Western powers, the Soviet Union has been able to ensure that its activities in Africa are in conformity with the consensus of African states. In providing assistance to national liberation movements, and in assisting independent African states against secessionist movements (as in the Congo, in Nigeria, and in Ethiopia) or attempts to alter international boundaries by force (as in the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict), the Soviet Union has been faithful to the dearest principles of the OAU.

Western observers are inclined to dismiss the role of the Soviet Union in Africa as "opportunist," the implication being that a contrast could be drawn between its approach to African affairs and the more high-minded and consistent approach of others, presumably ourselves. In the sense in which the foreign policy of all states takes advantage of opportunities and adopts varying tactics in the pursuit of its aims, the Soviet Union's policy in Africa is indeed "opportunist," but there is no reason to doubt that Soviet leaders and functionaries are sincere in their antagonism toward colonialism and white racism in Africa. Nor can there be any doubt that the Soviet Union has rendered great service to the undermining of the old order in Africa, or that today those who are committed to the cause of black liberation in South Africa have good reason to regard the Soviet Union as their most likely source of effective outside assistance.

For the Western powers, their inherited associations with the white minority regime in South Africa are a liability in any attempt to set limits to Soviet encroachment in Africa. To speak of the naval bases, the command of strategic positions, and the willingness to engage "Marxist" guerrillas that South Africa could contribute to the Western alliance is to neglect the fact that the currency of power in Africa is the emotions and loyalties of African peoples. The policy that would best serve the strategic interests of the West in Africa, short of a transformation of Pretoria's internal policies—so unlikely, that for practical purposes it may be left aside—is the severing of all diplomatic and economic connections with the Republic, in accordance with the proposal of

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black African states for mandatory trade sanctions. Such a policy would provide the Western powers with that element of flexibility in Africa, the lack of which has handicapped them so greatly in relation to the Soviet Union. It would also free them of an incubus and open the way toward building up further their connections with black African states and repairing their relations with the African National Congress, the Pan-African Congress, and other liberationist movements. These are likely ultimately to wield power in South Africa, and the Western powers' present alienation from these organizations and movements is possibly the gravest danger to their interests in Africa.

Such a policy, of course, will not be adopted. The economic and other pressures making for the maintenance of diplomatic and economic links with the Republic will prevent the Western countries from embarking on the course that would be strategically most rational, at least in the next few years. Yet over the last quarter century, the Western countries have gone a long way in shedding their connections with South Africa, and displayed a certain wisdom in resisting the suggestions that have never ceased to flow from Pretoria for closer and more formal associations. The present tendency of U.S. policy, reopening, as it does, questions about bases, formal ties, arms supplies, intelligence links, and cooperation against "international terrorism" that might have been regarded as closed, threatens to make very much more vulnerable a Western strategic position that is already scarcely a tenable one.

III

A second reason for close association between the West and Pretoria, the argument goes, is the economic stake that Western countries have in South Africa, which is said to be best secured by the preservation of the present political arrangements, or by a process of gradual evolution away from them that would avoid political disturbance and not result in a radical socialist or "Marxist" Azania. There is no doubt about the importance to Western countries, especially to European countries and above all to Britain, of their investments in South Africa and trade with it. To this we must add the importance of access to the so-called strategic minerals (chromium, manganese, platinum, vanadium, and cobalt). These play a vital part in Western industry, and in some cases, a sudden cut-off in access to them, in circumstances in which materials had not been stockpiled or were not available from other suppliers, would render Western economies vulnerable. American sensitivity to the cut-off of chromium from Rhodesia as a consequence of sanctions imposed on the Smith government, leading to the Byrd Amendment to frustrate the application of sanctions to chromium, is a case in point.

At stake here is not merely the private or sectional interests of Western firms in maintaining profitable enterprises, but also the national interests of Western states, as perceived by governments: British governments, both Labor and Conservative, for example, have made it clear that the vulnerability of the British economy—and thus of employment prospects in Britain—to any loss of investments in South Africa is in itself sufficient to rule out official encouragement of policies of "disinvestment." Nor does this argument depend on any positive sympathy for the policy of apartheid or the preservation of white

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dominance. Indeed, big business circles in the West involved in South Africa, like big business in South Africa itself, are notoriously critical of the apartheid doctrine, seeing it as unwarranted political interference in economic life. They embrace instead, on classic liberal lines, the idea that politically untrammeled development of the capitalist economy of South Africa is the grand panacea that will lead to a single multiracial society and ultimately to a single multiracial polity.

The essence of the argument is, rather, that the West's economic stake in South Africa gives it a common interest with Pretoria in resisting attempts to subvert or destabilize the existing order, and especially in defending the capitalist or free enterprise system in South Africa. Indeed, South Africa is one of the great citadels of self-confident capitalism in the contemporary world, and the depth of the white community's attachment to it is striking to a foreign visitor: Black Africa's attachment to socialism is widely noted and feared, and white liberals who profess to look forward to a black-ruled Azania will often express concern about the socialist form it is likely to take.

It is of course true that Western trade with South Africa and access to its mineral resources would be disrupted by protracted political disturbances or guerrilla activity within the country. What is less clear is that these disturbances can more likely be avoided by a policy of tacit support of the white supremacist government's efforts to maintain control of the situation than by bringing pressure to bear upon it to begin the process of sharing power. No doubt it is often the case that reforms initiated by the ruling authorities, intended to nip revolutions in the bud, have the effect only of sparking them off; they demonstrate that the ruling authorities are losing their self-confidence and invite a trial of strength. Few can be confident that South Africa can achieve a new political dispensation without violent political disturbance of some kind, whether reforms are initiated by the present authorities or not. But it is an illusion to suppose that political disturbances injurious to the West's economic stake in South Africa can be avoided by a policy of tacitly supporting Pretoria's efforts to maintain control of the situation.

It is true also that if the outcome of a transfer of power to the nonwhite majority of South Africans, or a seizure of power by them, were to be a socialist or "Marxist" government of Azania, this would create the same difficult problems of adjustment for Western traders, investors, and servants of multinational companies that it has done in many other parts of the world where such governments have been established. What the evidence does *not* support is the proposition that African governments that have opted for socialism in one form or another have thereby lost interest in trading with the West, in deriving benefits from cooperation with multinational corporate enterprise according to their own judgments of what is beneficial, or in making mineral resources available to Western buyers on their own terms. The cases of Gulf Oil in Angola and of Union Carbide in Zimbabwe help to make this point.

If Western economic enterprise is required to operate on different and less favorable terms in black Azania than it has been accustomed to do in white South Africa, this does not distinguish this case from many other instances of changes of regime throughout the Third World in recent decades. Nor could it be made a valid argument for the West's seeking to maintain the existing order,

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rather than make appropriate adjustments, should a transfer of political power to the black majority result in a radical reorganization of the economic system.

Moreover, any losses to the private sector in Western countries that might be thought likely to accrue from a black Azanian government committed to socialist reconstruction of the economy, or indeed any setbacks to the national interests of Western countries consequent upon such developments, would have to be balanced against the economic penalties that might be imposed upon Western countries by black African governments retaliating against a policy of cooperation with South Africa. Nigeria, in particular, which enjoys a share of Britain's trade comparable with that of South Africa, enjoys a considerable bargaining capacity in this respect, even though its position has declined with the slump in world demand for oil. The support given by Western aid agencies to the efforts of SADCC, mentioned above, to create a "counterconstellation" in Southern Africa, are one measure of the sensitivity of the Western powers to the charge that they are unduly sympathetic to South Africa.

The Reagan Administration's born-again ideology of capitalist enterprise, and hostility to socialism in all its forms, is one of the factors that draws it toward embattled South Africa. It also isolates the United States not only from most of Black Africa, but also from its European allies. Even in Mrs. Thatcher's Britain, where a similar ideology is enthroned, there is a basically different assessment of socialist models, by those opposed to them as well as those who are sympathetic, that, along with other factors, makes for a perception of African affairs radically at odds with that emanating from Washington.

Western economic enterprise, like that so massively engaged in South Africa, does indeed presuppose social and political stability, if one may use this overworked term. Stability in this sense is difficult to find anywhere in the Third World, and the prospects that it will endure in South Africa, whatever policies are adopted in Western capitals, or indeed in Pretoria, cannot be favorable. But a lesson that may be drawn from much of the experience of Western adjustment to the tide of African and Asian revolt is that, where a political regime is clearly doomed, the best prospects for stability in the long run lie not in helping to prop it up, but in allowing the inevitable to take place and preparing to do business with the successors.

IV

A third argument put forward to clear the way for a move toward South Africa is that the moral obloquy heaped upon white South Africa by the West, along with the world as a whole, is exaggerated, even if still justified: it fails to recognize the unique historical predicament in which white South Africans find themselves, and judges them by standards we do not apply to others, and would not dare apply to ourselves.

There is, indeed, much force in the complaint of white South Africans that the world judges them by a double standard. The South African regime is not unique in denying political, economic, and social rights to a majority of the population over which it rules, and yet it faces a degree of moral and legal condemnation from the outside world much greater than that faced by the socialist authoritarian governments of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and

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China, or the many squalid tyrannies to be found in Black Africa or Central and South America. Not only is this double standard applied in the United Nations and other forums dominated by Third World majorities, it is also applied by Western countries themselves, despite their strong feelings against these other cases of massive violation of human rights. It is sometimes argued that the legalized and institutionalized basis of racial oppression in South Africa does indeed call for condemnation of a special kind, and yet when one puts this alongside, say, Amin's arbitrary and brutal tyranny in Uganda, or Pol Pot's fanatical and genocidal millenarianism in Cambodia, it is difficult to be sure how the hierarchy of human wickednesses should be arranged, and whether South Africa should be placed at the top.

There is also force in the contention that the Western world, in asking white South Africa to concede political rights to the nonwhite majority in the Republic, is asking it to do something that Western societies would not do themselves, or at all events, have not done themselves, even if it is clearly the case that they should do it. The British were a white minority community within an imperial state, in which the majority of the people were different from themselves in race and culture. Adjustment to the tide of Asian and African revolt in the twentieth century has meant for them only acceptance of the independence of formerly subject peoples. The British have never been asked to surrender their own political independence, and all the economic, social, and cultural values that are bound up with that, to an alien majority. In the United States, the great strides forward in the last three decades toward ending the oppression of blacks by whites have never required white communities to accept a minority position, even in particular states, let alone in the United States as a whole. For Australia, adjustment to the passing of the era of white dominance in world affairs has meant only some changes in immigration policy and policy toward the aboriginal minority, together with some reorientations in foreign policy. The white Australian body politic has found it necessary to redefine its identity and to abandon illusions of superiority, but it has not been required to surrender control of the process of change.

It is proper, therefore, to cultivate a certain understanding of the fact that the white South African community has found itself in a unique predicament. South Africa may be regarded as a microcosm of the world: just as the white minority within the Republic faces the problem of coming to terms with the nonwhite peoples who make up the majority of the population, so the Western peoples within the world political system, who have also inherited a position of privilege, face the problem of coming to terms with the non-Western majority. The formula of acceptance of majority rule, which Western liberals urge the white minority to accept within the South African system, is one the Western world would not accept for itself if it were to be applied in a single state of the world as a whole: domination by an Asian majority would not be acceptable to West Europeans and North Americans, nor indeed to Africans. The Western minority in the world does not face any such threat of majority rule by alien peoples, because the world, in fact, is not organized as a single state, but as a multiplicity of separate states, each with its acknowledged rights of sovereignty. The white South African minority's apartheid policy is an attempt, by transforming South Africa also into a multiplicity of sovereign states, to bring

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about a closer approximation to the position of the Western minority in the world. Because it is unilaterally imposed by the ruling minority and does not rest on any process of consent; because it is fashioned in such a way as to enable the white minority to retain their dominance over the whole; and because the economic and social integration of South Africa may already have gone too far for any partition of the country to be practicable, it will not work. But it expresses the striving of this isolated and beleaguered community for the security against the winds of change that other Western peoples have been able to take for granted.

Although these considerations serve as a corrective to the cant that is talked about South Africa by Western liberals who have never made the effort of imagination of putting themselves in the white South Africans' position, there is a need not to get this matter out of proportion. If one cannot justify the application of a double standard to South Africa, one can at least explain why it is applied. It is a political fact that opposition to oppression of blacks by whites unites the world in a way in which other violations of human rights, including other kinds of racial oppression, do not. There is not a world consensus against communist oppression, or oppression by military governments, or of one Asian or African ethnic group by another, comparable to that which exists against this surviving symbol of a white supremacism that all other societies in the world, to different degrees and in different ways, have repudiated over the last three decades. The circumstances of recent history have made South Africa's particular violations of human rights more unacceptable to the international community than any others. While this should not lead us to fail to protest against these others, we should also recognize that it is not now possible to unite the international community on any other basis than that of a clear repudiation of white supremacism.

Moreover, our understanding of the predicament of white South Africans should not lead us to lose sight of the much more terrible predicament of the nonwhites, who suffer injustices that are present, real, and overwhelming, whereas the anxieties of the whites are about future, imagined dangers that are, in part at least, dangers only to privileges they have inherited. The Western countries cannot afford to equate South Africa with its white minority, as the South African authorities constantly invite them to do, and as their own historical experience tempts them to do; if their obligations are to all the people of South Africa, then special concern about the problems of one sixth of them will not be a governing factor in Western policy.

V

A fourth consideration is that Western liberal opinion may be regarded as irresponsible in that in condemning the course South Africa has taken, it does not consider honestly what the alternatives to that course are. The standard liberal critique of the policy of separate development, or perhaps more generally, of the policy of maintaining the white community's control of the political process—which is what separate development means in practice—proceeds on the assumption that the alternative to it would be a liberal, multiracial democracy, in which equal political rights were available to all

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citizens regardless of racial groupings. A variant of this is the idea, now favored by Fredrik van Zyl Slabbert and the Progressive Federal Party that he leads, of some form of liberal, multiracial democracy in which minority communities, such as the white community, would not be left at the mercy of policies of the majority formed in a "winner-takes-all" electoral system in a unitary state, but would be protected by constitutional guarantees of one kind or another.[7] The various forms these constitutional guarantees might take have been much explored by political scientists both in South Africa and outside.[8]

In fact, it is said, the political experience of black African states provides little ground for supposing that the abandonment of white control would lead to constitutional democracy of any kind in South Africa, whatever formal structures were at first set up. What the present South African regime has to be compared with, so the argument goes, is not constitutional models drawn from the experience of Western Europe and North America, but the African reality of authoritarian government, military intervention in politics, ethnic tension and rivalry, anarchy, and civil war. If this comparison is made, the present system in South Africa, we are told, unacceptable though it may be by Western standards, may be seen to have certain virtues: a rational system of public order and civil administration, underpinning a rich and dynamic economy; parliamentary democracy, a measure of the rule of law, and a measure of freedom of speech and of the press for the white community; and the promise that some of these institutions will ultimately be spread more widely throughout the community.

The discussion of South Africa's political future within the white community does in fact pay a great deal of attention to alternatives to the official policy of apartheid that do not presuppose structures of constitutional democracy: (1) a partition, or series of partitions, of the country, arising not by fiat of the white authorities (as is the case with the "independent homelands"), but out of a process of bargaining, perhaps after a violent conflict in which the white hold on power has been shaken; (2) an "incremental process" of power-sharing, tacitly accepted by the white government, in which political power is assumed and wielded without constitutional authority by the Zulus and other ethnic groups, homeland governments, and black trades unions, leading to an order based on an uneasy equilibrium of power; (3) a "Brazilian solution" of authoritarian, perhaps military, government, in which a facade of multiracialism makes South Africa more acceptable to the outside world, but the reality of white privilege is preserved. The old liberal doctrine that if only white South Africans would abandon their unjust privileges, a multiracial democracy would bloom, does indeed seem pious cant in the Africa of the 1980s. It may well be that, as Simon Jenkins has written, liberals will have to recognize that the only choices in South Africa will be between one illiberal solution and another.[9]

But this cannot be made into an argument for perpetuating white dominance, any more than the old argument that if colonial rule in Africa were ended, tyranny or anarchy would follow. From the point of view of the Western powers, a distinction can be drawn between a black authoritarian regime, or series of regimes, that enjoys legitimacy in the OAU and the United Nations, and with which the West can do business without injury to its political and strategic interests, and an authoritarian regime bearing the stigma of white

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racism, which is without these advantages. In any event, the prospect that all likely outcomes will be unsatisfactory when measured by liberal standards is not a reason for abandoning liberal endeavor. The scope for liberal politics, and for the realization of liberal values, may be limited in the new Azania—just as it is limited in the old South Africa—but it is not likely to have vanished altogether. Indeed, there are some who think that the strength of the South African economy, and its modernizing effects on society as a whole, make South Africa a unique case, and that arguments from the experience of other African states are of doubtful value. At all events, liberals—white and black—will not resign in advance the possibility of contributing to the shape of the new South Africa, any more than they have done in the hostile conditions of the present regime.

VI

A fifth argument is that the West should not shrink from offending Black Africa, the Third World, and the prevailing consensus within the United Nations, because it needs, in any case, to reverse its past appeasement of these forces, which courts the danger of betrayal of the West's own principles. The Reagan Administration's willingness to contemplate a move toward South Africa is part and parcel of a more general Western backlash against the Third World. This has been building up, especially, but not exclusively, in the United States over the years since the West ceased to dominate the General Assembly and other UN organs in the early 1960s, and has gathered force with the spectacular reverses suffered by the West in UN debates in the 1970s. The UN consensus and the views of Third World bodies such as the Group of 77, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the OAU do not command the respect in North American and West European public opinion that they once enjoyed, and this provides the context in which a Western alignment, or quasi-alignment, with South Africa is thought by some to be possible or even desirable.

It is true that as the Third World has gathered force in the 1970s and its pronouncements have become more strident, the ideological gulf between the Western countries and the countries of the Third World has widened. It is notorious that it is difficult to generalize about the countries of the Third World, which embrace a great variety of ideological positions and political stances. But there is a certain coherence in their common platforms, reflected in the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77, and in the resolutions sponsored by these bodies and endorsed by the United Nations, such as the program for a New International Economic Order and the Charter for the Economic Rights and Duties of States of 1974. More and more, the Third World has espoused positions that Western countries have rejected, not merely because they have found it contrary to their interests to do so, but also because to do so would be inconsistent with their own convictions or values.

The common language of human rights, for example, employed by both Western and Third World countries masks a contrast between the former's emphasis on the rights of individual persons against the state, and the latter's on collective rights—rights of states to sovereign equality or of nations to liberation. The Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States, with its

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emphasis on the rights of poor states to be the recipients of a redistribution of wealth, contrasts with the Western insistence that priority should be given to meeting the "basic needs" of individual persons. The demand of Third World countries for "national liberation" from colonial, neo-colonial, or white racist rule has sometimes gone along with certain assumptions: that the means of liberation must be violent; that the claims of national liberation movements to represent the nations they say they are liberating do not need to be tested by any electoral process; and that the end must be not merely political independence, but a social and economic transformation as well—assumptions that cannot be squared with Western liberal conceptions of national self-determination.

Touching more closely the question of South Africa, the principle of "No Independence before Majority Rule" proclaimed by the United Nations, the OAU, and the Commonwealth in relation to Rhodesia, and accepted by Britain, makes a powerful appeal to Western liberal sentiment. That sentiment is alienated, however, when particular national liberation movements are held to embody the choice of the majority even before any election has taken place, just as it is alienated by the decision of the United Nations, before the Namibian people have in fact been able to express their choice in an election, to treat SWAPO as "the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people." It is germane that SWAPO is denied the right to participate in a free election by the ruling South African authorities, and that the Patriotic Front was excluded from the electoral process in Zimbabwe by the Rhodesian authorities, up to the time of the Lancaster House Agreement, as it is that qualified observers believe that SWAPO would in fact win a free election. But where the status claimed for SWAPO is held to derive from a popular support made manifest in the guerrilla war for Namibia, or from its presumed appointed role in the historical process, this is incompatible with any Western liberal conception of the authentication of representatives.

From the 1940s to the 1960s, Third World movements, in their struggles against colonial rule, white racism, and economic injustice, were able to count upon a great reservoir of sympathy for their aims in liberal circles in the West (just as they had to face great reservoirs of hostility in other circles). In the course of the 1970s, much of this liberal sympathy evaporated, as it came to be felt that the revolt of the Third World movements was not merely against a Western dominance—the injustice of which could be readily conceded—but also against Western values and principles that should not be compromised. There is, therefore, a quite proper feeling that in responding to the demands of the Third World for change, the West should be more selective, and that in some cases, it should stand its ground.

It is important, however, to choose carefully the ground on which a stand is made. On the issue of South Africa, it is not the Third World, but the West itself, that is most conspicuously unfaithful to the West's own best principles. If the West as a whole were to follow the Reagan Administration in the direction it is now moving, this could be more conspicuous still. Much of the impetus that lies behind the Western backlash against the Third World, especially, but not exclusively, in the United States, derives not from any attachment to liberal principles but from a revival of conservative values that places the global

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struggle for power with Russia ahead of the need to respond to the aspirations of African peoples, the pursuit of narrow and short-term economic interests ahead of the right of African states to choose their own economic systems, and established ties with the white minority in South Africa ahead of new relations with the nonwhite majority, which our obligations and our long-term interests alike require.

It does not seem likely that the governments of Western Europe will follow the Reagan Administration on the course it has embarked upon. They do not share the motivations that are now causing the United States to enter into a gladiatorial contest with the Soviet Union to determine global primacy. They sense an interest in the present reality of détente in Europe that is jeopardized by raising the level of the contest in other parts of the world. And they distrust the judgments that treat the Soviet Union as the chief source of the West's difficulties in the Third World, and resistance to it as the chief means of overcoming them. Although the errors they have made in their policies in the Third World, and the disasters they have suffered in consequence, have been at least as great as those experienced by the United States in the post-1945 period, they are farther down the road of postimperial adjustment than the United States has yet gone. Their special relationship with black African countries, formalized in the Lomé II Convention, and having its counterpart in the relationship with Arab countries and in some degree with the Third World as a whole, reflects not only economic considerations, but also the attempt to gain great political leverage in world affairs. Nothing would more prejudice this endeavor than a "tilt toward South Africa." But in Africa, as in relation to other and more pressing matters that divide the Western alliance at present, the clash of policies arises less because of fundamental conflicts of interest, than because of differences of judgment as to how these interests can best be advanced. The impression that West European opinion has formed, surely correctly, is that the administration in Washington has not grasped the nature of the problem.

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